SNELL, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from district court decision on judicial review affirming termination of her teaching contract, asserting that the evidence does not support the conclusion that just cause existed for termination. We affirm.
On March 19, 1981, the superintendent of Hampton Community School District caused to be served upon plaintiff Arlene Everett a notice and recommendation to terminate her teaching contract, pursuant to Iowa Code section 279.15 (1983). The notice and recommendation listed the following reasons as just cause for plaintiff’s termination: unsatisfactory performance, failure to meet district standards, unsuitable teaching methods, inability to motivate students, and persistent failure to provide the type of teacher-directed responses, activities, and reinforcement techniques for students to make satisfactory progress to acquire basic skills and develop a positive self-concept. Plaintiff had been employed by the Hampton District as a fifth grade teacher for eleven consecutive school years and was therefore considered a nonproba-tionary teacher. Plaintiff requested a private hearing pursuant to section 279.15, which was granted. On May 4, 1981, the Board of Directors rendered its decision terminating plaintiff’s employment. This decision was affirmed both on plaintiff’s appeal to an adjudicator, pursuant to section 279.17, and to the district court, pursuant to [321]*321section 279.18. Plaintiff then filed this further appeal.
Our task on appeal is to make anew the determination of the district court based on seven grounds for review listed in Iowa Code section 279.18. Smith v. Board of Education, 293 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1980); Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 1979). This section provides, in material part:
In proceedings for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision, the court shall not hear any further evidence but shall hear the case upon the certified record. In such judicial review, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court shall give weight to the fact findings of the board; but shall not be bound by them. The court may affirm the adjudicator’s decision or remand to the adjudicator or the board for further proceedings upon conditions determined by the court. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the board decision or the adjudicator’s decision equitable or legal and including declaratory relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the action is:
1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
2. In excess of the statutory authority of the board or the adjudicator; or
3. In violation of a board rule or policy or contract; or
4. Made upon unlawful procedure; or
5. Affected by other error of law; or
6. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record made before the board and the adjudicator when that record is viewed as a whole; or
7. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Our review, as was the evidence presented to the school board, is “limited to the specific reasons stated in the superintendent’s notice of recommendation of termination.” Iowa Code § 279.16; Smith, 293 N.W.2d at 225. We therefore must consider these allegations in determining whether affirmance, reversal, or some other disposition is appropriate. In doing so, although we give weight to the fact findings of the board, we are not bound by them. Iowa Code § 279.-18.
Plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal is that the decisions of the board and the adjudicator that just cause existed to terminate her contract were unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record. While we are limited to the reasons stated in the superintendent’s recommendation in making our independent determination of whether just cause to terminate existed, it is not necessary that each allegation constitute just cause in and of itself; rather, we consider all of the allegations as a whole to determine whether the just cause requirement is satisfied. See Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 1979).
“Just cause” has been defined as conduct: which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high quality education for the district’s students. It relates to job performance including leadership and role model effectiveness. It must include the concept that a school district is not married to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing high quality work nor improving in performance.
Wedergren v. Board of Directors, 307 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Briggs v. Board of Directors, 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979)). The concept is a flexible one; each case “depends on its own circumstances.” Id. at 20.
In this case the superintendent, principal, and director of elementary education all testified that throughout a period of approximately eight years they had been concerned about plaintiff’s “negative reinforcement” of students, her sarcasm and ridicule of students and her lack of rapport with parents. These concerns arose after formal evaluations, informal observations of plain[322]*322tiff in the classroom, numerous parental complaints about plaintiff’s treatment of students and requests that children not be placed in her classroom, and incidents related by students. At various times throughout this approximate eight-year period, each of these individuals has discussed these problems with plaintiff.
The evidence submitted by the district details several incidents regarding these problems. Specifically, prior to the start of the 1974t-75 school year and each school year thereafter several parents contacted the superintendent stating that they did not want their children assigned to plaintiff’s classroom because of the “pressure” she used in motivating students. In November 1974, three parents told the superintendent that their children had felt pressure in plaintiff’s classroom and were fearful of being reprimanded in front of the class if they did not complete assignments. Many parents complained about the excessive amount of homework. Other parents told the superintendent that their children, who had always previously enjoyed school, were trying to avoid going to school during the year they were assigned to Mrs. Everett’s classroom. One child developed emotional problems and received counseling with the school psychologist.
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SNELL, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from district court decision on judicial review affirming termination of her teaching contract, asserting that the evidence does not support the conclusion that just cause existed for termination. We affirm.
On March 19, 1981, the superintendent of Hampton Community School District caused to be served upon plaintiff Arlene Everett a notice and recommendation to terminate her teaching contract, pursuant to Iowa Code section 279.15 (1983). The notice and recommendation listed the following reasons as just cause for plaintiff’s termination: unsatisfactory performance, failure to meet district standards, unsuitable teaching methods, inability to motivate students, and persistent failure to provide the type of teacher-directed responses, activities, and reinforcement techniques for students to make satisfactory progress to acquire basic skills and develop a positive self-concept. Plaintiff had been employed by the Hampton District as a fifth grade teacher for eleven consecutive school years and was therefore considered a nonproba-tionary teacher. Plaintiff requested a private hearing pursuant to section 279.15, which was granted. On May 4, 1981, the Board of Directors rendered its decision terminating plaintiff’s employment. This decision was affirmed both on plaintiff’s appeal to an adjudicator, pursuant to section 279.17, and to the district court, pursuant to [321]*321section 279.18. Plaintiff then filed this further appeal.
Our task on appeal is to make anew the determination of the district court based on seven grounds for review listed in Iowa Code section 279.18. Smith v. Board of Education, 293 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1980); Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 1979). This section provides, in material part:
In proceedings for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision, the court shall not hear any further evidence but shall hear the case upon the certified record. In such judicial review, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court shall give weight to the fact findings of the board; but shall not be bound by them. The court may affirm the adjudicator’s decision or remand to the adjudicator or the board for further proceedings upon conditions determined by the court. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the board decision or the adjudicator’s decision equitable or legal and including declaratory relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the action is:
1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
2. In excess of the statutory authority of the board or the adjudicator; or
3. In violation of a board rule or policy or contract; or
4. Made upon unlawful procedure; or
5. Affected by other error of law; or
6. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record made before the board and the adjudicator when that record is viewed as a whole; or
7. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Our review, as was the evidence presented to the school board, is “limited to the specific reasons stated in the superintendent’s notice of recommendation of termination.” Iowa Code § 279.16; Smith, 293 N.W.2d at 225. We therefore must consider these allegations in determining whether affirmance, reversal, or some other disposition is appropriate. In doing so, although we give weight to the fact findings of the board, we are not bound by them. Iowa Code § 279.-18.
Plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal is that the decisions of the board and the adjudicator that just cause existed to terminate her contract were unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the record. While we are limited to the reasons stated in the superintendent’s recommendation in making our independent determination of whether just cause to terminate existed, it is not necessary that each allegation constitute just cause in and of itself; rather, we consider all of the allegations as a whole to determine whether the just cause requirement is satisfied. See Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 1979).
“Just cause” has been defined as conduct: which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high quality education for the district’s students. It relates to job performance including leadership and role model effectiveness. It must include the concept that a school district is not married to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing high quality work nor improving in performance.
Wedergren v. Board of Directors, 307 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Briggs v. Board of Directors, 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979)). The concept is a flexible one; each case “depends on its own circumstances.” Id. at 20.
In this case the superintendent, principal, and director of elementary education all testified that throughout a period of approximately eight years they had been concerned about plaintiff’s “negative reinforcement” of students, her sarcasm and ridicule of students and her lack of rapport with parents. These concerns arose after formal evaluations, informal observations of plain[322]*322tiff in the classroom, numerous parental complaints about plaintiff’s treatment of students and requests that children not be placed in her classroom, and incidents related by students. At various times throughout this approximate eight-year period, each of these individuals has discussed these problems with plaintiff.
The evidence submitted by the district details several incidents regarding these problems. Specifically, prior to the start of the 1974t-75 school year and each school year thereafter several parents contacted the superintendent stating that they did not want their children assigned to plaintiff’s classroom because of the “pressure” she used in motivating students. In November 1974, three parents told the superintendent that their children had felt pressure in plaintiff’s classroom and were fearful of being reprimanded in front of the class if they did not complete assignments. Many parents complained about the excessive amount of homework. Other parents told the superintendent that their children, who had always previously enjoyed school, were trying to avoid going to school during the year they were assigned to Mrs. Everett’s classroom. One child developed emotional problems and received counseling with the school psychologist. Another child became a habitual bed wetter, a problem which existed at no time prior to or since the year she was assigned to Mrs. Everett’s classroom. . A student who mispronounced a word was required to repeat the word in front of the class until he pronounced it correctly — it took him twenty times. Finally, among the parents who specifically requested that their children not be placed in plaintiff’s classroom were fellow teachers in the school system. The superintendent discussed each of these incidents with plaintiff, stressed the importance of providing positive rather than negative reinforcement to children, and made suggestions as to how plaintiff could prevent such incidents in the future and improve her effectiveness.
During the 1976-77 school year a needs assessment was conducted with the participation of students, board members, faculty and citizens to develop goals and objectives for the school system. The primary goal established as a result of this needs assessment was to develop in students a positive self-concept. Teaching materials were developed, preschool workshops were conducted, and teachers were directed to actively work toward the building of students’ self-concepts. Notwithstanding this school-wide program, the superintendent testified that he observed plaintiff using sarcasm and ridicule in dealing with students, and that he continued to receive numerous complaints from parents. The formal evaluations of plaintiff completed in February 1980 and February 1981 indicate the need for improvement in these areas.
Although the record contains conflicting testimony regarding some of these problems, including testimony by twelve parents that their children respect plaintiff and made satisfactory progress when she was their teacher, affidavits by fifteen additional parents expressing a favorable impression of plaintiff, and a dispute regarding notice to plaintiff that her performance was unsatisfactory, this testimony must be considered in light of the demeanor of the witnesses who presented it. In this regard we give weight to the judgment and the fact findings of the board. Iowa Code § 279.18. We agree with the adjudicator that
given the specificity of the charges against [plaintiff] together wit her apparent failure to improve notwithstanding repeated notices and assistance, the likelihood of reoccurrences of such incidents, and the significant and adverse psychological and emotional effect such “negative” conduct has on elementary school age children, the greater weight must be accorded the District’s evidence.
Although the burden of proving just cause is on the superintendent, plaintiff must, like any appellant, demonstrate error in the decision below in order to succeed on appeal. See Board of Education v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1979). We do not think plaintiff has done so. We conclude that the decisions of the board and the [323]*323adjudicator to terminate plaintiff’s employment contract were supported by a “preponderance of the competent evidence in the record ... when that record is viewed as a whole,” and therefore affirm the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
All Judges concur except OXBERGER, C.J., and JOHNSON, J., who dissent.