Eunice Youmans v. Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; Doe(s) 1-100 employees of Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; and Corporation(s) XYZ 1-100

District Court, E.D. Washington·Decided January 13, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-00290·Unknown

Opinion

FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jan 13, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EUNICE YOUMANS, an individual No. 2:25-CV-00290-RLP

Plaintiff PROTECTIVE ORDER

v. CHELAN-DOUGLAS LAND TRUST; “DOE(S) 1-100” employees of CHELAN-DOUGLAS LAND TRUST; and “CORPORATION(S) XYZ 1-100,” Defendants. Before the Court is the parties’ Amended Stipulated Protective Order, ECF No. 15. Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court, upon motion of a party and upon good cause shown, “may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The Rule permits a court to order that “that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions.” FRCP 26(c)(2). There is a strong presumption in favor of access to court records. In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Pracs. Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2012). Even when parties agree to protective measures for discovery materials, courts generally favor allowing access to such materials by individuals involved in related litigation, as this promotes judicial economy. Cordero v. Stemilt AG Servs.,

142 F.4th 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003)). The party seeking a protective order has the burden of establishing good cause and must show prejudice “for each particular document it seeks to protect.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. “Broad allegations of harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). The requirement to demonstrate good cause cannot be waived, and remains

even where the parties stipulate to the order. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). The parties seek this protective order under Rule 26(c) to protect the disclosure of Plaintiff’s medical records and bills, bank account, financial

information, and tax records, Defendant’s personnel files of departed Executive Directors, and the home addresses, phone numbers, and contact information for membership lists. The Court finds that the parties have demonstrated good cause to

grant the order with regards to Plaintiff’s medical records and bills, bank account, financial information, and tax records and Defendant’s personnel files of departed Executive Directors. The parties have shown that Plaintiff, Defendant, and the

departed Executive Directors all have significant privacy interests in this information, and that harm would result from disclosure which outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure.

However, the Court finds the parties have not demonstrated good cause to seal the home addresses, phone numbers, and contact information for membership lists. In support of their request, the parties cite to two cases – Yellowcake, Inc. v. Dashgo, Inc., 2022 WL 3226824 at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2022) and Snedigar v.

Hoddersen, c, 159, 786 P.2d 781 (1990) – without analysis. Yellowcake concerned a discovery request for a list of customers which a district court found was a protectable trade secret. 2022 WL 3226824 at *10. Snedigar concerned the proper

standard for asserting a First Amendment right to association objection to discovery, specifically in the context of a discovery request for a socialist party’s meeting minutes. 114 Wn.2d at 163-64. Here, the parties do not explain why the membership lists are a protectable

trade secret, or make any showing that anyone’s First Amendment rights will be harmed by its disclosure. As such, the Court does not presently find good cause to grant a protective order with regards to this information.

Still, the Court recognizes there may be circumstances which would constitute good cause for a protective order to apply to the information. For

example, it may be the case that the contact information contained in the membership lists was collected with the expectation that it would remain private. The parties may file another motion for a protective order making a specific

showing of such circumstances, and how prejudice would result from disclosure of the membership lists. Alternatively, the parties remain free to contract between themselves regarding disclosure of the membership lists and pursue appropriate remedies in the event of a breach.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED: 1. The parties’ Amended Stipulated Protective Order, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. The Court enters the following protective order: 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for

which special protection may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. It does not confer blanket protection on all disclosures or responses to

discovery, the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles, and it does not presumptively

entitle parties to file confidential information under seal. 2. “CONFIDENTIAL” MATERIAL. “Confidential” material shall include the following documents and tangible things produced or otherwise exchanged:

• Plaintiff’s medical records and bills, bank account, financial information, and tax records would be subject to a protective order because these records can cause annoyance and embarrassment on Plaintiff that creates good cause for their protection. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(c). Exposing Plaintiffs medical records and bills, bank account, financial information, and tax records could result in specific harm to Plaintiff if these records are not subject to the protective order.

See Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). • Defendant’s personnel files of departed Executive Directors employed before plaintiff. In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of

Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 428 (9th Cir. 2011) (personnel files of retired employees not accused of wrongdoing are properly the subject of a protective order).

3. SCOPE. The protections conferred by this agreement cover not only confidential material (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied

or extracted from confidential material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of confidential material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by parties or their counsel that might reveal

confidential material. However, the protections conferred by this agreement do not cover information that is in the public domain or becomes part of the public domain through trial or otherwise. 4. ACCESS TO AND USE OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL.

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Eunice Youmans v. Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; Doe(s) 1-100 employees of Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; and Corporation(s) XYZ 1-100, (E.D. Wash. 2026).

Eunice Youmans v. Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; Doe(s) 1-100 employees of Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; and Corporation(s) XYZ 1-100 (Eunice Youmans v. Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; Doe(s) 1-100 employees of Chelan-Douglas Land Trust; and Corporation(s) XYZ 1-100) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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