Evans v. Absolute Results

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided February 12, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00280·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DALLAS X. EVANS, Plaintiff, 21-CV-00280 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND ABSOLUTE RESULTS, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. §1981, alleging that his employer discriminated against him based on his race and color. By order dated February 9, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Using the Court’s employment discrimination complaint form, Plaintiff asserts claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, disparate treatment, and constructive termination against Defendant, his former employer. (ECF 1 ¶ IV(A).) Where prompted to provide facts to support those claims, Plaintiff writes “see attached,” but there is no attachment detailing the events giving rise to this action. (Id. ¶ IV(B).) According to the complaint, Plaintiff currently resides in Rochester, New York, and he was employed in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. (Id. ¶ I.) A notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), dated October 13, 2020, shows a New York City address for Plaintiff and a Des Moines, Iowa address for Defendant. (Id. 1-1.) DISCUSSION A. Discrimination Claims Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, including employment contracts, “on account of [a person’s] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.” Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987). These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at

work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim under Title VII or § 1981. He does not provide any facts explaining what occurred, and thus he fails to show that his employer took adverse

action against him because of a protected characteristic. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint demonstrating that his employer took adverse action against him because of his race and color. B.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener
462 F.3d 95 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Keitt v. New York City
882 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D. New York, 2011)
Zemsky v. City of New York
821 F.2d 148 (Second Circuit, 1987)