24CA1383 Estate of Schafer 10-23-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1383 Adams County District Court No. 20PR30195 Honorable Sara Price, Magistrate
In re the Estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, a/k/a Llewellyn W. Schafer, a/k/a Llewellyn Schafer, deceased.
David L. Schafer,
Appellant,
v.
Kendra Knogge,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025
David L. Schafer, Pro Se
Schwartz, McMinimee & Andrew, LLC, Marcie R. McMinimee, Tyler C. McFarland, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 David L. Schafer appeals the district court’s order for final
settlement of the estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, his deceased
father. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Llewellyn died, David’s sister opened a probate case and
the court appointed her personal representative of the estate.1
¶3 Llewellyn’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided
among his seven children. The estate’s primary asset was real
property, which included a house and other buildings. At the time
Llewellyn died, David lived in the house. After David refused to
vacate, the personal representative retained counsel and began
eviction proceedings.
¶4 During this process, David set fire to the property, damaging
the house and other structures. For this conduct, David pleaded
guilty to first degree arson and received a six-year prison sentence.
¶5 The estate incurred about $35,000 in fees and costs related to
the eviction proceedings and property remediation. And while
insurance covered some of the property damage, it did not cover an
1 Because several parties have the same last name, we refer to
individuals by their first names. We mean no disrespect.
1 estimated $170,000 in repair costs for a damaged outbuilding. The
estate didn’t repair the outbuilding but sold the property “as is” at a
reduced price. The estate retained the insurance payment and sale
proceeds.
¶6 After selling the property, the personal representative filed a
petition for final settlement of the estate. Among other things, the
petition requested that the court offset against David’s share of the
estate the fees and costs related to the eviction proceedings and
property remediation ($35,000) and the estimated repair costs
($170,000). David and another sibling objected. Through counsel,
David challenged the offset of the estimated repair costs (but did
not appear to challenge the offset of the fees and costs).2
¶7 After a hearing, the district court issued a written order
(1) modifying the personal representative’s hourly rate for her
“executor work” (which reduced the requested fees and costs from
$35,000 to about $15,000) and (2) rejecting David’s objection to the
offset. The court found that the requested offset “properly
account[ed] for damages” that David caused to the estate, including
2 Though David didn’t object to the personal representative’s hourly
rate, his sibling did.
2 legal and repair costs. The court directed the personal
representative to file an amended petition reflecting the offset with
the modified rate.3
¶8 As directed, the personal representative filed an amended
petition for final settlement, but for reasons the record doesn’t
explain, the court didn’t enter a final settlement order at that time.
About a year later, David — now representing himself — filed a
“motion objecting to granting” the final settlement, raising a slew of
new and different objections to the petition. The district court
denied the motion, ruling that it was “unsupported by sufficient
and relevant facts and unwarranted by applicable law.” The court
then entered an order approving the amended petition for final
settlement of the estate. After deducting the approved offsets,
David received nothing from the estate.
II. Analysis
¶9 David appeals the order for final settlement. Because he is
self-represented, we broadly construe his filings to ensure he isn’t
3 David appealed the district court’s initial order directing the
personal representative to file an amended final petition, but this court dismissed that appeal for lack of a final, appealable judgment.
3 denied review of important issues because of his inability to
articulate his arguments like a lawyer. See Jones v. Williams, 2019
CO 61, ¶ 5. Doing that here, we understand David to argue that
• he was wrongfully evicted from the property;
• he did not set fire to the property and never admitted
liability for the property damage; instead, the personal
representative and other family members burned down the
house for the insurance money;
• the damage to the outbuilding was never proven and did not
affect the property’s sale price;
• he had a right to be present at the hearing on the petition
for final settlement of the estate, and his attorney’s
presence at the hearing did not waive that right;
• several of his constitutional rights were violated, including
his right to due process;
• the personal representative and other family members
“conspired” to forge Llewellyn’s will and “defraud” the
estate;
• the personal representative committed various crimes,
including theft, fraud, and forgery;
4 • the personal representative breached her fiduciary duty to
the estate by, among other things, incurring excessive
attorney fees and repair costs against the estate and by
charging excessive personal representative fees;
• the personal representative violated the will by refusing to
sell David the house; and
• the district court’s order is “flawed due to lack of competent
evidence.”
¶ 10 From all this, David asks us to (1) reverse the district court’s
order for final settlement of the estate, particularly those portions
involving the offset against his share of the estate and the fees and
costs that the personal representative charged against the estate;
(2) order a “full investigation” into the personal representative and
direct that she be charged with several crimes; (3) “suspend any
further use” of the estate’s money; and (4) award him $1,000,000 as
“restitution for his belongings” lost in the fire, for “pain and
suffering from incarceration” caused by the personal representative,
and to cover his share of the estate.
¶ 11 For several reasons, we decline to address David’s arguments.
First, the opening brief does not comply with the Colorado Appellate
5 Rules. While we acknowledge that self-representation is difficult,
pro se parties are bound by the same rules, procedures, and law as
represented parties. Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. The
opening brief does not comply with C.A.R. 28 because it doesn’t
identify whether or where in the record the arguments are
preserved, include a clear and concise discussion of the grounds on
which David seeks relief, or provide any review standards or record
citations. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5), (a)(7)(A)-(B), (e). And though the brief
cites some legal authority, it primarily directs us to criminal
statutes that David believes the personal representative has
violated. Insofar as the brief references relevant probate law, it does
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24CA1383 Estate of Schafer 10-23-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1383 Adams County District Court No. 20PR30195 Honorable Sara Price, Magistrate
In re the Estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, a/k/a Llewellyn W. Schafer, a/k/a Llewellyn Schafer, deceased.
David L. Schafer,
Appellant,
v.
Kendra Knogge,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025
David L. Schafer, Pro Se
Schwartz, McMinimee & Andrew, LLC, Marcie R. McMinimee, Tyler C. McFarland, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 David L. Schafer appeals the district court’s order for final
settlement of the estate of Llewellyn Woodrow Schafer, his deceased
father. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Llewellyn died, David’s sister opened a probate case and
the court appointed her personal representative of the estate.1
¶3 Llewellyn’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided
among his seven children. The estate’s primary asset was real
property, which included a house and other buildings. At the time
Llewellyn died, David lived in the house. After David refused to
vacate, the personal representative retained counsel and began
eviction proceedings.
¶4 During this process, David set fire to the property, damaging
the house and other structures. For this conduct, David pleaded
guilty to first degree arson and received a six-year prison sentence.
¶5 The estate incurred about $35,000 in fees and costs related to
the eviction proceedings and property remediation. And while
insurance covered some of the property damage, it did not cover an
1 Because several parties have the same last name, we refer to
individuals by their first names. We mean no disrespect.
1 estimated $170,000 in repair costs for a damaged outbuilding. The
estate didn’t repair the outbuilding but sold the property “as is” at a
reduced price. The estate retained the insurance payment and sale
proceeds.
¶6 After selling the property, the personal representative filed a
petition for final settlement of the estate. Among other things, the
petition requested that the court offset against David’s share of the
estate the fees and costs related to the eviction proceedings and
property remediation ($35,000) and the estimated repair costs
($170,000). David and another sibling objected. Through counsel,
David challenged the offset of the estimated repair costs (but did
not appear to challenge the offset of the fees and costs).2
¶7 After a hearing, the district court issued a written order
(1) modifying the personal representative’s hourly rate for her
“executor work” (which reduced the requested fees and costs from
$35,000 to about $15,000) and (2) rejecting David’s objection to the
offset. The court found that the requested offset “properly
account[ed] for damages” that David caused to the estate, including
2 Though David didn’t object to the personal representative’s hourly
rate, his sibling did.
2 legal and repair costs. The court directed the personal
representative to file an amended petition reflecting the offset with
the modified rate.3
¶8 As directed, the personal representative filed an amended
petition for final settlement, but for reasons the record doesn’t
explain, the court didn’t enter a final settlement order at that time.
About a year later, David — now representing himself — filed a
“motion objecting to granting” the final settlement, raising a slew of
new and different objections to the petition. The district court
denied the motion, ruling that it was “unsupported by sufficient
and relevant facts and unwarranted by applicable law.” The court
then entered an order approving the amended petition for final
settlement of the estate. After deducting the approved offsets,
David received nothing from the estate.
II. Analysis
¶9 David appeals the order for final settlement. Because he is
self-represented, we broadly construe his filings to ensure he isn’t
3 David appealed the district court’s initial order directing the
personal representative to file an amended final petition, but this court dismissed that appeal for lack of a final, appealable judgment.
3 denied review of important issues because of his inability to
articulate his arguments like a lawyer. See Jones v. Williams, 2019
CO 61, ¶ 5. Doing that here, we understand David to argue that
• he was wrongfully evicted from the property;
• he did not set fire to the property and never admitted
liability for the property damage; instead, the personal
representative and other family members burned down the
house for the insurance money;
• the damage to the outbuilding was never proven and did not
affect the property’s sale price;
• he had a right to be present at the hearing on the petition
for final settlement of the estate, and his attorney’s
presence at the hearing did not waive that right;
• several of his constitutional rights were violated, including
his right to due process;
• the personal representative and other family members
“conspired” to forge Llewellyn’s will and “defraud” the
estate;
• the personal representative committed various crimes,
including theft, fraud, and forgery;
4 • the personal representative breached her fiduciary duty to
the estate by, among other things, incurring excessive
attorney fees and repair costs against the estate and by
charging excessive personal representative fees;
• the personal representative violated the will by refusing to
sell David the house; and
• the district court’s order is “flawed due to lack of competent
evidence.”
¶ 10 From all this, David asks us to (1) reverse the district court’s
order for final settlement of the estate, particularly those portions
involving the offset against his share of the estate and the fees and
costs that the personal representative charged against the estate;
(2) order a “full investigation” into the personal representative and
direct that she be charged with several crimes; (3) “suspend any
further use” of the estate’s money; and (4) award him $1,000,000 as
“restitution for his belongings” lost in the fire, for “pain and
suffering from incarceration” caused by the personal representative,
and to cover his share of the estate.
¶ 11 For several reasons, we decline to address David’s arguments.
First, the opening brief does not comply with the Colorado Appellate
5 Rules. While we acknowledge that self-representation is difficult,
pro se parties are bound by the same rules, procedures, and law as
represented parties. Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. The
opening brief does not comply with C.A.R. 28 because it doesn’t
identify whether or where in the record the arguments are
preserved, include a clear and concise discussion of the grounds on
which David seeks relief, or provide any review standards or record
citations. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5), (a)(7)(A)-(B), (e). And though the brief
cites some legal authority, it primarily directs us to criminal
statutes that David believes the personal representative has
violated. Insofar as the brief references relevant probate law, it does
so in the context of arguments that are conclusory, undeveloped,
and difficult to follow. Based on these deficiencies alone, we could
end our review here. See Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289,
291-92 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining to review contention because
opening brief advanced no “cogent argument” and violated C.A.R.
28); see also C.A.R. 38(a) (outlining possible sanctions for failure to
comply with the appellate rules).
¶ 12 Second, even considering the record, David’s appellate
contentions are largely unpreserved. Before the hearing on the
6 petition for final settlement, David’s counsel objected to the petition,
arguing that (1) David did not admit criminal liability for damage to
the outbuilding as part of his guilty plea; (2) the quoted repair costs
were insufficient to prove damage to the outbuilding; and (3) the
insurance payment fully compensated the estate for damage caused
to the house. The objection, however, did not raise the wrongful
eviction, fraud, forgery, conspiracy, fiduciary duty, and
constitutional claims now presented. Because they weren’t raised,
they are unpreserved. And we do not address unpreserved
arguments. In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 12.4
¶ 13 To the extent David presents arguments in his opening brief
about the outbuilding damage and repair costs that align with
specific objections raised in the district court before the hearing on
4 We recognize that David raised these new arguments in his pro se
“motion objecting to granting” the petition for final settlement filed a year after the hearing on the petition and the initial order directing the personal representative to file an amended petition with the modified hourly rate. But that motion is essentially a motion for reconsideration, and the district court wasn’t required to consider new arguments first raised in a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Lorenzen v. Pinnacol Assurance, 2019 COA 54, ¶ 18 n.3. Regardless, even if the arguments were properly preserved, we would not address them because they are conclusory, undeveloped, and without record support. See In re Estate of Liebe, 2023 COA 55, ¶ 19.
7 the final settlement, David doesn’t explain how or why the court
erred by finding that the outbuilding was damaged and the repair
costs were proper. And because the appellate record includes no
transcripts, we must presume that the evidence — including the
testimony the district court references in its initial order —
supports the court’s findings. See Marchant v. Boulder Cmty.
Health, Inc., 2018 COA 126M, ¶ 18 n.2. Without any identified legal
or factual errors, there’s nothing for us to review. See Middlemist v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, 958 P.2d 486, 495 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting the
appellant’s obligation to identify the specific errors and legal
authorities that would support reversal).
¶ 14 Finally, David requests relief that we cannot grant. Our only
role is to review the district court’s order for final settlement; we
cannot award civil damages or order a criminal investigation into
the personal representative. And because David presents no
preserved or developed argument explaining why the district court’s
order was wrong, we have no basis to disturb it. See Biel v. Alcott,
876 P.2d 60, 64 (Colo. App. 1993) (“An appealing party bears the
burden to provide supporting authority for contentions of error
8 asserted on appeal, and a failure to do so will result in an
affirmation of the judgment.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 15 We affirm the order for final settlement.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.