Estate of Ruben Guzman v. County of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 29, 2025
Docket5:24-cv-01199
StatusUnknown

This text of Estate of Ruben Guzman v. County of Riverside (Estate of Ruben Guzman v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Ruben Guzman v. County of Riverside, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 ESTATE OF RUBEN GUZMAN, by Case No. 5:24-cv-01199-SSS-DTB 12 and through successor in interest Ruben Guzman, Sr., individually, 13 Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] STIPULATED 14 PROTECTIVE ORDER v. 15 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a public 16 entity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 17 SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO, in his individual and official capacities; 18 EDWARD DELGADO; JAMES KRACHMER; MARTIN TOCHTROP; 19 and DOES 1 through 10, individually, jointly and severally, 20 Defendants. 21

22 TO THE HONORABLE COURT: 23 By and through their counsel of record in this action, plaintiff ESTATE OF RUBEN 24 GUZMAN, by and through successor in interest Ruben Guzman, Sr., individually, 25 (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”) and defendants COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, 26 a public entity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF 27 CHAD BIANCO, in his individual and official capacities; EDWARD DELGADO; 1 JAMES KRACHMER; MARTIN TOCHTROP; and DOES 1 through 10, 2 individually, jointly and severally (hereinafter referred to collectively as 3 “Defendants”) – the parties – hereby stipulate for the purpose of jointly requesting 4 that the honorable Court enter a protective order re confidential documents in this 5 matter [and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, 7, and 26, as well as U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. 6 Cal., Local Rules 7-1 and 52-4.1; and any applicable Orders of the Court] – as 7 follows: 8 1. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 9 1.1. Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 10 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 11 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer 12 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 13 following reasons. 14 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy 15 in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 16 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 17 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 18 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 19 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 20 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 21 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] 22 privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 23 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights 24 [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code 25 §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 26 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of 27 non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 1 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 2 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 3 (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 4 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 5 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 6 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 7 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal 8 Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 9 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 10 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa 11 Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 12 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 13 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); 14 Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. 15 v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants 16 further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the 17 public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 18 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 19 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements 20 and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of 21 open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 22 misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement 23 any remedial measures that may be required. 24 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 25 as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the 26 fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 27 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 1 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 2 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 3 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 4 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving 5 the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 6 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 7 preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 8 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 9 result in litigation. 10 1.2. Plaintiff does not agree with and does not stipulate to Defendants’ 11 contentions herein above, and nothing in this Stipulation or its associated Order shall 12 resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal statements and 13 claimed privileges set forth above. 14 However, plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as 15 to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further burden 16 the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, absent this 17 Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege 18 interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulation and its associated 19 Protective Order may avoid such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery 20 with reduced risk that privileged and/or sensitive/confidential information will 21 become matters of public record. 22 1.3. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need 23 for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and autopsy 24 photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. Because of these 25 sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these documents rather than a private 26 agreement between the parties. 27 1.4. The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and hereby 1 documents consistent with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation. However, the 2 entry of a Protective Order by the Court pursuant to this Stipulation shall not be 3 construed as any ruling by the Court on the aforementioned legal statements or 4 privilege claims in this section (§ 1), nor shall this section be construed as part of any 5 such Court Order. 6 A.

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Estate of Ruben Guzman v. County of Riverside, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-ruben-guzman-v-county-of-riverside-cacd-2025.