06/30/2026
DA 25-0437 Case Number: DA 25-0437
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 136
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANN LAFFERTY PFEIFER-MURPHY,
Deceased.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, In and For the County of Chouteau, Cause No. DV-20-022 Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Paul A. Sandry, Johnson, Berg, & Saxby, PLLP, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Michelle K. Ostrye, Silverman Law Office, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 11, 2026
Decided: June 30, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The Cook-Reynolds Partnership and Linda Reynolds (collectively, the Partnership
or CRP) appeal the Twelfth Judicial District Court’s denial of their M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion seeking relief from an Idaho judgment registered in Montana.1 We restate and
address the following issue:
Whether the District Court erred by denying the Partnership’s motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief from a foreign judgment.
¶2 We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Linda Reynolds (Linda) and Gerald Cook (Gerald) each inherited a one-half interest
in certain Chouteau County farmland (Chouteau Property) after their mother died in 1986.
In 1992, Linda and Gerald formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership for the purpose of
“conducting the business of leasing and operating farm land and Conservation Reserve
Program land in Chouteau County, Montana.” Linda and Gerald retained ownership of the
Chouteau Property as equal cotenants while allowing the Partnership to lease the land to
third parties. CRP’s Partnership Agreement specifies that partnership management “shall
be by Linda Reynolds as the managing partner” and assigns Linda decision-making
authority regarding the care and leasing arrangements of the land, growing crops, land
1 The Estate suggests that Linda Reynolds improperly joined the District Court litigation and asks us to dismiss her individual appeal because the Idaho judgment granted no relief against her personally. Because the Estate does not provide any legal support or develop this argument, we decline to distinguish between the Appellants’ arguments. See Est. of Harris v. Reilly, 2025 MT 126, ¶ 16, 422 Mont. 383, 570 P.3d 552 (noting Court’s lack of obligation to develop arguments on a party’s behalf). 2 management, and conservation program participation. In June 2008, Linda and Gerald
conveyed their respective interests in the Chouteau Property to the Cook-Reynolds
Partnership, which continues to operate long-term agricultural leases. The Partnership
Agreement does not grant Gerald authority to encumber or convey any interest in CRP’s
property. The Partnership’s principal place of business has been continuously located in
Montana, although Gerald lives in Idaho.
¶4 In 2007, Gerald’s wife, Karin Cook (Karin), was appointed personal representative
of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy (the Estate) in probate proceedings before
the Idaho First Judicial District Court (Idaho Court). Between 2007 and 2019, Karin
breached her trustee and fiduciary obligations to the Estate by misappropriating hundreds
of thousands of dollars from the Estate to benefit herself, Gerald, and Pneumex, Inc., a
company they owned. Karin misappropriated these funds, in part, by making loans from
the Estate to Pneumex, Inc., and issuing stock in Pneumex, Inc., to the Estate to cover the
principal and interest.
¶5 In 2008 and 2014, Karin and Gerald executed two promissory notes in which Gerald
purported to pledge the proceeds from selling unspecified land in Chouteau County in order
to repay funds borrowed from the Estate. Gerald signed both promissory notes as “Gerry
Cook,” and neither note references the Cook-Reynolds Partnership. Executed on Pneumex
letterhead, the 2008 note promised that “Gerry Cooks [sic] land in Chouteau County and
the Cooks residence in Sandpoint Id [sic] will be liquidated” to repay Estate money
invested in Pneumex, Inc. The 2014 promissory note stated that principal and interest on
a loan from the Estate “shall be payable from the proceeds of the sale of real property
3 consisting of two 320 acre parcels located in Chouteau County, Montana,” which was “to
be completed within 60 days of the date of this note.”
¶6 On March 6, 2020, the Estate’s remaining beneficiaries (Beneficiaries) petitioned
the Idaho Court supervising the probate proceedings to restrain Karin from exercising her
personal representative powers until she posted a bond to secure the Estate. The
Beneficiaries also asked the Idaho Court to restrain Karin, Gerald, Pneumex, Inc., and the
Partnership from disposing of or further encumbering their assets to protect the Estate’s
ability to recover any misappropriated funds. The Beneficiaries served their petition and
supporting memorandum (collectively, the Petition) on “Gerald Cook personally and as
Partner: Cook-Reynolds Partnership” to Gerald’s Pneumex e-mail address and by mail to
Gerald’s residential address in Idaho. The Petition alleged that “Gerald Cook pledged
property owned by the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to which he holds a partial interest,”
but did not identify wrongdoing by the Partnership itself or indicate that the Partnership
was named an interested person in the Estate.
¶7 On March 7, 2020, a paralegal for Beneficiaries’ counsel emailed Linda “as a
courtesy” to inform her of the court filings, “which may impact the Cook-Reynolds
Partnership and the property it owns in Montana.” Counsel apparently attached copies of
the Beneficiaries’ Petition, a proposed restraining order, and a hearing notice.2 The email
2 The proposed restraining order and hearing notice do not appear in the record before the District Court. The Estate and the Partnership do not appear to dispute whether these documents were actually attached to the March 7 email. The Beneficiaries’ Petition was not officially filed with the Idaho Court until March 9, 2020, so it is unlikely that the hearing notice attached to the March 7 email was issued by the Idaho Court. 4 continued, “It would seem real estate owned by the Partnership was pledged by Gerald
Cook as collateral for loans Gerald Cook, Karin Cook and Pneumex Inc., took from the
estate of Mrs. Ann Lafferty Pfeiffer-Murphy [sic].” On March 12, 2020, Linda responded,
“Yes, I have received your email. Thank you, . . . .”
¶8 On March 19, 2020, the Idaho Court held an emergency hearing on Beneficiaries’
Petition. According to the hearing minutes, Gerald appeared as the “husband of Karin
Cook, PR” and argued that Karin and he received insufficient notice of the hearing to obtain
counsel.3 The minutes do not reference the Partnership at all. The Idaho Court restrained
Karin, Gerald, Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership from disposing of or encumbering their
assets until Karin posted a bond. The restraining order was served on Gerald personally
and as partner of CRP through his Pneumex e-mail address and by mail at his Idaho
address; Linda was not served.
¶9 On March 20, 2020, the Beneficiaries’ counsel emailed Linda to inform her of the
Idaho Court’s orders “requiring Karin Cook to post a bond and restraining the personal
representative and others.” The email explained, “Included in the order is a restrainment
[sic] on property of the Cook-Reynolds Partnership. You will note while reading the order
that it is in effect only until such time as Mrs. Cook posts a bond to secure the estate.”
Counsel apparently attached copies of the Idaho Court’s hearing minutes, restraining order,
and order to post bond.
3 The parties did not provide a transcript of the Idaho Court’s hearing, but the hearing minutes are part of the District Court’s record. 5 ¶10 In August 2020, Karin and Gerald entered into a Confidential Settlement Agreement
with the Estate and its Beneficiaries, confessing to a $1,072,944.78 judgment. Gerald
purported to execute the confession on CRP’s behalf, thereby including the Partnership as
a judgment debtor jointly and severally responsible for the total judgment. Pursuant to the
Confidential Settlement Agreement, Karin and Gerald executed a Stipulation for Entry of
Order of Judgment (Stipulation) with the other judgment debtors, the Estate, and the
Beneficiaries. In the Stipulation, the parties jointly stated that the Idaho Court had
jurisdiction in the matter and waived any right to appear or to plead further in favor of the
Idaho Court entering judgment without a hearing. Gerald signed the Confidential
Settlement Agreement and the Stipulation in his individual capacity, as president of
Pneumex, Inc., and another Idaho corporation, and as “General Partner, Cook-Reynolds
Partnership.”
¶11 On September 4, 2020, the Idaho Court entered a judgment pursuant to the
Stipulation in the total amount of $1,072,944.78 in favor of the Estate against the
Partnership and others (Idaho Judgment). The appended Certificate of Service indicates
that a copy of the judgment was mailed to the Partnership at Linda’s Montana residential
address. On September 11, 2020, the Beneficiaries domesticated the Idaho Judgment by
filing a copy in the Montana Twelfth Judicial District Court (District Court).
¶12 On December 18, 2024, the Estate and its Beneficiaries applied to the District Court
for a writ of execution of the domesticated Idaho Judgment against the Partnership. By
December 31, 2024, Linda engaged counsel on the Partnership’s behalf to challenge the
Idaho Judgment. On January 2, 2025, the Partnership moved to quash the writ of execution
6 and asked the District Court to declare the Idaho Judgment void for lack of personal
jurisdiction. On February 4, 2025, the Partnership moved to vacate the Idaho Judgment as
void for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and on other Rule 60
grounds.
¶13 On May 6, 2025, the District Court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion. Linda
testified that the Partnership had never conducted any business in Idaho, with Karin, or
with the Estate. Linda testified that the Partnership never benefited from and had no
knowledge of Karin’s misappropriation of Estate assets. Linda attested that the Partnership
did not pledge its Chouteau Property to the Estate and that she had only authorized two
mortgages against the Chouteau Property, which Linda and Gerald both executed as
partners in September 2014. Linda testified that she was not served a complaint or
summons related to the Idaho probate proceedings, and that she remained unaware of the
Idaho Judgment until the Estate attempted to execute it against the Partnership in December
2024. Linda admitted that the Idaho Judgment was mailed to her correct address, but she
explained that she “would not have paid attention to any mailing if it came” in 2020 because
she was taking care of her daughter, who was undergoing and recovering from cancer
treatment in Oregon. Linda testified that Gerald and she never discussed confessing to a
judgment against the Partnership and that she had not seen the Confidential Settlement
Agreement until after December 2024. The Estate called no witnesses and produced no
affidavits.
7 ¶14 The District Court did not rule on the Partnership’s Rule 60 motion to vacate within
its extended 120-day time frame, and the motion was deemed denied by the operation of
M. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) and 59(f) on June 4, 2025.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶15 The nature of the final judgment, order, or proceeding from which relief is sought
and the specific basis of a Rule 60(b) motion determines the applicable standard of review.
Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose’s Saloon, Inc., 2007 MT 202, ¶ 16, 338 Mont. 423, 166 P.3d 451.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, because whether a
judgment is void is a conclusion of law. Essex, ¶ 16. A district court’s deemed denial of
a motion to set aside judgment is reviewed for error on its merits. See Flathead Lakers
Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 2023 MT 85, ¶ 68, 412 Mont. 225,
530 P.3d 769.
DISCUSSION
¶16 Whether the District Court erred by denying the Partnership’s motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief from a foreign judgment.
¶17 The Partnership argues that the District Court incorrectly denied Rule 60(b)(4) relief
because the Idaho Court’s judgment against the Partnership is void for lack of personal
jurisdiction.4 The Estate responds that res judicata precludes collateral attack on the Idaho
Judgment and that the Partnership voluntarily submitted to the Idaho Court’s personal
jurisdiction through Gerald’s actions.
4 Because we hold that Rule 60(b)(4) relief is warranted, we do not reach the Partnership’s alternative arguments pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d). 8 ¶18 Although we owe full faith and credit to other states’ final judgments, they may be
challenged for invalidity. Carr v. Bett, 1998 MT 266, ¶ 42, 291 Mont. 326, 970 P.2d 1017.
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act allows a party to raise the rendering
court’s lack of personal jurisdiction as grounds to vacate a foreign judgment filed in
Montana. Carr, ¶ 42 (citing § 25-9-503, MCA). A Rule 60(b) motion is the appropriate
vehicle for seeking relief from a foreign judgment. Carr, ¶ 32. Rule 60(b)(4) allows a
court to grant relief from a final judgment or order because the judgment is “void” for lack
of jurisdiction. Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start,
Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 21, 353 Mont. 201, 211 P.3d 881. A motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief
must be made “within a reasonable time” after the entry of judgment. M. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1); Koch v. Billings Sch. Dist. No. 2, 253 Mont. 261, 269, 833 P.2d 181, 186 (1992).
¶19 An Idaho court could only exercise personal jurisdiction over the Partnership—an
out-of-state general partnership—through Idaho’s long-arm statute or if the Partnership
voluntarily appeared or waived any personal jurisdiction objection. See Telford v. Smith
County, 314 P.3d 179, 182-83 (Idaho 2013). The Partnership argues that because it never
conducted business in Idaho, had no connections with the Estate, and obtained no monies
from the Estate, the Idaho long-arm statute is not satisfied. Idaho Code § 5-514 (2020).
The Partnership concedes that Gerald purported to sign the Confidential Settlement
Agreement on its behalf, but contends that Gerald had no authority to appear in the Idaho
probate proceedings or consent to personal jurisdiction on the Partnership’s behalf. The
Estate responds that res judicata prevents the Partnership from relitigating the jurisdiction
question, as Gerald consented to Idaho jurisdiction over the Partnership. The Estate asserts
9 that Gerald’s actions as a general partner bound the Partnership because the Estate and
Beneficiaries lacked knowledge of his limited authority or, alternatively, because Linda
ratified his unauthorized conduct. The dispositive issue, therefore, is whether Gerald was
authorized to act on the Partnership’s behalf in the Idaho probate proceedings.
¶20 Although res judicata applies to questions of jurisdiction, the questions must be
“fully and fairly litigated” in the rendering court to be accorded full faith and credit.
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
455 U.S. 691, 706, 102 S. Ct. 1357, 1367 (1982); Genuine Parts Co. v. Rascal’s Auto Parts,
Inc., 2008 MT 313, ¶ 6, 346 Mont. 56, 192 P.3d 1153. In Genuine Parts, we determined
that a personal jurisdiction issue was fully and fairly litigated because appellants had made
the same argument before the rendering Georgia court. Genuine Parts, ¶ 8; see also In re
Child Support of Mason, 1998 MT 192, ¶¶ 17-19, 290 Mont. 253, 964 P.2d 743 (barring
relitigation when rendering Utah court received extensive briefing regarding personal
jurisdiction and parties presented identical arguments in Montana court).
¶21 Unlike the rendering courts in Genuine Parts and Mason, the Idaho Court did not
receive briefing about its jurisdiction over the Partnership and made no express finding.
The Idaho Court did not hear argument about whether Gerald could bind the Partnership
in dealings with third parties or voluntarily subject the out-of-state Partnership to Idaho
jurisdiction. The Idaho Court simply entered judgment against the Partnership pursuant to
the Stipulation, which Gerald purported to execute as general partner of the Cook-Reynolds
Partnership. But if Gerald could not act for CRP in the proceedings, then CRP had no
opportunity to argue that the Idaho Court lacked personal jurisdiction. Whether the Idaho
10 Court had personal jurisdiction over the Partnership was not fully and fairly litigated in the
Idaho probate proceedings, leaving Montana courts free to consider whether Gerald had
authority to consent to personal jurisdiction on the Partnership’s behalf.
¶22 Under the Partnership Agreement, Gerald had no actual authority to act on behalf
of the Partnership in the Idaho probate proceedings. See § 35-10-106(1), MCA (“[A]
partnership agreement governs relations among the partners and between the partners and
the partnership.”). The Partnership Agreement designated Linda as the managing partner
and reserved final management decision-making authority to her. The Estate asserts that
Gerald’s actions as a general partner could still bind the Partnership because he was
apparently acting within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s business, and even if
Gerald lacked authority, Linda ratified his conduct on the Partnership’s behalf.
¶23 Each partner is an “agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business.”
Section 35-10-301(1), MCA. A partner can bind the partnership to third parties subject to
the conditions in § 35-10-301(1) or (2), MCA, and other principles of agency law. See
§ 35-10-105(1), MCA (“Unless displaced by a particular provision of this chapter, the
principles of law and equity supplement this chapter.”); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 171,
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2026) (“[e]stablished principles of agency law will apply
under the Uniform Partnership Acts” unless displaced by a particular provision). If the
partner is “apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the partnership business,” the
partner’s act will bind the partnership unless the third party knows or has received
notification that the partner lacks authority to act for the partnership. Section 35-10-301(1),
MCA. If not apparently acting within the ordinary course of the partnership business, a
11 partner binds the partnership “only if the act was authorized by the other partners.”
Section 35-10-301(2), MCA. In agency terms, § 35-10-301(1), MCA, governs a partner
acting with apparent authority, while § 35-10-301(2), MCA, recognizes that a partner
without apparent authority may have actual authority to bind the partnership. See 68 C.J.S.
Partnership § 178.
¶24 To justify its application of § 35-10-301(1), MCA, the Estate argues that Gerald was
acting within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s business when he engaged in the
Idaho probate proceedings. The Estate first asserts that the “record is devoid of facts” to
overcome a presumption that Gerald was acting within the ordinary course of the
Partnership’s business. The Estate points to § 26-1-602(20), MCA, and Rock Island Plow
Co. v. Cut Bank Implement Co., 101 Mont. 117, 53 P.2d 116 (1935), which recognize the
rebuttable presumption that the “ordinary course of business has been followed.” But this
presumption simply establishes an evidentiary framework for proving that a business entity
adhered to its usual practices absent controverting evidence. See, e.g., New Hope Lutheran
Ministry v. Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc., 2014 MT 69, ¶ 48, 374 Mont. 229,
328 P.3d 586 (holding that defendant did not meet shifted evidentiary burden on summary
judgment to prove plaintiff congregation had not followed the ordinary course of business
when adopting new constitution), overruled in part on other grounds by Warrington v.
Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2020 MT 174, 400 Mont. 360, 467 P.3d 567. The presumption
has no bearing on the threshold question of what the Partnership’s ordinary course of
business is and whether, in this case, Gerald was acting within the ordinary course of the
Partnership’s business.
12 ¶25 The Estate next argues that it is within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s
business to borrow money secured by its Chouteau Property. The Partnership’s agricultural
purpose and usual business conduct demonstrate a much narrower scope of business. See,
e.g., Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 2003 MT 357, ¶¶ 40-45, 319 Mont. 23, 83 P.3d 256 (holding
that partner’s unilateral decision to transfer uneconomical farm leases was within
agricultural partnership’s ordinary course of business because partner had managed the
leases alone for 30 years and transferees would continue farming the land as before);
Rodgers v. Saunders, 144 Mont. 424, 428-29, 396 P.2d 817, 819 (1964) (reasoning that
partner’s contracts with dance students were within ordinary course of dance studio’s
business, but charges on studio’s account for personal gasoline were outside scope of
partnership business). The Partnership Agreement demonstrates that CRP’s purpose is to
manage its farmland and conservation land in Chouteau County. Linda testified that
agricultural leases were the Partnership’s sole source of income, that the Partnership never
conducted any business in Idaho or with Karin, and that the Partnership did not benefit
from Karin’s misappropriation of Estate assets. Linda testified that the Partnership took
no loans besides the mortgages executed by both Linda and Gerald as partners. The Estate
presented no contradictory testimony, and Linda denied the Estate’s assertions on
cross-examination that the Partnership had ever pledged its property as collateral for
monies Gerald borrowed from the Estate.
¶26 The Estate asserts that the 2008 and 2014 promissory notes executed by Gerald
demonstrate that he borrowed money from the Estate on the Partnership’s behalf, and that
the Partnership would ordinarily defend itself against contract and tort liability arising from
13 those loans.5 This argument is unavailing. First, Gerald did not purport to execute the
2008 and 2014 promissory notes on the Partnership’s behalf. Neither note mentions the
Cook-Reynolds Partnership or Gerald’s role as general partner, and the 2008 note was on
Pneumex letterhead. The notes’ references to “Gerry Cooks [sic] land in Chouteau
County” and to “two 320 acre parcels located in Chouteau County, Montana” do not
suggest that Gerald purported to bind the Partnership rather than himself personally. The
2008 and 2014 promissory notes are not the Partnership’s obligations. See Schrammeck v.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 258 Mont. 391, 398, 853 P.2d 702, 706 (1993) (considering
whether loan documents purported to bind the partnership before determining partner’s
authority to bind partnership pursuant to § 35-10-301(1), MCA); Est. of Pruyn v. Axmen
Propane, Inc., 2009 MT 448, ¶¶ 43, 49, 354 Mont. 208, 223 P.3d 845 (holding that agents
lacked apparent authority to bind principal business when promissory note did not
reference business or indicate that individuals were signing in representative capacity),
overruled in part on other grounds by Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Ruff, 2018 MT 182,
392 Mont. 139, 424 P.3d 571.
¶27 Second, the record does not show that Gerald participated in the Idaho probate
proceedings to protect the Partnership from liability, especially when considering that the
5 The Estate’s tort theory is premised on § 35-10-305(1), MCA (partnership liable for loss or injury to a person as a result of a wrongful act of a partner “acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership or with the authority of the partnership”) and § 35-10-305(2), MCA (partnership liable for loss caused by partner’s misapplication of money in partnership’s custody if money received in course of partnership business). But as both liability theories rely on action being taken in the ordinary course of partnership business, the analysis again comes down to whether Gerald was acting within the scope of CRP’s business or CRP authorized his actions. 14 Beneficiaries did not allege that the Partnership itself had wronged the Estate in any way.
The Beneficiaries’ March 2020 Petition and supporting memorandum alleges, “Gerald
Cook pledged property owned by the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to which he holds a
partial interest.” Counsel’s March 7, 2020 email to Linda states that Gerald pledged “real
estate owned by the Partnership,” not that he did so on the Partnership’s behalf. By all
accounts in the record, Gerald participated in the Idaho Court’s hearing on the Petition as
Karin’s husband, defended Karin’s actions as benefitting the Estate, and did not mention
the Partnership. The Idaho Court restrained “the Cook-Reynolds Partnership, by Gerald
Cook, partner,” from disposing of or encumbering its property until Karin posted bond,
and the restraining order was served on Gerald personally and as CRP’s partner. But these
references indicate concern that the Partnership’s assets would disappear before
Beneficiaries could recoup misappropriated funds from Gerald’s individual interest in the
Partnership, not that Gerald was protecting the Partnership from the Beneficiaries’ claims.
¶28 According to the record before the District Court, Gerald first purported to act on
CRP’s behalf when he signed the Confidential Settlement Agreement and the Stipulation
as CRP’s general partner in August 2020. The Confidential Settlement Agreement contains
the only reference to a relationship between the Partnership and the Estate; it states that
other debtors and “the Cook-Reynolds Partnership all benefited from [Karin] Cook’s
misappropriation of Estate funds.” Linda testified that this statement was false because the
Partnership would not have known or gained from Karin’s misappropriation. The Estate
provides no other basis for inferring that Gerald was protecting the Partnership by
confessing to judgment on its behalf. Unlike the transfer of agricultural leases in Baltrusch
15 and like the partner’s personal charges for gasoline in Rodgers, Gerald was not acting
within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s business when engaging in the Idaho
probate proceedings. Accordingly, Gerald’s authority to bind the Partnership is governed
by § 35-10-301(2), MCA.
¶29 A partner acting outside of the ordinary course of the partnership business can only
bind the partnership if authorized by the other partners. Section 35-10-301(2), MCA.
Authorization can occur through prior permission or subsequent ratification. Schrammeck,
258 Mont. at 399-400, 853 P.2d at 707. The record does not show that Linda authorized
Gerald to act on CRP’s behalf in the Idaho probate proceedings. Linda attested that she
did not provide permission to Gerald to execute the Confidential Settlement Agreement or
the Stipulation on the Partnership’s behalf. Linda testified that Gerald never talked to her
about confessing to a judgment against the Partnership and that she had not seen the
Confidential Settlement Agreement before the Estate’s application for a writ of execution.
The Estate points to the March 2020 emails to show that Linda “silently relied” on Gerald
to defend the Partnership in the Idaho probate proceedings, which “explicitly authorized”
Gerald to appear in the case and take binding legal positions on the Partnership’s behalf.
Attempting to reconcile the inherent contradiction between silence and explicit
authorization, the Estate appears to argue that Linda implicitly or explicitly ratified
Gerald’s unauthorized conduct on behalf of the Partnership.6
6 Having devoted most of its argument to showing that Gerald acted within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s business and applying § 35-10-301(1), MCA, the Estate does not directly engage with the Partnership’s § 35-10-301(2), MCA, analysis. However, the Estate’s discussion of common law ratification speaks to the authorization condition in § 35-10-301(2), MCA. 16 ¶30 A principal with “knowledge of the material facts may ratify a prior unauthorized
act or transaction by express declaration or implicitly by acts, statements, or conduct which
reasonably manifests an intent to affirm or be bound by the act.” Associated Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., ¶ 40. A principal ratifies an unauthorized act by “knowingly accepting or retaining
the benefit of the act.” Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc., ¶ 40 (quoting § 28-10-211, MCA).
As “mere acquiescence is not necessarily conclusive of ratification,” Associated Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., ¶ 41, the party asserting ratification must prove (1) the principal accepted the
benefits of the agent’s act, (2) with full knowledge of the facts, and (3) circumstances or
an affirmative election indicating an intention to adopt the unauthorized arrangement. Scott
D. Erler, D.D.S. Profit Sharing Plan v. Creative Fin. & Invs., L.L.C., 2009 MT 36, ¶ 27,
349 Mont. 207, 203 P.3d 744 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lovely Agency, 200 Mont. 447,
453, 652 P.2d 1160, 1163 (1982)).
¶31 Linda never had full knowledge of the facts related to Gerald’s purported
appearance in the Idaho probate proceedings, consent to personal jurisdiction, or
confession of liability on CRP’s behalf. The March 2020 emails to Linda did not suggest
that Gerald purported to act on the Partnership’s behalf before the Idaho Court or to consent
to personal jurisdiction over the Partnership. Even if the March 2020 emails included
Gerald’s 2008 and 2014 promissory notes, they did not purport to bind the Partnership and
would not suggest to Linda that Gerald might be acting on the Partnership’s behalf in the
Idaho probate proceedings. Without full knowledge of these facts, Linda’s March 2020
email correspondence with Beneficiaries’ counsel could not ratify Gerald’s prior
unauthorized appearance in the proceedings as acting on the Partnership’s behalf.
17 ¶32 The Estate is incorrect that Linda’s March 2020 email correspondence could
prospectively ratify Gerald’s attempt to bind the Partnership by the Confidential Settlement
Agreement and the Stipulation in August 2020. By definition, ratification is the
“affirmative confirmation of a prior act.” Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc., ¶ 40 (emphasis
added). The Estate presents no evidence that Linda knew that Gerald would subsequently
purport to act on CRP’s behalf to settle the Beneficiaries’ claims or sign the Stipulation,
which consented to the Idaho Court’s jurisdiction.
¶33 Linda did not gain full knowledge of the Confidential Settlement Agreement’s or
the Stipulation’s contents until over four years after Gerald executed them. Linda testified
that she had not seen the Confidential Settlement Agreement, including Gerald’s
confession of CRP’s contract and tort liability, before the Estate attempted to execute the
Idaho Judgment in December 2024. The Estate presents no evidence that Linda previously
received copies of the Confidential Settlement Agreement or the Stipulation. Even the
entry of the Idaho Judgment and service by mail did not inform Linda that Gerald had
purported to consent to personal jurisdiction and admit to liability on the Partnership’s
behalf. The Idaho Judgment identified CRP as a culpable party against whom the Estate
and its beneficiaries could recover, but it did not indicate that Gerald had purported to
voluntarily appear on the Partnership’s behalf and to consent to personal jurisdiction.
Linda also testified that she had no knowledge of the Idaho Judgment or its contents, since
she let her mail accumulate without opening it during 2020.
¶34 Linda did not expressly or impliedly ratify Gerald’s unauthorized appearance in the
Idaho probate proceedings, stipulation to the Idaho Court’s personal jurisdiction over the
18 Partnership, or waiver of personal jurisdiction objections. Linda did not ratify Gerald’s
unauthorized confession to the Partnership’s contract and tort liability. Accordingly,
Gerald was not authorized to appear for or bind the Partnership during the Idaho probate
proceedings.
¶35 The Partnership has demonstrated that the Idaho long-arm statute was not satisfied
as CRP has never engaged in business in Idaho, did not conduct business transactions with
the Estate, and did not act tortiously against the Estate. See Idaho Code § 5-514(a), (b)
(2020) (applying Idaho jurisdiction if person or their agent transacts business or commits
tortious act within Idaho). Because Linda did not ratify Gerald’s unauthorized appearance
on the Partnership’s behalf, the Partnership did not voluntarily appear in the Idaho probate
proceedings or waive its objections to the Idaho Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction. See
Telford, 314 P.3d at 182-83 (recognizing that voluntary general appearance waives
objection to lack of personal jurisdiction). The Idaho Judgment against the Partnership is
void for lack of jurisdiction, warranting Rule 60(b)(4) relief.
¶36 Finally, the Estate argues that the Partnership’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion was untimely
because it occurred four years after the entry of the Idaho Judgment. The Partnership
acknowledges that the time between the entry of judgment and moving for relief was
“appreciable” but argues that the circumstances justified the delay.
¶37 Rule 60(c)(1) requires a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), or (6), to be made
“within a reasonable time,” but it does not specify a definite time limit. Koch, 253 Mont.
at 269, 833 P.2d at 186. What counts as a reasonable time depends on the particular facts
19 of each case and is within the court’s sound discretion.7 In re Marriage of Waters,
223 Mont. 183, 189, 724 P.2d 726, 730 (1986). Relevant considerations include prejudice
to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the movant’s delay. Waters, 223 Mont.
at 189, 724 P.2d at 730; United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1985)
(analyzing timeliness of analogous Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6) motions by considering
whether opposing party was prejudiced and movant had good reason for delayed action).
¶38 In Waters, we held that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was made within a reasonable time
because the opposing party was not prejudiced by the two-year delay between Congress’s
enactment of new grounds for relief and the movant’s use of them. Waters, 223 Mont.
at 189, 724 P.2d at 730-31. Twenty-seven months after Congress allowed state courts to
equitably divide military retirement pay upon divorce, Doris Waters sought to amend her
dissolution decree to include her ex-husband’s military pension as a marital asset. Waters,
223 Mont. at 185, 724 P.2d at 728. Because the district court substituted Doris’s new right
to share her ex-husband’s pension payments for his existing spousal maintenance
obligation, we “perceive[d] no prejudice” to the ex-husband by Doris’s delayed Rule
60(b)(6) motion. Waters, 223 Mont. at 189, 724 P.2d at 730-31. In Holtzman, a five-year
delay before filing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6) motions was reasonable because the
movant provided adequate reasons for not appealing the original judgment and the delay
7 The Estate asserts that because the District Court acted within its discretion to find the Rule 60(b)(4) motion untimely, this Court must affirm the District Court. This is a puzzling assertion, because the District Court made no such finding. The Partnership’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion was deemed denied by operation of rule. The parties provided multiple grounds upon which the District Court could have denied the Rule 60(b)(4) motion, and timeliness was not necessarily the dispositive issue. 20 did not prejudice the opposing party. Holtzman, 762 F.2d at 725. Four years after a
permanent injunction restrained the movant from importing motor vehicles in violation of
the Clean Air Act, he learned that the Government interpreted the injunction more broadly
than the importer had understood. Holtzman, 762 F.2d at 723. The importer’s reasonable
interpretation of the injunction informed his decision to not appeal the original judgment,
and his failure to appeal did not prejudice the Government. Holtzman, 762 F.2d at 725. In
contrast, we held that a five-month delay in moving for Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a default
judgment was unreasonable when the movants clearly knew about the judgment within two
weeks of its entry and could have moved for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) within the
then-applicable 60-day deadline. Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244, ¶ 16, 301 Mont. 434,
10 P.3d 99.
¶39 The Partnership moved for Rule 60(b)(4) relief within a reasonable time under the
particular facts of this case. As in Waters and Holtzman, we perceive no prejudice to the
Estate as a result of the four-year delay between the entry of judgment against the
Partnership and its motion for relief. Even if the Partnership knew of the Idaho Judgment,
the Estate does not explain how it was harmed by the delay or how it detrimentally relied
upon the Idaho Judgment. The Estate presents no evidence that it attempted to enforce the
Idaho Judgment against the Partnership until the Estate applied for a writ of execution in
the District Court in December 2024, over four years after the entry of judgment, after
which Linda immediately sought to vacate the judgment.
¶40 Like the vehicle importer in Holtzman and unlike the movants in Bahm, the
Partnership provides a reasonable basis for the four-year delay. Linda testified that she
21 was not aware of the Idaho Judgment until the Estate attempted to execute it in December
2024. Linda admitted that her correct address was listed on the Idaho Judgment’s
Certificate of Service, but she reasonably explained that she let her mail accumulate
without opening it during 2020 while focusing on supporting her daughter’s cancer
treatment and recovery. Once Linda learned of the Idaho Judgment in December 2024,
when the Estate finally sought to execute it, she took immediate action by hiring an
attorney, opposing the writ of execution, and asking the District Court to vacate the
judgment.
¶41 The Estate argues that Linda’s failure to diligently monitor her mail in 2020 makes
the four-year delay inexcusable. But Linda had no reason to expect mail related to the
Idaho probate proceedings or an order entering judgment against the Partnership, unlike
the untimely movants in the Estate’s cited authority. See In re Wilson, 349 B.R. 831, 833,
835-36 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (finding that in debtor-initiated bankruptcy proceedings,
debtor’s failure to monitor mail at address he provided in bankruptcy petition did not satisfy
“good cause” standard required for Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) relief or any elements for Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) relief); Fischer v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla., 511 So.2d 1087, 1087-88
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that failure to respond to properly served petition was
inexcusable neglect because defendants were fully aware of the pending controversy, were
represented by counsel during pre-litigation negotiations, and left on two-month European
trip without establishing mail monitoring). The March 2020 emails from Beneficiaries’
counsel notified Linda that Gerald’s actions might affect the Partnership’s property and
that the Partnership was restrained from disposing of or encumbering its property until
22 Karin posted a bond. They did not indicate that the Estate would seek judgment against
the Partnership itself. Nor did they suggest that Gerald purported to act on CRP’s behalf
by appearing in the proceedings, consenting to the Idaho Court’s personal jurisdiction, or
admitting to tort and contract liability. Rather, the March 2020 emails informed Linda of
the proceedings as a “courtesy,” and she testified that she was never served a summons or
complaint relating to them. Having never before received mail regarding the Idaho probate
proceedings, Linda had no duty to examine each piece of mail sent to her home while she
focused on caring for her daughter.
¶42 Finally, the Estate argues that because Gerald knew of and consented to the entry of
judgment on CRP’s behalf, Linda’s lack of personal knowledge of the Idaho Judgment is
irrelevant to the timeliness of the Partnership’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion. The Estate does not
distinguish this position from its unsuccessful argument that Gerald could consent to
jurisdiction on the Partnership’s behalf, and it cites no legal authority requiring a different
outcome. We are “not obligated to develop arguments on behalf of parties to an appeal,
nor are we to guess a party’s precise position, or develop legal analysis that may lend
support to his position.” Est. of Harris v. Reilly, 2025 MT 126, ¶ 16, 422 Mont. 383,
570 P.3d 552. Gerald’s personal knowledge of the Idaho Judgment does not affect the
timeliness of the Partnership’s motion.
¶43 The Partnership has demonstrated a reasonable basis for not learning of the Idaho
Judgment until December 2024, and the Estate has shown no prejudice from the four-year
delay. Under these circumstances, the Partnership moved for Rule 60(b)(4) relief within a
reasonable time.
23 CONCLUSION
¶44 The District Court erred by denying the Partnership’s motion for Rule 60(b)(4)
relief. The domesticated Idaho Judgment against the Cook-Reynolds Partnership is void
for the Idaho Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction, and the Partnership made its Rule
60(b)(4) motion within a reasonable time. We reverse the District Court’s deemed denial
of the Partnership’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion and vacate that portion of the domesticated Idaho
Judgment holding the Cook-Reynolds Partnership liable to the Estate and its remaining
beneficiaries for the total judgment and interest. Our decision does not affect the Idaho
Judgment as it pertains to other judgment debtors.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE