Estate of Sherrano Stingley v. County of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 30, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-00255·Unknown

Opinion

Mark E. Merin (State Bar No. 043849) Paul H. Masuhara (State Bar No. 289805) 1010 F Street, Suite 300 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 443-6911 Facsimile: (916) 447-8336 E-Mail: mark@markmerin.com paul@markmerin.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, DYMIN STINGLEY, S:S., and ANNETTE HILBURN PORTER SCOTT A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Carl L. Fessenden, SBN 161494 cfessenden@porterscott.com Suli A. Mastorakos, SBN 330383 smastorakos@porterscott.com 350 University Ave., Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95825 TEL: 916.929.1481 FAX: 916.927.3706 Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S FREDDY MARTINEZ, RACHELL VILLEGAS, BRITTANY LINDE, and BRANDON SWAIM ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00255-TLN-AC Plaintiffs, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER vs RE: PSYCH EVALUATIONS; [PROPOSED] ORDER COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants.

Defendants believe that the disclosure and discovery activity concerning the materials described in this stipulated protective order is likely to involve production of information for which protection from public disclosure would be warranted. Plaintiffs have not been permitted to view the materials described in this stipulated protective order. The parties acknowledge that this protective order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or discovery activity, and that the protection it affords extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to such protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The parties further acknowledge that this stipulated protective order does not entitle any party to file information designated as protected or confidential under seal, where Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order: 1. The “Action” shall mean and refer to the above-captioned matter and to all actions now or later consolidated with the Action, and any appeal from the Action and from any other action consolidated at any time under the above-captioned matter, through final judgment. 2. “Documents” or “Confidential Documents” shall mean the documents that Defendants designate as “Confidential” and described in section C. 3. “Confidential” shall mean information designated “Confidential” pursuant to this stipulated protective order. Information designated “Confidential” shall be information that is determined in good faith by the attorneys representing the designating party to be subject to protection pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Confidential documents, material, and/or information shall be used solely for purposes of litigation. Confidential information shall not be used by the non-designating party for any business or other purpose, unless agreed to in writing by all parties to this action or as authorized by further order of the Court. 4. “Defendants” shall mean the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, SCOTT JONES, FREDDY MARTINEZ, RACHELL VILLEGAS, BRITTANY LINDE, and BRANDON SWAIM, and any other Defendants that may subsequently be added to this action (for example, “DOE 1 to 10”). 5. “Plaintiffs” shall mean the ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, DYMIN STINGLEY, S.S., and ANNETTE HILBURN. 6. “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs and Defendants, identified above. Covered Information: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(1), a description of the information eligible for protection under this stipulated protective order is limited to the following: 1. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Freddy Martinez (DEF 06213) 2. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Rachell Villegas (DEF 06215) 3. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Brittany Linde (DEF 06212) 4. Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluations of Brandon Swaim (DEF 06214) Particularized Need for Protection: Pursuant to Local Rule141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order. Defendants represented to the Court and Plaintiffs that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated protective order are limited solely to those which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Showing of Need for a Protective Order: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the parties and the Court from conducting the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered by a protective order remains on the party seeking the protective order; any other conclusion would turn Rule 26(c) on its head.”). As a result, production may be made with this stipulated protective order in place and, if necessary, it will permit discrete and narrowed challenges to documents designated for protection. Confidential Documents subject to protection may be designated as “Confidential” and produced subject to this stipulated protective order: 1. The Confidential documents shall be used solely in connection with the above-captioned civil case, and in the preparation and trial of the case. The parties do not waive any objections to the admissibility of the documents or portions thereof in future proceedings in this case, including trial. 2. The parties will designate the Confidential documents as confidential by affixing a mark labelling them “Confidential.” 3. The Confidential documents may only be disclosed to the following persons: a. Plaintiffs, Mark E. Merin and Paul H. Masuhara of the Law Office of Mark E. Merin, and any partners and associates in that office; b. Defendants, Carl L. Fessenden and Suli A. Mastorakos of Porter Scott, and any partners and associates in that office; c. Paralegal, clerical, and secretarial personnel or support staff regularly employed by counsel referred to in subparts (a) and (b) immediately above, including stenographic deposition reporters or videographers retained in connection with this action; d. Court personnel, including stenographic reporters or videographers engaged in proceedings as are necessarily incidental to the preparation for the trial in the civil action; e. Any expert, consultant, or investigator retained in connection with this action; however, such persons must be advised of and abide by this protective order; f. The finder of facts at the time of trial, subject to the court’s rulings on in limine motions and objections of counsel; and g. Witnesses during their depositions in this act

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Estate of Sherrano Stingley v. County of Sacramento, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

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