Evon Sylvia Gallman v. Alfa General Insurance Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: A25A0256
• Status: Published

Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 12, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0256. GALLMAN v. ALFA GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION.

MARKLE, Judge.

Evon Sylvia Gallman appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment to Alfa General Insurance Corporation (“Alfa”) in this suit arising from an

auto accident and seeking uninsured motorist coverage. On appeal, Gallman argues

that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Alfa because Alfa was

timely served with her renewal suit. For the reasons that follow, we agree.

Accordingly, we reverse.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

(Citation omitted.) Progressive Mountain Ins. Co. v. Vining, 373 Ga. App. 663, 663–664

(908 SE2d 350) (2024).

The relevant facts are generally undisputed. In February 2017, Gallman was

injured in an auto accident. She filed suit against the other driver, Lawrence Thomas,

on May 3, 2019. Although the trial court initially dismissed the suit for failure to serve

Thomas, it reinstated the case because the limitation period tolled until the

completion of Thomas’s criminal case.1 In July 2021, Gallman served Alfa with the

suit. Gallman then voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice in August 2021.

On December 6, 2021, Gallman filed the instant renewal complaint and served

Alfa the following day. Alfa moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not

timely served in the original action. Gallman responded that timely service in the

renewal suit was all that was required. Following a hearing, the trial court granted

1 Generally, the statute of limitation is two years for personal injury suits. See OCGA § 9-3-33. Here, however, the limitation period tolled until the criminal proceedings against Thomas were final. See OCGA § 9-3-99. 2 summary judgment to Alfa, finding that Gallman failed to perfect service within the

limitation period of the original suit.2 Gallman now appeals.

In related enumerations of error, Gallman argues that the trial court erred by

granting summary judgment because timely service in the renewal action was

sufficient, regardless of whether the UM carrier was timely served in the original suit.

We agree.

To begin, OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) authorizes a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses

a civil action, to renew the action “either within the original applicable period of

limitations or within six months after the . . . dismissal[.]”

In cases such as this one, involving uninsured motorist coverage, OCGA § 33-7-

11 (d) (2021) provides that, where “a reasonable belief exists that the vehicle is an

uninsured motor vehicle . . . , a copy of the action and all pleadings thereto shall be

served as prescribed by law upon the insurance company issuing the policy as though

the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant.” In interpreting this

statutory provision, our courts have repeatedly held that

2 Gallman moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, but it is unclear whether the trial court ruled on it. In any event, Gallman does not allege error with regard to that motion. And we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Mughni v. Beyond Mgmt. Group, 349 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) (825 SE2d 829) (2019). 3 under Georgia law, the general rule is that a plaintiff making a claim against a UM carrier must serve process upon the UM carrier within the same statute of limitation applicable to the uninsured motorist. This requirement is met where the UM carrier is timely served in a renewal action despite not having been served in the original action.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) King v. Peeples, 328 Ga. App. 814, 816 (3) (762

SE2d 817) (2014); see also Retention Alternatives v. Hayward, 285 Ga. 437, 439-440 (2)

(678 SE2d 877) (2009); U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Reid, 268 Ga. 432, 434 (491 SE2d

50) (1997); Strickland v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 358 Ga. App. 158, n. 1 (854 SE2d 348)

(2021); Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ga. App. 314, 321 (3) (765 SE2d 413)

(2014).

Although Alfa argues that Gallman should not be able to circumvent the statute

of limitation by timely serving it in the renewal action where she failed to obtain timely

service in the original suit, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s holding that timely

service on the UM carrier in the renewal action is sufficient. Hayward, 285 Ga. at 439-

440 (2); Reid, 268 Ga. at 434; Ward v. Marriott Intl., 352 Ga. App. 488, 493 (2) (a)

(835 SE2d 322) (2019) (“Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph VI of the Georgia

Constitution of 1983 specifically commands, ‘[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court

4 shall bind all other courts as precedents.’ This principle has even greater weight where

the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. Once the Supreme Court interprets

the statute, the interpretation has become an integral part of the statute.”) (citations

and punctuation omitted); Thomason v. Harper, 162 Ga. App. 441, 444-445 (2) (289

SE2d 773) (1982) (“This court is not at liberty to decline to follow this rule of law in

Georgia because our Supreme Court has addressed the issue in clear terms.”).

Here, Alfa acknowledged in the trial court that it was timely served in the

renewal action. As such, Gallman perfected service under OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), and

the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. Retention Alternatives, 285 Ga. at 440

(2); U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 268 Ga. at 434; Strickland, 358 Ga. App. at 158, n. 1;

King, 328 Ga. App. at 816 (3).

Judgment reversed. Doyle, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.