CLERK oF couRT
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
ESTATE OF GLEN CRUZ JR., SONIA K. CIVIL CASE no. CV0696-21 CRUZ, and TANYA CRUZ,
Plaintiffs, DECISION AND ORDER RE vs. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 DETRY CORPORATION, CENTURY SANCTIONS INSURANCE COMPANY (GUAM) L11vuTED, and DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Honorable Dana A. Gutierrez on April 4, 2022 for a hearing
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
("Rule ll Motion). Present via Zoom were Attorney Rachel Taimanao-Ayuyu representing
Plaintiffs Estate of Glen Cruz Jr., Sonia K. Cruz, and Tanya Cruz ("Plaintiffs"); and Attorney
Tim Roberts representing Detry Corporation ("Derry"), Century Insurance Company (Guam)
Ltd. and Does 1-5 (collectively "Defendants"). Upon a review of the pleadings and in
consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, the Court now issues this Decision and
Order GRANTING Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENYING Defendants'
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
BACKGROUND
The instant matter arises out of Plaintiffs' Complaint asserting the following causes of
action against Defendants: 1) Wrongful Death, 2) Loss of Consortium, 3) Emotional Distress, 4) DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz J'r:, et al. u Derry Corporation, et al.
Respondent Superior Liability, and 5) Insurance Liability. Comal., at 11 15-54 (Sept. 28, 2021).
The Complaint was brought by the Estate of Glen Thomas Cruz Jr., by and through its Special
Administrator Erika Alford, by Sonia K. Cruz, the Decedent's biological mother, and by Tanya
Cruz, the Decedent's biological sister. Id. at1]2-4.
T he C omp la int a lleges t ha t on or a b ou t O ct ob er 1 , 2 0 2 0 , G len T homa s C r u z J r .
("Decedent") was a front passenger in a Detry-owned truck while Detry employee, Alan S.
Calanda ("Calanda"), was driving. Id. at 1] 8-9. While Calando was driving, Calanda lost control
of the vehicle, the Detry truck's brakes ceased working, Calandra attempted to turn left at an
intersection, and ultimately, the Detry truck tipped on its side, rolled, and came to a stop on the
driver's side. Id. at 1[ 10-12.
As a result of the accident, Decedent received multiple traumatic internal and external
injuries and was pronounced dead at .Guam Memorial Hospital on October 1, 2020. Id. at 1113.
The Complaint alleges that Decedent was not an employee of Detry subject to the exclusive
remedies of worker's compensation. Id. at 1114.
On October 18, 2021, Defendants tiled an Answer to the Complaint and on November 3,
2021, Defendants tiled their First Amended Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. On November 30,
2021, Defendants tiled their Motion for Summaury Judgment asserting that Decedent died while
acting in the course and scope of his employment with Derry, and therefore, Plaintiffs' exclusive
remedy for their injuries is worker's compensation. The Motion for Summary Judgment was
suppor ted by the Decla r a tions of Attor ney T im Rober ts, Leila nie Deliguin, a nd r ebuke S.
Miranda. Plaintiffs tiled their Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 10,
2022. Defendants filed their Reply on January 19, 2022.
2 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21; Estate of Glen Cruz Jr., et al. Vu Derry Corporation, et al.
On December 27, 2021, Defendants tiled their Rule ll Motion. On January 24, 2022,
Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the Rule ll Motion. On February 1, 2022, Defendants filed
their Reply to the Opposition.
On February 10, 2022, the Court issued a CVR 7.1 Form 3 setting a hearing on both
Motions for April 4, 2022. Although the briefing period had closed, Plaintiffs filed a Declaration
of Erika M. Alford on April 1, 2022 ("Alford's Declaration").
The Court heard oral argument from the parties on April 4, 2022 and took the matter
under advisement. On May 17, 2022, Defendants Bled a Sur-Reply on the Declaration of Erika
M. Alford.'
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the GRCP, summary judgment may be granted "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on tile, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A genuine issue exists when "dlere is
'sufficient evidence' which establishes a factual dispute requiring resolution by a fact-finder."
liuka Corp. u Kawasho Int'l (Guam) Inc., 1997 Guam 10117. The factual dispute must concern
1 CVR 7.1(d)(l) of the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam provides that "[t]he opposing party may within twenty-eight (28) days of the Blind of the motion, file with the clerk ... (A) a memorandum in support thereof . . . and (C) any affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury[.]" (emphasis added). Further, CVR 7.l(f) provides that "[p]apers not timely filed by a party including any ... papers required to be tiled under this Rule shall not be considered without leave of Court."
At the April 4, 2022 hearing, Defendants did not object to the late tiling of Alford's Declaration. Therefore, the Court did not strike the Plaintiffs' untimely submission of Alford's Declaration. Thus, although Defendants did not request leave of court to file the sur-reply, this Court, in its discretion, will consider both Alford's Declaration and the Defendants' Sur-Reply to Alford's Declaration.
3 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz Jr, et al. u Derry Corporation, et al.
a material fact, Id. "A 'material fact' is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense
and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit ... [d]isputes over irrelevant or
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." Id.
In addition, "the court must view the evidence and draw inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant." Edwards v Pacyic Financial Corp., 2007 Guam 27 1] 7. The
court's "ultimate inquiry is to determine whether a 'specific fact' set forth by the nonmoving
party, coupled with the undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or
reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence." l i u k a , 1997 Guam
10118. A. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact.
Pursuant to 22 GCA § 9106, "if the employer has obtained the coverage prescribed by the
statute then the liability of the employer for compensation is exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee." Amerault u Intercom Support Sena, Ire., 2004
Guam 23 1] 12 (citing 22 GCA § 9106). Plaintiffs do not dispute the issue of whether Detry
obtained the required worker's compensation coverage, nor do they dispute that If Decedent
qualified as an "employee" of Detry, then worker's compensation would be Decedent's exclusive
remedy.
Plaintiffs instead argue that Decedent did not meet the definition of "employee" pursuant
to 22 GCA § 9103(i). Opp., at 4 ("[T ]here exists genuine issues of material fact as to the
employer-employee relationship between decedent and Detry."). Thus, the relevant issue in dis
case is whether Decedent qualified as an "employee" under 22 GCA § 9l03(i) .
Defendants assert that the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that at the time of his
4 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21 ,- Estate of Glen Cruz Jr, et al. v Detry Corporation, et al.
accident in the Detr y tr ack, Decedent was an employee of Der r y acting in the cour se and scope
of his employment, and Detry had worker's compensation insurance covering Decedent. Mot., at
2-4. Based on this, Defendants argue that as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' civil action is barred
because their exclusive remedy is worker's compensation. Id. at 4-11.
In opposition, Plaintiffs acknowledge the facts put forth by Defendants, but argue that
"there is no evidence presented that the decedent was not a purely casual employee in the short
time that he allegedly returned to employment with Detry on the date of his death." Opp., at 4.
W i th o u t d i r e c ti n g th e C o u r t to a n y s p e c i fi c d i s p u te d fa c t, P l a i n ti ffs a r g u e th a t th e y " m u s t b e
affor ded the oppor tunity to conduct discover y in the matter and have the oppor tunity to pr esent
evidence not personally known to them at this early stage of the litigation." Id.
W h e n d e te r min in g w h e th e r a ma te r ia l fa c t e x is ts , "if th e mo v a n t c a n d e mo n s tr a te th a t
ther e ar e no genuine issues of mater ial fact, the non- movant cannot mer ely r ely on allegations
contained in the complaint, but must produce at least some significant probative evidence
tending to support the complaint." Moylan u Citizens Sec. Bank, 2015 Guam 3 6 1 ] 2 3 . " A
genuine issue exists when there is 'sufficient evidence' which establishes a factual dispute ms r equir ing r es olution by a fac t- finder . [...] Howev er , the dis pute mus t inv olv e a 'mater ial fac t.
Government of Guam v. Gutierrez, 2015 Guam 8 11 25 (internal citations omitted).
Title 22 GCA § 9l03(i) defines "employee" as:
[A]ny per son who has enter ed into the employment of or wor ks under contr act of service or apprenticeship with an employer. It includes aquaculture and agr icultur al wor ker s but excludes a person whose employment is purely casual and not, for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. As used her ein the term employee includes any person who has worked forty (40) hours per week during the previous sixty (60) days, exclusive of holidays, for the same employer.
(emphasis added). The Guam Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusion provision within this
5 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz Jr, et al, u Derry Corporation, et al.
statute must be applied in the conjunctive, holding that "a person who may be under contract for
services is an employee except if his employment is casual and not for the purpose of the
employer's trade or business." Villalon v. Hawaiian Rock Products, Inc., 2001 Guam 5 1123.
With respect to facts in this case, Decedent was hired to work for Detry on July 18, 2019.
Decl. of Nobuo S. Miranda, at 1] 2 ("Miranda's Declaration"). He separated from the company
from August 4, 2020 through September ll, 2020. Id. He was rehired by Detry on September
11, 2020. Id. On the date of his accident, Decedent was employed by Detry as a General Helper.
Id. The accident occurred while the Decedent and Calando were on a work trip. Id.
Miranda's Declaration attaches copies of Decedent's partially handwritten timesheets for
the relevant payroll periods, demonstrating the Decedent clocked hours working for Detry from
July 28, 2020 through August 3, 2020, and then from September ll, 2020 through October 1,
2020. Id. at 1] 3, Exhibit 1. Miranda's Declaration also attaches copies of Decedent's direct
deposit payroll records with Detry for 2020, his paystub records with Deny for the payroll
periods &om June 28, 2020 through October 9, 2020, and Decedent's W-2GU Guam Wage and
Tax Statement for 2020. Id. at 'II 4-6, Exhibits 2-4.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the aforementioned facts are in dispute, nor do they offer
"significant probative evidence tending to support the" allegation in that Complaint that
Decedent was "not an employee of Detry subject to the exclusive remedies of worker's
compensation." Rather, Plaintiffs merely assert that Defendants did not present evidence that the
Decedent was not purely a casual employee. Opp., at 4.
Plaintiffs do present Alford's Declaration which alleges facts related to Decedent's
employment while he was separated firm his employment with Detry from August 4, 2020
6 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE ll SANCTIONS CV0696-21; Estate of Glen Cruz Jr, et al. u Detrjy Corporation, et al.
t hr ough S ept ember ll, 2020. Assuming the r eleva nt fa cts offer ed by Pla intiffs a r e tr ue,
Dec edent applied for employ ment with Roc k y Mountain Pr ec as t ( "Roc k y Mountain") on Augus t
24, 2020. Altlor d's Deck., at 1] 3. Decedent was not employed by Detty on August 24, 2020. Id.
at 1[ 4. D e c e d e n t w a s h i r e d b y R o c k y M o u n t a i n o n o r a b o u t A u g u s t 3 1 , 2 0 2 0 . I d . a t 1 ] 5 .
Decedent clocked hour s wor king for Rocky Mountain on September 1, September 2, September
4, and September 5, 2020 and was paid as a Rocky Mountain employee for working those hours.
Id. at 1]6, Exhibit B. Decedent was not an employee of Detry in August 2020. Id. at 1] 7.
Alfor d asser ts that if Decedent wor ked for Detr y after August 2020, "Ir would have been
casual employment," however , none of the facts offer ed in Alfor d's Declar ation ar e r elevant to
the time per iod after whic h Decedent was r ehir ed by D e t r y on September 11, 2020. See id. at 11
13. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support this assertion, nor have they
identified which facts put forward by Defendants are in dispute.
Plaintiffs' implication that Defendants' bear the burden to demonstrate that Decedent was
n o t a c a s u a l e m p l o y e e o f De r r y i s n o t the cor r ect a p p l i c a ti o n o f G u a m l a w . S e e O p p . , a t 4 .
Bec aus e Defendants hav e demons tr ated that ther e ar e no genuine is s ues of mater ial fac t, the
burden shifts to Plaintiffs to "produce at least some significant probative evidence tending to
suppor t the" Complaint's allegation that Decedent was "not an employee of Detr y subject to the
ex c lus iv e r emedies of wor k er 's c ompens ation." See Moylan VS Citizens See. Bank, 2015 Guam
361123. He r e , Pla in tiffs h a v e fa ile d to o ffe r a n y e v id e n c e d e mo n s tr a tin g th a t De c e d e n t wa s n o t
Detry's employee at the time of his accident. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine
d i s p u te a s to a n y ma te r i a l fa c ts r e g a r d i n g th e i s s u e o f w h e th e r D e c e d e n t' s e mp l o y me n t w a s
7 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE ll SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz Jr., et al. v Derry Corporation, et al.
22 GCA § 9l03(i). 992 "purely casual" and "not for the purpose of [Detry's] trade or business.
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment As a Matter of Law.
As this Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material facts regarding whether
Decedent's employment was "purely casual" and "not for the purpose of Detly's trade or
business," the Court mms to whether Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
PlaintiEs assert that Decedent is excluded under 22 GCA § 9103(i) because the definition
of "employee" additionally provides that "employee includes any person who has worked forty
(40) hours per week during the previous sixty (60) days, exclusive of holidays, for the same
employer." Opp., at 3.3 Plaintiffs argue that the Guam Supreme Court has not yet had the
occasion to decide the issue of whether an employee under 22 GCA § 9103(i) must have worked
forty hours per week during the previous sixty days for the same employer. Id.
T he G u a m S u p r eme C ou r t ha s held t ha t a lt hou gh "it is a p r inc ip le of s t a t u t or y
construction to look first at the plain language of the statute," it is "also fundamental that a
construction resulting in an absurd and unjust result and would clearly be illconsistent with the
purposes and policies of the act in question should be avoided." Wllalon, 2001 Guam 5 1[ 24.
More than one absurd result would occur if the Court were to adopt Plaintiffs' assertion that
"employee" does not include any person who has not worked forty hours per week during the
2 The Court notes that even assuming, arguendo,Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Decedent's employment was "purely casual," 22 GCA § 9I03(i) must be read in the conjunctive. Villalon, 2001 Guam 5 11 23. As PlaintiBls do not address, or even acknowledge, the second requirement-whether Decedent's employment was not for the purpose of Detry's trade or business-Plaintiifs have failed to offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Decedent is excluded as an employee under 22 GCA § 9l03(i). See, e.g.,Scott u Rhoads, 51 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943), Kunkler it Mauck, 1940, 27 N.E.2d 97, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1940) (holding that an injured employee may recover compensation even though his employment is casual, if such employment is in the usual course of employer's business). 3 It is undisputed that Decedent did not work forty hours for Detry over the span of sixty days prior tohis accident, andneitherparty irises this as a factual issue.
8 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE ll SANCTIONS CV0696-21; Estate of Glen Cruz Jr, et al. u Derry Corporation, et al.
previous sixty days.
F ir st , 22 GC A § 9103(i) st a t es t ha t t he t er m employee "includes aquaculture and
agricultural workers[.]" (emphasis added). Additionally, 22 GCA § 9103(i) states that the term
employee "includes any person who has worked forty (40) hours per week during the previous
sixty (60) days[.]" (emphasis added). "As a matter of statutory construction, a word or phrase
repeated in a statute should be given the same meaning throughout, unless there is a clear
indication that the legislature intended a different meaning." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 394 (2022).
Thus, if the Court were to interpret the word "includes" as excluding any person who has
not worked forty hours per week during the previous sixty days, then pursuant to general rules of
statutory construction, the Court should also interpret the word "includes" as excluding any
person who is not an "aquacultural" or "agricultural" worker. This is clearly an absurd result that
would be inconsistent with the intended application of Guam's Worker's Compensation Act. See
Wllalon, 2001 Guam 5 1124.
Additionally, if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs' purported interpretation of the statute,
the result would mean that newly hired employees working less than forty hours per work week
would be precluded from collecting worker's compensation if injured while acting within the
course and scope of their employment. Furthermore, an employee who does not consistently
work forty hours per work week would have coverage during some time periods, but would lose
coverage during others. These are other absurd results which this Court declines to adopt in the
absence of any binding or persuasive authority interpreting the statute to have such an effect."
Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts regarding the issue of
4 Plaintiffs offered no case law to support their interpretation, and dies Court has not found such case law in its own search.
9 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE ll SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz Jr., et al. u Derry Corporation, et al.
whether Decedent's employment was "purely casual" and "not for the purpose of [DeiTy's] trade
or business," and the Court declines to interpret the statute as excluding employees who have not
yet worked forty hours over the span of sixty days, the Court finds that Decedent qualified as an
statutorily defined "employee" as a matter of law pursuant to 22 GCA § 9103(i). Therefore,
under 22 GCA § 9106, worker's compensation is the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy to recover for
any liability of Detry to Decedent. See Amerault, 2004 Guam 23 15 12 (citing 22 GCA § 9106).
As worker's compensation is the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy, the instant civil action is improper,
and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
11. Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
Defendants move the Court to award Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule
l 1(b)(2) of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure ("GRCP"), arguing that Plaintiffs' Complaint is
not warranted by existing law, and at best, can be characterized as a frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. Mot. for
Sanctions, at 1-2. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their interpretation of 22 GCA § 9103(i)
provides them with a plausible legal theory which does not warrant sanctions. Opp., at 1-5 .
Rule 11(b)(2) of the GRCP provides that:
By pr esenting to the cour t ... a plea ding, wr itten motion, or other pa per , a n a ttor ney or unr epr esented pa r ty is cer tifying tha t to the best of the per son's knowledge, information, arld belief; formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are wa r r a nted by existing la w or by a nonfr ivolous a r gument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.]
Rule 11 " i s d e s i g n e d t o v e s t t r i a l c o u r t s w i t h w i d e d i s c r e t i o n i n s a n c t i o n
decision-making." DFS Guam L.R v. A.B. Won Pat Int'I Airport Authority, 2014 Guam 121]29
(internal citations omitted). A trial judge "is entitled not only to the ordinary deference due the
10 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21;Estate of Glen Cruz Jr., et al. v Derry Corporation, et al.
trial judge, and additional deference in the entire area of sanctions, but extraordinary deference in
denying sanctions." Id. "The coull's inherent power to sanction affords the trial court even more
discretion and requires a higher threshold of misconduct." Id.
The Court finds the present case analogous DFS, 2014 Guam 12. In DFS, the plaintiff
a r gued tha t Gua m's sta tutor y scheme r ega r ding pr ocur ement a ppea ls a llowed it to choose
between taking its protest to the Superior Court or to the Office of Public Accountability after the
Airport Authority denied its initial protest. Id. at 1131. The argument required the tnlal coin to
conduct statutory interpretation, and the trial court was not persuaded by DFS's argument. Id.
Although the trial com granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the
defendants' motion for Rule ll sanctions. Id.
Upon review of the trial court's denial of sanctions, the Guam Supreme Court held that
"there is a significant difference between a weak o r unpersuasive argument and one that is as sanctionably frivolous. Id. The DFS Court held that "an even greater showing-bad faith-is
required for an exercise of a trial coult's inherent power to sanction." Id. at fi 32.
Here, although not explicit, Defendants imply that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith by refusing
to call the Guam Workers Compensation Commission ("WCC") to ask if a worker is covered by
wor ker s compensa tion on his fir st da y on the job. Reply, a t 2. However , even a ssuming
Plaintiffs' could have obtained an affirmative answer to this question from the WCC, there is no
binding Guam precedent explicitly affirming this Court's interpretation of the 22 GCA § 9103(i).
Simply because the WCC and its lawyers may interpret the law to apply a certain way would not
preclude a comet from adopting a different interpretation if the issue is presented for adjudication.
Although the Cour t does End that Plaintiff's pur por ted inter pr etation of 22 GCA §
11 DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS CV0696-21; Estate of GIen Cruz Jr, et al. u Derry Corporation, Hz al.
9l03(i) would lead to absurd results, the Court does not find evidence that Plaintiffs have acted
in bad faith in bringing their Complaint. Accordingly, this Court, in its discretion, declines to
impose Rule ll sanctions upon Plaintiffs for the filing of their Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and in accordance with the applicable law, the Court hereby
GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Defendants' Motion for
Rule ll Sanctions.
SO ORDERED: JULO 5 2022
HOD ORABLE D GUTIE HZ Judy 'riot Courddf Guam
SERVICE VIA E-MAIL | acknowledge that an electronic copy of the original was e-mailed to: /¢mW 7?!»w-44- y
knlM H"/If ¥~;£,' Date: 7/x/ Time: 7 : >'s},, 57-4 Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Guam