Evans v. Continental Motors Corp.

105 F. Supp. 784, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4220
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 25, 1952
DocketCiv. A. Nos. 6521, 6892
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 105 F. Supp. 784 (Evans v. Continental Motors Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4220 (E.D. Mich. 1952).

Opinion

KOSCINSKI, District Judge.

These two cases were consolidated for trial. Plaintiffs claim compensation for overtime work for the period 1941 to 1947, liquidated damages, and attorney fees under provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). Claims of plaintiffs Miller, Little, Rolby and Phillips were separated and tried first as typical of remaining plaintiffs’ claims.

The principal questions involved here are, (1) The propriety of plaintiffs’ classification by defendant as exempt employees, Sec. 213(a) (1) of the Act, and 541.1, 541.2 and 541.3 of the Regulations, and, (2) Defendant’s good faith in so classifying them. Sec. 260 of the Act.

Facts

Plaintiffs had been previously employed by the defendant for long periods of time until defendant’s Detroit Plant was completely shut down early in 1940. When the National Defense Program got under way in the latter part of 1940, the Plant was prepared for reopening and production of tank and airplane engines under contract with the War and Navy Departments of the Government. New equipment and machinery was ordered and organization of key personnel begun. Because of their experience, knowledge and ability, based on their long previous employment with defendant, plaintiffs were re-employed on a salary basis to use their experience and skills in the organization and supervision of plant departments headed by each of them. At peak production the Plant employed 8,000 workers and their activities were supervised and coordinated by personnel appointed by Management for that purpose.

Each of the four plaintiffs had a Management classification, as distinguished from the hourly rated employees, and each was excluded from union membership by the union contract, and was by the same contract prohibited from doing the work of hourly rated employees except for instruction and demonstration purposes or in an emergency. The Union Local had its stewards posted throughout the Plant to detect violations of the contract and prevent plaintiffs and other persons identified with Management from violating this contract provision. Enforcement of this provision in the union’s contract with defendant was so strict that the union, through its stewards, caused work stoppages in the Plant whenever violations of this type were discovered. Plaintiffs definitely were not “working foremen” or “working supervisors” with a nonexempt status.

As the Company’s operations increased in tempo and importance, applications for permission to increase plaintiffs’ salaries were made by the Company to the Salary Stabilization Unit of the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C., whose function it was to pass on the salary increases of those employed in an “Executive.” “Administrative” or “Professional” capacity, as defined by Regulations issued by the Treasury Department, 1A C.C.H.Lab.Law Serv., p. 14008. These Regulations were identical with those issued by the Wage and Hour Administrator. Approval of increases in plaintiffs’ salaries Was made by the Treasury Department on the basis of such classification.

Hulah Miller

Miller was originally employed as electrician by the defendant in 1928 and worked continuously until, the early part of 1940 when the Detroit Plant was shut down and he was transferred to defendant’s Muskegon Plant. Late in 1940 he returned from the Research Division of the Muskegon Plant to undertake the organization of the Maintenance Department of defendant’s Detroit Plant, and was appointed Foreman of that Department and later Division Sup[786]*786erintendent, responsible for complete factory maintenance. He had direct supervision of several categories of hourly rated employees in the Maintenance Department, such as electricians, pipe fitters, millwrights, carpenters, laborers, welders, elevator operators and motor oilers, with a foreman at the head of each group. Miller supervised those 200 employees in the Department, including two general foremen and seven regular foremen, all of whom were hourly rated employees. He regularly issued directions to these foremen relating to the work done 'by employees under them. He had his own glass-enclosed office and desks where clerical personnel assisted him in the performance of his supervisory duties of the Department, and where foremen consulted him and received orders from him.

Miller was responsible, only to the top executives of the Company, whom he regularly and directly assisted in the most important duties of maintaining the entire Plant in operation. Although he did perform some manual work from time to time, it was only in an emergency or for demonstration purposes. He was not, however, assigned or directed to do any hourly rated employees’ work, and whenever he did such work it was invariably done voluntarily and only as an incident to his supervisory duties. His claimed clerical work was generally related to his supervisory functions, such, for example, as making reports or recommendations following his inspection and observations, and was not work “of the same nature” as performed by the hourly rated employees whose work he directed.

Miller’s initial salary was $225 per month. This was increased October 3, 1942 to $385 per month, and later increased to $425 per month, so that with the various, bonuses paid to all employees, Miller’s salary reached a peak of approximately $660 per month. He was the highest paid employee in the Maintenance Division.

Miller regularly interviewed applicants for jobs and made recommendations to the highest executives in the plant for the hiring and firing of hourly rated employees. These recommendations were invariably approved, as evidenced by employment records of the Company. He used his own judgment and discretion in making such recommendations, and he also exercised authority to hire and discharge employees. His recommendations for transfer of employees from one department to another and upgrading employees were regularly followed, as were his recommendations for retention or discharge of employees. It was his responsibility to determine whether or not it was necessary for hourly rated employees to work overtime. While foremen of the various groups of workers had authority to hire and fire hourly rated employees in their own category, only Miller exercised the authority inherent in his position to hire and fire hourly fated employees in the various categories described, throughout the Maintenance Department.

He was entrusted with the responsibility of estimating the cost of work orders. In this he exercised an important function of industry. He regularly used his own discretion in the purchase of materials and supplies. He made the determination of the kind, type and amount of materials to be purchased, and the source from which such materials were to be secured. When work orders were issued by the Plant Engineer’s office they were transmitted to Miller who used his discretion in apportioning the work to the various foremen in the Maintenance Department, following his determination of the cost of each job as approved by the executive whom he assisted. He regularly participated in meetings and conferences with the highest executives and Company officials relating to policy, methods of work and formulating job programs. He also ■held regular meetings with the foremen under his supervision, as well as conferences with the Plant Engineer, Production Manager, Planning Manager and other high officers of the defendant Company, so that those whom he supervised would conform to Management policies.

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Bluebook (online)
105 F. Supp. 784, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/evans-v-continental-motors-corp-mied-1952.