SANDSTROM, Justice.
[¶ 1] Mitch Evenson appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his action against Quantum Industries, Inc. (“Quantum”), and James Page. We affirm, concluding the trial court did not err in determining Evenson had failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on his breach of contract and fraud claims.
I
[¶ 2] Quantum has designed and manufactured various products, including the Maximan line of products. The Maximan is a walk-behind skid-steer loader. Page is the president of Quantum.
[¶ 3] On approximately April 5, 2000, Evenson, who owned a laundromat, car wash, and RV park in Minot, visited Quantum’s manufacturing plant in Bottineau, seeking a used skid7steer loader. Evenson was impressed with the Maximan and entered into negotiations with Quantum to become a dealer of Maximan products. In early May 2000, Evenson met with Page and Brad Knudson, Quantum’s sales manager. Evenson alleges that he expressed concerns Quantum would sell off the Maxi-man line to another manufacturer and that Page stated the Maximan line would not be sold.
[¶ 4] On May 15, 2000, Evenson and Quantum executed a written dealership agreement. The agreement included a provision for terminating the agreement:
[243]*243Termination of the dealer relationship can be made by either party, for any reason, by •written notice.
Evenson began efforts to market the Max-iman in North Dakota and Colorado.
[¶ 5] In August 2000, the Bobcat Company contacted Quantum with questions about the Maximan. Bobcat eventually expressed interest in purchasing the line. On January 24, 2001, Quantum sold the Maximan line, including the exclusive right to market and sell the Maximan, to Bobcat, effectively terminating the dealership agreement with Evenson.
[¶ 6] Evenson brought this action against Quantum and Page in July 2001, alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Quantum and Page moved for summary judgment dismissing the action. The trial court concluded Evenson had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on his claims, and Evenson had failed to present evidence from which a jury could find fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was entered dismissing Evenson’s action, and he appealed.
[¶ 7] The trial court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 28-27-01 and 28-27-02.
II
[¶ 8] We recently outlined our standard of review of an appeal from a summary judgment in Zuger v. State, 2004 ND 16, ¶¶ 7-8, 673 N.W.2d 615 (citations omitted):
Summary judgment is a procedural device for promptly disposing of a lawsuit without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences which can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or -if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. ‘Whether summary judgment was properly granted is ‘a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.’ ” Iglehart v. Iglehart, 2003 ND 154, ¶ 9, 670 N.W.2d 343 (quoting Wahl v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 ND 42, ¶ 6, 640 N.W.2d 689). On appeal, this Court decides if the information available to the trial court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate against parties who fail to establish the existence of a factual dispute on an essential element of a claim on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial.
A party resisting a motion for summary judgment may not simply rely upon the pleadings or upon unsupported, conclusory allegations. “Factual assertions in a brief do not raise an issue of material fact satisfying Rule 56(e).” Kemp v. City of Grand Forks, 523 N.W.2d 406, 408 (N.D.1994). “Nor may a party merely reassert the allegations in his pleadings in order to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Id.
The resisting party must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court’s attention to relevant evidence in the record by setting out the page and line in depositions or other comparable documents containing testimony or evidence raising an issue of material fact.
In summary judgment proceedings, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has any obligation, duty, or responsibility to search the record for evidence opposing the motion for summary judgment. The opposing party [244]*244must also explain the connection between the factual assertions and the legal theories in the case, and cannot leave to the court the chore of divining what facts are relevant or why facts are relevant, let alone material, to the claim for relief.
Iglehart, at ¶ 10 (quoting Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 14, 680 N.W.2d 46 (citations omitted)). Mere speculation is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and a scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to support a claim. If no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the trial court in resistance to a motion for summary judgment, it is presumed that no such evidence exists.
Ill
[¶ 9] Evenson contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing his breach of contract claims, because Quantum breached oral and implied terms of the dealership contract.
A
[¶ 10] Evenson argues that during negotiations for the dealership agreement, he expressed concerns to Page and Knud-son about the Maximan product line being sold. Evenson claims Page assured him the Maximan product line would not be sold. Evenson contends this created an additional term to the parties’ contract, prohibiting sale of the Maximan product line, and Quantum breached this oral term when it sold the Maximan line to Bobcat, effectively terminating Evenson’s dealership agreement. Quantum argues any pri- or oral negotiations were superseded by the parties’ written agreement, which specifically provided the dealership agreement could be terminated by either party at any time for any reason.
[¶ 11] The parol evidence rule is partially codified in N.D.C.C. § 9-06-07:
Written contract supersedes oral negotiations. The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law and precludes the use of evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to vary or add to the terms expressed in the written contract. Syversen v. Hess, 2003 ND 118, ¶ 5, 665 N.W.2d 23; Des Lacs Valley Land Corp. v. Herzig, 2001 ND 17, ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d 860; Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D.1985).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SANDSTROM, Justice.
[¶ 1] Mitch Evenson appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his action against Quantum Industries, Inc. (“Quantum”), and James Page. We affirm, concluding the trial court did not err in determining Evenson had failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on his breach of contract and fraud claims.
I
[¶ 2] Quantum has designed and manufactured various products, including the Maximan line of products. The Maximan is a walk-behind skid-steer loader. Page is the president of Quantum.
[¶ 3] On approximately April 5, 2000, Evenson, who owned a laundromat, car wash, and RV park in Minot, visited Quantum’s manufacturing plant in Bottineau, seeking a used skid7steer loader. Evenson was impressed with the Maximan and entered into negotiations with Quantum to become a dealer of Maximan products. In early May 2000, Evenson met with Page and Brad Knudson, Quantum’s sales manager. Evenson alleges that he expressed concerns Quantum would sell off the Maxi-man line to another manufacturer and that Page stated the Maximan line would not be sold.
[¶ 4] On May 15, 2000, Evenson and Quantum executed a written dealership agreement. The agreement included a provision for terminating the agreement:
[243]*243Termination of the dealer relationship can be made by either party, for any reason, by •written notice.
Evenson began efforts to market the Max-iman in North Dakota and Colorado.
[¶ 5] In August 2000, the Bobcat Company contacted Quantum with questions about the Maximan. Bobcat eventually expressed interest in purchasing the line. On January 24, 2001, Quantum sold the Maximan line, including the exclusive right to market and sell the Maximan, to Bobcat, effectively terminating the dealership agreement with Evenson.
[¶ 6] Evenson brought this action against Quantum and Page in July 2001, alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Quantum and Page moved for summary judgment dismissing the action. The trial court concluded Evenson had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on his claims, and Evenson had failed to present evidence from which a jury could find fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was entered dismissing Evenson’s action, and he appealed.
[¶ 7] The trial court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 28-27-01 and 28-27-02.
II
[¶ 8] We recently outlined our standard of review of an appeal from a summary judgment in Zuger v. State, 2004 ND 16, ¶¶ 7-8, 673 N.W.2d 615 (citations omitted):
Summary judgment is a procedural device for promptly disposing of a lawsuit without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences which can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or -if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. ‘Whether summary judgment was properly granted is ‘a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.’ ” Iglehart v. Iglehart, 2003 ND 154, ¶ 9, 670 N.W.2d 343 (quoting Wahl v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 ND 42, ¶ 6, 640 N.W.2d 689). On appeal, this Court decides if the information available to the trial court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate against parties who fail to establish the existence of a factual dispute on an essential element of a claim on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial.
A party resisting a motion for summary judgment may not simply rely upon the pleadings or upon unsupported, conclusory allegations. “Factual assertions in a brief do not raise an issue of material fact satisfying Rule 56(e).” Kemp v. City of Grand Forks, 523 N.W.2d 406, 408 (N.D.1994). “Nor may a party merely reassert the allegations in his pleadings in order to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Id.
The resisting party must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court’s attention to relevant evidence in the record by setting out the page and line in depositions or other comparable documents containing testimony or evidence raising an issue of material fact.
In summary judgment proceedings, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has any obligation, duty, or responsibility to search the record for evidence opposing the motion for summary judgment. The opposing party [244]*244must also explain the connection between the factual assertions and the legal theories in the case, and cannot leave to the court the chore of divining what facts are relevant or why facts are relevant, let alone material, to the claim for relief.
Iglehart, at ¶ 10 (quoting Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 14, 680 N.W.2d 46 (citations omitted)). Mere speculation is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and a scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to support a claim. If no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the trial court in resistance to a motion for summary judgment, it is presumed that no such evidence exists.
Ill
[¶ 9] Evenson contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing his breach of contract claims, because Quantum breached oral and implied terms of the dealership contract.
A
[¶ 10] Evenson argues that during negotiations for the dealership agreement, he expressed concerns to Page and Knud-son about the Maximan product line being sold. Evenson claims Page assured him the Maximan product line would not be sold. Evenson contends this created an additional term to the parties’ contract, prohibiting sale of the Maximan product line, and Quantum breached this oral term when it sold the Maximan line to Bobcat, effectively terminating Evenson’s dealership agreement. Quantum argues any pri- or oral negotiations were superseded by the parties’ written agreement, which specifically provided the dealership agreement could be terminated by either party at any time for any reason.
[¶ 11] The parol evidence rule is partially codified in N.D.C.C. § 9-06-07:
Written contract supersedes oral negotiations. The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law and precludes the use of evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to vary or add to the terms expressed in the written contract. Syversen v. Hess, 2003 ND 118, ¶ 5, 665 N.W.2d 23; Des Lacs Valley Land Corp. v. Herzig, 2001 ND 17, ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d 860; Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D.1985). All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are merged into and superseded by the subsequent written contract. Syversen, at ¶ 5; Des Lacs, at ¶ 8; Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 626 (N.D.1974). The rule is founded on experience and public policy, created by necessity, and designed to give certainty to a transaction that has been reduced to writing by protecting the parties against the doubtful veracity and uncertain memory of interested witnesses. Syversen, at ¶ 5; Des Lacs, at ¶ 8; Gajewski, at 626.
[¶ 12] Even though we must, for purposes of summary judgment, accept Even-son’s allegations about the prior oral negotiations as true, Page’s alleged assurance that the Maximan product line would not be sold cannot be used to vary or add to the parties’ subsequent written dealership agreement. That agreement gave Quantum the right to terminate Page’s dealership at any time for any reason. The trial court did not err in refusing to enforce the alleged oral term.
B
[¶ 13] Evenson argues Quantum breached an implied term in the contract [245]*245prohibiting termination of the dealership agreement without good cause. Evenson contends the Maximan constituted “farm machinery” under N.D.C.C. § 51-07-01(1) and therefore his dealership agreement could not be terminated except for “good cause” under N.D.C.C. § 51-07-01.1.
[¶ 14] Quantum contends Evenson did not raise this issue in response to the motion for summary judgment and is therefore precluded from raising it on appeal. Evenson has not drawn our attention to any portion of the record showing this issue was raised in the trial court. When a party fails to raise an issue in the trial court in response to a motion for summary judgment, he is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. Dimond v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 2001 ND 208, ¶ 19, 637 N.W.2d 692.
C
[¶ 15] We conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing Evenson’s breach of contract claims.
IV
[¶ 16] Evenson argues the trial court erred in dismissing his fraud claims against Quantum and Page. Evenson contends he was fraudulently induced to enter into the dealership agreement by Page’s assurance the Maximan product line would not be sold.
[¶ 17] Evenson argued Page’s promise that the Maximan line would not be sold created a term of the contract prohibiting sale of the line. Preliminary oral statements and promises related to the terms of the contract do not provide the basis for a fraud claim if there is a subsequent written contract. See First State Bank v. Moen Enters., 529 N.W.2d 887, 892-93 (N.D.1995). Because Page’s alleged promise related to terms of the contract and there is contradictory language in the parties’ subsequent written contract, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing Evenson’s fraud claim.
V
[¶ 18] The judgment dismissing Even-son’s action against Quantum and Page is affirmed.
[¶ 19] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and MARY MUEHLEN MARING, JJ., concur.
[¶ 20] The Honorable JOHN C. McCLINTOCK, JR., D.J., sitting in place of WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, J., disqualified.