TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00655-CR
Ex parte Adam Ahmad Noureddine
FROM THE 426TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 78979, THE HONORABLE STEVEN J. DUSKIE, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Adam Noureddine appeals the denial of his Article 11.072 application for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged claims including involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues the trial court erred in denying relief on those two claims and in failing to hold a hearing on the application. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2018, Killeen police found Noureddine unconscious in a vehicle.
Motel staff told officers that he was a guest at the motel and that they had seen drugs in his room. Officers executed a search warrant on the room and found 4.4 grams of cocaine. On December 28, 2018, Noureddine, represented by counsel, entered a plea of no contest to possession of a controlled substance, four grams or more but less than 200 grams.
On February 19, 2019, the trial court held a punishment hearing. Counsel offered the PSI as well as psychiatric records reflecting that Noureddine—just before he committed this possession offense—received inpatient psychiatric treatment in February 2018 for mood
2
stabilization. After speaking with Noureddine about his current mental health treatment, the trial court found enough evidence to substantiate guilt and followed the plea agreement, putting Noureddine on deferred adjudication for five years. The State later filed two motions to adjudicate; neither motion resulted in adjudication. In June 2024, Noureddine, representing himself pro se, filed the underlying Article 11.072 application. In September 2024, the trial court, after considering Noureddine and his counsel’s affidavits, filed detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law denying relief. In December 2024, the trial court administratively terminated Noureddine from community supervision without adjudicating guilt. The trial court ordered the accusation dismissed; it also informed Noureddine that he was ineligible to petition the court for an order of nondisclosure.
Noureddine nevertheless appeals the denial of the Article 11.072 application, as is his statutory right. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072 § 8.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Article 11.072 is “the exclusive means by which the district courts may exercise their original habeas jurisdiction under Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution” in cases involving an individual who is serving or has served a term of community supervision. Ex parte Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
An Article 11.072 applicant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts that would entitle him to relief. State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In Article 11.072 proceedings, the trial court is the sole finder of fact. Id. We therefore afford almost total deference to a trial court’s factual findings when they are supported
3
by the record, especially when those findings are based upon credibility and demeanor. Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (in Article 11.072 context, courts of appeals “are truly appellate courts,” and, thus, there is “less leeway” to disregard trial court’s factual findings). Reviewing courts defer to a trial judge’s factual findings that are supported by the record even when no witnesses testify, and all the evidence is submitted through affidavits. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 583.
Involuntary Plea/Lack of Inquiry into Competency First, Noureddine argues that the trial court accepted a plea from him without conducting the mandatory inquiry into competency required by article 46B.004. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004.
A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person. Id. art. 46B.003(a). A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art. 46B.003(b).
Chapter 46B provides that, on suggestion by any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c), (c-1). If after an informal inquiry the court determines that evidence exists to support a finding of incompetency, the court shall order an examination to determine whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.005(a).
4
The trial court did not make findings specific to this ground. It did find Noureddine was adequately admonished.
• Before the trial court accepted Noureddine’s plea of no contest, it admonished him about:
the range of punishment for the offense; his right to a jury trial; his right to remain silent;
his right to confront and examine the witnesses against him; and, the fact that he would have no right to appeal if it followed the plea agreement he negotiated with the State; and
• Before the trial court granted Noureddine’s request for deferred adjudication, it explained to him that if he successfully completed his term of supervision, there would not be a felony conviction on his record, but if he violated it and was adjudicated, the entire range of punishment for the offense would be available to it at sentencing.
The record further reflects that at the beginning of the punishment hearing after the no-contest plea, the trial court directly asked Noureddine if he understood that “this is your punishment hearing.” He said yes. The trial court then directly asked if he was ready to proceed. He again said yes.
Noureddine asserts here that the trial court ignored red flags including that inpatient psychiatric discharge records from Cedar Crest Hospital show that Noureddine was treated for acute manic and psychotic symptoms and that he was released only five days before the plea hearing. Noureddine later states that he “was discharged from Cedar Crest Hospital on June 9, 2024—five days before the plea.”
But the sealed records reflect only a psychiatric hospital stay, in a different facility, in February 2018, just before Noureddine committed the underlying offense.
Counsel, at the punishment hearing, offered “a couple of documents from the inpatient psychiatric treatment that he had at the time of the offense.” The trial court admitted the records under seal. They reflect that Noureddine began treatment at Milwood Hospital on February 14, 2018, for mood stabilization and was diagnosed with “Bipolar I, severe manic with
5
psychosis.” He was routinely discharged on February 23, 2018, with the following comments: “Patient had acute exacerbation of his psychoactive illness requiring inpatient treatment and medication adjustment. His episode lasted from 2/1/18 – 4/4/18.”
Counsel explained to the trial court that at the time of the offense, March 10, 2018, Noureddine “was in the middle of a six-week manic episode” and “does not recall a lot” but that he is “not denying that there was cocaine found in the room.” The trial court directly asked Noureddine if he was still under the care of a psychiatrist or psychologist. Noureddine replied “Yes . . . Every month or three weeks, depending on the doctor’s recommendation.” Counsel elaborated:
Your, Honor, just brief argument, I guess. This was—if you read kind of carefully on the narrative and fill in blanks, this was a previously undiagnosed condition.
And in a six-week period, he went off the reservation, two DWIs, two marijuana possessions and this. And he has no connection to the city of Killeen. He has no reason to be here and doesn’t know why he was here. Obviously, it’s been a year almost to the month where all of this started and we’ve had no problems. He has been on probation on two of the other charges, has passed UAs, has kept all of his appointments. You know, this is just tragic. Luckily, nobody was hurt. And he’s under control now.
Noureddine added that, “I’m aware now of this condition that it can happen. And my family is also aware; my wife, my kids.” He noted that his behavior was “totally out of character” and “poor judgment on my part” but that he has “things in place now to prevent any of that from happening, the care of the doctor, constant.” “I’m taking five medications to make sure that something like this does not happen again.” He asked for less than the proposed amount of community service hours because he has a job, a business to run, and “three kids that I care for.”
Besides putting Noureddine on deferred adjudication, the trial court transferred the probation to Tarrant County, where Noureddine lived; ordered that Noureddine attend “outpatient
6
and self-help support groups as directed by your health-care professional” if any; and kept the community hours but explained to Noureddine that he could make donations to cover the community service and that any hours would run concurrent with hours required for his other probations.
Thus, the records in this case reflect that the trial court, at the punishment hearing, was presented with evidence establishing a nexus between the mental illness and the criminal conduct, rather than a nexus between the mental illness and the plea. And, after an informal inquiry and listening to Noureddine advocate for himself, the trial court apparently determined that evidence did not exist to support a competency examination under Article 46B.005(a), much less a finding of incompetency to stand trial. We overrule Noureddine’s first complaint.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Noureddine next argues that trial counsel failed to investigate his competency;
interview witnesses; explore exculpatory evidence; develop mitigation evidence; or correctly advise him about deferred adjudication and the right to appeal. Counsel, instead, coerced him into entering a plea he did not understand.
To demonstrate that he or she is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s errors, in that, but for those errors, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 693 (1984). In the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty (or no contest) plea, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
7
the plea process,” and on whether an applicant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Counsel responded to Noureddine’s complaints in an affidavit. The trial court found counsel’s affidavit credible. As set out below, the trial court made findings (some paraphrased or reordered or left out here) responsive to the complaints raised on appeal.
Counsel’s alleged failure to investigate competency
• Noureddine presented himself as an educated, coherent and competent man who gave Counsel no reason to question his mental capacity;
• Noureddine never complained to Counsel about not understanding the charges against him;
• Counsel was able to discuss the facts of the case with Noureddine, explain to him the charges against him, and inform him about the range of punishment for the offense;
• Noureddine did tell Counsel that he had been seeing a doctor/therapist for mental health concerns, but because he continued to work and was able to assist in the preparation of his case, his competency was never a concern;
• Counsel asked Noureddine for the doctor’s contact information, when the treatment began, and a list of any prescription medications he was taking at the time of his arrest; and
• Noureddine told Counsel that this doctor had recommended that he “experiment” with Cocaine and other drugs to treat his mental illness; Counsel expressed skepticism that a doctor would prescribe illegal drugs and again requested confirmation, but Noureddine never provided any.
Counsel’s alleged failure to interview witnesses, investigate exculpatory evidence, or develop mitigation evidence
• Noureddine emailed Counsel an image of a driver’s license of a female he claimed was the person who had the substance in the room, but Counsel was unable to find any contact information for that person; and
• Counsel explained to Noureddine that the motel staff told him that Noureddine arrived alone and remained alone throughout his brief stay in his motel room, before returning to his car and passing out and later being detained by the police, questioned and arrested.
8
Counsel’s alleged failure to correctly advise Noureddine about deferred adjudication and the right to appeal
• Counsel fully explained to Noureddine the benefits of deferred adjudication, i.e., the avoidance of a felony conviction on his record, and that the conditions would be set by the trial court and if violations were alleged, there would be a limited hearing to determine if the violations were true, and if the trial court found them true it would have the full range of punishment available to it when he was sentenced;
• Counsel told Noureddine that he would have a limited right to appeal if he accepted the State’s plea agreement;
• Noureddine insisted on entering a plea of no contest because he maintained that it appeared better than a plea of guilty; and
• After the plea, Noureddine never contacted Counsel to express a lack of understanding of what had happened or to complain about the outcome, and in fact continued to pay the balance of his fees in monthly installments until May of 2019.
Counsel’s alleged coercion
• After Counsel received a plea offer from the State, he told Noureddine that he felt the evidence was sufficient for a conviction.
• Counsel informed Noureddine that it was his decision to accept the offer or proceed to trial, but he did remind him that there was an additional fee if he chose to take his case to trial, which they had discussed and agreed upon in the initial consultation;
• Noureddine was concerned about paying the trial fee, but Counsel told him that he could continue to make payments as before, or he could seek less expensive counsel, or Counsel could withdraw from the case so that Noureddine could apply for court appointed counsel;
• Counsel made no attempts to coerce him to enter a plea;
• Noureddine told Counsel that based on his concern about the police search; police “lying”;
the lack of fingerprint evidence; the credit card found by the police; and him not being in possession of the hotel room when the drugs were found, he wanted Counsel to file a motion to dismiss the case;
• Counsel explained to Noureddine that there was no legal basis or support for his theories, and reminded him that he had admitted to Killeen police officers, that he had taken “party favors” to the room which included Cocaine that he had been experimenting with for the previous two weeks at his doctor’s recommendation; and
• Noureddine asked Counsel to counter the State’s offer with one-year probation, but he explained to Noureddine that he could not receive one year probation in his case, and also
9
told him that he would have a limited right to appeal if he accepted the State’s plea agreement, which Noureddine eventually decided he wanted to do.
The findings are supported by trial counsel’s affidavit, the plea papers, and the reporter’s record. In finding trial counsel’s affidavit credible, the trial court implicitly found at least part of Noureddine’s affidavit incredible. Given that the findings are both supported by the record and based upon credibility, we afford them almost total deference. Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 42; Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d at 788. This is true even though no witnesses testified and all of the evidence was submitted through affidavits. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d at 583. We additionally note that the record supports a finding that counsel presented the mental health evidence in an attempt to urge the trial court to follow the plea agreement and defer adjudication rather than adjudicate Noureddine and assess a sentence. And that plan worked. Given the trial court’s findings and the records before us, we find counsel’s performance met an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore do not consider the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland. We overrule Noureddine’s ineffective assistance complaint.
Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing Last, Noureddine argues that the trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing and relied solely on counsel’s conclusory affidavit.
Article 11.072 allows the court to “order affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or a hearing,” or to “rely on the court’s personal recollection.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072 § 6(b). So, the statute allows, but does not require, a trial court to hold a hearing. See Ex parte Salazar, 510 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d); Ex parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Here, the trial court asked trial counsel for an affidavit addressing ten different issues, and counsel provided one. Counsel’s
10
affidavit runs three pages. Noureddine filed a response to the affidavit, claiming it was the product of falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth. The trial court made ten pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law, most addressing the ineffective assistance complaints. The trial court also found that “to substantiate his claims,” Noureddine cites his own statements. That, together with the polar opposite claims between Noureddine and counsel, makes this case amenable to being decided based on affidavits. We do not find the trial court abused its discretion in not holding a hearing on this application and therefore overrule this last complaint.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Noureddine’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s denial of habeas relief.
__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Ellis Affirmed Filed: August 5, 2026 Do Not Publish