Estrada v. Eric M. Taylor Center Warden

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 29, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-11321
StatusUnknown

This text of Estrada v. Eric M. Taylor Center Warden (Estrada v. Eric M. Taylor Center Warden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estrada v. Eric M. Taylor Center Warden, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELIJAH DAVID ESTRADA, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-11321 (LTS) RIKERS ISLAND; NEW YORK CITY; ERIC ORDER TO AMEND M. TAYLOR CENTER WARDEN; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the Eric M. Taylor Center (“EMTC”) on Rikers Island, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. Named as Defendants are Rikers Island, the City of New York, the Warden of EMTC, and the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”). By order dated January 5, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred since he entered Rikers Island on September 14, 2023.2 Plaintiff states, “Pipes leaking water on my bed, water is asbestos which causes mesothelioma, unhygenic inhuman incarceration, illegal search and seizure of mail, feed is forced malnutrition, spoiled food, toilet backwashes.” (ECF 1 at 3.)3 He

alleges that the food given to him at EMTC is “cold and half eaten” and that “CO Sisto says racial slurs to me and my peers.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff suggests that he may not have received medical attention after suffering an asthma attack. He alleges, “I had a[n] asthma [a]ttack after spray was deployed twice I requested medical and didn’t go. I reported it to 311 after being informed by the CO on duty.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Claims against Rikers Island Plaintiff’s claims against Rikers Island must be dismissed. Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the

2 The complaint states that Plaintiff arrived on Rikers Island on “September 14, 2024,” which the Court assumes is a mistake. 3 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. “Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. App. Div., Second Dep’t S. Ct., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Rikers Island for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, however, the Court will construe any claims he may be asserting against Rikers Island as being asserted against the City of New York, which is also a named Defendant. B. New York City Department of Correction Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must also be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by

law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).

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Estrada v. Eric M. Taylor Center Warden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estrada-v-eric-m-taylor-center-warden-nysd-2024.