Estate of Sherrano Stingley v. County of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 30, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-00255·Unknown

Opinion

1 || Mark E. Merin (State Bar No. 043849) Paul H. Masuhara (State Bar No. 289805) 2 LAW OFFICE OF MARK E. MERIN 3 1010 F Street, Suite 300 Sacramento, California 95814 4|| Telephone: (916) 443-6911 Facsimile: (916) 447-8336 5 || E-Mail: mark@markmerin.com 6 paul@markmerin.com 7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, 8 DYMIN STINGLEY, S:S., and ANNETTE HILBURN 9 19 ||PORTER SCOTT A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 11 || Carl L. Fessenden, SBN 161494 cfessenden@porterscott.com 12 || Suli A. Mastorakos, SBN 330383 smastorakos@porterscott.com 350 University Ave., Suite 200 14 Sacramento, California 95825 TEL: 916.929.1481 15 || FAX: 916.927.3706 16 Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 18 DEPARTMENT, SCOTT JONES, FREDDY MARTINEZ, RACHELL VILLEGAS, 19 BRITTANY LINDE, and BRANDON SWAIM 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 21 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 22 SACRAMENTO DIVISION 23 || ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00255-TLN-AC 24 Plaintiffs, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 25 || vs RE: PSYCH EVALUATIONS; [PROPOSED] ORDER 26 || COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 27 Defendants. 28

1 STIPULATION 2 A. PURPOSE AND LIMITATION 3 Defendants believe that the disclosure and discovery activity concerning the materials described 4 in this stipulated protective order is likely to involve production of information for which protection from 5 public disclosure would be warranted. Plaintiffs have not been permitted to view the materials described 6 in this stipulated protective order. The parties acknowledge that this protective order does not confer 7 blanket protections on all disclosures or discovery activity, and that the protection it affords extends only 8 to the limited information or items that are entitled to such protection under Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 26(c). The parties further acknowledge that this stipulated protective order does not entitle any 10 party to file information designated as protected or confidential under seal, where Local Rule 141 sets 11 forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party 12 seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. 13 B. DEFINITIONS 14 The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order: 15 1. The “Action” shall mean and refer to the above-captioned matter and to all actions now or 16 later consolidated with the Action, and any appeal from the Action and from any other action 17 consolidated at any time under the above-captioned matter, through final judgment. 18 2. “Documents” or “Confidential Documents” shall mean the documents that Defendants 19 designate as “Confidential” and described in section C. 20 3. “Confidential” shall mean information designated “Confidential” pursuant to this 21 stipulated protective order. Information designated “Confidential” shall be information that is determined 22 in good faith by the attorneys representing the designating party to be subject to protection pursuant to 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Confidential documents, material, and/or information shall be 24 used solely for purposes of litigation. Confidential information shall not be used by the non-designating 25 party for any business or other purpose, unless agreed to in writing by all parties to this action or as 26 authorized by further order of the Court. 27 4. “Defendants” shall mean the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO 28 COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, SCOTT JONES, FREDDY MARTINEZ, RACHELL 1 VILLEGAS, BRITTANY LINDE, and BRANDON SWAIM, and any other Defendants that may 2 subsequently be added to this action (for example, “DOE 1 to 10”). 3 5. “Plaintiffs” shall mean the ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, DYMIN STINGLEY, 4 S.S., and ANNETTE HILBURN. 5 6. “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs and Defendants, identified above. 6 C. INFORMATION COVERED 7 Covered Information: 8 Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(1), a description of the information eligible for protection under 9 this stipulated protective order is limited to the following: 10 1. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Freddy Martinez (DEF 06213) 11 2. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Rachell Villegas (DEF 06215) 12 3. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Brittany Linde (DEF 06212) 13 4. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Brandon Swaim (DEF 06214) 14 Particularized Need for Protection: 15 Pursuant to Local Rule141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized 16 need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order. Defendants 17 represented to the Court and Plaintiffs that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated 18 protective order are limited solely to those which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. 20 See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). 21 Showing of Need for a Protective Order: 22 Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for 23 the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of 24 resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the parties and the Court from conducting 26 the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure 27 whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need 28 for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he 1 burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered by a protective 2 order remains on the party seeking the protective order; any other conclusion would turn Rule 26(c) on 3 its head.”). As a result, production may be made with this stipulated protective order in place and, if 4 necessary, it will permit discrete and narrowed challenges to documents designated for protection. 5 D. TERMS OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER 6 Confidential Documents subject to protection may be designated as “Confidential” and produced 7 subject to this stipulated protective order: 8 1. The Confidential documents shall be used solely in connection with the above-captioned 9 civil case, and in the preparation and trial of the case. The parties do not waive any objections to the 10 admissibility of the documents or portions thereof in future proceedings in this case, including trial. 11 2. The parties will designate the Confidential documents as confidential by affixing a mark 12 labelling them “Confidential.” 13 3. The Confidential documents may only be disclosed to the following persons: 14 a. Plaintiffs, Mark E. Merin and Paul H. Masuhara of the Law Office of Mark E. 15 Merin, and any partners and associates in that office; 16 b. Defendants, Carl L. Fessenden and Suli A. Mastorakos of Porter Scott, and any 17 partners and associates in that office; 18 c. Paralegal, clerical, and secretarial personnel or support staff regularly employed by 19 counsel referred to in subparts (a) and (b) immediately above, including stenographic deposition 20 reporters or videographers retained in connection with this action; 21 d.

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Estate of Sherrano Stingley v. County of Sacramento, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

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