Filed 5/23/14 Estate of Issa CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Estate of MURCHED MIKE ISSA, Deceased. D063244 SABAH E. MALEK,
Petitioner and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00150332- PR-EB-NC) v.
MAY ISSA LORAH et al.,
Objectors and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard G.
Cline, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Joseph M. Kar, Joseph M. Kar; Law Offices of Gregory R. Ellis
and Gregory R. Ellis for Objectors and Appellants.
Steven S. Alkema for Petitioner and Respondent. INTRODUCTION
May Issa Lorah (May) and Marwan Mark Issa (Marwan) appeal an order
establishing Sabah E. Malek (Sabah) is entitled to status as the putative spouse of their
deceased father, Murched Mike Issa (Murched), and estopping them from asserting the
invalidity of the marriage in pending probate proceedings.1 May and Marwan
(collectively appellants) contend: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction under
Health and Safety Code section 103450 to determine putative spouse status; (2) there is
no substantial evidence to support the court's finding of putative spouse; and (3) estoppel
does not apply to the facts presented in this case. We find no merit in these contentions
and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A
When Sabah met Murched through mutual friends in Lebanon in 2002, Sabah was
52 years old and a highly educated professor of mathematics teaching in her home
country of Lebanon. She obtained numerous degrees from Lebanese University in
subjects such as mathematics and computer science and later attended American
University of Beirut where she received a graduate degree in education and a teaching
diploma. She passed a test of English as a foreign language and studied English literature
to improve her English. Sabah taught mathematics and physics for 36 years and
contributed to several mathematics textbooks used in the local schools. She led a busy,
1 Because a number of the parties and witnesses share similar names, we use first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. 2 happy and contented life living as a single woman with her mother. Although she had
relatives, including a brother, who lived in the United States, Sabah never considered
going to the United States other than possibly as a tourist.
Murched was a naturalized United States resident who had lived in the United
States for 29 years. He had four children with his first wife (two girls and two boys) and
was a successful businessman who travelled frequently. After Murched's first wife
passed away in 2001, he felt "emptiness in [his] life and in [his] heart]." He missed the
companionship and love of a spouse and he wanted to find someone with whom he could
travel.
B
Mutual acquaintances introduced Murched and Sabah in September 2002 while
Murched was visiting old friends in Lebanon. Murched and Sabah immediately "hit it
off." Murched called Sabah a few days after their introduction to arrange for another
date. Throughout the next month, they saw each other every few days and traveled
together locally. Murched introduced Sabah to family members who lived in Lebanon.
Sabah began having feelings for Murched and believed he was developing feelings for
her as well.
Eventually, on November 2, 2002, Murched proposed marriage. He asked Sabah
to marry him both in private and in the presence of her mother, as is customary. Murched
informed May of his intention to marry Sabah.
They celebrated their engagement in Lebanon. Camil Saab (Camil), a family
friend, met Sabah at a social gathering at the home of Camil's parents in Lebanon. He
3 understood Sabah and Murched were engaged. Camil was also going through the process
of obtaining an alien fiancée visa to bring his future wife to the United States from
Lebanon. He discussed the process with Murched, including how to convert to
permanent residency after marriage.
Murched returned to the United States a few days later, but he told Sabah he
would take care of everything required to bring her to the United States. This included
obtaining a fiancée visa (also known as a K-1 visa), which allows an alien fiancée to
enter the country for the purpose of marrying a United States citizen. Sabah did not
know how to obtain such a visa and did not investigate what was required. She relied on
Murched, who assured her he would take care of everything. They continued to
communicate by telephone, e-mail and letters after he left.
C
Consistent with his promise, Murched contacted an attorney and arranged for the
preparation and completion of an application for a fiancée visa, which he sent to Sabah
for signature. Under penalty of perjury, Murched confirmed he intended to marry Sabah
within 90 days of her arrival in the United States. He described in his declaration they
would be "wed at City Hall," and thereafter "have a church ceremony and a large
reception inviting all of my family and friends." Murched's daughter, May, also
submitted a declaration describing how, after speaking with Sabah on the telephone, May
believed Sabah "is an exceptional human being and truly cares for my father" and she
planned to attend the wedding.
4 Sabah's brother, Michael Malek (Michael), lives in New York. He came to the
United States on a student visa in 1976, received a degree in civil engineering in 1982
and became a citizen in 1984. When Michael learned his sister was engaged to Murched,
he spoke to Murched by telephone and arranged to meet in California around Christmas
because Michael was planning to visit friends on the west coast. Murched, along with
Marwan, met Michael and went to dinner in Los Angeles. Murched spoke highly of
Sabah and said he was in the process of filing a fiancée visa. Michael introduced
Murched to his friends as Sabah's future husband.
After the visa was approved, Sabah made arrangements to leave Lebanon. She
said good-bye to her friends and family and gave notice at the school where she was
teaching.
D
Sabah came to the United States in August 2003 and initially stayed with Michael
in New York until Murched could come to meet her. When Murched arrived in
September 2003, he stayed with Michael and Sabah. Murched and Sabah slept in
separate bedrooms, as was the custom. When Michael asked about the wedding
arrangements so he could plan to attend, Murched told Michael he wanted Sabah to meet
his son and daughter in California and then marry in Las Vegas, Nevada where it was
easiest and fastest to marry. Murched told Sabah they only needed to complete and sign
some documents, submit them to a clerk and pay a fee to marry in Las Vegas.
Murched, Sabah and Michael traveled to California where they stayed at
Murched's residence in Carlsbad. Murched and Sabah again slept in separate rooms.
5 Over the next two days, Murched introduced Sabah to his children and grandchildren as
his fiancée and his future wife. Sabah presented gold gifts from Lebanon to May and her
daughters because it is Lebanese custom for the bride to give gifts to the groom's family.
Murched, Sabah and Michael traveled to Las Vegas by car. When they arrived,
Murched booked two rooms, one for Sabah and Michael and one for himself for the first
night.
The following morning, September 15, 2003, the trio went to the County Clerk's
office, which they called "City Hall." Sabah and Murched completed paperwork and then
waited in line. Others in the office appeared to be there to get married. Some were
dressed formally in white gowns and suits or tuxedos.
Neither Sabah nor Michael knew what to expect of a civil marriage in Las Vegas.
Lebanon does not recognize civil marriage, so Sabah relied on what Murched told her.
He said they would submit an application, pay a fee and then be considered married. As
he had explained, they completed and signed paperwork, which they gave to a clerk.
Murched paid a fee and was given documents in return. Murched then told Sabah and
Michael the marriage was complete and legal documents would be sent by mail.
Murched embraced Sabah and she cried while Michael congratulated them.
They went to a Mediterranean restaurant to celebrate. Murched told Sabah they
would have a ceremony with his daughter Mona Wilcox (Mona), which Sabah
understood to be a social celebration, based upon the Arabic translation of the word.
Murched called Mona who lived in the area, and asked her to join them. When she
arrived, Murched told her she should congratulate them because they were married.
6 Mona congratulated them, they had a toast, and pictures were taken. Michael gave
Murched an expensive watch as a gift. They then went to Mona's house where Sabah
presented gifts to Mona and her children. When they returned to the hotel, Sabah and
Murched retired to a room together, which was the first time they shared a room since
Sabah came to the United States.
Sabah and Murched returned to Carlsbad where they lived as a married couple
until Murched's death on November 12, 2010. In October 2003, one of Sabah's cousins
hosted a reception in Detroit with other family members to celebrate her marriage.
Although some of the decorations incorporated a Halloween theme due to the time of
year, the hostess made a speech congratulating and toasting the couple, and asking them
to cut the cake. Pictures were taken of Murched and Sabah cutting the cake and feeding
it to each other. Sabah understood the celebration with Mona and the Detroit celebration
constituted ceremonies, based on the Arabic translation of the word, which is a social
celebration.
Murched later presented Sabah with a marriage certificate. Sabah did not fully
examine the certificate, but put it in a drawer for safekeeping.
With the help of an attorney, Murched and Sabah prepared an application to
register permanent residence for Sabah on the basis they were married. Although Sabah
believed they were married on September 15, 2003, the date of marriage listed on the
application was November 1, 2003 and it was signed by Mona as the official performing
the marriage. The petition was approved and Sabah was granted conditional permanent
resident status. A few years later, Sabah and Murched filed a third immigration petition
7 to remove the conditions on residence. Both verified, consistent with the marriage
certificate, they were married in Las Vegas on November 1, 2003 and remained married.
E
Over the years, friends with whom Murched and Sabah regularly socialized
understood they were married. Murched introduced Sabah as his wife. The couple spent
time with Murched's children and grandchildren for holidays and celebrations.
Murched introduced Sabah to his personal physician and the physician's staff as
his wife. She attended medical appointments with him and they acted like a couple. The
physician only knew Sabah as Murched's wife.
Murched filed joint federal and state tax returns with Sabah from 2003 through the
time of his death. Murched informed their accountant Sabah was his wife.
F
Murched died on November 12, 2010 from complications of bladder cancer. The
first time Sabah learned there might be a problem with the marriage was after Murched's
death when the probate proceedings started.
Sabah became somewhat suspicious of Murched's children when May took video
of the house before her father's operation and during Murched's hospital stay, a stranger
warned Sabah there was a "big plot" against her. After Murched's death, Sabah took
some tax and stock papers from the house and gave them to a lawyer.
Only two individuals testified Murched and Sabah were not married. Murched's
business partner, Thomas D. Fenchel (Tom), and Murched's daughter, May. Tom
testified Murched brought Sabah from Lebanon as a companion. When Tom asked if
8 Murched had taken care of his financial affairs, Murched responded it was not important
because they were not really married. Although Tom represented he was Murched's good
friend and Murched relied on him for "every financial decision he ever made in his life,"
Tom did not know about the Las Vegas trip until later.
May testified she did not know how Murched met Sabah and understood her father
"wanted to bring this woman so she could be a travel companion." Although May
acknowledged signing the declaration in 2003 stating Sabah was an exceptional human
being and she believed her father was in love with Sabah and intended to marry her, she
testified she understood Murched "needed" to bring Sabah to the United States and the
only way to do so was with the fiancée visa.
May identified Sabah as her father's surviving spouse on his death certificate, but
claimed at trial she did so because Sabah threatened to disclose information to her father's
friends about her brother acting in gay pornographic movies. She claimed she believed if
she listed Sabah on the death certificate she would leave them alone. Sabah denied
finding pornographic pictures in the brother's room and denied threatening or
blackmailing the family.
G
In January 2011, Sabah filed a petition for appointment of a special administrator
for decedent's estate and later filed a petition for probate of will and for letters
testamentary requesting her appointment as executor of the estate, to which May and
Marwan objected. May and Marwan filed a competing petition for letters testamentary
9 requesting a petition for determination of entitlement to estate distribution in March
2011 asserting Sabah "never had a valid marriage" to their father.
Sabah filed her petition to establish fact of her marriage to Murched in June 2011.
The court later granted Sabah's motion for leave to amend her petition to seek relief as a
putative spouse if the court determined the marriage was invalid.2
The matter was bifurcated with the issue of marriage tried first. After hearing
evidence, the court issued a statement of decision determining: (1) Sabah is entitled to
status as the putative spouse of Murched because she had "a reasonable and objectively
good faith belief that her marriage was valid;" (2) Murched's children are equitably
estopped from asserting the invalidity of the marriage because Murched, who knew the
marriage was invalid, acted as if it were valid and intended his conduct should be relied
upon by Sabah and others whereas Sabah was ignorant of the invalidity of the marriage;
and (3) Murched's children are judicially estopped from asserting the invalidity of the
marriage because Murched took the position he was legally married to Sabah in
immigration and tax filings, which is inconsistent with the position taken by the children
in this action.
2 During the course of litigation, May obtained a judgment from a court in Nevada declaring the marriage certificate invalid. 10 DISCUSSION
I
A Petition under Health and Safety Code Section 103450 Does Not Preclude a Putative Spouse Finding
Appellants contend a putative spouse claim may not be litigated in a petition
brought under Health and Safety Code section 103450. We disagree.
Health and Safety Code section 103450 provides a procedure to judicially
establish the fact of a marriage where the marriage was not registered or no certificate
could be obtained. The procedure may also be used where a spouse is deceased or is
unable to participate in a declaration procedure under Family Code section 425. (Estate
of DePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 105, overruled on other grounds Ceja v. Rudolph
& Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1126 (Ceja).)
Initially, this procedure was used to establish the fact of a marriage, but not the
validity of a marriage. (Estate of DePasse, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.) In 2006,
however, Family Code section 309 was amended to allow a party to a marriage to use the
Health and Safety Code section 103450 procedure to determine the validity of the
marriage if the other party to the marriage denies the marriage or refuses to join a
declaration of marriage. (Fam. Code, § 309.) Appellants do not acknowledge this
statutory amendment.
When a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, "an innocent party
nevertheless may be entitled to relief under the long recognized protections of the
putative marriage doctrine." (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 717,
11 overruled on other grounds Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) "Relief under the
putative spouse doctrine is not precluded even if the circumstances do not establish either
a void or voidable marriage." (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005, overruled on other grounds Ceja, at p. 1126.)
Family Code section 2251 is one of several statutes codifying California's
judicially developed putative spouse doctrine. (Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1120-1121
& fn. 5.) It states in pertinent part, "[i]f a determination is made that a marriage is void or
voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, the court shall: [¶] . . . [d]eclare the party or parties to have the status
of a putative spouse." (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings
including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973, 978-
979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to
guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is
void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in
the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003, 1008 [trial court erred in dismissing petition for dissolution of a
domestic partnership without permitting an opportunity to plead a good faith belief in the
existence of a registered domestic partnership under putative spouse doctrine]), probate
proceedings (Estate of Leslie (1984) 37 Cal.3d 186, 191) and wrongful death (Ceja,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1115).
12 In this case, Sabah petitioned the court to establish the fact of her marriage after
appellants alleged during the probate proceedings that Sabah and Murched were never
married. In response to the petition, appellants alleged there was no valid marriage.
Sabah thereafter sought and obtained leave of court to amend the petition to specify she
alternatively sought relief under the putative spouse doctrine if the court determined the
marriage was invalid. Given these circumstances, we conclude there is no procedural
impediment to the court's ability to determine whether or not Sabah was entitled to
putative spouse status in the context of determining the fact or validity of marriage based
on a petition under Health and Safety Code section 103450.
II
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Finding Sabah is Entitled to Putative Spouse Status
If a court determines a marriage is void or voidable and finds a party "believed in
good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall: [¶] . . . [d]eclare the party or
parties to have the status of a putative spouse." (Fam. Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1).) The
Supreme Court recently analyzed whether a subjective or objective standard should be
applied to determine the good faith belief necessary for putative spouse status. (Ceja,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1119-1121.) After reviewing precodification case law, the court
concluded "[t]he good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of
mind of the alleged putative spouse." (Ceja, at p. 1128, italics added.)
13 The court overruled a line of cases holding good faith should be tested by an
objective standard examining "whether the facts surrounding the marriage would cause a
hypothetical reasonable person to believe in its validity." (Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 1126) However, it determined "the reasonableness of a party's belief may legitimately
inform the subjective good faith inquiry." (Id. at pp. 1127-1128.) "Although the claimed
belief need not pass a reasonable person test, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
one's belief in the face of objective circumstances pointing to a marriage's invalidity is a
factor properly considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether the belief was genuinely and honestly held." (Id. at p. 1128.) Other factors the
court should consider include "the efforts made to create a valid marriage, the alleged
putative spouse's personal background and experience, and all the circumstances
surrounding the marriage." (Ibid.)
Appellants acknowledge judicial decisions are generally given retroactive effect.
(Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973, 978.) They do not dispute
Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1113 applies to this case. They ask us to remand, however, for
retrial under the subjective standard of good faith as articulated by the Supreme Court.
We are not persuaded.
Unlike in Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 372, footnote
21, where the court determined there was evidence a party's trial strategy was weakened
by a subsequent Supreme Court decision, appellants point to no evidence in the record
their trial strategy was weakened as a result of the trial court's application of an objective
standard for good faith as opposed to a subjective standard of good faith. There is no
14 indication they made a strategy decision to omit evidence that could be relevant to the
Sabah's subjective belief. Indeed, Sabah bore a more substantial burden by proving she
had an objective good faith belief in her marriage than if the trial court had applied the
subjective standard expressed by the Supreme Court.
We will uphold a trial court's finding of putative spouse status if supported by
substantial evidence. (Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1119.) In determining if substantial
evidence exists to sustain a trial court's factual finding, "the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial
court." (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)
In this case, after hearing several days of testimony from numerous witnesses and
considering additional documentary evidence, the trial court determined Sabah had a
reasonable and honest belief she was married to Murched in Las Vegas and the
evidentiary picture she painted to be true. The court rejected the assertion of appellants
that Sabah and Murched engaged in a fraudulent plan to obtain permanent residency for
Sabah in the United States and that she lived with Murched as husband and wife,
including attending family gatherings, knowing they were not legally married for the
purpose of living a life of luxury and excitement.
15 The court determined Sabah and her witnesses "were credible and, except for
minor inconsistencies, presented a coherent and credible story. Having in mind that
[Sabah] was obviously and reportedly recovering from a serious illness and harsh
regimen of treatment, she was a steadfast and totally credible witness. In spite of
opposing counsel's daunting efforts to discredit, undermine and confuse her, [Sabah] was
unwavering." On the other hand, the court found May's testimony incredible because it
was contradicted by numerous witnesses and impeached by written evidence.
We accept the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and will
not substitute it with our own. (In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.) The
trial court was in the best position to assess the nature and tenor of the testimony, the
demeanor of the witnesses and the impeaching factors. The record here shows the court
properly performed its task in this regard. "That the . . . court reasonably could have
assessed . . . credibility less favorably or that our court could reasonably make a different
assessment of credibility is not sufficient grounds for reversal." (Ibid.)
Appellants argue Sabah's testimony was unreasonable and incredible because she
thought a ceremony occurred. The court determined that, although Sabah was smart and
educated, she was naïve and trusting when it came to Murched. She was ignorant of the
requirements of an official marriage, particularly in the United States, and she placed her
trust in Murched. The court found Sabah and Murched went to Las Vegas on
September 14, 2003, for the purpose of getting married with Sabah's brother as the family
chaperone and witness. The court noted although Sabah was somewhat ambiguous about
whether a ceremony was required, her understanding of the Arabic translation of the
16 word included a social celebration, both of which occurred. The court determined Sabah
reasonably and in good faith believed the necessary procedures had occurred.3
Appellants also argue the premarital agreement drafted by Murched's attorney in
September or October of 2003 suggests Sabah could not have reasonably believed she
was married on September 15, 2003. However, Sabah testified she never spoke to the
attorney about a premarital agreement. Although the trial court found the attorney was a
credible witness, he had a poor memory except where matters were clearly shown by
documents in his file and he was vague as to when he had conversations with either
Sabah or Murched. Whether Murched discussed this premarital agreement before or after
the September 15, Las Vegas trip has no bearing on whether Sabah reasonably and in
good faith believed they were married on this date.
Appellants finally argue Sabah should have known her marriage was invalid when
she learned about the marriage certificate dated November 1, 2003. Although both Sabah
and Murched certified in immigration documents they were married on November 1,
2003, the court noted Sabah took a passive role in the document preparation and the only
evidence supporting this date as the date of marriage is the certificate itself. The court
noted Murched's daughter, Mona, who signed the certificate, as the official performing
the marriage using the title "Reverend," was present during the trial but did not testify to
3 Appellants assert Sabah's belief should be viewed as unreasonable because she studied English literature in college. We find no basis to override the trial court's assessment of credibility. We also note Sabah testified she studied literature as a means to improve her English. There is no indication her testimony about her understanding of the word "ceremony" was untruthful or unreasonable. 17 dispel the uncertainties surrounding the execution of the marriage certificate and
Murched's intentions. Finding this "highly suspicious" the court drew negative inferences
against appellants. As a result, the court concluded Murched procured the marriage
certificate and provided it to the attorney knowing it was false and caused him to submit
it to the Immigration and Naturalization Service whereas Sabah was not aware of the
existence of the marriage certificate or its contents. The court also found it "highly
probable" May and her sister Mona participated to some degree in the fraud.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings Sabah had a
good faith belief in the validity of her marriage, under either a subjective or objective
standard.
III
Estoppel
Four elements are required to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: " '(1) the
party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct
shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to
believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts;
and (4) he [or she] must rely upon the conduct to his [or her] injury.' " (Long Beach v.
Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 489.) If a decedent would be estopped from denying the
validity of a marriage, the heirs may likewise be estopped. (In re Estate of Davis (1940)
38 Cal.App.2d 579, 585.)
Our review of a trial court's decision regarding the application of equitable
estoppel involves a two-step process. First, we independently review whether the factual
18 findings provide a legally sufficient basis for estoppel. Second, assuming estoppel may
be applied based upon the facts as found, the court's decision of whether or not it should
apply estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co.
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 483-484.)
In this case, we conclude there is a legally sufficient basis for estoppel and the trial
court properly exercised its discretion to apply equitable estoppel to preclude appellants
from asserting the marriage between Sabah and Murched was invalid. As discussed, the
court found Murched procured a false marriage certificate and provided it to the attorney
knowing it was false and caused him to submit it to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. He held himself out both socially and in tax documents as the husband of Sabah.
As a result, governmental entities acted upon these representations to his benefit although
he knew he was not legally married and was not acting in good faith.
The court found there was nothing to put Sabah on notice she was not legally
married from September 15, 2003, until the time of Murched's death and she reasonably
and in good faith relied on the representations of a valid marriage. However, Murched
did not act so honorably. He did not put Sabah on his business health plan and informed
his business partner she was merely an enjoyable companion, not a wife. We conclude
appellants are equitably estopped from asserting the invalidity of the marriage.
Appellants assert estoppel is not appropriate because "the fact of marriage cannot
be created through estoppel." However, "estoppel does not make valid the thing
complained of, but merely closes the mouth of the complainant." (In re Estate of Davis,
supra, 38 Cal.App.2d at p. 585.) Here, the evidence shows Murched induced Sabah to
19 come to the United States to be his wife. He took her to Las Vegas for the purpose of
marriage and thereafter held her out as his spouse for his own benefit. The trial court's
order does not make the marriage valid, but precludes Murched's children from asserting
invalidity of the marriage in the remaining probate proceedings. We find no abuse of
discretion in applying estoppel principles under these circumstances. 4
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
IRION, J.
4 Given our conclusions, we do not reach the issue of whether or not judicial estoppel should apply to statements submitted to administrative agencies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.