Esteban Alvarez Mora (A-240-170-125) v. Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTEBAN ALVAREZ MORA (A-240- No. 1:26-cv-3346 DC CSK 170-125), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER AND FINDINGS & v. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY 15 DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Esteban Alvarez Mora (A-240-170-125), a citizen and native of Costa Rica, 19 was admitted to the United States on October 2, 2022 as a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor for pleasure 20 with authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed March 30, 2023. Petitioner 21 remained in the United States beyond March 30, 2023 without authorization. Petitioner was 22 detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on March 19, 2025. Petitioner, 23 proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 24 This habeas action concerns petitioner’s detention. For the reasons that follow, the Court 25 recommends that respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted. 26 /// 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17). 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a national and citizen of Costa Rica. (ECF No. 7-1 at 1.) On August 5, 2016, 3 petitioner was issued a visa in San Jose, Costa Rica. (ECF No. 7-2 at 8.) On October 2, 2022 4 petitioner was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor for pleasure with 5 authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 7-1 at 6 1.) Petitioner remained in the United States beyond March 30, 2023 without authorization. (Id.) 7 On March 30, 2023, Costa Rica requested revocation of petitioner’s visa to the U.S. State 8 Department, which was revoked the same day. (ECF No. 7-2 at 8.) On November 13, 2024, 9 petitioner was referred to ICE. (Id.) ICE determined that petitioner was a threat to public safety 10 due to his February 12, 2019 conviction for rape of an eight-year-old child in Costa Rica. (ECF 11 No. 7-2 at 6; ECF No. 7-3 at 5-11 (Interpol Red Notice)). On March 19, 2025, ICE located and 12 detained petitioner. (ECF No. 7-2 at 7.) Petitioner has been in continuous detention since that 13 time. (See ECF No. 1.) On March 19, 2025, petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear and placed 14 into removal proceedings. (ECF No. 7-1 at 1-2; ECF No. 7-2 at 7-8). 15 On May 8, 2025, petitioner was provided with a bond hearing before an immigration 16 judge. (ECF No. 7-4 at 1-2.) The immigration judge denied bond after finding that petitioner 17 failed to establish that he was “not a danger to the community or such a substantial flight risk that 18 bond should be denied.” (Id.) In the motion to dismiss, respondents state that it does not appear 19 that petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) regarding the May 20 8, 2025 order by the immigration judge denying bond. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 21 On April 6, 2026, an immigration judge ordered petitioner removed to Costa Rica. (ECF 22 No. 7-5 at 1-10.) Petitioner’s appeal of the immigration judge’s April 6, 2026 order was received 23 by the BIA on April 20, 2026. (ECF No. 7-6 at 1-2.) This appeal remains pending.2 See 24 2 The court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute 25 because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), including undisputed information posted on 26 official websites. Daniels-Hall v. National Education, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 27 2010). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) adjudicates immigration cases, and the EOIR Automated Case Information website is an official website of the United States 28 Government. The address of this official website is https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/. 1 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. 2 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 On May 1, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion to 4 appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) On May 13, 2026, respondents timely filed a motion to 5 dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner did not file a reply. (See docket.) Briefing is now complete. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual 8 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., 9 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality 10 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 11 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 12 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 13 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing 14 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” 15 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges 16 to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 17 IV. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner raises a Fifth Amendment due process claim for prolonged detention that 19 exceeds six months. (See ECF No. 1 at 18-19.) Respondents argue that this action should be 20 dismissed because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 7 at 3-5.) 21 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 22 In the motion to dismiss, respondents claim that petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 23 § 1226(a). (ECF No. 7 at 3-4.) 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting 24 and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” 25 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the 26 government makes an initial custody determination, and the noncitizen will be released upon a 27 showing “to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or 28 persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Rodriguez Diaz, 1 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). Section 1226(a) provides “an initial bond 2 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to 3 present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances 4 materially change.” Id. at 1202. Therefore, “[i]f the noncitizen is detained under section 1226(a), 5 she is entitled to a bond hearing.” Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 2025 WL 3458802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 6 Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)). As discussed above, 7 petitioner received a bond hearing on May 8, 2025. 8 In the motion to dismiss, respondents argue that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative 9 remedies by failing to appeal the immigration judge’s May 8, 2025 order denying petitioner’s 10 request for bond to the BIA. (ECF No. 7 at 4.) Respondents also argue that petitioner can request 11 a new bond hearing based upon a showing of materially changed circumstances. (Id. (citing 12 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e)). Respondents argue that petitioner 13 makes no argument as to why he should be excused from prudential exhaustion of administrative 14 remedies. (Id.) 15 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals 16 before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 17 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 18 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 19 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not 20 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 21 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 22 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the 23 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach 24 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in 25 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency 26 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 27 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 28 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude 1 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 2 citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court may waive the exhaustion requirement 3 when administrative remedies are inadequate, irreparable injury may occur without immediate 4 judicial relief, or exhaustion otherwise would be futile. Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000-01 (“[D]istrict 5 court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ordinarily reserved for instances in which 6 no other judicial remedy is available.”). 7 For the following reasons, to the extent petitioner’s prolonged detention claim challenges 8 the May 8, 2025 denial of his request for bond by the immigration judge, this Court agrees with 9 respondents that this claim should be dismissed based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust 10 administrative remedies. In Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011), the petitioner 11 was a noncitizen held in immigration detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and filed a petition 12 for writ of habeas in the federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his prolonged 13 detention without a bond hearing violated his due process rights. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 14 1159. The district court entered an order directing respondent to hold a bond hearing consistent 15 with the requirements set forth in Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 16 942 (9th Cir. 2008), and refrained from entering judgment on the habeas corpus petition until 17 respondents had reported to the court that such a hearing had been held. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d 18 at 1159. Respondents complied with the order and an Immigration Judge held a bond hearing, at 19 which he denied bond upon finding petitioner was a danger to the community. See id. The 20 petitioner did not appeal this determination to the BIA, but instead filed in the district court in his 21 pending habeas corpus proceeding a motion for the court to review and reverse the Immigration 22 Judge’s bond order, arguing that the bond hearing did not conform to the court’s prior order nor 23 satisfy due process. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the petitioner’s request should have been 24 denied, and his underlying claim dismissed without prejudice, due to his failure to exhaust 25 administrative remedies by seeking review of the bond decision to the BIA. See id. at 1160. The 26 Ninth Circuit explained that the statutory and regulatory scheme of § 1226(a) 27 entitle[s] [detainees] to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. If they are dissatisfied with the IJ's bond determination, they may file 28 an administrative appeal so that “the necessity of detention can be 1 reviewed by ... the BIA.” If they remain dissatisfied, they may file a petition for habeas corpus in the district court. 2 Id. (citations omitted). As such, it was “improper” for petitioner to employ the “short cut” of 3 seeking review of the immigration judge’s bond decision in the district court before seeking 4 review in the BIA. See id. Instead, petitioner “should have exhausted administrative remedies by 5 appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the immigration judge’s 6 decision” and “[o]nce the BIA rendered its decision, [petitioner] could have properly pursued 7 habeas relief in the district court and the district court's decision would have been subject to 8 review in this court.” Id. Because petitioner had not shown that his request should be excused 9 from the prudential exhaustion requirement, nor that the proceeding should be stayed to permit 10 him to exhaust the new claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the petition should be dismissed without 11 prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claim challenging the adequacy of the bond 12 determination. See id. at 1160-61. 13 In the instant action, petitioner does not dispute respondents’ claim that he failed to appeal 14 the immigration judge’s May 8, 2025 decision denying him bond to the BIA. Petitioner also fails 15 to show why he should be excused from the prudential exhaustion requirement regarding this 16 claim. Accordingly, to the extent petitioner’s prolonged detention claim challenges the May 8, 17 2025 decision by the immigration judge denying his request for bond, respondents’ motion to 18 dismiss this claim based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be 19 granted. See id. 20 To the extent petitioner seeks a second bond hearing, as a remedy for alleged prolonged 21 detention, for the following reason this Court finds that petitioner was required to exhaust 22 administrative remedies as to his request for a second bond hearing and failed to do so. The 23 procedures for a petitioner seeking a second bond hearing are set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e): 24 “After an initial bond redetermination, an alien’s request for a subsequent bond redetermination 25 shall be made in writing and shall be considered only upon a showing that the alien’s 26 circumstances have changed materially since the prior bond redetermination.” Petitioner does not 27 claim that he requested a subsequent bond hearing pursuant to the procedures in 8 C.F.R. 28 1 § 1003.19(3). (See ECF No. 1.) This Court finds that the Puga factors suggest that administrative 2 exhaustion should be required. First, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(3) clarifies that, after an initial bond 3 hearing, a detainee’s request for a subsequent bond hearing “shall be made in writing and shall be 4 considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the 5 prior bond redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). “This regulation demonstrates a clearly 6 established administrative scheme designed to address custodial determinations, a practice that 7 includes an appeals process.” See Duc Quoc Bui v. Holder, 2015 WL 3903764, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 8 Jun. 25, 2015) (citing Resendiz v. Holder, 2012 WL 5451162, at *4 (N. D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012)). 9 Second, instead of requesting a subsequent bond hearing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e), 10 petitioner instead pursued his habeas petition. To allow petitioners to circumvent the procedures 11 for seeking a subsequent bond hearing “‘would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 12 administrative scheme.’” Duc Quoc Bui, 2015 WL 3903764, at *3 (quoting Resendiz, 2012 WL 13 5451162, at *4). Third, the BIA should have the first opportunity to address any mistakes made 14 in addressing petitioner’s request for a subsequent bond hearing. See Duc Quoc Bui, 2015 WL 15 3903764, at *4. Petitioner also fails to identify any valid exception to the requirement that he 16 exhaust administrative remedies by requesting a subsequent bond hearing under the procedures 17 set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). Petitioner has not requested that he be excepted from the 18 exhaustion requirement nor has he provided any legal basis for applying such an exception. For 19 these reasons, this Court finds that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his 20 request for a second bond hearing. On these grounds, respondents’ motion to dismiss petitioner’s 21 prolonged detention claim based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies 22 regarding his request for a second bond hearing should be granted. But see Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 23 Supp. 3d 1005, 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (waiving administrative exhaustion requirement under 24 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) where exhaustion futile because petitioner failed to allege changed 25 circumstances). 26 V. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 27 Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) There currently exists 28 no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 1 |) F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any 2 || stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 3 || Cases. The Court concludes that the interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel, 4 | and petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice. 5 | VI. CONCLUSION 6 In summary, the Court recommends that respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted. 7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for appointment of 8 | counsel (ECF No. 3 ) is denied without prejudice. 9 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 10 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) be granted. 11 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of respondents and close 12 this case. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days of the 15 || date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court 16 || and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 17 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and 18 || served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to 19 || file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 20 || See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 22 | Dated: June 8, 2026 A aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 || Mora3346.157.imm/2 27 28