Estate of Sakas-Sluder

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1202
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1202 Estate of Sakas-Sluder 07-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1202 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22PR30962 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge

In re the Estate of Elena Sakas-Sluder, deceased.

Reed O’Brien,

Appellant,

v.

Regina G. O’Brien,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026

Reed O’Brien, Pro Se

Olsen & Mahoney, LLP, Kevin S. Mahoney, Andrea N. Mahoney, Glendale, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 If a decedent had executed a quitclaim deed giving her

daughter a joint-tenancy interest in a home before the decedent

passed, should the decedent’s estate be allowed to untimely contest

the deed and attempt to bring the home into probate? The district

court answered this question according to the facts established at

trial: No. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2016, decedent, Elena Sakas-Sluder, executed a quitclaim

deed that created a joint tenancy in her home between herself and

her daughter, appellee, Regina G. O’Brien.1 Years later, Sakas-

Sluder’s grandson, appellant, Reed O’Brien, and her former son-in-

law, Terrence O’Brien, helped Sakas-Sluder revise her will to devise

the home to Reed.

¶3 In 2022, Sakas-Sluder passed away, and Terrence initiated

formal probate proceedings. Terrence was appointed as the initial

personal representative. Reed was later appointed as the successor

personal representative before trial. In the probate case, Terrence

filed a petition, which he later amended, raising four claims against

1 To distinguish between individuals, we refer to the O’Brien family

members by their first names. In doing so, we mean no disrespect.

1 Regina: fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,

unjust enrichment, and civil theft. These claims challenged the

transfer of the home to Regina through her joint tenancy with

Sakas-Sluder, alleging that Regina had deceived Sakas-Sluder into

creating the joint tenancy to prevent the home from passing

through probate.

¶4 Regina moved to dismiss the claims against her under

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The district court initially dismissed three of the

claims as barred by the statute of limitations according to the

allegations in the petition, leaving the civil theft claim to proceed to

trial. But at trial, the court granted the personal representative’s

motion to reconsider, and the court reinstated the three dismissed

claims.

¶5 Following the trial, the court found in a written order that the

statutes of limitation did in fact bar all of the estate’s claims. The

court further addressed and denied each of the claims on their

merits.

II. Discussion

¶6 On appeal, Reed, as successor personal representative,

contends that the district court erred by (1) finding that statutes of

2 limitation barred the estate’s claims; (2) denying in the alternative

each of the estate’s claims on their merits; (3) precluding certain

evidence and admitting other evidence at trial; (4) exhibiting a

pattern of erroneous and belated rulings; (5) limiting the estate’s

time to present its case; and (6) denying his motion to intervene and

a petition he filed in his individual capacity. Also, both parties

request appellate attorney fees. We address each contention in

turn.

A. Statutes of Limitation

¶7 Reed contends that the record does not support the district

court’s finding that the applicable statutes of limitation bar the

estate’s claims against Regina. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 “We review a [district] court’s judgment entered following a

bench trial as a mixed question of fact and law.” Fear v. GEICO

Cas. Co., 2023 COA 31, ¶ 15, aff’d on other grounds, 2024 CO 77.

“We review legal conclusions de novo and will disturb factual

findings only if they are clearly erroneous and not supported by the

record.” Id. (citations omitted). When a party is pro se, as Reed is,

we construe that party’s filings broadly, but it is not our role to act

3 as an advocate for self-represented parties. See Johnson v.

McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.

¶9 “The credibility of witnesses, sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence, as well as any inferences or conclusions to

be drawn therefrom, are all within the province of the [district]

court.” Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA

177, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). “If the evidence is conflicting, we may

not substitute our own conclusions for those of the [district] court

merely because there may be credible evidence supporting a

different result.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC v. Giberson Ltd. P’ship, LLLP,

2024 COA 125, ¶ 66.

¶ 10 When a claim accrues and whether it is barred by a statute of

limitations are questions of fact. Jackson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,

258 P.3d 328, 332 (Colo. App. 2011); see also Black v. Black, 2018

COA 7, ¶ 87 (“The date a claim accrues is a question of fact that we

review for clear error.”). “[T]he statute of limitations does not begin

to run until the cause of action has accrued . . . .” Jones v. Cox,

828 P.2d 218, 223 (Colo. 1992).

¶ 11 A claim accrues when the relevant information was known or

should have been known through reasonable diligence. See

4 § 13-80-108(1), (3), (6), C.R.S. 2025. Under their respective

statutes of limitation, the claims of fraudulent misrepresentation,

breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment must be

commenced within three years of their accrual. § 13-80-101(1)(a),

(c), (f), C.R.S. 2025; see Chidester v. E. Gas & Fuel Assocs., 859

P.2d 222, 228 (Colo. App. 1992) (fraud); Tisch v. Tisch, 2019 COA

41, ¶ 37 (breach of fiduciary duty); Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d

428, 437 (Colo. App. 2011) (unjust enrichment). The claim of civil

theft must be brought within two years. § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.

2025; see Black, ¶ 87.

2. Additional Facts

¶ 12 In his 2022 petition, Reed alleged that Regina had deceived

Sakas-Sluder into executing the quitclaim deed and creating a joint

tenancy by telling Sakas-Sluder that the joint tenancy would

provide tax advantages. According to Reed, Sakas-Sluder was

“unaware of the rights she signed to Regina” until Reed and

Terrence put Sakas-Sluder in contact with an attorney in 2020.

Not until that consultation did Sakas-Sluder allegedly learn that the

home would, upon her death, transfer in its entirety to Regina

outside of probate.

5 ¶ 13 However, Regina presented at trial the following testimony to

support the conclusion that Sakas-Sluder had executed the

quitclaim deed in 2016 with the intent of transferring the home to

Regina after Sakas-Sluder died:

• Regina testified that Sakas-Sluder had said that she wanted

to leave Regina the home when Sakas-Sluder died, and they

had discussed doing so through a quitclaim deed.

• Regina’s daughter testified that, before 2016, Sakas-Sluder

and Regina had several discussions about executing

paperwork to ensure that the home transferred to Regina

when Sakas-Sluder died.

• Three disinterested witnesses testified that Sakas-Sluder

had told each of them over the course of many years —

including from around 2016 until before 2020 — that she

wanted to leave the home to Regina.

• Regina and Regina’s daughter testified that Sakas-Sluder’s

husband had used a quitclaim deed to pass his home to

Regina’s sister upon his death in approximately 2007.

• One of the disinterested witnesses testified that before 2016

she had discussed with Sakas-Sluder how the witness’s

6 father had added the witness to his home’s title to allow her

to acquire the home when he died, and not long after that

discussion, Sakas-Sluder told the witness that she was

leaving the home to Regina.

• Sakas-Sluder executed a new will in 2019, giving half of her

estate to Regina and half to Regina’s sister.

• Regina’s daughter and one of the disinterested witnesses

testified that Sakas-Sluder described her estate planning

intent as the home going to Regina and a pension going to

Regina’s sister.

The court found these witnesses credible.

¶ 14 Reed also testified that before 2016 he had heard Sakas-

Sluder say multiple times, “[Regina] gets the house.” Further, the

quitclaim deed expressly stated that Sakas-Sluder conveyed the

home to herself and Regina “in joint tenancy.”

¶ 15 Regarding the execution of the deed itself, the testimony

showed that Regina delivered the unsigned but partially filled out

quitclaim deed to Reed. At Regina’s direction, Reed wrote on the

deed the legal description of the home and that it was being granted

in joint tenancy. Reed then gave the deed to Sakas-Sluder, she

7 signed it in front of a notary with Reed present, and Reed had the

signed deed recorded. Lastly, there was no evidence that Sakas-

Sluder lacked capacity in 2016.

¶ 16 The district court found Regina, her daughter, and the

disinterested witnesses to be credible. But the court did not find

credible the testimony given by Reed, Reed’s cousin, and Terrance

suggesting that Sakas-Sluder didn’t understand the implications of

the quitclaim deed. After making these determinations, and upon

weighing the evidence, the court found that Sakas-Sluder “knew

that [she] and Regina jointly owned the [home] when she signed the

[d]eed [in] 2016.” The court therefore found “for purposes of the

[s]tatute of [l]imitations that [Sakas-Sluder] knew of the transfer

and intended that it would cause the [home] to be Regina’s [in]

2016 when she signed the [d]eed.”

3. The Estate’s Claims Are Barred by the Statutes of Limitation

¶ 17 Reed asserts that the record fails to support the district court’s

findings because there is a lack of evidence showing that Sakas-

Sluder was aware of the ramifications of the joint tenancy when she

executed the quitclaim deed. Thus, according to the estate, the

8 claims couldn’t accrue until 2020 when she came to appreciate that

the home would pass outside of probate.

¶ 18 As a preliminary matter, we interpret the district court’s

findings made “for purposes of the statute of limitations” as

implicitly ruling that the claims were barred. But to the extent this

implication is ambiguous, it doesn’t impact our disposition because

we can affirm on any grounds supported by the record. See Migoya

v. Wheeler, 2024 COA 124, ¶ 40.

¶ 19 Here, the record supports the conclusion that Sakas-Sluder

knew or should have known of the alleged underlying injuries for

each claim when she executed the deed in 2016. See

§ 13-80-108(1), (3), (6). In the petition, Reed alleged that Regina

committed the following acts to establish each of his claims.

• Fraudulent Misrepresentation: “Regina deceived [Sakas-

Sluder] into believing that her execution of the [d]eed would

be helpful for tax purposes.” That misrepresentation

caused Sakas-Sluder to execute the quitclaim deed and

transfer the home without consideration.

• Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Regina was allegedly acting in a

fiduciary capacity as financial agent according to a general

9 power of attorney. She breached her duty by facilitating the

execution of the quitclaim deed through the fraudulent

misrepresentation that the quitclaim deed would provide

Sakas-Sluder a tax advantage, and she didn’t tell Sakas-

Sluder of the implications that the transfer of the home to

Regina would have.

• Civil Theft: Regina intentionally obtained control of the

home by fraudulently misrepresenting to Sakas-Sluder that

the execution of the quitclaim deed would provide Sakas-

Sluder with tax advantages.

• Unjust Enrichment: Regina unjustly received the benefit of

having the home transfer to her upon Sakas-Sluder’s death,

which deprived Sakas-Sluder of distributing the home

through her will.

¶ 20 But the record doesn’t support those claims. Testimony of

multiple witnesses, whom the district court found credible,

demonstrated that she intended to execute the quitclaim deed as a

way of transferring the home after her death to Regina. As noted

above, Sakas-Sluder had discussed this intent with others on

multiple occasions. And she had — at the least — a basic

10 understanding of the effects the deed would have on her interests in

her home because she knew of similar processes completed by her

husband and a friend’s father to transfer property through a deed

instead of a will.

¶ 21 The evidence further supports the conclusion that Sakas-

Sluder signed the deed voluntarily without Regina’s direct

participation and that she understood the deed would create a joint

tenancy by its plain language and through her earlier dealings. By

contrast, the estate presented no evidence that Sakas-Sluder lacked

capacity in 2016. Indeed, the court found, “Although [Sakas-

Sluder] at times had medical complications in the years following

the signing of the [d]eed there is nothing before the [c]ourt

suggesting [she], as a result of those medical complications, was

unable to act (or instruct her [p]ower of [a]ttorney to act) with

regard to challenging the [d]eed.”2 (Emphasis added.)

¶ 22 The court’s findings, which have record support, also support

its conclusion that Sakas-Sluder intended to transfer her interest in

2 The record indicates that Regina had concerns about Sakas-

Sluder’s capacity starting around 2020, but Sakas-Sluder declined to take cognitive assessment tests. In 2021, she suffered a stroke several months before she died.

11 the home to Regina, and Sakas-Sluder knew that the deed fulfilled

her intent by creating a joint tenancy. Therefore, when she

executed the quitclaim deed, Sakas-Sluder knew or should have

known of the following pieces of information that establish the

accrual date for each of the estate’s claims as occurring in 2016.

• Fraudulent Misrepresentation: “[T]he exercise of proper

prudence and diligence, would enable [Sakas-Sluder in

2016] to discover the fraud” that the deed wouldn’t be

helpful for tax purpose as allegedly misrepresented by

Regina. Chidester, 859 P.2d at 228.

• Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Sakas-Sluder knew in 2016 that

Regina allegedly “engaged in wrongful conduct” while acting

under a power of attorney by fraudulently misrepresenting

that the quitclaim deed would provide tax advantages and

not telling Sakas-Sluder of the implications of the joint

tenancy, and “that wrongful conduct caused some

damages” by preventing the home from being distributed

12 according to Sakas-Sluder’s last will.3 Prospect Dev. Co. v.

Holland & Knight, LLP, 2018 COA 107, ¶ 26.

• Civil Theft: In 2016, “the injury and its cause” that Regina

had obtained control of the home by fraudulently

misrepresenting to Sakas-Sluder that the quitclaim deed

would provide tax advantages were “known or should have

been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Black,

¶ 87 (quoting § 13-80-108(1)).

• Unjust Enrichment: 2016 is when Sakas-Sluder

“discover[ed], or through the exercise of reasonable diligence

should [have] discover[ed],” that Regina had received the

3 We note that breach of fiduciary duty has a lower standard of

inquiry than that of other claims. Fiscus v. Liberty Mortg. Corp., 2014 COA 79, ¶ 19 (“[I]n a fiduciary relationship . . . , ‘facts which would ordinarily require investigation may not excite suspicion, and the same degree of diligence is not required.’” (citation omitted)), aff’d on other grounds, 2016 CO 31. To the extent that Reed argues that this standard applies here, there is no evidence that Regina was acting in her fiduciary capacity simply by having Reed deliver the deed to Sakas-Sluder. Besides, even under a lowered standard, Sakas-Sluder had sufficient notice for accrual based on the facts supported in the record, as discussed above. See Hansen v. Lederman, 759 P.2d 810, 812 (Colo. App. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim accrued when he had “notice of facts which, in spite of the fiduciary relationship, gave rise to his duty of reasonable inquiry and enabled him to discover [the fiduciary’s] fraud against [them]”).

13 benefit of the home transferring to her upon Sakas-Sluder’s

death, and that benefit to Regina deprived Sakas-Sluder of

passing the home through her will. Sterenbuch, 266 P.3d at

437 (citation omitted); see also Bd. of Governors of Colo.

State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 35 (elements for

unjust enrichment).

¶ 23 In addition to these facts, the district court’s findings are fatal

to the estate’s claims: “The [district court] therefore f[ound] for

purposes of the [s]tatute of [l]imitations that [Sakas-Sluder] knew of

the transfer and intended that it would cause the [home] to be

Regina’s on January 15, 2016[,] when she signed the [d]eed in front

of the Notary Public.” The district court did not clearly err in its

findings. The record supports the findings that the claims in the

estate’s 2022 petition accrued in 2016, meaning that the claims

were barred by the two- and three-year statutes of limitation. See

Fear, ¶ 15.

¶ 24 Reed asserts that the claims couldn’t accrue until Sakas-

Sluder consulted an attorney about the precise ramifications of a

joint tenancy in 2020. But Reed’s assertion fails because the

statute of limitations “does not reward denial or self-induced

14 ignorance.” Olson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 P.3d 849,

854 (Colo. App. 2007) (citation omitted). Even if we accept that

Sakas-Sluder did not appreciate the precise contours of the joint

tenancy or the tax ramifications, these facts are not enough to

overcome the court’s finding that Sakas-Sluder knowingly executed

the deed intending it to transfer the home to Regina.

¶ 25 Further, the record shows that as of 2016 Sakas-Sluder had a

Lithuanian college degree, had an associate degree from a

community college in the United States, spoke several languages,

had a successful career as a dietician, had previously handled her

own real estate transactions, and handled all her own finances.

Thus, Sakas-Sluder had the intellectual capability and relevant

experience to understand the effects of the quitclaim deed. So the

language of the deed, her intent to transfer the home to Regina, and

her familiarity with similar transactions sufficiently established that

someone of her capability could, through the exercise reasonable

diligence, know about the ramifications of the joint tenancy in

2016. Consequently, her knowledge for accrual purposes did not

depend on her consultation with an attorney in 2020. See id. at

854-55 (holding that an accrual depends on facts pertinent to the

15 injury, not on the date a claimant consults an attorney to discover if

they have an actionable claim).

4. We Decline to Address the Estate’s Merits and Evidentiary Contentions

¶ 26 Because we have determined that the statutes of limitation

barred the claims, we need not address the estate’s contention that

the district court’s ruling on the merits of the estate’s claims

misapplied the law and lacked evidentiary support. See Migoya,

¶ 40.

¶ 27 We further reject the estate’s contention that the district court

abused its discretion at trial. The estate claims that the court erred

by excluding an adult protective services report from 2020,

precluding portions of a text chain between Regina and Reed from

2021, and admitting an excited utterance regarding Reed attacking

and choking his sister — an event unrelated to Sakas-Sluder or her

home — which occurred at an unspecified time.4 This evidence all

related to events that occurred years after the 2016 execution of the

quitclaim deed. Accordingly, this evidence was not relevant to —

and indeed had no connection to — the accrual of the claims.

4 On appeal, the estate alleges that the assault occurred in 2020.

16 Therefore, even if we were to assume that the court erred in any of

these decisions, any such errors would be harmless. See C.A.R.

35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or defect not

affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”).

B. The District Court’s Pattern of Conduct

¶ 28 Reed contends that the district court prejudiced him through a

pattern of erroneous and biased rulings. Reed did not preserve this

issue, but he asks us to review under plain error.

¶ 29 “[P]lain error review in civil cases applies only in unusual or

special circumstances and, even then, ‘only “when necessary to

avert unequivocal and manifest injustice.”’” Caylao-Do v. Logue,

2025 COA 42, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). Here, Reed casts aspersions

on the district court and raises generalized disagreements with the

court’s evidentiary rulings. But our review of the record shows that

the court acted competently, fairly, and patiently while issuing its

rulings with reasonable diligence and due consideration for both

parties. Therefore, we perceive no unusual or special

circumstances that would justify applying plain error review. See

id.

17 C. Trial Time Limits

¶ 30 Reed contends that the district court abused its discretion by

providing inadequate time at trial for the estate to present its case.

We are unpersuaded.

¶ 31 We review whether time limits violated a party’s due process

rights for an abuse of discretion. Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d

1097, 1102 (Colo. App. 2010). “A court abuses its discretion when

it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner, or

when it misconstrues or misapplies the law.” In re Marriage of

Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 31.

¶ 32 “[A] court may set a time limit on a hearing from the outset

and monitor the parties’ use of their time during the hearing.” Id.

at ¶ 30. Because due process is implicated, we employ a level of

heightened scrutiny to discern whether a district court’s time limits

were an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 31. We initially determine

whether the court imposed inadequate limits at the outset of the

proceeding. Id. If it didn’t, we then decide whether developments

during the proceeding caused the limits to become inadequate. Id.

We look at multiple enumerated factors in reviewing whether time

18 limits became inadequate, including if “the complaining party made

a sufficiently detailed proffer in requesting extra time.” Maloney,

251 P.3d at 1103.

2. The Imposed Time Limits Were Not an Abuse of Discretion

¶ 33 At the outset of the case, the personal representative filed an

unopposed motion for a three-day trial. The court denied the

motion in part and scheduled the trial for two days. This meant the

court ultimately afforded the parties at trial six and a half hours

each.5 At trial, Reed exhausted his time first — although the court

permitted him to continue to raise objections. However, Reed didn’t

object to the time limits at trial or provide an offer of proof related to

unpresented evidence.

¶ 34 On appeal, Reed broadly asserts that the imposed time limits

made the trial unfeasible and unfair, and he claims that the limits

prevented the calling of unspecified witnesses to authenticate

5 At the start of trial, the district court took half a day to address

the personal representative’s motion to reconsider the court’s pretrial order granting in part Regina’s motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion to reconsider and scheduled an additional day for trial to accommodate the time spent deliberating, adding for the parties “an hour or so extra time” to the amount originally scheduled.

19 unspecified documents. However, he still fails to “make a

‘sufficiently detailed proffer’ identifying ‘the evidence that [was] . . .

excluded.’” In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 47 (quoting

Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1103, 1105). Moreover, he doesn’t explain

how the time allotted was inadequate at the outset, illustrate how

the time allotted became inadequate during the course of the

proceedings, or address any of the factors relevant to the adequacy

of time limits. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1102-03. Without

providing an offer of proof at trial, specifically identifying the

evidence on appeal, or establishing specific inadequacies, Reed fails

to show that the court abused its discretion. See Wiggs, ¶ 47; cf. In

re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 310 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding

that a time limit of seven hours per side was not an abuse of

discretion).

D. Reed’s Individual Motion to Intervene and Petition

¶ 35 Recall that Terrence was the estate’s initial personal

representative pretrial. In 2024, while Terrence was still the

personal representative, Reed moved to intervene on his own behalf

and petitioned for individual relief by raising the same four claims

20 that the estate’s 2022 petition raised.6 The district court denied the

motion to intervene as moot and dismissed the petition under Rule

12(b)(5) as barred by the statutes of limitation.

¶ 36 On appeal, Reed’s challenges to the district court’s rulings

seemingly conflate the motion to intervene and the petition. But we

address each pleading separately.

1. Reed’s Motion to Intervene Was Moot

¶ 37 As best we can discern, Reed contends that the district court

erred by denying his motion to intervene because the motion

“should have been considered timely” as he submitted it “before the

case management conference and before trial was set.”

¶ 38 We reject this contention because the court denied the motion

to intervene as moot, clarifying that Reed “is an interested person”

who “may participate in this action without the need to intervene.”

See § 15-10-201(27), C.R.S. 2025 (defining “interested person” as

including heirs and beneficiaries). And the court granted Reed the

relief sought in his motion — to have the court address his

6 Distinct from the estate’s petition, Reed’s petition asked for

punitive damages.

21 petition — undermining Reed’s assertions on appeal.7 See Black,

¶¶ 76-77 (holding that a district court has broad authority to

resolve disputes logically related to the estate).

2. Reed’s 2024 Petition Was Properly Dismissed

¶ 39 Next, Reed contends that the district court erred by applying

the statutes of limitation to dismiss the claims in his 2024 petition.

This is error, Reed claims, because the petition related back under

C.R.C.P. 15(c) to the estate’s 2022 petition.8

a. Standard of Review

¶ 40 We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(5), and we apply the same standards as the

district court. Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc.,

2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5), a

claimant must plead sufficient facts that suggest plausible grounds

7 We further note that Reed’s motion to intervene stated that

Terrence’s appointment as personal representative didn’t adequately represent Reed’s interest. But at trial, the district court permitted Terrence to resign and appointed Reed to serve as the personal representative. The court’s appointment of Reed as successor personal representative thus necessarily avoided the prejudice alleged in Reed’s motion to intervene. See C.A.R. 35(c).

8 The estate amended its petition in 2024.

22 to support a claim for relief. Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24; Froid

v. Zacheis, 2021 COA 74, ¶ 29.

¶ 41 In conducting our review, “[w]e accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to

the [claimant], but we are not required to accept bare legal

conclusions as true.” Norton, ¶ 7. We may consider only “facts

alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or

incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice.”

Id. We will uphold a district court order granting a Rule 12(b)(5)

motion only if the claimant’s factual allegations don’t support the

claim for relief as a matter of law. Norton, ¶ 7.

b. Additional Facts

¶ 42 In pertinent part, Reed’s 2024 petition alleged that Sakas-

Sluder “was unaware of the rights she signed to Regina until

[Sakas-Sluder] met with [an attorney] and [Terrence] in October of

2020.” After the district court allowed Reed to file his petition as an

interested party, Regina moved under Rule 12(b)(5) to dismiss his

claims. The court granted the motion because the claims didn’t

allegedly accrue until 2020, resulting in the statutes of limitation

23 barring Reed’s claims. The court awarded Regina reasonable

attorney fees associated with her motion to dismiss against Reed.

c. The Statutes of Limitation Barred Reed’s Claims

¶ 43 Taking the allegations in Reed’s 2024 petition as true, as we

must in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), Reed’s

claims accrued when Sakas-Sluder learned of the legal

ramifications of the quitclaim deed during her attorney consultation

in 2020. As discussed supra Part II.A.3, there is a three-year

statute of limitations for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of

fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment, and there is a two-year

statute of limitations for civil theft. Therefore, the statutes of

limitation bar Reed’s 2024 petition because he filed it four years

after the claims accrued. See § 13-80-101(1)(a), (c), (f);

§ 13-80-102(1)(a); § 13-80-108(1), (3), (6), (8).

¶ 44 We are unpersuaded by Reed’s claim that Rule 15(c) allows his

2024 petition to relate back to the estate’s 2020 petition. The

relation back doctrine under Rule 15(c) applies to amendments, and

24 Reed’s petition didn’t amend the 2020 (or any other) petition.9 See

Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co., 262 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Colo. App.

2011) (“The plain language of [Rule 15(c)] clearly provides that it

applies only to the amendment of a pleading in an ongoing

action . . . .”); Subryan v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 789 P.2d 472,

475 (Colo. App. 1989) (“[Rule] 15(c) allows an amended pleading to

relate back to the date of the original pleading under certain

circumstances.”); § 15-12-107(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (noting that each

proceeding before the court is independent of every other

proceeding involving the same estate).

¶ 45 Reed further contests the district court’s award of attorney

fees to Regina for her successful motion to dismiss. He claims that

the award was unwarranted because his petition wasn’t frivolous

and fees cannot be awarded based on a dismissal under the

statutes of limitation.

9 Within his C.R.C.P. 15(c) contention, Reed cites federal case law,

which states in part that the federal rules permit the “addition of a party who has a close identity of interest with the old party.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. U.S., for Use of Constr. Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967). To the extent Reed contends that his being an additional party substituted into the case allowed his petition to relate back, his contention fails. The federal law cited addresses substitutions of defendants, which is inapposite here.

25 ¶ 46 However, we reject Reed’s contention because Regina

successfully obtaining dismissal of Reed’s tort claims under Rule

12(b)(5) meant the award of fees was mandatory. See

§ 13-17-201(1), C.R.S. 2025. And contrary to Reed’s assertions, the

fees remain mandatory even if the court based the dismissal on the

statutes of limitation.10 See Crandall v. City & County of Denver,

238 P.3d 659, 665 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an award of attorney

fees is mandatory without exception for a “plaintiff’s tort action . . .

dismissed pre-trial on a [Rule] 12(b) motion to dismiss”).

E. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 47 We deny Reed’s novel request for pro se appellate attorney fees

because he provides no factual or legal basis for such an award.

See C.A.R. 39.1. Moreover, he does not prevail in this appeal.

10 Reed misconstrues the record when he claims opposing counsel

conceded at trial that the court cannot use the statutes of limitation to grant a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. Reed refers to counsel stating, “[The estate] filed motions to reconsider based on . . . it’s a 12(b)(5) motion, therefore, [the court] can’t dismiss for statute of limitations, but you treat it as a judgment on the pleadings.” Review of the record shows that counsel’s statement referred to a pending motion for summary judgment brought against the estate. Regarding the motion to dismiss brought against Reed’s petition, counsel said, “Reed’s entire petition is still dismissed because adding a new party plaintiff, you cannot do that under C.R.C.P. 15(c).” (Emphasis added.)

26 ¶ 48 Under C.A.R. 39.1 and C.A.R. 39(a), Regina requests appellate

attorney fees and costs. As discussed, Regina successfully moved

to dismiss Reed’s tort claims, resulting in a mandatory award of

attorney fees. See § 13-17-201(1); Crandall, 238 P.3d at 665.

Because she successfully defended this dismissal on appeal, she is

entitled to an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees. Mosley v.

Daves, 2025 COA 80, ¶ 60. And because we affirm the order, she is

also entitled to her costs on appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a).

III. Disposition

¶ 49 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district

court to determine the amount for an award of reasonable appellate

attorney fees and costs as directed in this opinion. See C.A.R. 39.1.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.