ESTATE OF MICHAEL OLIVO, by and through successor in interest, PATRICIA OLIVO, et al. v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 10, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00896
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF MICHAEL OLIVO, by Case No.: 24cv896-W-MMP and through successor in interest, 12 PATRICIA OLIVO, et al., ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND STRIKE Plaintiffs, PUNITIVE DAMAGES [DOCS. 43, 49] 14 v. 15 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 16 CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al., 17 Defendants. 18

19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss: one by Defendants Jeff 22 Macomber, Diana Toche, Connie Gipson, Amar Mehta, James Hill, and Christopher 23 Podratz (the “Executive Defendants”) to dismiss all causes of action asserted against 24 them in the TAC and to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages, and another by Defendants 25 Osuji and Haas1 to dismiss several causes of action against them and also strike punitive 26

27 1 The Court will refer to the Executive Defendants and Defendants Haas and Osuji individually, or 28 1 damages. (Mtn. [Doc. 43]; Second Mtn. [Doc. 49].) Plaintiffs oppose both motions. 2 (Opp’n [Doc. 45]; Second Opp’n [Doc. 50].) In the event the Court grants the motions to 3 dismiss, Plaintiffs request leave to amend. 4 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument 5 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court 6 GRANTS the motions to dismiss the TAC’s first through third causes of action as to all 7 Defendants, the fourth cause of action as to the Executive Defendants and Defendant 8 Haas, the fifth and sixth causes of action as to the Executive Defendants, and the seventh 9 cause of action as to Defendant Haas and Osuji. All causes of action asserted against the 10 Executive Defendants are dismissed WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, while all causes 11 of action asserted against Defendant Haas and Osuji are dismissed WITH LEAVE TO 12 AMEND. The Court also STRIKES Plaintiffs’ punitive damages as to all Defendants. 13 14 II. BACKGROUND 15 On January 26, 2023, 42-year-old Michael Olivo died while in custody at the 16 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Richard J. Donovan 17 (hereinafter “RJD”) Correctional Facility. (TAC [Doc. 40] at ¶ 1.) Mr. Olivo entered the 18 CDCR system originally in November 2000 and was incarcerated at Kern Valley State 19 Prison. (Id. at ¶ 50–51.) At that time, he received mental health treatment for symptoms 20 of major depression and was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and anti-social 21 personality disorder. (Id. at ¶ 51.) Mr. Olivo was allegedly housed in a mental health unit 22 on three occasions between March, April, and July 2022. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Although he did 23 not receive formal services through CDCR’s Mental Health Services Delivery System 24 (“MHSDS”), Mr. Olivo participated in a mental health coping group from September to 25 December 2022. (Id. at ¶ 54.) 26

27 appear to have been served and are not represented by counsel. Therefore, this order does not apply to 28 1 In March 2022, while incarcerated at Kern Valley, Mr. Olivo allegedly submitted a 2 Health Care Services Request Form requesting to speak with a psychiatrist, but he never 3 met with one, and a new order was not placed upon his transfer to RJD later that month. 4 (Id. at ¶ 52.) On January 12, 2023, Mr. Olivo was placed in the Administrative 5 Segregation Unit (“ASU”) in a single person cell due to concerns for his safety. (TAC at 6 ¶ 55.) That same day, Defendant Osuji, a vocational nurse, completed a pre-placement 7 mental health screening and Defendant Mendoza, a psychiatric technician, then 8 completed an initial mental health screening. (Id. at ¶ 58–59.) Plaintiffs allege that the 9 above Defendants failed to adequately complete a suicide risk assessment, and Defendant 10 Mendoza additionally failed to ensure that Mr. Olivo was provided with follow-up 11 treatment while housed in the ASU. (Id.) 12 One week later, Mr. Olivio met with Defendant Haas, a senior psychologist 13 specialist, who Plaintiffs allege failed to adequately complete an initial Mental Health 14 Placement Chrono (“MHPC”) which is meant to assess an inmate patient’s level of care, 15 among other things. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Then on January 25, 2023, Plaintiffs allege Defendant 16 Raymond, a psychiatric technician, completed a suicide risk assessment, but failed to do 17 so adequately “and [who] noted that there was no access to suicide means.” (Id. at ¶ 61.) 18 Less than twenty-four hours later, Mr. Olivo was found hanging by a sheet tied around 19 his neck in his cell and was pronounced dead at 5:18 a.m. (Id. at ¶ 62.) 20 Plaintiffs have brought suit against various defendants in their individual 21 capacities, including: (1) Jeff Macomber, CDCR Secretary; (2) Diana Toche, CDCR 22 Undersecretary of Health Care Services; (3) Connie Gipson, CDCR Director of the 23 Division of Adult Institutions; (4) Amar Mehta, CDCR Deputy Director of the Statewide 24 Mental Health Program; (5) James Hill, RJD Warden; (6) Christopher Podratz, RJD 25 Health Care Chief Executive Officer; (7) Kristen Haas, a CDCR Senior Psychologist 26 Specialist and clinical supervisor; (8) Oscar Mendoza, CDCR Correctional Health Care 27 Services Psychiatric Technician; (9) Rebecca Raymond, also a CDCR Psychiatric 28 1 Technician; and (10) Joy Osuji , a CDCR Correctional Health Care Services Licensed 2 Vocational Nurse. (See TAC.) 3 The TAC asserts eight causes of action against the Defendants, including: (1) 4 Failure to provide medical health treatment under the Eighth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 5 § 1983); (2) Failure to protect from harm under the Eighth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983); (3) Deprivation of the right to familial relationship with decedent under the 7 Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) Supervisory liability causing 8 constitutional violations (failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline, 42 U.S.C. § 9 1983) 3; (5) Wrongful death (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 377.60); (6) Negligence; (7) 10 Failure to provide medical care; and (8) Declaratory relief (28 U.S.C. § 2201) 4. (See 11 TAC.) 12 The Executive Defendants previously moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC, and the 13 Court granted dismissal of the first four causes of action with leave to amend and struck 14 punitive damages. (Order [Doc. 29].) Though the causes of action five through seven 15 were initially dismissed without leave to amend, they were reinstated after the Court 16 granted Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 39.) 17 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A pleading can be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 20 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 21 pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 22 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only 23 appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to 24 25 2 The TAC added Defendants Osuji, Mendoza, Haas, and Raymond. (See TAC.) 26 3 The first three causes of action are asserted against the Executive Defendants and Defendants Haas and Osuji. Whereas the fourth cause of action is asserted against the Executive Defendants and Defendant 27 Haas only. 4 The fifth, six, and eighth causes of action are asserted against all Defendants. The seventh cause of 28 1 support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pac. Police Depot, 901 F.2d 696, 699 2 (9th Cir. 1988). At the motion to dismiss phase, the allegations of material fact in the 3 complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 4 plaintiff. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations "must be 6 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations 8 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 9 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Only a complaint 10 that states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 12 A court “may order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, 13 impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Redundant matter “consists of 14 allegations that constitute a needless repetition of other averments in the pleading.” 15 Moreno v. USG Corp., No. CIV 06-CV-2196BPCL, 2007 WL 951301, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 16 Mar. 19, 2007). Immaterial matter is “that which has no essential or important 17 relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Id. Impertinent matter 18 “consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in 19 question.” Id. Finally, scandalous matter is “that which improperly casts a derogatory 20 light on someone, most typically on a party to the action.” Id. “[T]he function of a 12(f) 21 motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from 22 litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . .” Sidney- 23 Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 24 Courts have broad discretion to grant leave to amend a complaint. Nguyen v. 25 Endologix, Inc., 962 F.3d 405, 420 (9th Cir. 2020). This discretion includes the right to 26 deny leave to amend where such amendment would be futile. Lathus v. City of 27 Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. 28 v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[W]here the plaintiff 1 has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the 2 requisite particularity to its claims, the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 3 is particularly broad.” Nguyen, 962 F.3d at 420 (holding that the district court did not err 4 by denying leave to amend “because it was clear that the plaintiff had made her best case 5 and had been found wanting”) (internal quotations omitted). 6 7 IV. DISCUSSION 8 A. Causes of Action 1–4: Deliberate Indifference and Supervisor Liability 9 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 causes of action on several 10 grounds. The first three causes of action under Section 1983: (1) failure to provide 11 medical health treatment, (2) failure to protect from harm, and (3) deprivation of the right 12 to familial relationship, require a showing of deliberate indifference. To state a claim for 13 deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts 14 showing that the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s 15 health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Mere negligence, medical 16 malpractice, or a difference of opinion concerning appropriate treatment is insufficient to 17 establish a constitutional violation. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057–160 (9th Cir. 18 2004). Deliberate indifference is therefore a “high legal standard” requiring facts 19 plausibly showing that the defendant was subjectively aware of a significant risk of harm 20 and consciously disregarded that risk. Id. at 1058–1060. 21 Similarly, to state a claim for deprivation of the right to familial relationship under 22 the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege conduct that “shocks the conscience.” 23 Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent that showing, courts have 24 also dismissed these claims for failing to plead deliberate indifference. See Est. of Bews v. 25 Cty. of L.A., No. CV 23-9775 PA (JPRx), 2024 WL 1135671, at *5, 2024 U.S. Dist. 26 LEXIS 48671, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024) (dismissing deprivation of familial 27 relationship claim where plaintiff failed to plead viable deliberate indifference claim); 28 Hernandez v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 19-cv-07888-EJD, 2020 WL 3101041 at *5, 2020 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102568 at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2020) (dismissing same claim as it 2 “fail[ed] to clear the lower bar of adequately alleging deliberate indifference”); Fosbinder 3 v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 24-CV-733-RSH-SBC, 2024 WL 4631275, at *9 (S.D. Cal. 4 Oct. 30, 2024) (same). 5 The fourth cause of action is premised on supervisor liability. Section 1983, 6 however, does not permit liability based solely on a defendant’s supervisory status. 7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Rather, “[a] supervisor may be liable only if 8 (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a 9 ‘sufficient casual connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 10 constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (quoting Hansen v. 11 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Circ. 1989)); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 12 942 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 13 defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 14 Constitution”)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (2009)).) 15 The Court first addresses supervisory liability before turning to Plaintiffs’ 16 allegations of direct liability. 17 I. Supervisor Liability a. Executive Defendants – Causes of Action One Through Four 18 The Executive Defendants argue that the TAC’s first four causes of action 19 improperly rely on a theory of supervisory liability and fail to allege facts establishing 20 their personal involvement in any constitutional violation. (Mtn. at 8–10.) The Executive 21 Defendants further contend that the Coleman litigation does not provide a basis for 22 liability. (Id.) Plaintiffs disagree, and in turn, maintain that the “[Executive] Defendants 23 were deliberately indifferent to conditions that placed prisoners situated similarly to Mr. 24 Olivo at substantial risk of harm.” (Opp’n at 9.) 25 In an effort to address the deficiencies previously identified by the Court, the TAC 26 added allegations concerning CDCR suicide prevention policies and a Quality 27 Improvement Plan, including the following: 28 1 According to the MHSDS Program Guide (Program Guide), placement in an Administrative Segregation Unit is a risk factor for suicide. In addition 2 to “dynamic” risk factors such as single-cell placement and fear for safety that 3 requires ongoing assessment. As such, inmates undergo a pre-placement mental health screening to assess for “possible suicide risk, safety concerns, 4 and mental health problems before placement in ASU.” Moreover, CDCR’s 5 own policies recognize that suicide risk assessments are “critical” to suicide prevention. Accordingly, inmates housed in an Administrative Segregation 6 Unit are required to be seen daily by correctional health staff conducting 7 clinical rounds. Upon information and belief, Defendants were aware that inmates housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit, including Michael 8 Olivo, were at an increased risk for suicide. Indeed, CDCR policy requires 9 security checks in ASUs to be conducted every thirty (30) minutes.

10 Upon information and belief, CDCR’s internal review of Mr. Olivo’s death 11 contained four (4) recommendations for corrective action through a Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) in relation to his death. One of these 12 recommendations included ensuring that staff responding to a suicide or 13 attempted suicide have a cut-down kit. 14 (TAC at ¶ ¶ 56, 57, 68.) These additional allegations do not cure the deficiencies 15 previously identified by the Court. In partially dismissing the FAC, the Court explained 16 that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts demonstrating how deficiencies in CDCR’s policies, 17 training, actions, or inactions were attributable to the Executive Defendants or otherwise 18 established deliberate indifference to Mr. Olivo’s constitutional rights. (Order at 8–9.) 19 The newly added allegations remain generalized and fail to identify how any specific 20 policy, training deficiency, or omission attributable to the Executive Defendants caused 21 the alleged constitutional violation. Conclusory assertations that policies or training were 22 inadequate, absent factual allegations identifying a specific deficiency and its causal 23 connection to the alleged harm, are insufficient to establish supervisor liability under 24 Section 1983. 25 Nor do Plaintiffs allege facts demonstrating that any Executive Defendant, through 26 his or her own individual conduct, violated the Constitution. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 27 942. Plaintiffs do not identify any action, or inaction, by any Executive Defendant 28 demonstrating a failure to implement adequate suicide risk assessments. Mere awareness 1 of systemwide problems, coupled with a failure to rectify them, is insufficient to impose 2 liability under Section 1983. See Carrea v. California, No. EDCV07-1148CASMAN, 3 2009 WL 1770130, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to 4 plausibly allege a connection between any Executive Defendant’s conduct to a 5 constitutional violation. 6 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Coleman litigation does not alter this conclusion. See 7 Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp (E.D. Cal 1995). As the Court previously explained, 8 although the Coleman Special Master’s recommendations are relevant to the adequacy of 9 CDCR’s mental health treatment and suicide prevention policies, Plaintiffs must identify 10 specific deficiencies recognized in Coleman and plausibly connect those deficiencies to 11 the facts alleged in this case. (See Order at 8–9.) In an apparent effort to do so, Plaintiffs 12 added the following allegations to the TAC: 13 On January 7, 2020, the Court adopted the Coleman Special Master’s recommendations which required 90 percent of the custody and health care 14 staff to receive annual suicide prevention training. (Id. at ¶47.) The Executive 15 Defendants failed to take necessary and reasonable actions within their respective scope of responsibility to cure the identified deficiencies and 16 ensure compliance with existing CDCR policies and procedures including 17 annual requirements for suicide prevention training. 18 (TAC at ¶71–72.) These additional allegations remain insufficient. Even accepting them 19 as true, Plaintiffs still fail to allege facts showing how any particular Executive Defendant 20 was personally responsible for implementing or failing to implement the training 21 requirement, or how any failure to do so caused or contributed to Mr. Olivo’s death. 22 Rather, Plaintiffs rely on the conclusory assertion that the Executive Defendants failed to 23 ensure compliance with Coleman-related training mandates. Such generalized allegations 24 of noncompliance do not satisfy the requirement of personal involvement or a causal 25 connection under Section 1983. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942. Nor does Coleman itself 26 impose liability on prison officials based solely on their supervisory positions. See 27 Roberts v. Cate, No. 2:08-CV-2624 JAM KJN, 2013 WL 268709, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28 23, 2013.) 1 Despite the Court’s prior guidance, the TAC continues to rely on generalized 2 allegations concerning institutional failures and supervisory status rather than facts 3 establishing personal involvement or a causal connection between any Executive 4 Defendant’s conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The failure to make any 5 meaningful changes to the TAC to improve the Section 1983 causes of action lends itself 6 to a finding of futility. Accordingly, the first four causes of action against the Executive 7 Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 8 b. Defendant Haas – Fourth Cause of Action 9 The same deficiencies apply to the extent Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on 10 Defendant Haas based on her supervisory role. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haas, as a 11 senior psychologist specialist and clinical supervisor, was responsible for supervising 12 staff and promulgating policies at RJD, including supervising Defendants Mendoza, 13 Raymond, and Osuji. (TAC at ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs further allege, in conclusory fashion, that 14 Defendant Haas “breached” the duty to properly train, supervise, or discipline 15 subordinate staff. (Id. at 30–31.) 16 These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for supervisor liability. The TAC 17 identifies no specific deficiency in training, supervision, or discipline attributable to 18 Defendant Haas and contains no facts showing her personal involvement in, or a causal 19 connection to, the alleged constitutional deprivation. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on Defendant 20 Haas’s title and supervisory responsibilities. Such allegations are insufficient under 21 Section 1983. Therefore, the TAC fails to state a supervisory liability claim against Haas. 22 Since Defendant Haas is a newly named defendant, and Plaintiffs have not had the 23 opportunity to cure these deficiencies as to her, the Court cannot conclude that 24 amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the fourth cause of action against Defendant 25 Haas is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. This conclusion is limited to 26 Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability theory. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Haas failed to 27 adequately conduct a mental health evaluation of Mr. Olivo. (See TAC at ¶60.) Because 28 1 that allegation presents a distinct theory of direct liability, the Court addresses it 2 separately below. 3 II. Deliberate Indifference a. Defendants Haas and Osuji – Causes of Action One Through 4 Three 5 Defendants Haas and Osuji argue that the TAC alleges, at most, negligence or 6 medical malpractice, which are insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference 7 under Section 1983. (Second Mtn. at 14–15.) Plaintiffs respond that Defendants Haas and 8 Osuji “knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Mr. Olivo’s health and safety[,]” and 9 contend that, “where allegations ‘raise suggestions of deliberate indifference,’ courts 10 ‘must let the case proceed to discovery.’” (Second Opp’n at 9 (citing Rocha v. Kernan, 11 No. EDCV 17-869-GW(FFMX), 2019 WL 2949031, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019)).) 12 Apart from their titles and job descriptions, Plaintiffs allege the following with 13 respect to Defendants Haas and Osuji: 14 On January 12, 2023, Defendant LVN JOY OSUJI completed a pre-placement mental health screening. Upon information and belief, Defendant LVN JOY 15 OSUJI failed to adequately complete a suicide risk assessment despite Mr. 16 Olivo’s increased risk factors for suicide and concerns for his safety.

17 On January 19, 2023, Mr. Olivo met with Defendant KRISTIN HAAS (Senior 18 Psychologist Specialist) for an initial Mental Health Placement Chrono (MHPC). According to the MHDS Program Guide (Program Guide), a MHPC 19 indicates “the inmate-patient’s LOC [level of care] medication status, any 20 behavioral alerts, and their GAF [Global Assessment Functioning] score.” Upon information and belief, Defendant KRISTIN HAAS failed to adequately 21 complete Mr. Olivo’s initial MHPC despite his increased risk of suicide and 22 concerns for his safety which led to his placement in the ASU at RJD. 23 (TAC at ¶¶ 58, 60.) These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for deliberate 24 indifference. Plaintiffs allege only that Defendant Haas and Osuji inadequately completed 25 mental-health evaluations, but they do not identify any specific deficiency in the 26 assessments, no warning signs that were ignored, and no facts showing that either 27 Defendant was aware of a substantial risk that Mr. Olivo would commit suicide. Nor do 28 Plaintiffs allege how any purported deficiency in the evaluations contributed to Mr. 1 Olivo’s death. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to infer that the evaluations must have 2 been inadequate because Mr. Olivo later committed suicide. Such speculation is 3 insufficient to plausibly establish deliberate indifference. 4 The Court likewise finds Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rocha unpersuasive. In Rocha, the 5 complaint alleged that the decedent had a well-documented history of depression, suicidal 6 ideation, and suicide attempts during the two years she was treated by the defendant 7 clinicians. See Rocha v. Kernan, 2019 WL 2949031, at *9–11. The plaintiffs further 8 alleged that the defendants ignored repeated expressions of suicidal intent, failed to 9 follow CDCR suicide-prevention policies, and repeatedly copied inaccurate information 10 into suicide risk assessments, creating a false record that the decedent was not suicidal. 11 Id. Based on those detailed allegations, the court concluded that the complaint plausibly 12 supported an inference that the defendants knew of and consciously disregarded a 13 substantial risk of suicide. Id. 14 This case bears little resemblance to Rocha. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants 15 Haas and Osuji were aware of a documented history of suicidal ideation, that Mr. Olivo 16 communicated suicidal thoughts to them, that they ignored specific warning signs, or that 17 they knowingly falsified or disregarded information concerning his suicide risk. Rather, 18 Plaintiffs allege only that the evaluations were inadequately performed during isolated 19 encounters with Mr. Olivo shortly before his death. Accordingly, Rocha does not support 20 Plaintiffs’ contention that a mere suggestion of deliberate indifference is sufficient to 21 proceed to discovery. Rather, Rocha involved detailed factual allegations supporting an 22 inference that defendants were subjectively aware of and consciously disregarded a 23 substantial risk of suicide. No comparable allegations are present here. Since the TAC 24 does not plausibly allege that Defendants Haas or Osuji were aware of and disregarded a 25 substantial risk that Mr. Olivo would commit suicide, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for 26 deliberate indifference against either Defendant. 27 Because Defendants Haas and Osuji are newly named defendants, and Plaintiffs 28 have not had the opportunity to cure the deficiencies as to them, the Court cannot 1 conclude that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the first three causes of action 2 against Defendants Haas and Osuji are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 B. Causes of Action Five and Six – Executive Defendants 4 Next, the Executive Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims for wrongful 5 death and negligence should be dismissed as an improper claim against supervisors 6 because the Executive Defendants are immunized by California Government Code 7 Section 820.8. (Mtn. at 12.) Plaintiffs argue against immunity. (Opp’n at 10–11.) 8 Regarding liability of public employees, Section 820.8 states that “[e]xcept as 9 otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the 10 act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee 11 from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or 12 omission.” Cal. Gov't Code § 820.8. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “supervisory 13 personnel whose personal involvement is not alleged may not be held responsible for the 14 acts of their subordinates under California law.” Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 15 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 820.8); see also Weaver by & through Weaver v. 16 State, 63 Cal.App.4th 188, 202-03 (1998) (a Commissioner of CHP officers was not 17 liable because he did not train officers and was not personally involved in the incident in 18 any way). 19 Although a public employee may be held liable for any injury proximately caused 20 by his own negligence, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific information which 21 personally links the Executive Defendants to Mr. Olivos’s death for many of the same 22 reasons discussed above. Statistics regarding prison suicides, citations to RJD’s mental 23 health policies, proposed remedial measures, and non-implementation of Coleman 24 recommendations do not impose individual liability on the Secretary for CDCR 25 (Defendant Macomber), the Undersecretary of Health Care Services for CDCR 26 (Defendant Toche), the Director of the Division of Adult Institutions (Defendant Gipson), 27 the Deputy Director of the Statewide Mental Health Program for CDCR (Defendant 28 Mehta), the Warden for RJD (Defendant Hill), or the Health Care Chief Officer for RJD 1 (Defendant Podratz). The facts alleged, even taken as true as the Court is bound to do at 2 this stage, are insufficient to warrant finding personal negligence. 3 Plaintiffs, however, argue that statutory immunity does not apply because Section 4 820.2 only confers immunity with respect to “basic policy decisions” and does not 5 immunize government entities from liability for subsequent ministerial actions taken in 6 the implementation of those basic policy decisions. (Opp’n at 10–11.) In so arguing, 7 Plaintiffs confuse the applicable legal standard. The Ninth Circuit and the California 8 Supreme Court apply the “basic policy decisions” standard to Section 820.2 immunity, 9 not Section 820.8. McQuirk v. Donnelley, 189 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 10 California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360 (1968). 11 Plaintiffs do not address the applicability of Section 820.8 immunity, which is 12 claimed by the Executive Defendants. However, in the Court’s own research, Section 13 820.8 immunity applies to Plaintiffs’ causes of action against the Executive Defendants. 14 Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, and the Plaintiffs have 15 repeatedly failed to plead facts which link the alleged personal negligence of the 16 Executive Defendants to Mr. Olivos’s death. As a result, Plaintiffs’ state law causes of 17 action against the Executive Defendants are barred by California Government Code 18 Section 820.8. Accordingly, the fifth and sixth causes of action against the Executive 19 Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 20 C. Seventh Cause of Action – Defendants Haas and Osuji 21 Additionally, Defendants Haas and Osjui argue that Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of 22 action, failure to summon medical care, under California Government Code Section 23 844.6 and 845.6, should be dismissed since there are no allegations in the TAC that 24 support the claim. (Second Mtn. at 10–11.) The Court agrees. 25 Section 844.6 of the California Government Code states that public entities are not 26 liable for “injury to any prisoner” but clarifies that “[n]othing in this section exonerates a 27 public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful 28 act or omission.” Cal. Gov't Code § 844.6(d). This provision is partially modified by 1 Section 845.6, which states that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable 2 for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical 3 care for a prisoner in his custody . . . but [a] public employee, and the public entity where 4 the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee 5 knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and 6 he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6 7 Here, the TAC alleges that Defendant Osuji failed to “adequately” conduct a 8 mental health evaluation on January 12, 2023, as well as Defendant Haas on January 19, 9 2023. (TAC at ¶¶ 58, 60.) Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants knew or had reason to 10 know that on or before January 26, 20235, Michael Olivo needed immediate medical care 11 and was not given such care.” (TAC at ¶ 122.) As Defendants Osuji and Haas correctly 12 assert, “[i]n order to state a claim against Defendants for failure to summon medical care, 13 he would have to allege that when they saw Plaintiff . . . he was at that time suffering a 14 physical injury requiring immediate medical care, they knew or should have known about 15 this need for immediate care, yet they failed to summon anyone to provide such care.” 16 (Second Mtn. at 10–11.) Plaintiffs do not allege any facts or circumstances that indicate 17 that Defendant Osuji and Haas were in a position where they knew or should have known 18 that Mr. Olivo needed immediate medical care. 19 Since Defendant Haas and Osuji are newly named defendants, and Plaintiffs have 20 not had an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in their allegations as to these Defendants, 21 it is not clear that amendment would be futile. For these reasons, the sixth cause of action 22 against Defendant Haas and Osuji is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 23 D. Punitive Damages 24 Lastly, Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages again 25 because like its predecessors, the TAC lacks allegations sufficient to support punitive 26 27 28 1 damages. (Mtn. at 13; Second Mtn. at 16–17.) Although Plaintiffs insist that they have 2 sufficiently alleged facts to support a claim for punitive damages, for the same reasons 3 illustrated above and those enumerated by the Court when it struck the request for 4 punitive damages the first time, the facts alleged do not support such a claim. (See Opp’n. 5 at 12; Second Opp’n at 12.) The facts do not show “evil motive or intent, or reckless and 6 callous indifference to federally protected rights,” as would be required to succeed in a 7 Section 1983 action for punitive damages. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The 8 facts also do not reflect “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant[s] [have] been 9 guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice…,” as would be required to warrant punitive 10 damages for the state law claims. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3294(a). As a result, Defendants’ 11 motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED. 12 13 V. CONCLUSION 14 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the Executive 15 Defendants from the TAC (causes of action one through six) WITHOUT LEAVE TO 16 AMEND because the record shows amendment would be futile. Plaintiffs have made two 17 attempts to plead the same causes of action and there is no indication that Plaintiffs have 18 other facts to allege to cure the deficiencies discussed above. 19 / / / / 20 / / / / 21 / / / / 22 / / / / 23 / / / / 24 / / / / 25 / / / / 26 / / / / 27 / / / / 28 / / / / 1 However, the Court GRANTS Defendant Haas’s motion to dismiss the fourth 2 || cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and Defendant Haas and Osuji’s motion to 3 || dismiss causes of action one through three and seven WITH LEAVE TO AMEND since 4 || Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to cure the deficiencies against these Defendants 5 || and there is no basis to conclude that amendment would be futile at this time. The Court 6 GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages. Plaintiffs shall have until 7 || June 24, 2026 to file a fourth amended complaint in compliance with this Order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: June 10, 2026 \ 11 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28