Evelyn v. Rantab Enterprises Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 23, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00528
StatusUnknown

This text of Evelyn v. Rantab Enterprises Incorporated (Evelyn v. Rantab Enterprises Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evelyn v. Rantab Enterprises Incorporated, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DBY (a deceased minor child); ROCHELLE EVELYN DATE FILED:_ 02/23/2024 a/k/a “Rachel baht Yahudah”; ROYCE CORLEY a/k/a “Yisrael ben Yahudah”, Plaintiffs, -against- RANTAB ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED d/b/a “Rantab Restaurant Cuisine”; ANJALI SINGH, M.D.; 1:24-CV-0528 (MMG) CHRISTINA LIU, M.D.; JANE DOE, in their individual and official capacities as employees of ST LUKE’S — ORDER OF SERVICE ROOSEVELT HOSPITAL CENTER a/k/a “Mount Sinai Morningside”; NYPD OFFICER #1; NYPD OFFICER #2; JOHN DOE in their individual and official capacities as public officers of the City of New York; ST. LUKE’S — ROOSEVELT HOSPITAL CENTER; CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge: Plaintiffs Rochelle Evelyn (also known as Rachel baht Yahudah) (“Evelyn”) and Royce Corley (also known as Yisrael ben Yahudah) (“Corley”), who allege that they are married to each other, appear pro se and have filed this action invoking the Court’s federal-question, diversity, and supplemental jurisdiction. They assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law, seeking damages and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs Evelyn and Corley (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) assert claims on their own behalf and on behalf of their deceased daughter, DBY, whom they describe as having died as a 20-week-old stillborn fetus.’ Plaintiffs sue: (1) Rantab

' The Complaint names DBY, Plaintiffs’ deceased minor child, as another plaintiff in this action, revealing her full name. Under Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, court submissions must not refer to the full name of a minor child; they may only refer to a minor child by using the child’s initials. In light of this rule, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to refer to Plaintiffs’ deceased minor child as “DBY” in the electronic caption on this

Enterprises Incorporated (“Rantab”), which Plaintiffs allege is a New York corporation “that owned and operated a restaurant located [in] . . . Brooklyn”; (2) Anjali Singh, M.D., a physician employed at the Manhattan hospital formerly known as St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center (“St. Luke’s”), and currently known as Mount Sinai Morningside; (3) Christina Liu, M.D.,

another physician employed at St. Luke’s; (4) “Jane Doe,” an unidentified St. Luke’s administrator; (5) St. Luke’s; (6) unidentified “NYPD Officer #1 (an older short white male police officer approx[imately] 50-60 years old)”; (7) unidentified “NYPD Officer #2 (a younger tall [H]ispanic male police officer approx[imately] 30-40 years old)”; (8) an unidentified “supervising [police] officer John Doe” (“Supervising Officer John Doe”); and (9) the City of New York.2 (ECF 1, at 2-3.) The Court construes the Complaint as asserting claims under 42 1F U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, as well as claims under state law. By the orders dated February 2, 2024 (ECF 4 and 5), the Court granted Plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) directs the Clerk of Court to drop DBY as a plaintiff, add the Estate of DBY as a plaintiff, drop St. Luke’s as a defendant, and to add Mount Sinai Morningside as a defendant, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) dismisses, without prejudice, the claims that Plaintiffs assert on behalf of the Estate of DBY pro se; (3) directs service on the identified defendants, including Defendants Rantab, Singh, Liu, Mount Sinai Morningside, and the City of New York; and (4) directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York and counsel for Mount Sinai Morningside to provide the full names,

action, and to restrict electronic access to the Complaint to a “case participant-only” basis. The Court will refer to Plaintiffs’ deceased minor child as “DBY” throughout this order. 2 Plaintiffs sue the individual defendants in their official and individual capacities. service addresses and, if appropriate, badge numbers, of the unidentified defendants to Plaintiffs and to the Court. DISCUSSION A. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Because Plaintiffs allege that DBY is deceased, the Court construes their pro se Complaint as naming the Estate of DBY, rather that DBY herself, as a plaintiff in this action. In

addition, because Plaintiffs allege that St. Luke’s is now known as Mount Sinai Morningside, the Court construes their pro se Complaint as naming Mount Sinai Morningside, rather than St. Luke’s, as a defendant in this action. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to drop DBY as a plaintiff, add the Estate of DBY as a plaintiff, drop St Luke’s as a defendant, and add Mount Sinai Morningside as a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”). B. Claims Brought on Behalf of the Estate of DBY The Court understands that Plaintiffs are collectively asserting claims on behalf of the Estate of DBY pro se. Where, as here, however, there are multiple survivors to a deceased’s

estate (Plaintiffs Evelyn and Corley, respectively), claims cannot be asserted by any of those survivors (collectively or individually) on behalf of that estate pro se. Compare Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.3d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[W]hen the administrator and sole beneficiary of an estate with no creditors seeks to appear pro se [in federal court] on behalf of the estate, she is in fact appearing solely on her own behalf, because she is the only party affected by the disposition of the suit. Under those circumstances, the assignment of the sole beneficiary’s claims to a paper entity – the estate – rather than to the beneficiary herself, is only a legal fiction.” (citing Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20–21 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added))), with Guest, 603 F.3d at 20 (“Where there are other beneficiaries, ‘an action cannot be described as the litigant’s own, because the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors . . . will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings.” (citation omitted and emphasis added))); see generally Iannacone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to

appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims that they assert on behalf of the Estate of DBY pro se without prejudice to such claims being reasserted in this action, or in a separate civil action, by an attorney representing that estate. C.

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Related

Guest v. Hansen
603 F.3d 15 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc.
915 F.3d 889 (Second Circuit, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
Evelyn v. Rantab Enterprises Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evelyn-v-rantab-enterprises-incorporated-nysd-2024.