Estate Stove Co. v. General Motors Corp.

79 F. Supp. 765, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 12, 1948
DocketCivil Action No. 103
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 79 F. Supp. 765 (Estate Stove Co. v. General Motors Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate Stove Co. v. General Motors Corp., 79 F. Supp. 765, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371 (S.D. Ohio 1948).

Opinion

NEVIN, District Judge.

This suit was instituted under the patent laws of the United States. The action originally was commenced by the plaintiff, The Estate Stove Company, an Ohio corporation, having its principal place of business in Hamilton, Ohio, against the defendants, General Motors Corporation and General Motors Sales Corporation, both corporations of the State of Delaware, and both having a place of business in Dayton, Ohio.

Originally, in its complaint filed March 14, 1941, plaintiff included Kahn patent No. 2,176,075 among the others which it charged defendants with infringing. At the trial, counsel for plaintiff informed the court (Rec. pp. 18, 19) that this patent (Kahn patent No. 2,176,075) had been withdrawn and was not to be further considered. Originally, too, a counterclaim had been filed by defendants but that, also, counsel stated, had been withdrawn.

At the trial, therefore, there were six patents actually before the Court and now involved in this litigation. Those patents, together with the claims charged to be infringed of each one respectively, are as follows:

Named Inventor Number Date Claims in Issue 1 (Ex.l) Bradbury (Ex.2) Kahn and Hake • (Ex.3) Kahn and Hake (Ex.4) Kahn (Ex.5) Kahn (Ex.6) Wells 2,055,246 Sept. 22, 2,079,618 May 11, 2,123,699 July 12, 1,786,429 Dec. 30, 1,717,221 June 11, 1,785,568 Dec. 16, 1936 1, 11, 14, 24 1937 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1938 4, 5, 6, 9 1930 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 18 1929 13, 14 1930 1,2,3

Subsequent to the institution of this action, to-wit, on July 31, 1946, the plaintiff, Noma Electric Corporation, a corporation of Maryland, became, and it now is, vested with title to all the foregoing letters patent. By agreement of the parties, Noma Electric Corporation was joined as a party plaintiff herein and thereupon it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of 'this Court.

Also subsequent to the institution of this suit, to-wit, on December 31, 1941, the defendant, General Motors Sales Corporation, was liquidated. At the trial (Rec. p. 14) it was stipulated, however, by defendant, General Motors Corporation, that “the sales organization was a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors, which at all times is responsible for anything the sales organization did. When it was wiped out, it was just as though the suit was against General Motors solely and it was responsible for anything that is done.”

Alleged Unfair Competition.

In addition to infringement the complaint, in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 thereof, charges defendants with unfair business practices in connection with the sale of the alleged infringing electric ranges. As to this the record (p. 19 et seq.) shows the following: “Mr. Marechal (of counsel for plaintiff) : There was also in the complaint as a second matter of litigation a claim of unfair competition or unfair business practices based upon, very generally speaking, the allegation that General Motors or General Motors Sales Corporation, or both, had improperly utilized a trade-mark of the plaintiff in its advertising and conduct of its business in the selling of the electric ranges which were the subject matter involved in the claimed infringement. The trade-mark in question is one which has been used by the Estate Stove Company for many years and has been applied to its so-called Bradbury [767]*767ranges, that is, ranges which it has manufactured and sold under the Bradbury-patent No. 2,055,246, as “balanced oven heat.”

At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ prima facie case (Rec. pp. 699 and 811) defendants moved to dismiss “as to the two charges of unfair competition, on the ground that no evidence whatever has been introduced here on either.”

This motion the court sustained, the pertinent parts of the record showing as follows : “The Court (pp. 828 et seq.) : The cause is now before the Court on the motion filed on behalf of the defendants to dismiss from the case or take out of the case for any further consideration whatever charge or charges there are in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 which have reference to or bear upon the isgue of unfair competition. * * * It has been stated by counsel for plaintiff that trademark infringement technically, as such, is not here charged. We are not dealing with a registered trade-mark, but that there is a trade-mark and trade-name, or a use of some words or language (by plaintiff) over a period of many years. * * * The Court is asked to enjoin the use of these words, this trade-mark or trade-name, ‘Balanced Heat.’ * * * The Court is of the opinion under the facts in this case and the evidence adduced, the charges of unfair competition that are based upon the use of the trade-mark or trade-name, be it ‘Balanced Heat’ or whatever it was, at least, what is charged in the complaint is not sustained, * * * and the motion will be sustained with regard to any question of unfair competition. * * * There is not sufficient proper evidence in this record to warrant the Court to issue an injunction. That will be denied and the motion (of defendants) will be (and it is) sustained.” Further reference to this aspect of the case is made by the Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Validity.

At the conclusion of the trial defendants moved (Rec. p. 1233) to dismiss the complaint “on the ground that the evidence establishes without any contradiction whatever the invalidity of all six patents.” As to this the record (pp. 1234 et seq.) further shows as follows:

“Mr. Cooper: (of counsel for defendants) I shall rest my motion to dismiss upon the plain invalidity of each of the patents. * * *
Mr. Morris (of counsel for plaintiff): Your Honor, I should not object at all to replying to Mr. Cooper on the question of validity, if your Honor cares to take the matter up in that way, first dispose of validity and then of infringement.
“Mr. Cooper: I am not dealing with infringement at all now.
“The Court: I understand that. * * * I have no objection to taking up the question of validity first and deciding that question before we get into the question of infringement.”

The cause is now before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss above referred to, with (Rec. p. 1264) “the understanding that the future conduct of the case will depend on the results of the conclusion of the Court on this point.”

Regardless of the question of infringement it is proper always for the District Court to inquire fully into the validity of the patent or patents in suit. In fact, it usually is the better practice to do so. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corporation, 325 U.S. 327, 330, 65 S.Ct. 1143, 89 L.Ed. 1644. At what stage of the trial this inquiry shall be made rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case.

We come then to a consideration of the validity of the claims in issue of the patents in suit.

The patents and -the claims thereof in issue here “are presumedly valid.” Oil Conservation Engineering Co. v. Brooks Engineering Co. 6 Cir., 52 F.2d 783, 785; Merco Nordstrom Valve Co. v. W.M. Acker Organization et al., 6 Cir., 131 F.2d 277

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Related

Estate Stove Co. v. General Motors Corp.
92 F. Supp. 293 (S.D. Ohio, 1950)

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Bluebook (online)
79 F. Supp. 765, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-stove-co-v-general-motors-corp-ohsd-1948.