Estate of William Hayden Schuck v. County of San Diego

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 23-cv-785-DMS-AHG ESTATE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN

12 SCHUCK, by and through his successors ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT in-interest Sabrina Schuck and Timothy 13 KAHL’S MOTION TO DISMISS Schuck; et al., PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED 14 Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT 15 v. 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Defendant Nicholas Kahl’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 20 Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF 21 No. 87). Following the death of William Hayden Schuck (“Schuck”) in San Diego County 22 Central Jail on March 16, 2022, Schuck’s parents, Sabrina and Timothy Schuck, on behalf 23 of Schuck’s Estate and in their individual capacities as Schuck’s next of kin, sued the 24 County of San Diego (“the County”), Correctional Healthcare Partners (“CHP”), Kahl, and 25 various county employees for constitutional and state-law violations. Plaintiffs filed an 26 Opposition, (ECF No. 89), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 93). For the following 27 reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Kahl’s Motion. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Allegations 3 The background of this case is set forth in detail in the Court’s previous Order dated 4 February 8, 2024. (ECF No. 53). See Estate of Schuck ex rel. Schuck v. County of San 5 Diego (Estate of Schuck I), 2024 WL 500711, at *1–4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2024). The Second 6 Amended Complaint (“SAC”) added Kahl as a named defendant and alleged Kahl was, at 7 all relevant times, a CHP employee contracted by the San Diego Sheriff’s Department in 8 the Medical Services Division at the San Diego County Jail. (SAC ¶ 27). On March 15, 9 2022, four days after Schuck’s hospitalization at UCSD, Kahl allegedly reviewed the 10 “After Visit Summary” and requested Schuck’s complete record from UCSD including all 11 physician notes. (Id. at ¶ 95). 12 The TAC supplements the SAC’s allegations. Namely, Plaintiffs allege that the 13 “After Visit Summary” stated (1) Schuck “had been in a motor vehicle accident”; (2) 14 Schuck “had relatively high blood pressure of 142/102”; (3) Schuck “had a relatively high 15 pulse of 95”; (4) Shuck was discharged against medical advice (“AMA”); and (5) there 16 were “[n]o obvious signs of trauma or illness but occult injury is possible given 17 mechanism.” (TAC ¶ 128) (alteration and emphasis in original). Plaintiffs allege 18 Defendant Kahl reviewed the “After Visit Summary” as “part of a ‘medical chart review’”, 19 which “required” viewing all of Schuck’s medical records in the electronic filing system 20 TechCare. (Id. at ¶ 131). As a result, Defendant Kahl “should have reviewed” medical 21 records describing Schuck as having “difficulty . . . following direction”, being 22 “disorganized” and “non sensical”, appearing “disheveled” with “dry blood” on his t-shirt 23 and “lower extremities”, and having “concerning” symptoms that “worsened in custody”. 24 (Id. at ¶ 133–34). He thus allegedly “knew of [Schuck’s] serious medical issues and failed 25 to administer treatment or summon medical care.” (Id. at ¶ 137). 26 B. Claims 27 Plaintiffs initiated this action on April 28, 2023. (ECF No. 1). They filed the First 28 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 1, 2023. (ECF No. 25). On February 8, 2024, the 1 Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant CHP’s Motion to Dismiss with leave to 2 amend. (ECF No. 53). Plaintiffs filed their SAC on March 14, 2024. (ECF No. 58). On 3 July 19, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants CHP and Kahl’s 4 Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. (ECF No. 74). At issue now is Plaintiffs’ TAC, 5 filed on August 12, 2024. (ECF No. 78). It alleges five claims against Defendant Kahl: 6 (1) Count 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by Schuck’s Estate. (TAC ¶¶ 234–43). 7 (2) Count 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by 8 Schuck’s parents. (Id. at ¶¶ 244–51). 9 (3) Count 5: California Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) by Schuck’s Estate. (Id. 10 at ¶¶ 275–83). 11 (4) Count 7: Negligence by Schuck’s Estate. (Id. at ¶¶ 295–306). 12 (5) Count 9: Wrongful death by Schuck’s parents. (Id. at ¶¶ 319–27). 13 On September 16, 2024, an informal telephonic status conference was held. (See 14 ECF No. 86). Defendant Kahl filed the third Motion to Dismiss on September 30, 2024. 15 (Defendant’s Motion (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 87). Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on 16 October 25, 2024. (Plaintiffs’ Opposition (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 89). On November 8, 2024, 17 Defendant Kahl filed his Reply. (ECF No. 93). 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss 20 on the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”. 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain 22 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 23 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 24 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 25 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 26 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 27 for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 28 1 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough 2 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If 3 Plaintiffs have “not nudged” their “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” 4 the TAC “must be dismissed.” Id. at 570. 5 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must 6 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 7 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 8 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts are not “required to accept as true 9 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 10 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 11 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 A. Extrinsic Evidence 14 Plaintiffs oppose Defendant Kahl’s reference to extrinsic evidence in his Motion. 15 When disputing Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, Defendant Kahl supports his argument with 16 testimony by an emergency department physician and facts not in the TAC, namely that 17 the doctor who drafted Schuck’s “After Visit Summary” and examined his vitals “did not 18 issue any new orders as a result of those vitals or indicate any concern related thereto”. 19 (Def.’s Mot. 12–13). The Court agrees. “Generally, district courts may not consider 20 [outside] material . . . when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under [Federal] Rule 21 [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)”. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 22 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). 23 Judicial notice is inapplicable because the facts are “subject to reasonable dispute”. Fed. 24 R. Evid. 201(b). The facts and testimony only serve to contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations, 25 which the Court is required to accept as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, the Court 26 will not consider them when assessing the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims. 27 B. Counts 1–2: § 1983 Claims 28 According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Kahl viewed Schuck’s “After Visit Summary” as 1 part of a mandatory review of all of Schuck’s medical records. (TAC ¶¶ 127, 131). 2 Plaintiffs contend that, from these records and his medical training, Defendant Kahl 3 “should have known . . . that the circumstances warranted immediate intervention.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 136) (emphasis in original). Defendant Kahl argues that the limited information available 5 to Defendant Kahl was insufficient to put him on notice that Schuck was at a substantial 6 risk of suffering serious harm and that he acted reasonably under the circumstances. 7 (Def.’s Mot. 12–15). 8 “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: 9 (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) 10 proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” 11 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). “Individuals in state custody 12 have a constitutional right to adequate medical treatment.” Sandoval v. County of San 13 Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 14 (1976)). For pretrial detainees, this right arises under the Due Process Clause of the 15 Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979)). The 16 Ninth Circuit applies an “objective deliberate indifference” standard to Fourteenth 17 Amendment claims alleging a pretrial detainee received deficient medical care. Gordon v. 18 County of Orange (Gordon I), 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018). Under this 19 standard, pretrial detainees alleging that jail officials failed to provide constitutionally 20 adequate medical care must show: 21 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined [including a decision with respect 22 to medical treatment]; 23 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 24 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, 25 even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of 26 the defendant’s conduct obvious; and 27 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 28 1 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669 (quoting Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125) (alteration in original). At 2 issue are the second and third prongs of the Gordon test. (Def.’s Mot. 12–15). 3 1. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm 4 There is a “substantial risk of . . . serious harm” if there is a “serious medical need, 5 such that a failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or 6 the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125; Russell v. 7 Lumitap, 31 F.4th 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 This includes the “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find 9 important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 10 significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 11 substantial pain.” Id. (quoting Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)). 12 Conditions causing death are serious medical needs. Id. (“Russell’s aortic dissection was 13 indeed a ‘serious’ medical need, as it resulted in his death.”). Symptoms indicative of 14 serious medical needs include “hyperventilation, vomiting, dry heaving, difficulty 15 breathing, severe chest pain . . . , numbness . . . , and tachycardia”. Id. 16 Applying Russell, Schuck was at a “substantial risk of . . . serious harm” because his 17 condition resulted in his death. Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125; Russell, 31 F.4th at 739. 18 Further, the combination of symptoms listed in Schuck’s “After Visit Summary” and other 19 records—which Defendant Kahl was allegedly required to read—were “worthy of 20 comment or treatment” and “affect[ed] [Schuck’s] daily activities”. Id. (quoting Colwell, 21 763 F.3d at 1066); (TAC ¶ 131). According to Schuck’s records, Schuck had blood 22 pressure of 142/102, one category below a “hypertensive crisis”; might have had a hidden 23 injury because he refused medical evaluation at the hospital; and appeared disoriented and 24 disorganized. (Id. at ¶¶ 128, 133). Especially considering his deteriorating condition, (id. 25 at ¶ 134), these symptoms indicated that Schuck was at risk of serious harm. Plaintiffs thus 26 sufficiently allege facts supporting the second element of the Gordon test. 27 28 1 2. Reasonableness 2 “To satisfy the third element [of Gordon], the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s 3 actions were ‘objectively unreasonable,’ which requires a showing of ‘more than 4 negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.’” 5 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669 (quoting Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125). “A defendant can be 6 liable even if he did not actually draw the inference that the plaintiff was at a substantial 7 risk of suffering serious harm, so long as a reasonable official in his circumstances would 8 have drawn that inference.” Russell, 31 F.4th at 739. Objective unreasonableness may be 9 found when healthcare employees fail to administer CPR to an unconscious patient or fail 10 to call paramedics when an inmate is having a seizure. Id. at 741 (citing Lemire v. 11 California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) and Sandoval, 12 985 F.3d at 679). 13 At this stage in the litigation, the Court considers it plausible that “the care rendered 14 [was] inadequate to the circumstances [allegedly] known to [Defendant Kahl]”. Id. 15 Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendant Kahl either knew or should have known 16 that Schuck was at risk of an injury from a motor vehicle accident and was exhibiting 17 strange symptoms. (TAC ¶¶ 128, 133). With this information, he should have, at a 18 minimum, examined Schuck or requested that someone else do so. Russell, 31 F.4th at 742 19 (finding objective unreasonableness because the physician “[n]ever physically examine[d] 20 Russell, even though he lived only fifteen minutes away”). Further, Schuck’s records 21 allegedly stated that Schuck’s condition “worsened in custody”, which increased the 22 likelihood that he had a hidden injury. Id. (finding objective unreasonableness because 23 Russell “steadily grew worse instead of better”); (TAC ¶¶ 128, 134) (alleging that “After 24 Visit Summary” stated hidden injury was “possible”). A reasonable nurse practitioner in 25 Defendant Kahl’s position would have taken some action. “[T]aking the facts most 26 favorably to [Plaintiffs], [Defendant Kahl] could not have reasonably believed . . . that he 27 could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with 28 [Schuck’s] symptoms”. Russell, 31 F.4th at 743. As a result, Plaintiffs satisfy the third 1 element of Gordon. The Court DENIES Defendant Kahl’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 2 § 1983 claims. 3 C. Count 5: Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) 4 “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper 5 means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation[,] or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from 6 doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do 7 something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Cornell v. City and County 8 of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 791–92 (2017) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). 9 Violations of federal and California constitutional and statutory rights are all cognizable 10 under the Bane Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b) (a violation occurs when a defendant 11 “interfere[s] . . . with the exercise or enjoyment . . . of rights secured by the Constitution 12 or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this 13 state”). The Ninth Circuit has held “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, 14 intimidation[,] or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the 15 constitutional violation alleged” so long as the claimant shows the defendant had a 16 “specific intent” to commit the constitutional violation. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 17 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Estate of Serna v. County of San Diego, 2022 18 WL 827123, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (noting that “the act [amounting] to a 19 deprivation of a constitutional right may . . . satisfy th[e] [‘threat, intimidation, or 20 coercion’] element”). There is specific intent when “the defendant . . . acted with 21 ‘[r]eckless disregard of the right at issue.’” Id. (quoting Cornell, 17 Cal.App.5th at 804) 22 (alteration in original). As noted above, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant 23 Kahl acted with reckless disregard to Schuck’s right to adequate medical care under the 24 Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Kahl 25 from Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim. 26 D. Counts 7 and 9: Negligence and Wrongful Death 27 To state a negligence claim under California law, a plaintiff must allege (1) a legal 28 duty to use due care; (2) a breach of such legal duty; and (3) the breach as the proximate 1 || or legal cause of the resulting harm. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009). 2 || Deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment requires more than a showing of 3 ||negligence. Gordon I, 888 F.3d at 1125; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) 4 || (holding that “mere lack of due care” by state official does not deprive individual of life, 5 liberty, or property under Fourteenth Amendment). Because Plaintiffs have plausibly 6 ||alleged deliberate indifference—and thus negligence—the Court DENIES Defendant 7 || Kahl’s Motion to Dismiss these negligence-based causes of action. 8 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Kahl’s Motion to Dismiss 10 || Plaintiffs’ TAC. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: November 20, 2024 2» 3 2 Sood Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge 14 United States District Court 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28