Estate of Elliot
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Opinion
FILED 01/23/2023 02/13/2023
No. DA 23-0031 Bowen Greenwood CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA
Case Number: DA 23-0031
IN THE
Supreme Court of the State of Montana ______________________ IN RE THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF IAN RAY ELLIOT, DECEASED. __________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, HON. ROD SOUZA CASE NO. DP-22-0034
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
MICHAEL P. MANNING RITCHIE MANNING KAUTZ PLLP 175 North 27th Street Suite 1206 Billings, MT 59101 (406) 601-1400 mmanning@rmkfirm.com
Counsel for Appellee Joseph V. Womack, Special Administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating Partner of StarFire, LP STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Appellants Jenny Jing, Alice Carpenter, and Michael Bolenbaugh
have appealed two district court orders—a May 23, 2022 order
appointing a special administrator in the Estate of Ian Ray Elliot and a
December 9, 2020 order denying their Rule 60(b) motion, which asked
the court to vacate its earlier order. While their appeal is timely as to
the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, the appeal of the court’s underlying
order is not. Accordingly, Appellee Joseph Womack, as the special
administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and the liquidating partner
of StarFire, LP, moves under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 16
to dismiss the portion of the appeal directed to the district court’s
May 23, 2022 order. Neither Womack nor any other party should have
to spend unnecessary time and resources briefing the merits of that
part of the appeal, which was filed months too late. Womack has
contacted Jing, Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh regarding this motion.
They oppose it.
BACKGROUND
This Court has weighed in multiple times in the lengthy battle
over the Estate of Ada Elliot, which has now spilled over into the estate
of her deceased son, Ian. Most recently, the Court affirmed the district 1 court’s refusal to remove Womack as the special administrator of Ada’s
estate, approved Womack’s actions as the liquidating partner of
StarFire, LP, and rejected Ian’s bias claims after he was held in
contempt. See In re Est. of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N (unpublished). In doing
so, the Court recognized that “Ian obstructed Womack’s administration
with constant litigation and unfounded accusations,” including filing
“numerous, lengthy motions objecting to almost every action by
Womack,” and suing him personally twice. Id., ¶ 19.
Ian passed away while the last appeal was pending, leaving a will
naming his domestic partner, Jenny Jing, and ex-wife, Ann Taylor
Sargent, as co-personal representatives. See Ex. A, at 1. Because of the
historically contentious nature of the proceedings, Womack petitioned
for supervised administration of Ian’s estate, which Cindy Elliot joined
but which Jing and Sargent strongly opposed.1 Id. After holding two
evidentiary hearings, the district court entered a detailed 29-page order
on May 23, 2022 granting Womack’s petition and appointing attorney
Andrew Billstein as the special administrator of Ian’s estate. See
generally id. Among other things, the court’s 65 findings of fact and 35
1 Cindy and Ian are the sole heirs of Ada’s estate. 2 conclusions of law recount Jing’s intimate involvement in Ian’s frequent
and frivolous pro se litigation, her commitment to continuing the same
course of action, her conflict of interest due to debts she owes Ian’s
estate, and her continued unfounded attacks on Womack and inability
to work with him. Id.
On July 11, 2022, Womack filed a Rule 77(d) notice of entry of the
district court’s order. See Ex. B. He served the notice on all interested
parties, including Jing and both Carpenter and Bolenbaugh, who are
devisees in Ian’s will. Id. No party appealed in the next 30 days.
Instead, on October 20, 2022—101 days later—Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh jointly filed a motion invoking Rules 42(a), 60(b) and 60(d)
asking the court to: (1) vacate its May 23, 2022 order; (2) allow an
independent action to investigate fraud on the court; and (3) consolidate
the various Elliot estate cases (the Rule 60(b) motion). See Ex. C. The
district court denied that motion on December 9, 2022, again issuing a
detailed order. See Ex. D. On January 9, 2023, Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh filed their notice of appeal, purporting to appeal not only
the December 9 order denying their Rule 60(b) motion, but also the
underlying May 23 order appointing Billstein as the special
administrator of Ian’s estate. 3 ARGUMENT
I. The Appeal of the District Court’s Order Denying the Rule 60(b) Motion Is Timely.
Under Montana law, an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is a
final, appealable order. Donovan v. Graff, 248 Mont. 21, 24, 808 P.2d
491, 493 (1991). Because Jing, Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh’s notice of
appeal was filed within 30 days of the district court’s denial of their
Rule 60(b) motion, they properly perfected their appeal of that order.
See Mont. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i); see also Mont. R. App. P. 3. Accordingly,
this motion does not seek to dismiss the portion of the appeal related to
the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
II. The Appeal of the District Court’s Underlying Order Appointing a Special Administrator Is Woefully Untimely.
That said, an appeal of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion “brings
up for review only the order of the denial itself and not the underlying
judgment.” Donovan, 248 Mont. at 24, 808 P.2d at 493. Thus, to also
perfect an appeal of the district court’s May 23, 2022 order, Jing,
Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh were required to file a timely notice of
appeal as to that specific order. They did not come close.
Under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(5)(a)(i), Jing,
Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh had 30 days after Womack’s Rule 77(d)
4 notice to appeal the May 23 order. Accordingly, their notice of appeal
needed to be filed no later than August 10, 2022, meaning that their
January 9, 2023 notice was 166 days too late. See, e.g., Greenup v.
Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124 (“[I]t is
reasonable to expect all litigants, including those acting pro se, to
adhere to procedural rules.”).
The Court should reject any argument that Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh’s time to appeal was extended under Rule 4(5)(a)(iii)(E)
simply because they later filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Montana law is
clear that “a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for
appeal.” Donovan, 248 Mont. at 25, 808 P.2d 494; see also State v.
Osborn, 2015 MT 48, ¶ 15, 378 Mont. 244, 343 P.3d 1188. Moreover, in
unpublished decisions, the Court has interpreted the timeliness
requirement in Rule 4(5)(a)(iii)(E) to mean that a Rule 60(b) motion
extends the deadline for appealing an underlying order only if it is filed
before expiration of the initial time for appealing that order. See, e.g.,
Boland v. Boland, 2020 MT 30N, ¶ 11, 399 Mont. 551, 456 P.3d 588
(Table). Although Womack acknowledges that Boland is not
precedential, it appears the Court has found this interpretation so
5 fundamentally mandated by the Rules of Appellate Procedure that a
published decision elaborating on it has been unnecessary.
The result makes sense—any other rule would allow a party to
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FILED 01/23/2023 02/13/2023
No. DA 23-0031 Bowen Greenwood CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA
Case Number: DA 23-0031
IN THE
Supreme Court of the State of Montana ______________________ IN RE THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF IAN RAY ELLIOT, DECEASED. __________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, HON. ROD SOUZA CASE NO. DP-22-0034
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
MICHAEL P. MANNING RITCHIE MANNING KAUTZ PLLP 175 North 27th Street Suite 1206 Billings, MT 59101 (406) 601-1400 mmanning@rmkfirm.com
Counsel for Appellee Joseph V. Womack, Special Administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating Partner of StarFire, LP STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Appellants Jenny Jing, Alice Carpenter, and Michael Bolenbaugh
have appealed two district court orders—a May 23, 2022 order
appointing a special administrator in the Estate of Ian Ray Elliot and a
December 9, 2020 order denying their Rule 60(b) motion, which asked
the court to vacate its earlier order. While their appeal is timely as to
the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, the appeal of the court’s underlying
order is not. Accordingly, Appellee Joseph Womack, as the special
administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and the liquidating partner
of StarFire, LP, moves under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 16
to dismiss the portion of the appeal directed to the district court’s
May 23, 2022 order. Neither Womack nor any other party should have
to spend unnecessary time and resources briefing the merits of that
part of the appeal, which was filed months too late. Womack has
contacted Jing, Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh regarding this motion.
They oppose it.
BACKGROUND
This Court has weighed in multiple times in the lengthy battle
over the Estate of Ada Elliot, which has now spilled over into the estate
of her deceased son, Ian. Most recently, the Court affirmed the district 1 court’s refusal to remove Womack as the special administrator of Ada’s
estate, approved Womack’s actions as the liquidating partner of
StarFire, LP, and rejected Ian’s bias claims after he was held in
contempt. See In re Est. of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N (unpublished). In doing
so, the Court recognized that “Ian obstructed Womack’s administration
with constant litigation and unfounded accusations,” including filing
“numerous, lengthy motions objecting to almost every action by
Womack,” and suing him personally twice. Id., ¶ 19.
Ian passed away while the last appeal was pending, leaving a will
naming his domestic partner, Jenny Jing, and ex-wife, Ann Taylor
Sargent, as co-personal representatives. See Ex. A, at 1. Because of the
historically contentious nature of the proceedings, Womack petitioned
for supervised administration of Ian’s estate, which Cindy Elliot joined
but which Jing and Sargent strongly opposed.1 Id. After holding two
evidentiary hearings, the district court entered a detailed 29-page order
on May 23, 2022 granting Womack’s petition and appointing attorney
Andrew Billstein as the special administrator of Ian’s estate. See
generally id. Among other things, the court’s 65 findings of fact and 35
1 Cindy and Ian are the sole heirs of Ada’s estate. 2 conclusions of law recount Jing’s intimate involvement in Ian’s frequent
and frivolous pro se litigation, her commitment to continuing the same
course of action, her conflict of interest due to debts she owes Ian’s
estate, and her continued unfounded attacks on Womack and inability
to work with him. Id.
On July 11, 2022, Womack filed a Rule 77(d) notice of entry of the
district court’s order. See Ex. B. He served the notice on all interested
parties, including Jing and both Carpenter and Bolenbaugh, who are
devisees in Ian’s will. Id. No party appealed in the next 30 days.
Instead, on October 20, 2022—101 days later—Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh jointly filed a motion invoking Rules 42(a), 60(b) and 60(d)
asking the court to: (1) vacate its May 23, 2022 order; (2) allow an
independent action to investigate fraud on the court; and (3) consolidate
the various Elliot estate cases (the Rule 60(b) motion). See Ex. C. The
district court denied that motion on December 9, 2022, again issuing a
detailed order. See Ex. D. On January 9, 2023, Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh filed their notice of appeal, purporting to appeal not only
the December 9 order denying their Rule 60(b) motion, but also the
underlying May 23 order appointing Billstein as the special
administrator of Ian’s estate. 3 ARGUMENT
I. The Appeal of the District Court’s Order Denying the Rule 60(b) Motion Is Timely.
Under Montana law, an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is a
final, appealable order. Donovan v. Graff, 248 Mont. 21, 24, 808 P.2d
491, 493 (1991). Because Jing, Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh’s notice of
appeal was filed within 30 days of the district court’s denial of their
Rule 60(b) motion, they properly perfected their appeal of that order.
See Mont. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i); see also Mont. R. App. P. 3. Accordingly,
this motion does not seek to dismiss the portion of the appeal related to
the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
II. The Appeal of the District Court’s Underlying Order Appointing a Special Administrator Is Woefully Untimely.
That said, an appeal of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion “brings
up for review only the order of the denial itself and not the underlying
judgment.” Donovan, 248 Mont. at 24, 808 P.2d at 493. Thus, to also
perfect an appeal of the district court’s May 23, 2022 order, Jing,
Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh were required to file a timely notice of
appeal as to that specific order. They did not come close.
Under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(5)(a)(i), Jing,
Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh had 30 days after Womack’s Rule 77(d)
4 notice to appeal the May 23 order. Accordingly, their notice of appeal
needed to be filed no later than August 10, 2022, meaning that their
January 9, 2023 notice was 166 days too late. See, e.g., Greenup v.
Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124 (“[I]t is
reasonable to expect all litigants, including those acting pro se, to
adhere to procedural rules.”).
The Court should reject any argument that Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh’s time to appeal was extended under Rule 4(5)(a)(iii)(E)
simply because they later filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Montana law is
clear that “a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for
appeal.” Donovan, 248 Mont. at 25, 808 P.2d 494; see also State v.
Osborn, 2015 MT 48, ¶ 15, 378 Mont. 244, 343 P.3d 1188. Moreover, in
unpublished decisions, the Court has interpreted the timeliness
requirement in Rule 4(5)(a)(iii)(E) to mean that a Rule 60(b) motion
extends the deadline for appealing an underlying order only if it is filed
before expiration of the initial time for appealing that order. See, e.g.,
Boland v. Boland, 2020 MT 30N, ¶ 11, 399 Mont. 551, 456 P.3d 588
(Table). Although Womack acknowledges that Boland is not
precedential, it appears the Court has found this interpretation so
5 fundamentally mandated by the Rules of Appellate Procedure that a
published decision elaborating on it has been unnecessary.
The result makes sense—any other rule would allow a party to
resurrect a long-forfeited right to appeal merely by filing a Rule 60(b)
motion months after the deadline has run. Here, Jing, Carpenter, and
Bolenbaugh are trying to do just that. Had they filed their Rule 60(b)
motion before August 10, 2022, the deadline to appeal the May 23 order
would have run from denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. See Mont. R. App.
P. 4(5)(a)(iii)(E). But they did not, so their time to appeal expired on
August 10. They did not somehow create a new right to appeal by filing
a Rule 60(b) motion three months later asking the Court to vacate the
May 23 order. Rather, they attempted to use Rule 60(b) as a substitute
for an appeal, which Donovan and other cases forbid.
Simply put, Jing, Carpenter, and Bolenbaugh’s appeal of the
district court’s order appointing a special administrator in Ian’s estate
is untimely. Consequently, that portion of the appeal should be
dismissed to avoid unnecessary merits briefing about an unappealable
order.
6 Dated: January 23, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael P. Manning RITCHIE MANNING KAUTZ PLLP
Counsel for Joseph V. Womack, Special Administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating Partner of Starfire, LP
7 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that, pursuant to Mont. R. App. P. 16(3), this response
brief is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and
contains 1,247 words, as determined by the undersigned’s word
processing program.
/s/ Michael P. Manning Michael P. Manning RITCHIE MANNING KAUTZ PLLP
Counsel for Joseph V. Womack, Special Administrator of the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating Partner of Starfire, LP
8 1
3 MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY 4 Cause No.: DP 22-34 5 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: Judge Rod Souza 6 IAN RAY ELLIOT, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 7 Deceased. LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR SUPERVISED 8 ADMINISTRATION THAT INTERESTED PERSON JOINED AND APPOINTING 9 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 10 This matter conies before the Court on the Petition for Supervised Administration of the 11 Estate of Ian Elliot. The petitioner is Joseph Wornack (hereafter "Womack.") [Dkt. I.] 12 Interested Person Cindy Elliot (hereafter "Cindy") has joined in seeking supervised 13 administration. [Dkt. 9 at 7.] Jenny Jing (hereafter "Jenny") and Ann Taylor Sargent (hereafter 14 "Ann") strongly oppose supervised administration. The Court took evidence through witness 15 testimony and admission of exhibits during a hearing on March 7, 2022 and April I, 2021 16 [Dkts. 25, 36.] Now the Court rnakes the following:
17 FINDINGS OF FACT
18 Introducing the Parties 19 1. The deceased is Ian Ray Elliot (hereafter "Ian"). Ian died on December 19, 2021.
20 2. Jenny was Ian's domestic partner.
3. Ann is Ian's ex-wife. 2] 4. Adrian Elliot Olson (hereafter "Adrian") is Ian's nephew. 22 5. Ex. B to Dkt. 7 is a copy of Ian's will. The will appoints Jenny and Ann as co-personal 23 representatives of Ian's estate. [Ex. B at 1 to Dkt. 7.] All parties agree the will is valid. 24
"Exhibit A" 1 6. Ian was the son of Ada H. Elliot (hereafter "Ada") and one of two heirs to her Estate.
2 Ada passed away in January 2017. Before she died, Ian was appointed Ada's guardian , 3 and Joyce Wuertz was appointed Ada's conservator.
7. Ian's sister Cindy is the other heir to the Estate of Ada Elliot. 4 8. The rnajor asset in Ada's Estate is StarFire, Limited Partnership (hereafter "StarFire.") Ian and Cindy are StarFire's two general partners. Cindy was StarFire's prirnary 6 manager and handled its business affairs. StarFire's primary asset is farrnland (called 7 the Ecton Ranch) in Gallatin County, Montana. Long before Ada passed, Ian and Cindy 8 had been embroiled in conflict and litigation over StarFii•e. 9 9. After Ada passed away, Ian sought appointment as personal representative of Ada's 10 Estate. At this point, lan was represented by counsel. Cindy objected. In June 2017, 11 Judge (now Montana Supreme Court Justice) Gustafson granted Cindy's petition for 12 special administration. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 29.] In her order, Judge Gustafson directed the 13 parties to confer and attempt to agree on a special administrator. Ian notified the Court
14 agreement could not be reached. [Dkt. 31.]
15 10. Ian requested Judge Gustafson arnend her prior decision. [DP ] 7-36, Dkt. 30.]
Approximately one month after the motion and supporting brief was filed, Ian's counsel 16 sought withdrawal. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 36.] Judge Gustafson permitted Ian's counsel to 17 withdraw. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 37.] 18 11. From this point forward, Ian represented himself. Concomitant with this self 19 representation, the Estate's adrninistration has been marred by contentious litigation. 20 12. Now self-representing, Ian appealed appointment of special administrator to the 21 Montana Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed Judge Gustafson 22 appointing a special administrator. In re Estate of Elliot, 2018 MT 171N, IN 1 1-12, 393 23 Mont. 538, 421 P.3d 795 (table opinion). The Court observed that Ian's "motion to alter
"Exhibit A" 1 and amend and for reconsideration" requested "the [district] court...re-evaluate the
evidence and reach a different conclusion,...a request the [district] court was under no
3 obligation to honor." 2018 MT 17IN at IT 10.
13. After remand, Judge Knisely assumed jurisdiction on December 6, 2018. [DP 17-36,
Dkt. 54.] In May 2019, Judge Knisley appointed Duncan Peete as the Special 5 Administrator of Ada's Estate. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 60.] However, as Mr. Peete's law firm 6 previously represented Ian, Mr. Peete resigned. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 59.j Judge Knisely then 7 appointed Joe Womack as special administrator on May 30, 2019. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 60.] 8 Womack has been a licensed Montana attorney since September 1984. The Montana 9 Supreme Court described Womack as "the natural choice for liquidating partner given 10 his extensive experience and the disqualifying acrimony between" Ian and Cindy. In re 11 Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at 16. 12 14. The contentious litigation pursued by Ian referenced in Finding of Fact No. 11 supra
13 will be detailed ir?fra beginning with Finding of Fact 24. At this point, the Court turns to
14 Ian's nephew, Adrian Olson. Adrian provided compelling testimony regarding the role
15 ofJenny Jing, Ian's domestic partner in Ian's ongoing Iitigation strategy. Adrian also
offered important insight on the long-running family dispute between Ian and Cindy and 16 Adrian's efforts to resolve the conflici. 17 Jenny Jing's longstanding involvement in Ian's litigation 18 15. Adrian and Ian were very close. At one point, Ian had custody of Adrian. Adrian would 19 visit Ian in Montana yearly. 20 16. In 2013, on his way to Glacier National Park, Adrian spent a week in Billings. As a 21 mediator and peacemaker (the Iitigation between Cindy and Ian having destroyed the 22 family), Adrian proposed selling the entire Gallatin property. Ian and Cindy would then 23 equally split the proceeds. Cindy and Ian agreed.
24 3
"Exhibit A" 1 17. Jenny Jing, Ian's domestic partner, became upset with Ian: A heated argument ensued. 2 At one point, Jenny started screaming at Cindy. Adrian believe d the conflict could turn 3 physical between Jenny and Cindy. To deescalate, Adrian's girlfriend escorted him away. When the proposal and explosive reaction happened, Adrian did not know Jenny well and was shocked how interested she was in the affairs 5 of Adrian's family. Adrian cornrnented the situation "blew his mind." Jenny's disagreement 6 led Ian to reject Adrian's proposal. 7 l 8. Due to Adrian's close relationship with Ian, Adrian attempting to serve as peacemaker 8 in the dispute between Ian and Cindy, and his ability to recall details of the meeting 9 almost nine years later, the Court deems Adrian's testirnony credib] e and entitled to 10 great weight. Moreover, Womack detailed a timeline of events early in his tenure as 11 special administrator of Ada's estate that similarly showcased Jenny's involvement with 12 Ian and her perpetuation of the acrirnonious dispute between Ian and Cindy. Womack 13 held a meeting with Ian, Cindy, and her attorney. Jenny was exclude d from this 14 rneeting. During the meeting, Ian was very kind, and an agreement was reached. After
15 the meeting (with Jenny now having access to Ian), Ian's positio n diametrically changed. Ian proclaimed Cindy, her attorney, and Womack were all lying 16 about the outcome of the rneeting, which necessitated another hearing in 17 front of Judge Knisely. 19. Adrian testified Jenny assisted Ian with his court filings. On rnultipl 18 e occasions he saw Jenny on a computer working on court documents. Adrian specifi cally referenced 19 observing Jenny frequently on the computer over a two-week period in 2017 (which 20 would be the early stages of DP 17-36, years before Womack was appointed). In 2018, 21 Adrian observed Jenny working on legal matters. Adrian regularly conversed with Ian 22 and Jenny regarding how much legal research and writing she comple ted for Ian. 23
24 4
"Exhibit A" 1 20. Adrian also compared Jenny's and Ann's filings in this case with Ian's pro se filings.
Adrian described Jenny's and Ann's filings as having the same style, headings, and
3 numbering as well as the sarne tactic of "objecting to everything" and "aggressive
statements." 4 21. Womack testified Jenny has appeared at every hearing and was at every meeting 5 Womack had with Ian. Jenny has attempted to speak during court hearings, and Judge 6 Knisely had to order her to stop speaking. The papers Jenny and Ann have filed in this 7 case have the same formatting as the papers Ian filed in Ada's probate case and have the 8 sarne type of inflammatory allegations that were in the papers Ian filed pro se, Ian told 9 Womack that Jenny helped with research throughout Ada's probate case. 10 22. Therefore, the Court finds Jenny has been heavily involved with Ian's decisions and 11 questionable litigation tactics for years, lfJenny serves as co-personal representative,
12 she will pick up where Ian left off. Jenny will not work with Womack. Jenny will
13 pursue litigation to the detriment of Ian's estate and the Estate of Ada Elliot. Such
14 actions will cascade to needlessly delay closure and squander Ian's Estate's remaining
assets. 15 23. The Court details below the expansive fora of Ian's pro se litigation. 16 Ian's Litigation Strategy 17 24. Cindy filed the case of SlarFire v. Ian Elliot, DV 2014-829 in Montana's Eighteenth 18 Judicial District before the Hon. Holly Brown. Cindy commenced that case to remove 19 Ian as a StarFire general manager. Ian represented himself. 20 25. Judge Brown said Ian "is cautioned that legally unfounded motions filed with the Court 21 can subject him to sanctions by the Court, including the payrnent of attorney's fees." 22 [DV14-829, Dkt. 67 at 4.] Judge Brown moreover "direct[ed Ian] to Rule 11, 23 M.R.Civ.P., specifically including Rule 11(b), relating to the representations made to
24 5
"Exhibit A" 1 the Court by a party upon the filing of any pleading, motion, or other paper, and the
2 availability of sanctions for a violation of Rule 1 1 by a party." [Id.]
3 26. Judge Brown issued an order requiring mediation that also bolded for ernphasis
"[w]illful failure of a party to schedule, attend[,] and/or participate in good faith in the 4 mediation may result in...sanctions, up to and including...ent[ty of] default." [DV 14- 5 829, Dkt. 117.] Despite this clear, strong language, Ian filed a rnotion essentially asking 6 "the Court to...vacate its...[o]rder.. . requiring...mediation." [DV 14-829, Dkt. 119.] 7 Judge Brown denied this motion. [Id.] This case has been closed. 8 27. In Ada's guardianship/conservatorship case, DG 2014-132 in Yellowstone County, Ian 9 pro se moved to rernove Ms. Wuertz as conservator. [Dkt. 26.] Judge Gustafson denied 10 Ian's motion. [DG 2014-132, Dkt. 36.] Ian appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court 11 affirmed denial of rernoval. In re the Estate ofA.H.E., 2016 MT 315N, 12, 14, 16, 12 386 Mont. 395, 384 P.3d 1 14 (tabie opinion).
13 28. Nevertheless, in DV 18-536 in Yellowstone County, Ian filed suit against Terry Seiffert,
14 Joyce Wuertz, Michael Usleber and everyone else involved in the conservatorship,
including Glen Pike, Ada's and StarFire's accountant. 15 29. Uslebei• and his law firm moved to dismiss for failure to state a claiin. [DV 18-536, Dkt. 16 11.] In Montana, a litigant rnust satisfy a high threshold before obtaining such a 17 dismissal. "A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual 18 case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that 19 there is some insuperable bar to relief." Glaude v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 894 20 P.2d 940, 942 (Mont. 1995). Despite this high threshold, Judge Harada dismissed all of 21 Ian's clahns that she was specifically asked to dismiss. [DV 18-536. Dkt. 28.] 22
24 6
"Exhibit A" 1 30. Elliot v. Elliot, 1 :15-cv-00107 is a case Ian flied in the U.S. District Court for the
2 District of Montana. Ian accused Cindy and her d/b/a of negligence, fraud, and breach
3 of fiduciary duty in administering StarFire and taking care of Ada.
31. A settlement was reached between StarFire, Cindy, and Womack (on behalf of Ada's 4 Estate). Ian strenuously objected to the settlement. All but lan's derivative claims were 5 dismissed. Ian appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth 6 Circuit dismissed Ian's appeal for lack of standing. Ian's actions consumed money, 7 tirne, and a substantiai amount of effort. Ian's derivative claims were stayed pending a 8 complete accounting of StarFire. 9 32. Ian interfered with completion of this accounting. Ian sent the accountant an ernail 10 stating there was a restraining order against Womack which precluded Womack from 11 paying the accountant without consent of Ian or the Court. Not only was this email false
12 but also it resulted in the accountant temporarily stopping work, delaying completion of
13 the accounting.
14 33. DV 20-244 is a Yellowstone County case where Ian sued Wornack. Ian's multi-count
15 complaint alleged Womack's administration of StarFire and Ada's Estate breached
fiduciary duty and committed "negligence and/or abuse of discretion." [DV 20-244, 16 Dkt. 1 at 12 (internal emphasis omitted). Like DV 18-536, Judge Knisely dismissed this 17 case at the pleading stage. [Id., Dkt. 16.] 18 34. Ian, individually and derivatively on StarFire's behalf, filed DV 21-811, apro se 19 complaint against Womack in Yellowstone County. [Dkt. 1.] Ian's complaint raised 20 claims of fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. [ld. at 15- 21 17.] Ian surnrnarized his complaint in DV 21-811 as rewriting and refiling his complaint 22 that Judge Knisely dismissed in DV 20-244. [Ex. N at 6-7.] The proposed Amended 23 Complaint attached to Ian's Motion to Amend [dv 20-244, dkt.6] raises the same claims
24 7
"Exhibit A" (fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence) as his complai nt [dkt. 1] in DV 21-811. This was improper procedure. One must appeal adverse district court decisions to the Montana Supreme Court, not subsequently refile them in another
4 district court. Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution gives the Montana Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over Montana district courts. 35. DV 21-811 is pending before the Honorable Ashley Harada (including Womac k's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and Wornack's motion to have Ian 7 declared a vexatious litigant). [DV 2 1-811, Dkts. 8, 10.] Along with violations of 8 various Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, Womack is seeking dismissal based on res 9 judicata and collateral estoppel. [DV 21-811, Dkt. 9.] 10 36. As referenced supra, DP 17-36 is the probate of Ada's Estate. Womack describe d Ian's 11 pro se litigation as duplicative and repetitious, repeatedly raising the same points.
12 Review of DP 17-36 and Ian's extraordinary nurnber of filings therein reveals the
13 accuracy of Wornack's characterization.
14 37. Judge Knisely held a hearing on April 22, 2021. During the hearing, Judge Knisely
15 orally ruled she had no intent "to entertain further objections to or attempted
interference with Womack's performance of his duties as...Special Administrator.. 16 .." [Ex. E-1 at 18. See, also, DP 17-36, Dkt. 151.] 17 38. After Judge Knisely's oral ruling, Ian told a broker "Womack's authority to sell 18 Starfire...property was still in dispute" and his later email to the broker suggeste d 19 Womack lacked authority to sell StarFire real estate. [Ex. E-3 at 2.] Ian's 20 communications precipitated the broker withdrawing from listing and sale activitie s. 21 Judge Knisely had to hold Ian in contempt and state her willingness to use 22 incarceration, "fines, and other severe measures" to force Ian's compliance with court 23
"Exhibit A" 1 orders. [Ex. E-3 at 2.] It is remarkable Judge Knisely had to threaten incarceration to
2 achieve compliance with a court order.
3 39. Even before Judge Knisely issued fi ndings and conclusions, Ian moved for additional
findings and amended findings, to alter or amend the order, for a new trial, and to stay
the order. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 155.] lan previously argued his mere moving for an 5 injunction constituted a court order precluding Womack from paying expenses. [Ex. E-1 6 at 4-5. See, also, DP 17-36, Dkt. 130 at 2-3.] 7 40. The order denying Ian's motion to amend findings and for additional findings, to alter 8 or amend, or for new trial stated Ian's "current [m]otions include nothing more than 9 frivolous arguments to again delay the progress of this 2017 Estate proceeding to 10 closure." [Ex. E-2 at 4.] Judge Knisely said Ian "continues to frustrate the Court's 11 [o]rders and cause great difficulty and financial expense for the other parties." [Ex. E-2
12 at 4.]
13 41. On July 16, 2021, Ian moved to stay pending appeal, [DP 17-36, Dkt. 171.] Judge
14 Knisely denied this motion. [DP, 17-36, Dkt. 175.] Judge Knisely described Ian's
15 argument as "nonsensical," and another as "meritless." [DP 17-36, Dkt. 175 at 3-4.] The
order characterizes Ian's request for discovery as "a fishing expedition to support 16 motions containing baseless allegations." [Id. at 4.] 17 42. On Septernber 15, 2021, Ian petitioned the Montana Suprerne Court for Writ of 18 Injunction, Supervisory Control, or Other Appropriate Writ, Elliot v. Womack and 19 Elliot, OP 21-473, Petition. The Montana Supreme Court issued an order denying and 20 dismissing Ian's Petition. Elliot v. Womack and Elliot, OP 21-473, Order. 21 43. Ian then sought to remove Judge Knisely. On December 7, 2021, Ian requested 22 disqualification ofJudge Knisely alleging bias based on her previous rulings. [Ex. N.] 23 The Montana Supreme Court issued an order denying this request as void and stated
24 9
"Exhibit A" adverse rulings "cannot support disqualification." [Ex. E-4.] Ian seeking disqualifi cation 2 led to yet rnore delay as all rnatters in Ada's Estate were halted until the Montana
3 Supreme Court issued a ruling. Adrian reviewed Ian's pro se litigation and was most
upset at Ian seeking disqualification. Adrian's sentiment reflects Montana Supreme 4 Court precedent. 5 44. "[A] judge's previous adverse rulings against a party do not constitute sufficient 6 evidence to demonstrate a judge's personal bias or prejudice against that party." Siam. I, 7 Strang, 2017 MT 217, 1 25, 388 Mont. 428, 401 P.3d 690 (citing cases). 8 "Disqualify[ing] judges for bias was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to 9 oust a judge because of adverse rulings rnade." Slate v. 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 10 715, *16, 1 26 (20th Jud. Dist.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte 11 American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1913)). 12 45. Ian appealed Judge Knisely's orders in DP 17-36 to the Montana Supreme Court, On 13 May 12, 2022, the Montana Supreme Court issued an unpublished opinion unanimou sly 14 affirming Judge K.nisely. ln re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N, The Montana Suprerne
15 Court stated "[t]he record demonstrates that, however sincere he rnay have been, lan obstructed Womack's administration with constant litigation and unfounded 16 accusations." In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at ¶ 19. The Court also stated Ian 17 "filed numerous, lengthy motions objecting to almost every action by Womack, and ]8 even sued hirn twice personally." Id "[D]espite his oft-stated purpose to save money for 19 the Estate, Ian's interference objectively and significantly increased costs and delays, 20 further necessitating the second sale. Womack spent a considerable amount of tirne 21 responding to Ian's various motions and lawsuits, tirne which was necessarily charged to 22 the Estate.- In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at ¶ 23. 23
24 10
"Exhibit A" 1 46. The Montana Suprerne Court described Womack as "the natural choice for liquidating
2 partner given his extensive experience and the disqualifying acrirnony between" Cindy
3 and Ian. 2022 MT 91N at (II 16. "[R]ulings in favor of Womack do not equate to bias
against Ian." In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at 41127. The Court also described Ian's 4 position as "not the reality of the situation." Id. at ¶ 23. The Montana Supreme Court 5 stated "the accounting was essential to ending the seven years of litigation over StarFire 6 and the almost five years of litigation over the Estate." Id. at ¶ 23. 7 47. The orders and opinions referenced supra all regard motions or appeals Ian filed pro se. 8 This pro se litigation in multiple fora reveal troubling themes. The first was Ian's 9 willingness to make arguments unsupported by law or fact, and second was Ian's 10 unwillingness to accept adverse court rulings or comply with court orders. Ian's 11 objections have tremendously delayed, arguably by years, closing of Ada's probate case
12 and have caused exponential escalation of Womack's fees.
13 A special administrator must be appointed to avoid undue delay and a conflict 14 of interest.
15 48. The Montana Supreme Court stated "Ian similarly struggled to stay within the scope of
questioning and limit his arguments to the present issues during hearings." In re Estate 16 of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at ¶ 28. This statement exactly describes Jenny's conduct 17 during the March 7, 2022 and April 1, 2022 hearings. Jenny's conduct revealed she 18 would frustrate administration of Ian's estate. 19 49. Jenny asked questions having nothing to do with whether to appoint a special 20 administrator. For example, Jenny asked questions regarding Ada's care in 2010 and 21 2011, around 11 years before the hearing. Also, Jenny repeatedly launched into 22 testimony while examining witnesses. The Court sustained countless objections on this 23 issue. However, Jenny persisted.
"Exhibit A" 1 50. Jenny additionally asked questions and argued the Court needed to accept Ian's will after Womack and Cindy made clear at the start of the March 7 hearing they were not
3 challenging that will. Equally important, much ofJenny's questioning of witnesses was meant to cast aspersion on Womack, Cindy, and Adrian. This shows Jenny's lack 4 of understanding that a special administrator would be neutral, making decisions 5 involving the Estate after their own investigation and would not be an extension of Womack 6 or Cindy. 7 51. During the hearings, Jenny demonstrated unwillingness to accept adverse rulings. 8 During questioning by Ann, Womack characterized Jenny as dogmatic, argumen tative, 9 and persistent with the same things over and over again. The Court believes Womack's 10 testimony that how Jenny acted in this case is precisely what happened in DP 17-36. 11 52. Moreover, Jenny is incapable of working with Womack. Jenny insists on having only 12 written communication with Womack, a position Ann adopted during the first meeting 13 she had with Womack. The Court agrees with Womack's characterization ofJenny's 14 feelings towards hint as anger and hatred.
15 53. As the March 7, 2022 hearing drew to a close, the Court asked Jenny what she wanted, and Jenny launched into an expansive narrative where she disparaged Womack 16 and an attorney involved in Ada's conservatorship. Jenny described Womack as 17 "predatoiy" and "not ethical." Of significant note, this is the exact language "Ian" used to 18 describe Womack in his written motion to recuse Judge Knisely. [DP 17-36, Dkt. 188 at 2 19 ("predatory" and "unethical") Dkt. 188 at 10 ("predatory.")] The fact that the sante. 20 precise language was used to disparage Womack is compelling evidence that Jenny has 21 consistently engaged in ghostwriting of Ian's documents. Even if not so, Jenny has fully 22 embraced Ian's long-terrn litigation strategy of casting Womack as an enemy which will 23
"Exhibit A" inevitably delay closure of the Estate and further increase Womack's already mounting
fees.
3 54. During the March 7 and April 1, 2022 hearings, Jenny suggested Ian acted alone.
However, this claim is belied by Jenny's own sworn court filing opposing Womack's 4 petition. [See Dkt. 7.] In that filing Jenny acknowledged previously performing legal 5 research for Ian. [Dkt. 7 at 4.] She supported this acknowledernent by referencing a 6 transcript of a hearing in DP 17-36 where Ian testified Jenny assisted him with legal 7 research. [Dkt. 7 at 4 (citing Ex. D).] Ian said Jenny "helps me do research on when I'm 8 being falsely accused." [Ex. D to Dkt. 7.] Upon further questioning, Ian acknowledged 9 Jenny had helped him and referenced "legal advice." [Ex. D to Dkt. 7.] 10 55. Jenny finally answered the Court's question of what she wanted by stating she wanted II Womack investigated. However, Judge Knisely in DP 17-36 refused lan's repeated
12 attempts to rernove Womack. [See Exs. E-1, E-2, DP 1 7-36, Dkt. 175.] The Montana
13 Supreme Court affirmed Judge Knisely's denial of rernoval and described Ian's position
14 as "not the reality of the situation." In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at WI 18, 23.
15 See, also, 11 19 ("Ian forced Womack to fight for virtually eveiy decision, even those
that the District Court expressly placed within his discretion, most notably obtaining 16 a full accounting of StarFire. Womack nonetheless acted professionally as special 17 administrator and liquidating partner.") 18 56. Womack is not only the Special Administrator of Ada's Estate but also StarFire's 19 liquidating partner. The major asset of Ada's Estate is land still owned by StarFire. 20 Thus, whether it is a special administrator or a personal representative handling lan's 21 estate, that person must work with Womack. Jenny is incapable of doing so.
57. Moreover, if the Court appointed Jenny as co-personal representative, she would have a 23 conflict of interest due to financial records indicating Ian lent Jenny and her entity (Win
24 13
"Exhibit A" 1 Win Star) a substantial amount of money. The conflict arises because Jenny disclaims
the full amount of the debt. During testimony, Jenny acknowledged Ian probably put
3 between $20,000 and $30,000 into her horne. However, when questioned about Ian
4 transferring_ $21,000 to Jenny during the last year of his life, Jenny denied the scope of
the transfers. She stated transfers probably totaled $2,000. Ian's financial records 5 admitted as evidence demonstrate Jenny vastly underestiinated the total amount of these 6 transfers—hence a conflict of interest arises. 7 58. Ex. V are bank statements covering activities in Ian's account from December 2020 to 8 December 2021, the time period in question regarding the financial transfers. These 9 bank statements show Ian transferred to Jenny or Jenny's entity, Win Win Star, a total 10 of $21,900. Jenny's debt to the Estate, the extent of which she denies incentivizes 11 Jenny to delay Estate administration.
12 59. Moreover, Ian asked Adrian for $25,000 in October 2021. This request took place after
13 Ian received $25,000 from Ada's Estate. Adrian was concerned about the amount of
14 money Ian needed. Also, Ian mortgaged his home (with a co-signor who is now
15 concerned about repayment) after StarFire previously paid off Ian's mortgage. Ian's
need for money, the independent financial evidence of substantial transfers of money to 16 Jenny or her entity, and Jenny's minimization of money she received from Ian further 17 reveal Jenny's conflict of interest. 18 60. Heightening the Court's concern is the plain language requirement in Ian's will (as 19 recounted supra and infra) that Ann and Jenny serve together as personal 20 representatives and "must act unanimously." 21 61. Ann was not a part of Ian's pro se litigation. Ann also was able to formulate relevant, 22 coherent questions and make her points during the hearing. However, Ann signed every 23 filing made in this case, and these filings are similar in tone to Ian's filings recounted
24 14
"Exhibit A" supra. The Court especially notcs the Memorandum of Law (signed by Ann and Jenny)
2 that states Ian's pro se litigation "should be able to survive and be carried out by [his]
3 estate." [Dkt. 35.01 at 9, 14.]
62. Even if Ann disagreed with Jenny's commitment to continue Ian's pro se litigation 4 tactics, as recounted supra, Ian's will nominates Ann and Jenny as co-personal 5 representatives. Moreover, Ian's will states "[m]y [p]ersonal [c]o-representatives must 6 act unanimously." [Ex. B at 3 to Dkt. 7.] The plain laiiguage of lan's will does not 7 empower the Court to appoint Ann as sole personal representative of Ian's estate. 8 63. Adrian supports special administration of Ian's estate. Adrian is an heir to Ian's estate. 9 As an heir, Adrian is concerned the absence of special adrninistration will lead to 10 continuing litigation, and the Estate incurring additional attorney's fees. Adrian opined 11 Ian's objection to everything and aggressive litigation strategy would continue if the
12 Court were to appoint Jenny and Ann as co-personal representatives of lan's estate.
13 64. Adrian expressed dismay at the time and rnoney lan wasted and that Ian passed away
14 before he could enjoy a single dollar of his inheritance. The Court shares Adrian's
15 incredulity at the result of Ian's pro se litigation strategy. Instead of enjoying inheriting
a substantial estate, Ian needed to borrow $8,000 from Womack in the 15 rnonths before 16 Ian died to repair liis home and his car and to pay for a doctor's visit, a tiine when Ian 17 also faced possible foreclosure on his horne and "serious credit card problems." [Exs. L 18 and M.] 19 65. Lastly, Jenny and Ann observed that even if the Court rnade them co-personal 20 representatives, they would still need to hire a Montana attorney to represent the Estate 21 in court. This does not obviate the need for a special administrator. A special 22 administrator rnust act in the best interest of the estate. See In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 23 MT 91N at 1124. As discussed extensively supra, the Court finds Jenny and Ann would
24 15
"Exhibit A" 1 frustrate administration of the Estate. Jenny and Ann having to hire an attorney would 2 not impact their intent, motivation, or intransigence toward Womack.
3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. To the extent any preceding Finding of Fact is better suited 4 as a Conclusion of Law or a Conclusion of Law is better suited as a Finding of Fact, they are 5 hereby stated as such. 2. The Court has jurisdiction to determine whether to grant Woma 6 ck's Petition for Supervised Administration that Cindy joined. 7 3. Under M.R, Evid. 202(b)(6) lrjecords of any court of this state or of any court of 8 record of the United States" are proper subjects of judicial notice . Court orders in DV 9 14-829 (Montana's Eighteenth Judicial District) and court orders in DG 14-132, DV 18- 10 536, DP 17-36, DV 20-244, and DV 21-811 (all of Monta na's Thirteenth Judicial 11 District) constitute "records of any court of this state." See, also, Stale v. Homer, 2014 12 MT 57, ¶ 8, 374 Mont. 157, 321 P.3d 77 (internal citation omitte d) (M.R.Evid. 13 202(b)(6) encompasses "prior proceedings in other cases. . .and...in the same case.") 14 The Montana Supreme Cotes opinions at 2016 MT 315N, 2018 MT 171N, and 2022
15 MT 91N, its order denying Ian's writ petition in OP 21-473 , and its order denying as void Ian's request to recuse Judge Knisely in PR 21-0001 are also 16 records of a Montana court. The court file in the federal court case between Cindy 17 and Ian constitutes a "Necord...of any court of record of the United States." Thus, 18 the Court can take judicial notice of the court files in these cases. 19 4. Judicial notice is proper because what Judge Brown, Judge Knisely, the federal court, 20 and the Montana Suprerne Court said about and how they ruled on Ian's pro se 21 litigation "is not subject to reasonable dispute." See In re Marriage of Carter-Scanlon, 22 2014 MT 97, 22-23, 374 Mont. 434, 322 P.3d 1033. A court order or opinio n speaks 23 for itself. See Gray v. Beverly Enterprises-Mississippi, Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 407, fn. 7 24 16
"Exhibit A" 1 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he fact that a judicial action was taken is indisputable and is
2 therefore amenable to judicial notice.") During the March 7, 2022 hearing neither Jenny
3 nor Ann objected to the request for judicial notice. Moreover, the Court indicated it
would take judicial notice during the April 1, 2022 hearing in response to Jenny's 4 questions about Ian's federal case. 5 5. M.R.Evid. 202(d)(2) states "[a] court shall take judicial notice [of records of Montana 6 courts and federal courts of record] when requested by a party and supplied with the 7 necessaty information." Wornack, as petitioner for supervised adrninistration, has 8 requested judicial notice and supplied the Court with the necessary information to take 9 such notice. [Dkt. 23.] During the March 7, 2022 hearing Cindy, as an interested 10 person, also asked the Court to take judicial notice, and offered as exhibits the 11 documents needed to take such notice. Thus, the Court must take judicial notice of Ian's
12 pro se litigation analyzed supra.
13 6. "A special administrator may be appointed. . ..in a formal proceeding by order of the
14 court on the petition of any interested person and finding, after notice and hearing, that
15 appointrnent is necessaty to preserve the estate or to secure its proper administration,
including its administration in circurnstances where a general personal representative 16 cannot or should not act." Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-701(2). 17 7. Appointing a special administrator "is necessary to preserve [Ian's] estate or to secure 18 its proper adrninistration." As explained more fully supra, Ian's pro se litigation in 19 multiple fora has revealed his willingness to make arguments unsupported by law or 20 fact and his unwillingness to accept adverse court rulings or comply with Court orders. 21 Judge Brown warned Ian he could face sanctions frorn filing legally unfounded motions 22 and referred him to M.R.Civ.P. 11. Judge Knisely has described Ian's arguments as 23 "frivolous," "nonsensical," and "inei•itless" and his allegations as "baseless." The
24 17
"Exhibit A" Montana Supreme Court denied Ian's request to disqualify Judge Knisely as void. Judge
Knisely had to hold Ian in contempt and threaten him with incarceration to obtain his
compliance with court orders.
4 8. Jenny was inextricably intertwined with Ian in his pro se litigation. As recounted rnore
fully supra, Adrian observed Jenny multiple times on a computer working on court 5 documents. Ian and Jenny openly conversed with Adrian about the legal research and 6 writing she regularly did for Ian. Jenny has appeared at every hearing with Ian and at 7 every meeting Ian and Womack had. jenny's confrontational and accusatory attitude 8 towards Ian's litigation is longstanding. In 2013, Jenny exploding at Adrian's proposed 9 settlement led Ian to reject the proposal. Adrian described Jenny's interest in Ian's 10 litigation as shocking. Jenny's pro se filings in this case are similar to Ian's pro se 11 filings in formatting, style. and confrontational and aggressive tone.
12 9. During the March 7 and April I, 2022 hearings, Jenny demonstrated the same
13 "struggle[s] to stay within the scope of questioning and limit...arguments to the present
14 issues during hearings" that the Montana Suprerne Court observed of Ian. See In re
15 Estate ofElliot, 2022 MT 91N at 1128. Jenny has argued about and asked questions of
witnesses to support the validity of Ian's will even after Womack and Cindy said in 16 open court they were not challenging Ian's will. Jenny has opposed supervised 17 administration by attacking Womack and Cindy even after she was told repeatedly a 18 special administrator would make decisions independent of Womack and Cindy. Jenny 19 repeatedly testified while asking questions. Jenny repeatedly asked irrelevant questions. 20 Jenny asked the sarne questions over and over after answers were given. The Court 21 sustained countless objections to her questions. 22 10. The Court acknowledges Ann's ability to concisely question and succinctly make her 23 points during the hearing as well as Ann having no part in Ian'spro se litigation. 24 18
"Exhibit A" Nevertheless, Ann has joined each ofJenny's accusatory and confrontational pro se
fi lings in this case.
3 11. Moreover, as recounted supra, Ian's will specifically narnes Jenny and Ann as co-
personal representatives and requires their unanimity to act. The Court must respect 4 Ian's intent that Jenny and Ann both be personal representatives and not appoint Ann as 5 a single personal representative. 6 12. Ann's and Jenny's chief argument against appointing a special adrninistrator is Ian's 7 will appointed thern co-personal representatives of his estate. [Dkt. 35.01.] However, 8 Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-701(2) does not state a special administrator can be appointed 9 only in the absence of a will nominating a personal representative. The Court cannot 10 edit a Montana statute. Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-101. Moreover, testator intent does not 11 overrule the statute's plain language. In re Estate of &utter, 189 Mont. 244, 615 P.2d
12 875 (Mont. 1980). In Sauter, the Montana Supreme Court observed testator intent was
13 for Mr. Werner to serve as personal representative. Sauter, 189 Mont. at 245-46, 249,
14 615 P.2d at 876, 878. Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme Court applied the plain
15 language of Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-701 to reverse the district court and to order
appointment of a special adrninistrator regarding the fate of an alleged estate claim that 16 Mr. Werner's law partner had been defending. 189 Mont. at 248, 250-51, 615 P.2d at 17 877-79. See, alsoin re Estate of Franchs, 722 P.2d 422, 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) 18 (When the record supports the necessity of appointing a special administrator "to 19 preserve the estate and to secure its proper administration," "the probate court did not 20 abuse its discretion in appointing a...special administrator, despite spouse's statutory 21 priority for appointment as personal representative,"); "[A] common thread in all of the 22 foregoing provisions is that appointment of a special administrator is appropriate only 23 where action or inaction by the personal representative designated by the decedent may
24 19
"Exhibit A" be adverse to the interests of the decedent's estate." Relf v. Shatayeva, 998 N.E.2d 18,
2 32, 7 51 (III. 2013).
3 13. As recounted rnore fiilly infra, Ann and Jenny have cited caselaw from other
jurisdictions on rernoving a personal representative. The Court agrees caselaw 4 analyzing removal of personal representative sheds light on whether to grant special 5 administration. Under Montana law, - a person interested in the estate may petition for 6 rernoval of a personal representative for cause at any tirnc." Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3- 7 526(1)."Cause for removal [of a personal representative] exists...when removal would 8 be in the best interests of the estate." Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-526(2)(a). Montana law 9 authorizing a court to ren-tove a personal representative for cause further supports 10 testator intcnt does not defeat a petition for special administrator. 11 14. The Montana Suprerne "Court has given broad authority to district courts to remove
12 personal representatives so long as the grounds for such rernoval are 'valid and
13 supported by the record.'" In re Estate of Boland, 2019 MT 236, ¶ 55, 397 Mont. 319,
14 450 P.3d 849. See, also, In re Estate of Anderson-Feeley, 2007 MT 354, 7 9, 340 Mont.
15 352, 174 P.3d 512 ("[W]e will not overturn a removal unless there is clear abuse of
discretion."); In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at ¶ 21. In Boland, the testatoes will 16 nominated two of his children as co-personal representatives of his estate. 2019 MT 236 17 at 7 2. The will's explicit nomination did not prevent the Montana Supreme Court from 18 affirming removal of a co-personal representative based inter alia on § 72-3-526. See 19 Boland, 2019 MT 236 at 77 55-58. "The pleadings, testirnony, and extensive litigation 20 and harassment show[s the co-personal representative's] pattern of hostility towards 21 opposing counsel." 2019 MT 236 at 57. Ian objecting to virtually everything Wornack
sought to do--necessitating a response and a hearing--constitutes a pattern of hostility. 23
24 20
"Exhibit A" 1 As recounted supra, Jenny's conduct during the March 7, 2022 and April 1, 2022
2 hearing shows she despises Womack and will not work with him.
3 15. In affirming removal of the co-personal representative, Boland additionally observed
the co-personal representative's "out-of-bounds conduct has produced a multitude of 4 cases, repetitive motions, unnecessary delay and costs, factual contentions lacking in 5 evidcntiaiy support, and legal rnaneuvers unwarranted by existing law." 2019 MT 236 6 at 1157. Unfortunately, as explained supra, Ian's pro se litigation strategy and tactics 7 (with which Jenny played an integral role) have also featured out-of-bounds conduct 8 resulting in each of the effects listed in I3oland. The Court has already enumerated Ian's 9 repetitive motions, factual arguments without evidence, and legal arguments totally 10 unsupported by precedent. Ian's strategy of opposing alrnost everything Womack has 11 done resulted in delaying the closing of Ada's Estate, arguably for years, and
12 exponentially increasing fees. Ian created a multitude of cases staggering in scope. He
13 sued everyone involved in Ada's conservatorship in a case pending before Judge
14 Harada. He sued Womack personally in a case that Judge Knisely dismissed, and his
motion to disqualify her from Ada's probate case confirms that rather than properly 15 appeal dismissal, he refiled the same case before another Yellowstone County District 16 Judge. Ada's probate case spans nine files and has reached a staggering 194 docket 17 entries. Utile Court were to appoint Ann and Jenny as co-personal representatives, this 18 number would only increase further as Jenny will carry out Ian's decision to oppose the 19 accounting, a decision he niade before the accounting was complete. The Court notes ")0 the finished accounting is very favorable to Ian. 21 16. The Montana Supreme Court has also affirmed removal of a personal representative 22 under § 72-3-526 upon a district court's specific finding "that significant hostility and 23 alienation existed between Robert and the Sisters and that Robert's removal would
24 71
"Exhibit A" 1 enable an expeditious settlement and closure of the estate." In re Estate of Greenhec k, 2 2001 MT 1 14, Tif 19-20, 305 Mont. 308, 27 P.3d 42. As recounted supra, hostility and
3 alienation characterized Ian's interaction with Womack, and everything the Court
4 observed from Jenny during March 7 and April 1, 2022 hearing confirms she has the sarne hostile attitude towards Wornack that Ian did. Ann has also indicated her lack 5 of trust in Wornack by insisting in their veiy first meeting that all communications 6 between them be in writing. The presence in this case—of reasons the Montana 7 Suprerne Court has previously utilized to affirm removing a personal representative— 8 further support granting special administration. 9 17. "The existence of a potential claim against Feeley is sufficient to create a conflict of 10 interest, and such conflict of interest is sufficient for reinoval of Feeley as personal 11 representative ofJan's estate." Estate ofAnderson-Feeley, 2007 MT 354 at II 13. As 12 recounted supra, the Estate has a claim against Jenny for the money Ian lent her. Under 13 Feeley, this is sufficient for a conflict to interest to exist that warrants removing a 14 personal representative. This case has the additional features of Jenny significantly
15 minimizing the arnount of money Ian lent her despite documentary evidence to the contrary, Ian taking out a mortgage on his horne (with the co-signor now worried about 16 repayment) even though StarFire had previously paid off his mortgage, and Adrian 17 expressing concern about the amount of rnoney Ian claimed to need in the months 18 before Ian's death. 19 18. Ann and Jenny argue Wornack lacks standing to seek special administration because he 20 is not a creditor. [Dkt. 35.01 at 2.J Judge Knisely issued an order approving an 21 "[a]greement for StarFire...to Make Loans to Limited Partners and Heirs." [Ex. Z.J 22 Moreover, in correspondence with Womack, Ian called the transaction a "loan." [Ex. L.] 23 Therefore, Womack is a creditor.
"Exhibit A" 1 19. Ann and Jenny assert challenging appointment of personal representative circumvents
2 their demanded jury trial. [Dkt. 35.01 at 3.] As recounted supra, district courts have
3 "broad authority...to remove personal representatives." See, also, In re Estate ofElliot,
2022 MT 91N at II 26 (rejecting Ian's claimed right to a jury trial). 4 20. Ann and Jenny quote In re Estate ofKuralt, 2000 MT 359, ¶ 14, 303 Mont. 335, 15 5 P.3d 931. [Dkt. 35.01 at 7.] Kuralt does not analyze Mont. Code Arm. §§ 72-3-701 or 6 72-3-526. 7 21. "In 1974, Montana adopted a version of the Uniform Probate Code." Northland Royalty 8 Corp. v. Engel, 2014 MT 295, ¶ 9, 377 Mont. 11, 339 P.3d 599. Ann and Jenny discuss 9 case law from the Montana Supreme Court that predates Montana's adoption of the 10 Uniform Probate Code. [Dkt. 35.01 at 3, 5-7, 9.] These cases cannot alter the plain 11 language of Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-3-701 or 72-3-526. The Court nonetheless observes
12 Ann and Jenny quote Justice Milburn's concurring opinion in State ex rel. Eakins v.
13 District Court, 34 Mont. 226, 85 P. 1022 (Mont. 1906). [Dkt. 35.01 at 4.] Justice
14 Milburn's concurrence instructs the probate court "to save as much as possible of the
15 assets for those to whom they belong." 34 Mont. at 232, 85 P. at 1024. See, also,
Gonzales v. Yaunick (In re Estate of Gonzales), 977 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Wyo. 1999) 16 ("[T]he aim of probate procedure is the speedy settlement and adjudication of rights in 17 the property of a decedent to the end that those entitled to share may have the fullest 18 benefit of the right which the law gives them at the earliest moment consonant with due 19 process and orderly procedure.") This langUage strongly supports granting special 20 administration. As recounted supra, the largest asset of Ada's estate is land presently 21 held by StarFii•e. Judge Knisely denied Ian's repeated requests to remove Womack, and 22 the Montana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed her denials. Thus, a special 23 adrninistrator or personal representative of Ian's estate must work with Wornack.
24 23
"Exhibit A" 1 Jenny's conduct reveals animosity toward Womack and incapability of working with
2 him. Meanwhile, Ian's will requires Jenny and Ann act unanimously as co-personal
3 representatives. Therefore, saving as rnuch of Ian's estate as possible for Ian's heirs is
4 incornpatible with appointing Jenny and Ann as co-personal representatives.
22. Ann and Jenny quote /n re Esiale of- Willman, 2001 MT 109, 305 Mont. 290, 27 5 P.3d 35. [Dkt. 35.01 at 10.] Wiltinan states lin]ere suspicion that undue influence may 6 have or could have been brought to bear is not sufficient." 2001 MT 109 at 1121 . As shown 7 supra, regardless of the level of.lenny's influence, much more than mere suspicion 8 supports the Court's finding that appointing Ann and Jenny as co-personal 9 representatives will perpetuate Ian's pro se litigation strategy of argumen ts lacking 10 evidentiary or precedential support and Ian's unwillingness to accept adverse court 11 rulings or to comply with court orders. 12 23. Moreover, Ann and Jenny argue "a decedent's pending actions should be able to survive 13 and be carried out by the decedent's estate" and cite Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-501 . [Dkt. 14 35.01 at 9.] Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-501 states - the action or defense survives and may
15 be maintained by the party's representatives or successors in interest. " (emphasis added). "[M]ay' is permissive." Gaustad v City of Colwnbus an re Investiga 16 tive Records of the 00) of Colwnbus Police Dep'0, 272 Mont. 486, 488, 901 P.2d 17 565, 567 (Mont. 1995). Thus, contrary to Ann's and Jenny's position, a personal represen 18 tative has discretion to continue litigating Ian's cases. The Montana Supreme Court said 19 "[w]hen the law created a rnechanism whereby one person as a represen tative of a group 20 could conduct litigation, the purpose was the efficient, speedy, and orderly 21 determination of rights which were held in common." State ex rel. Palmer District v. 22 Court, 190 Mont. 185, 189, 619 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Mont. 1980). Neither efficient, 23 speedy, nor orderly can describe Ian's scorched earth legal campaign that accompl ished 24
"Exhibit A" 1 little but wasted time and money while ensuring Ian could not enjoy when alive the
benefits of a substantial inheritance.
3 24. Ann and Jenny quote decisions of other state and federal courts to support their
argument that the Court must defer to Ian selecting them as co-personal personal 4 representatives. [Dkt. 35.01 at 11-13.] However, granting special administration would 5 not be the outlier this list makes it seern. First, of the listed states, Arizona and 6 Wisconsin have similar statutes. See Arizona Rev. Stat. § 14-3614 (Allowing 7 appointment of special administrator upon necessity "to preserve the estate or to secure 8 its proper administration,Th Wis. Stat. § 867.07(7) ("Other circumstances exist which in 9 the discretion of the court require the appointment of a special administrator.") 10 25. Second, Jenny and Ann quote Estate ofBuchman, 267 P.2d 73 (2d Dist., Cal. Ct. App. 11 1954). [Dkt. 35.01 at 11.] Buchman quotes the maxim Jenny and Ann reference, i.e.
12 "whorn the testator will trust so will the law." Compare 267 P.3d at 81 with [Dkt. 35.01
13 at 6 (emphasis oniitted).] Significantly, Buchman also states "[a] testator's selection of
14 an executor should not be annulled except on a clear showing that the best interests of
15 the estate require it." 267 P.3d at 80. As shown supra, the best interests of this estate
require special administration. 16 26. Third, Jenny and Ann quote In re Estate ofkhnnma, 41 A.3d 41 (Pa. Super. 2012). 17 [Dkt. 35.01 at 12.] Mumma states "rernoval of a personally chosen individual is thus 18 considered to be a 'drastic remedy' that requires clear and convincing evidence of a 19 substantial reason for removal." 41 A.3d at 50. However, 20 Pa.C.S. § 3182(5) 20 authorizes "[t]he Court...to remove a personal representative.. .when, for any other 21 reason, the interests of the estate are likely to be jeopardized by his continuance in 22 office." Analyzing its precedents, Pennsylvania's high court has instructed when ill- 23
"Exhibit A" 1 feeling runs so deep as to harm the estate's best interest, it warrants removal even if the
testator chose the executor. Ill re Estate of Lux, 389 A.2d 1053, 1060 (Pa. 1978).
3 27. Fourth, Ann and Jenny quote West Virginia law. [Dkt. 35.01 at 13-14.] West Virginia's
4 high court has stated "[o]ne may be considered unsuitable for the appointment...who is
otherwise so advcrsely interested to heirs, creditors, or other kindred, as to prejudice the 5 due settlement of the estate, if it be placed under his charge." Smith v. Harmer, 64 6 S.E.2d 481, 486 (W.V. 1951). 7 28. Fifth, Ann and Jenny reference Florida law. [Dkt. 35.01 at 11.] Florida's Fourth District 8 Court of Appeal affirmed denying appointment of a will's nominee as personai 9 representative upon the finding "it is apparent that if [the nominee] were to be appointed 10 as a personal representative, this Estate would be locked in endless and unnecessary 11 litigation that would irnpede the adrninistration of this Estate." Boyles v. Jimenez, 330 12 So. 3d 953, 959-60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021). See, also, Hernandez v. Hernandez,
13 946 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007 ("Where a dispute will cause
14 unnecessary litigation and impede the estate's administration, and either the person lacks
15 the character, ability, and experience to serve or exceptional circumstances exist, the
totality of circumstances rnay permit the court to refuse to appoint the personal 16 representative named in the will.") 17 29. Other persuasive precedents exist warranting granting special administration. "Where, 18 however, the designatcd person is in a position or has acted in a manner antagonistic 19 toward the interests of the estate or the heirs in a way indicating that his administration 20 of the estate would probably result in prolonged and unnecessary difficulty or expense, '71 then such a person should not be appointed as executor." In re Estate of Petty, 608 P.2d 22 987, 995 (Kan. 1980) (emphasis added). A finding of unsuitability for appointment as 23 executor "may also be based upon. ..a mental attitude...towards some person interested
24 26
"Exhibit A" 1 in the estate that creates reasonable doubt whether the executor or administrator will act
honorably, intelligently, efficiently, promptly, fairly and dispassionately in his trust."
3 Tiffany v. Tiffany (In re Estate of Ragan), 541 N.W.2d 859, 861 (Iowa 1995). The
Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed removing a personal representative upon evidence 4 supporting "animosity and ill-feeling, and the effect that it had upon the orderly 5 administration of the estate." Estate of Jaworski v. Jaworski, 479 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ind. 6 Ct. App. 1985). "[W]here ill wili exists which would result in more litigation the court 7 may appoint any suitable person even if that person is outside of the family." In re 8 Estate ofJones, 93 P.RI 147, 156 (Wash. 2004). 9 30. The Court does not lightly appoint a special administrator. See In re Estate of Hannwn, 10 2012 MT 171, IN 28, 33, 366 Mont. 1, 285 P.3d 463 (Disfavoring removal of a personal 11 representative, and instructing "removal is harsh and severe, and irregularities that are
12 not directly harmful will be overlooked, and if the court can remedy the matter readily,
13 no removal will be ordered."); See, also, In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at 1 7- 14 18. As recounted supra, Jenny was heavily involved with and will continue Ian's pro se
15 litigation tactics. Jenny will not work with Womack despite multiple courts refusing to
remove him. Further, Womack is the liquidating partner of StarFire, the holder of the 16 biggest asset of Ada's estate, which will be the biggest asset in Ian's estate, Jenny's 17 strategy is directly harmful to Ian's estate because it will only delay closure of Ian's 18 Estate (and Ada's Estate which has been pending for almost 5 years) and will greatly 19 increase expenses, i.e. Womack's fees (already significantly increased due to Ian's 20 tactics). Unfortunately, the only ready remedy is to grant special administration. This 21 finding is compounded by Ian's will nominating Jenny and Ann as co-personal 22 representatives and requiring them to act unanimously. These are extrcrne and special
24 27
"Exhibit A" 1 equitable circurnstances warranting appointing a special administrator. See ln re Estate
2 of Long, 225 Mont. 429, 437, 732 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Mont. 1987).
3 31. The Court provided a substantial amount of tirne to the parties to present their case.
Over two days, the Court received approximately 12 hours of testimony. However, 4 Jenny provided virtually no pertinent evidence to oppose Womack's Petition for Special 5 Administration that Cindy joined. 6 32. "The District Court has broad discretion in deterrnining issues relating to trial 7 adrninistration." Fink v. Williams, 2012 MT 304, ¶ 18, 367 Mont. 431; 291 P.3d 1140. 8 "One matter of 'trial administration' is the establishment by the court of 'a reasonable 9 tirne limit on the time allowed to present evidence." 2012 MT 304 at 11 18. In Fink, the 10 Montana Supreme Court observed the parties had ample notice of the reasonable time 11 they had to present their case. Fink, 2012 MT 304 at11 18.
12 33. During the Court's March 7, 2022 hearing, Cindy was provided approximately six hours 13 to present her case. [Dkt. 25.] Cindy's case ended at 4:14 p.m. [Dkt. 25.] Womack,
14 Adrian, and Ann did not have any witnesses. [Dkt. 25.] The Court then asked Jenny if
15 she had witnesses. Jenny said yes but observed they were not in the Courtroo m. Jenny did not subpoena her witnesses in advance despite having six weeks advance notice 16 of the time set for hearing. [See Dkt. 3.] 17 34. Upon learning Jenny had not subpoenaed witnesses despite the extensive notice, the 18 parties objected to Jenny having further opportunity to call witnesses. Nevertheless, the 19 Court said it would schedule a second day of trial to facilitate Jenny's case. Jenny then 20 began her case and recalled Adrian as a witness. Before the March 7, 2022 hearing 21 ended, the Court reiterated its oral ruling by referencing a second day for Jenny to 22 "finish presenting her testimony and calling any witnesses she intends to call." 23
24 28
"Exhibit A" 1 35. The second day was scheduled for April 1, 2022. At this hearing, the Court provided
Jenny with approximately six additional hours, resulting in more time than Cindy had to
3 present her case. Although the Court provided a greater amount of time to Jenny, the
4 Court commented after hours of testirnony on April 1, 2022 that it had received
"virtually no relevant information" on the issue of appointing specia] administrator. 5 Before the Court broke for the lunch recess, the Court informed Jenny "this is ending 6 today, so you better get to it." At around 2 p.m. on April 1, 2022, the Court told Jenny 7 her tirne to present evidence would end at 4 p.m. that day. The Court additionally 8 repeatedly reminded Jenny of the 4 p.rn. deadline as it drew closer. Thus, this case is 9 similar to Fink where the Montana Suprerne Court observed the trial court divided the 10 two days set for trial "almost equally between the parties." 2012 MT 304 at ¶ 19. Jenny 11 had sufficient opportunity to present her case. She neither presented compelling 12 evidence to oppose special administration nor to support her nomination as co-perso nal 13 representative.
14 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Womack's Petition for Supervised
15 Administration that Cindy joins is GRANTED. The Court HERE13Y APPOINTS Andrew
Billstein, Esq. as Special Administrator of Ian's Estate. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 DATED: this e?...) ed day of , 2022. 18
20 Hon. Rod Souza, 'ourt Judge 21 cc: Ann Taylor Sargent (via email) ann2022ian@ramail.com
Jenny Jing (via email) jennvianmt(@,ernail.corn 23 Joseph Womack, Esq. (via email) iwomackejvwlaw.com 24 29
"Exhibit A" 1 Cindy Elliot, via Jeffrey A. Humes, Esq. (via email) jhunnesafeltmartinlaw.com 2 Cindy Elliot via Joseph Soueidi, Esq. (via email) jsoueidi Rc feltmartinlaw.com 3 Adrian Olson (via ernail) aceleastronaravahoo.com 4 W. Scott Green, Esq. (via email) sereeneopbalaw.com 5
6 Holly Marie Dudley (via ernail) MotherHollyeamail.com
7 Emily Sapp (via email) emilvesappagmail.com
8 Mike Bolenbaugh (via email) m.bolenbaugh@ernail.com
9 Alice Carpenter (via email) tio2u2doOarnail.com 10 Shelley Paterson (via ernail) pattersonss@yahoo.corn 1 Ray Ecton & Ian Elliot Trust, via email to Jenny and Ann at their emails supra 12 Andrew Billstein, Esq. (via email) andrew@bmslaw.com 13
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 15 This is to certify that the foregoing was duly served by email/mail or hand delivery upon the pat ies or their attorneys of record at their last known 16 addresses this .e9Z.lay of -.4LAn . 17 BY Judici ssistant to Hon. iza 18
24 30
"Exhibit A" CLERK OF THE Joseph V. Womack EICTRICT CO WOMACK & ASSOCIATES, LLC 1001 S. 24th St. W., Ste. 318 Billings, MT 59102 NZ? JUL I A cl: 45 Phone: (406) 252-7200 HLED Email: jwornack@ivw1aw.com
Special Administrator for the D:.,-U Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating Partner of Starfire, SP Interested Parties to this Proceeding
MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF THE Case No.: DP-22-0034 ESTATE OF Hon. Rod Souza IAN RAY ELLIOT,
Deceased.
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION THAT INTERESTED PERSON JOINED AND APPOINTING SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Pursuant to Rule 77(d), M.R.C.P., you will please take notice that on May 23, 2022,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting the Petition of Joseph Womack for the
Supervised Administration of the Estate of Ian Elliot that Interested Person Cindy Elliot joined
were entered in the foregoing cause and the Court appointed Andrew Billstein, Esq. as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Ian Ray Elliot.
A true copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order Granting Petition for
Supervised Administration that Interested Person Joined and Appointing Special Administrator is
"Exhibit B" 1 Supervised Administration that Interested Person Joined and Appointing Special Administrator i
attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and is being served upon you at this time. 3 '77 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 2021. 4
5 WOMACK & ASSOCIATES, LLC
6 By: 7 /JoseA V. Womack, Attorney and) 8 Special. Administrator for the Estate of Ada E. Elliot and Liquidating 9 Partner of Starfire, LP
"Exhibit B" CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the 7'6. day of , 2022, I rnailed and emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method shown elow or addressed to the following interested parties:
Jeffery A. Hunnes Ann Sargent Felt Martin, P.C. 210 W. Grant Street, Apt. 202 2825 3rd Ave. N., Ste. 100 Minneapolis, MN 55403-2243 Billings, MT 59101 Email only to: ann2022ian@gmail.corn Attorneysfor Cindy Elliot Email only to:jsoueidi(iffeltmartinlaw.corn
Adrian Elliot Olson Jenny Q. Jing 9 Grant Street, Apt. A 10 Alpine Pl. Redlands, CA 92373 Kearny, NJ 07032-1608 Email only to: acelegstrong ahoo.com Email only to: jennviamtaginail.corn
Holly Marie Dudley Ray Ecton & Ian Elliot Trust 1226 Hallinan Circle Jenny Jing and Ann Sargent Lake Oswego, OR 97034 6540 Amsterdam Rd. Email only to: MotherHolly@grnail.com Manhattan, MT 59741 Email only to: ientwianrnagmail.com Ray Ecton & Ian Elliot Trust Alice Carpenter Jenny Jing & Ann Sargent 407 S. 341h Street 2512 Golden Blvd. Billings, MT 59101 Billings, MT 59102-1212 Email only to: up2u2do@grnail.com Email only to: jennyianmt@tzmail.com Emily Sapp Mike Bolenbaugh 426 NE 92nd Ave. 2460 Village Lane, Apt. 209-B Portland, OR 97220 Billings, MT 59102 Email only to: ernilyesapp@gmail.com Email only to: m.bolenbaugh@gmail.com
W. Scott Green Patten, Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, PLLC 2817 2nd Ave. N., Ste. 300 Billings, MT 59101 Emai1 only to:ggpigt r wbglaw.corn - i —I/ ,in & By:
"Exhibit B" CLERK OF THE Jenny Jing DISTRICT COURT 10 Alpine PL. TERRY HALPIN Kearny, NJ 07032 1011 OCT 20 p jennyianmt@gmail.com 3: 48 Alice Carpenter P.O. Box 22702 BY Billings, MT 59104 DEP up2u2do@gmail.com Mike Bolenbaugh 2351 Solomon Ave, Apt. 334 Billings, MT 59102 m.bolenbaugh@gmail.com Pro Se
MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY ) IN THE MATTER OF ) DP 22-0034 THE ESTATE OF IAN R. ELLIOT, ) Hon. Judge Rod Souza Deceased. ) ) MOTION TO ) 1. VACATE 5/23/2022 ORDER ) 2. ALLOW AN INDIPENDENT ) ACTION TO INVESTIGATE ) FRAUD ON THE COURT ) 3. CONSOLIDATE THE CASES ) AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW ) IN SUPPORT THE MOTION )
1. Pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure Rule (MRCP) Rule 60(b) and (d),
Rule 42(a) (1), (2) and (3), Alice Carpenter (Alice), Jenny Jing (Jenny), Mike
Bolenbaugh (Mike), respectfully submit this motion and memorandum of law in
support the motion. The opposing parties would object to our motion.
INTRODUCTION
2. Ian and Womack's conflicts in Ada Elliot estate matters involved Ian's
Page 1 of 15
"Exhibit C" allegations against Womack's misrepresentations and actions in
a.Shielding Ada and Starfire's former fiduciary Cindy's fraud and breaches;
b. Purposely creating more than $1 million "administration expenses" for a
solvent company with a simple operation of paying 6-8 bills of approximate
$26,000 from its annual rental income of approximate $60,000.
3. After Ian's death, Cindy and Womack opposed to appoint Ian designated
personal representatives Ann Sargent and Jenny, because Jenny participated in
Ian's actions against Cindy and Womack, and Jenny stated that she would continue
Ian's surviving actions according to Ian's wishes.
4. This Court's 5/23/2022 order ruled in Womack's favor and denied Ann and
Jenny's appointment.
5. We request a Rule 60 (b) and (d) relief to vacate this Court's 5/23/2022 order
based on the facts indicating attorneys' fraud on the court, which results in gross
injustice and weakens the public trust of our judicial system.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Ian's Actions Protected Ada And Ada's Properfies
6. When Ada's two children Ian and Cindy's conflicts involved their parents' care,
Ian always stood firm and took actions to protect their parents.
7. In 2005, 2 years after Cindy moved Ada and Archie to live in an isolated life at
the ranch's modular home, Ian noticed Archie's serious depression of not willing
Page 2 of 15
"Exhibit C" to get out of bed daily. Ian insisted to Cindy that "Dad is going to die" and
brought his parents Ada and Archie Elliot back to live in Billings.
8. In August 2010, Archie died. Cindy placed Ada to live in a caregiver's
basement and paid the caregiver with Ada's $2,000 monthly social security and
teacher's retirement fund for the reason that the family could not afford other
options for Ada's care.
9. Ian expressed his concerns to Cindy that this caregiver did not treat Ada well.
At the time, Jenny only offered to help Ian take care of Ada when she was visiting
Ian in Montana, but declined to help taking care of Ada year around.
10. Without any other options, Ian arranged two part-time caregivers to visit Ada
for 2 hours every other weekdays. Ian himself took Ada out to stay with him a few
hours the rest of the weekdays and every weekend. Ian did not ask to be paid.
11. In 4 months, Ada experienced 2 emergency room treatments for injuries in this
caregiver's home. One of the treatments was from a fall resulting in a 2 inch
stitches on Ada's scalp. Cindy defended her arrangement and the caregiver.
12. Ian called Jenny for help. Jenny came to Montana and helped Ian to move Ada
out of this caregivers home and to lived in Ian's home.
13. During the rest 6 years of Ada's life, Ian and Jenny took care of Ada 24/7, and
received support and comfort from Ian's friends. Alice and Mike are among them.
14. Cindy then went to the Senior Center and talked to attorneys with all kinds of
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"Exhibit C" disinformation about Ian.
15. At first, Ian and Jenny thought that Cindy did this because Cindy did not want
to appear that she did not want to take care of her own mother so she did not want
Ian to take care of Ada either.
16. In 2012, after Cindy claimed the $242,000 net dry land sale proceeds she
received half a year ago were used out to pay for Ada and Archie's previous care
expenses, Ian and Jenny started to have doubt. After rnore than one year paying all
of Ada's expenses, they realized that Ada's care was not as expensive as
Cindy previously claimed when she sold more than $2 million Ada's properties.
17. Ian asked Cindy to provide him with Ada's bank and credit card statements.
Cindy promised to provide but asked Ian for patience stating health issues and the
pressure dealing with her divorce.
18. Cindy's son and Ian's nephew Adrian Olsen, while living outside of Montana
and seldom visited Ada for years, all stated in the same tone that Ian should go out
to find a job making his own money instead of taking care of Ada for Ada's
retirement money and had conflict with Cindy.
B. Cindv And Attornevs' Efforts To Manipulate The Aecountin2
19. For 8 years of the courts' proceedings as of today, no accounting were
conducted to examine Ada's personal bank and credit card accounts.
20. Ada's conservator Joyce Wurtz, took her counsels advise to withheld the
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"Exhibit C" accounting/audit and signed a resolution with Cindy to sell Starfire's remaining
properties.
21. Ada estate's special administrator Womack, also had Cindy's assistance to be
appointed as Starfire's liquidating partner to sell Starfire's remaining properties.
22. Both of them took Cindy's suggestion to conduct a Starfire accounting so as
to avoid examining the additional more than $1 million transactions in Ada's
personal bank and credit card accounts which Cindy had sole access to.
23. This irregularity of Ada/Ada estate's trustees avoiding to conduct the
accounting regarding Ada's personal finances is unusual, especially when it
happened under the court supervisions.
24. It is the result of attorneys' manipulations and misrepresentations to the
courts for the purpose to shield Cindy when they needed Cindy's assistance to cash
in more than $1 million Ada's properties because the properties are under
Starfire's name.
25. This motion focuses on Attorney Womack's misrepresentations, which was
instrumental in this Court's 5/23/2022 ruled in Womack's favor.
26. We have filed an intervention in Ian's surviving actions, Case DV 21-811. In
order to prevent duplicated actions, we submit Exhibit A, and ask this Court to
consolidate the cases or hold a joint hearing, in deciding whether we stated our
claims with clear facts and evidence for some of Womack's misrepresentations to
Page 5 of 15
"Exhibit C" the courts which induced the courts' mlings in Womack's favor.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I. This Motion Is In Accordance With MRCP Rule 60(b) And (d)
27. Rule 60 (b) permits a district court to reopen and relief a court order or
judgement for the reason of mistake, "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party".
28. Rule 60 (d)(1) allows the relief for an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding. Rule 60 (d)(3) allows the relief for
setting aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
29. Our motion satisfies Rule 60 (b) and (d) relief to set aside this Court's
5/23/2022 Order because the Order was based on the mistakes from both the
Court's side and Jenny's side, and on attorneys' misrepresentations which
constitutes a fraud on the Court that affect this Court's ultimate conclusions.
A. The Mistakes, Inadvertence, Or Excusable Neglect
30. a) Jenny made several mistakes in the court hearings. One of them was that she
answered Cindy counsel's tricky question when she was not served with Ian's
bank statements. Cindy counsel asked how much money Jenny thought she
received from Ian in 2021? Jenny answered she thought was about $2,000.
The correct calculation is $8,900 after Jeimy was able to review Ian's bank
statements. This mistake made the Court believed that Jenny was trying to
Page 6 of 15
"Exhibit C" minimize the amount. Ian sent his money from his bank account in Montana
to Jenny's bank account in New Jersey to support their living expenses there
when they lived together as domestic partners and Jenny lost her rental
income due to the pandemic.
31. Although Jenny had repeatedly and explicitly stated, and Ian's loan co-signer
also stated that Jenny promised to pay Ian's loan before and after Ian's death,
the opposing parties kept pushing their legally unfounded suggestion to gave
this Court an impression that Jenny did something wrong.
32. b) This Court then mistakenly believed the amount was $21,000 because the
opposing counsel's pushing the $21,000 multiple times with their
miscalculation of adding the fund Jenny transferred into Ian's account as the
fund Jenny received. The approximate $21,000 mortgage loaned to Jenny was
guaranteed by Jenny's house sale proceeds during 2018-2019 instead of
during 2020 and 2021. So, Jenny's mistaken difference was $6,900, not trying
to minimize from $21,000 to $2,000.
33. c) There are other mistakes Jenny made such as her zoom connection
sometimes froze and she was too embarrassed to keep asking the court or the
witness to repeat what she did not hear well, and she did not know she could
object to judicial notice, etc., but this motion is rather focused on Rule 60(d),
attorney's fraud on the court.
Page 7 of 15
"Exhibit C" B. Fraud On The Court
34. The Montana Supreme Court stated that
"M. R. Civ. P. 60 is modeled on F. R. Civ. P. 60, so we look to interpretation of the Federal Rules for guidance." Marriage of Rernitz, Note 2.
35. The 9th Circuit Court held that,
"Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court." Alexander v. Robertson, (882 F. 2d 421, (9th Cir. 1989)), citing H.K. Porter Co. Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir.1976)
a) Womack's Misrepresentations And Telling Half Truth In This Court
36. We incorporate some of Womack's misrepresentations to the courts
submitted in Exhibit A in this motion. Despite these misrepresentations not
happened in this Court, they resulted in the previous court rulings in Womack's
favor, which in turn affected this court's 5/23/2022 order also in Womack's favor.
37. In this Court's hearings, Jenny had showed several incidence how Womack
was untruthful and evasive under oath, and how Womack sworn to tell the whole
truth but told the Court only the half truth to mislead the Court. For example:
38. Womack told the court that he conducted Ada estate's accounting. Yet he
contradicted himself in his inability to tell the court where in his accounting
report was Ada estate's accounting. Cindy counsel's objections helped Womack
to evade his further contradicting his testimony.
39. Womack also testified that Jenny talked Ann to refused converse with him
Page 8 of 15
"Exhibit C" while what Ann actually said was she would like to talk via email;
40. Womack filed this litigation stating Jenny claimed "a purported Ian's will but
refused to provide" so to gave the court an impression that Jenny was planning
something sinister. Womack omitted the fact that Ann and Jenny informed him in
writing just 4 days ago, that they would provide Ian's notarized Last Will with
affidavits under penalty of perjury after they received Ian's death certificate.
Womack and Cindy could have provided to Ann and Jenny with Ian's death
certificate that Cindy already possessed, instead of initiating their litigation.
41. In Selway v. Burns, (429 P. 2d 640 Mont. 1967), the Montana Supreme
Court stated that the "concealment of facts by a person who was under a legal
duty to make a full disclosure to the court" and "affirmatively misrepresenting
facts" constitute fraud on the court "that goes to the very integrity of the judicial
system because the court is mislead and made one of the victims of the fraud."
42. Womack also misrepresented to the Montana Supreme Court. One of the
misrepresentations was Ian obstructed his administration. This misrepresentation
was rebutted in this Court's 4/1/2022 hearing when Jenny used opposing parties'
exhibits of courts' dockets as the evidence and showed that Ian did not obstruct
or stall the cases. However, Ian's estate did not have the chance to submit a
Reply Brief to show this to the Montana Supreme Court.
43. In this Court's hearings, Womack frequently advised this court not to allow
Page 9 of 15
"Exhibit C" Ann and Jenny to be a temporary placeholder to retain an attorney in submitting
Ian estate's Reply Brief, which could give Ian's estate a chance to rebut the
misrepresentations in Womack's Answer Brief thus "presenting its case fiilly" to
the Montana Supreme Court.
"The fraud that will move a court of equity to exercise its inherent power to vacate judgments has been described as that which prevents the unsuccessful party from having a trial or presenting its case fully." Id. ref Clark v. Clark, 64 Mont. 386, 210 P. 93
44. The Montana Supreme Court gave Ian's estate a chance of a 60 day
extension, despite stated that the reply brief was not mandatory thus not
necessary. The reply brief is in the Montana Appeal Procedure for a reason.
Although it is optional, Ian's estate did not opt-out this option. Womack's actions
blocked it. Womack's advice to this Court to prevent Ian's estate to be fully
heard in the Montana Supreme Court constitutes a fraud on the court.
45. In Synanon Found., Inc., v. Bernstein, 503 A.2d 1254 (D.C.1986), Synanon
counsels told the district court that intenogatories would be unduly burdensome
to listen 10,000 audio tapes, and indices of the tapes did not exist. The DC
Appeal Court held that the attorneys had perpetrated a fraud on the court with
misrepresentations, which influenced the course of the district court's discovery
rulings in Synanon's favor, and attorneys' "destroying materials they thought
subject to discovery" was also to "corrupt the administration of justice." Id.
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"Exhibit C" 46. Womack's misrepresentations and his withheld/destroy the audio record
(Exhibit A, p13-14 ) which is subject to the discovery are parallel to Synanon
counsels' acts.
b) Opposing Counsels Knowingly Presented A Witness With Fabricated Facts
47. 1) Opposing counsels knew that after Ada died, Ian never agreed to sell
properties except let Womack sell the 2 building sites. In order to prove Jenny
was with some kind of bad quality or character, they prepared their witness
Adrian to testify with fabricated facts that Adrian saw Jenny was angry and
"screamed at Ian" when Ian signed the contract to sell properties in 2017.
48. 2) Opposing counsels also knew that in 2014, after Ian refused to sell
Starfire's remaining properties, Cindy sued Ian for "causing liabilities to
Starfire" by signing property listing "in bad faith". Ian then submitted the
evidence of Cindy's misrepresentations to the Court. When Adrian was with
Cindy visiting Ian in 2013, Ian refused to sign the listing and Jenny was on
the same side with Ian and confronted Cindy who withheld Ian's health
insurance payment as a coercion. After they left, Cindy sent a letter to Ian
fraudulently told Ian that listing Starfire's property was a condition required
by Starfire's bank loan, or Starfire's properties would face bank foreclosure.
(Exhibit B). Ian then signed the listing and told the Realtor how much he
cherished the land that his Grandma and Uncle Ray left. (Exhibit C) Ian later
Page 11of 15
"Exhibit C" contacted the bank loan officer who stated that the bank never had such loan
condition to Starfire. (Exhibit D)
49. Therefore, Cindy's counsels knew that either before or after Ada's death,
there was no such possibility at all for Adrian to witness Ian signing a
property sale contract which caused "Jenny was angry and screamed at" Ian
or Cindy.
50. 3) Please see Adrian's own email to Ian stating why he did not want to
contact Ian for 15 years after Ian's emails asking Adrian to keep contact.
(Exhibit E) and Ian's efforts to connect with Adrian. (Exhibit F)
51. Yet the opposing counsels prepared Adrian to fabricate the facts that Adrian
was close to Ian because Ian was Adrian's guardian so Adrian had been visiting
Ian every year and acted as the "peacemaker" so as to mislead the Court.
52. Attomey's involvement in presenting a witness' perjured testimony is a fraud
on the court. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238
(1944); Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986
(4th Cir.1987)
53. The 9th Circuit Court held that,
"the inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for fraud upon the court under Rule 60(b) focuses not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process." In Pumphrey v. K. W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1995)
Page 12 of 15
"Exhibit C" 54. In Dixon v. Comni'r of Internal Revenue, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003),
the 9th Circuit further held that,
"Furthermore, the perpetrator of the fraud should not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after the fact."
55. Similarly, the 4th Circuits held that,
"once fraud enters the case in any manner, the judgment must be vitiated without further inquiry as to the materiality or effect of the fraud on the judgment". Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 675 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1982)
56. The 5th Circuits also held that,
"once the determination is made that officers of the court have corruptly abused the judicial process, the court is not required to examine the effect that such conduct might have had on the ultimate judgrnent, but rather the court may rely on such conduct alone to set aside the judgment." Browning v. Navarro, 826 F.2d 335, 344 (5th Cir. 1987)
57. Therefore, we request this Court to vacate its 5/23/2022 order based on
opposing attorneys, especially Attorney Womack's fraud on the court conduct.
IL This Motion Is In Accordance With MRCP Rule 42(a) (1), (2), (3)
58. Rule 42(a) allows consolidation or join for a hearing or trial, if actions before
the court involve a common question of law or fact.
59. At present, the cases before 3 different courts (DP 17-0036, DV 21-811, and
DP 22-0024 ) in this jurisdiction involve the common questions of law and facts,
the same or similar issues, and depend largely upon the same evidence:
1. Whether Womack misrepresented facts and laws to the Courts and whether
Page 13 of 15
"Exhibit C" his misrepresentations constitute fraud on the court.
2. Whether the settlement signed by Ian estate's special administrator Andrew
Billstein justifies Ian estate beneficiaries' intervention against Cindy and
Womack because the beneficiaries' interests were not adequately represented.
60. This Court's 5/23/2022 order relied on Womack and Adrian's testimonies,
and also greatly relied on judicial notice in its criticizing Ian's surviving actions.
61. However, the previous orders ruled in Womack's favor relied on Womack's
court testimonies and statements, which are the subject of courts' fact-findings
whether Womack made misrepresentations and perpetrated fraud on the court.
62. Consolidating the cases or a joint hearing will help the courts better
understand and examine the related issues and facts.
63. In addition, consolidation or a joined hearing save court economy and avoid
duplicated hearings, delays or unnecessary cost for the parties.
CONCLUSION
64. The attorney's misrepresentations to the courts to circumvent the laws and
manipulate court procedures and deprive the adversary parties' right to seek
redress constitute fraud on the court. It is an attack to the integrity of the judicial
system. The Court has a duty to treat this issue seriously to protect the public trust.
For the above reasons, we respectfully request this Court to grant our motion to
vacate its 5/23/2022 order and to consolidate the cases (or to hold a joint hearing).
Page 14 of 15
"Exhibit C" DECLARATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information I set forth in this
document is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Respectfully submitt 0/20/2022
'2A4411 /1 Jenny Jing er Mike Bolenbaugh Interested Parties in Ian liot's Estate, Pro Se
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 20th day of October, 2022, I served a true copy of this
document, via emails to:
Andrew T. Billstein via andrew@bmslawmt.com Joseph Womack, via jwomack@ivwlaw.com Cindy Elliot, via jsoueidi@feltmartinlaw.com Adrian Olson, via acelegstrong@yahoo.com Holly Marie Dudley, via MotherHolly@gmail.com Emily Sapp, via emilyesapp@gmail.com Mike Bolenbaugh, via m.bolenbaugh@gmail.com Alice Carpenter, via 2u2do mail.com Shelley Paterson, via attersonss alioo.com W. Scott Green via s
d QAT"- Ina' Jenny Jing
Page 15 of 15
"Exhibit C" CLERK OF TH Jenny Jing DISTRICT CO T 10 Alpine PL. TERRY H IN Kearny, NJ 07032 jennyianrnt@gmail.com 1071 SEP P 12: 5 ! Alice Carpenter FILED P.O. Box 22702 DY Billings, MT 59104 D EPUTY up2u2do@gmail.com Mike Bolenbaugh 2351 Solomon Ave, Apt. 334 Billings, MT 59102 m.bolenbaugh@jgrnail.corn Pro Se
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION
IAN ELLIOT, And Case No. DV 21-811 Derivatively on Behalf of Starfire L.P., Hon. Judge Ashley Harada Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH WOMACK, an lndividual, MOTION TO INTERVENE Defendant, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENTION
1. Pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure Rule (MRCP) 24 (a) and (b)(1),
Alice Carpenter (Alice), Jenny Jing (Jenny), Mike Bolenbaugh (Mike),
(collectively Plaintiffs-interventors) respectfully submit our motion to intervene
and brief in support of intervention on the side of plaintiffs Ian Elliot (Ian). The
opposing party's counsel has stated they would object to this rnotion.
2. We request a hcaring. We also request this Court and interested parties to
Exhhibit A Page 1 of 14
"Exhibit C" serve the documents to our email addresses to prevent mail delays.
3. Please refer to the attached complaint.
ARGUMENT
I. WE ARE ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT
4. We became interested parties after Ian passed away during this proceeding.
With a combined 53.3% interest in Ian's estate, we have significant claims at
stake in this litigation (see Exhibit A, Ian's Last Will).
5. We satisfy the requirement for intervention as of right under MRCP Rule
24(a).
" Intervention under M. R. Civ. P. 24(a) requires satisfaction of four elements: (1) timeliness; (2) an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) that the protection of the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) that the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party. (citations omitted) Three Blind Mice v. Price, 2020 MT 292N
6. Our motion meets each of the four required elements.
A. Our Motion Is Timely
7. Our motion is timely. We filed this motion after we know that Ian estate's
special administrator Andrew Billstein has not filed motion to substitute party in
this litigation.
B. We Have The Same Interest In The Subject Matter
8. The alleged Womack's fraud (misrepresentations to Ian and to the courts)
Page 2 of 14
"Exhibit C" and breaches interfered and harmed Ian's inheritance from Ada's estate. This in
turn interfered and harmed our share of inheritance from Ian's estate.
C. Our Ability To Protect Our Interest Will Be Impaired Or Impeded If Ian's Actions Are Disposed Without Our Intervention
1. We Have Standing And We Satisfy Rule 24(a) Requirements
9. Although in general, only estate's personal representative has the standing to
sue a 3rd person, Womack is not any 3rd person, he is the trustee of Ada's estate
and Starfire. The Montana statute allows "a trustee or beneficiary" to petition the
court for "compelling redress of a breach of the trust by any available remedy".
MCA 72-38-213(2)(1).
10. We copy Ian's argument regarding this statute as follows: although Montana
does not have a case interpreting whether this statute limits a beneficiary's
redress only to the current trustee, the California's 2nd and 4'h Appellate Courts
have given their answers to a California's equivalent statute,
"Section 17200 does not, by its terms, limit the beneficiary's right to compel redress of a breach of trust to a petition against a current trustee. Nor is there any decisional authority to that effect." Estate of Bowles, 169 Cal. App. 4th 684 - Cal: 2nd App. Dist., 5th Div. 2008), at 698 (emphasis original)
11. Please note that the Section 17200 clause mentioned in Bowles, the Section
17200 (b)(12) reads almost exactly as Montana's MCA 72-38-213 (2)(1).
12. In King v. Johnston, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1488 (2009), the 4th Appellate Court
of California agreed with Bowles, and held that a beneficiary had standing to sue
Page 3 of 14
"Exhibit C" a former trustee and a third-party participant in a breach of the former trustee's
fiduciary duties, or the third-party participant alone. The King court explained:
"because 'primarily it is the beneficiaries who are wronged and who are entitled to sue....'[Citation.] The liability of the third party is to the beneficiaries, rather than to the trustee...", (Citing Scott on Trusts, 4th ed., § 282, §294; and City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 68 Ca1.App.4th 445, 467 [80 Ca1.Rptr.2d 329] (1998)) Id., at 1500
13. These rulings reasoned that the beneficiaries' personal stake entitled their
legal right to sue, especially when the suit is against a trustee.
14. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers ofAm., (404 U.S. 528, 538, 92 S.Ct.
630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972)), a union member was represented by the Secretary
of Labor in the litigation. The lower courts agreed with the Secretary and denied
his intervention as of right from Rule 24(a), for the reason that the Secretary
already represented his interest. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decisions
and explained in its note that,
`The requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest "may be" inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.' Id., Note 10.
15. Accordingly, the 9th Circuit has consistently ruled that,
`We stress that intervention of right does not require an absolute certainty that a party's interests will be impaired or that existing parties will not adequately represent its interests. Rule 24(a) is invoked when the disposition of the action "may" practically impair a party's ability to protect their interest in the subject matter of the litigation, "unless existing parties adequately represent that interest."Citizensfor Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness, 647 F. 3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011), see also County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.1980)
Page 4 of 14
"Exhibit C" 16. Our intervention satisfy the above requirements and circumstances.
2. Our Interest Cannot Be Protected Without This Court's Fact-finding Of A Scheme By Womack To Mislead The Courts
17. Our intervention requests this Court examine Womack's dishonest conducts
aimed at the courts. In Alexander v. Robertson, (882 F. 2d 421, (9th Cir. 1989)),
the 9th Circuit held that,
"Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court." citing H.K Porter Co. Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir.1976)
18. Montana law allows the beneficiaries to sue under special circumstances of
"a showing of fraud, collusion, conflict of interest, inability to act or other special equitable circumstances". Matter of Estate of Long, 225 Mont. 732 P. 2d 1347 (1987)
19. In our complaint, we showed that Womack, together with Ada and Starfire's
former fiduciary Cindy Elliot, deliberately planned and carefully executed a
scheme to shield Cindy and also create unnecessary and lucrative service
compensations to Womack.
20. First, Womack stated to every court that he did not know whether Cindy
had wrongdoings without his accounting. This contradicts the fact what Womack
did know and should have known.
21. Then, with a promise to the Federal Court that he would bring action against
Cindy if he find wrongdoing, Womack dismissed Ada Estate's claims after
delaying his accounting for 8 months.
Page 5 of 14
"Exhibit C" 22. In Ada and Ian's probate courts, Womack then testified under oath that Ian's
litigation against Cindy was without merits, or he did not have money to retain an
attorney to bring actions against Cindy.
23. Among the different courts, Womack made different misrepresentations. He
made a false promise to the Federal Court that he did not have any intention to
keep, since his accounting does implicate Cindy's wrongdoings. Also, the
Federal Court records indicates that Attorney Duke was already in the process of
preparing the trial against Cindy. Womack "caged" Duke yet misrepresented to
the state courts that he did not have money to retain an attorney.
24. As of today, Womack has conducted no accounting for Ada's Estate. Under
Womack's direction to his accountant, the transactions in Ada's personal bank
and credit card accounts which Cindy had sole access to were allocated as
Starfire or Ada's expenses without being further examined.
25. In Ian estate court hearing, Womack testified under oath that he conducted
Ada estate's accounting. When Jenny asked Womack to show where Womack's
accounting report indicated Ada estate's accounting, Womack evaded the
question after the objection from Cindy's counsel, who also acted as Womack's
counsel in the hearing.
26. Our intervention supplement Ian's complaint, with additional facts and legal
principles, showing Womack's misrepresentations were aimed at the courts in
Page 6 of 14
"Exhibit C" obtaining court rulings in his favor.
27. Without the intervention, the protection of our interest may be impaired by
the disposition of Ian's actions, since Womack has been trying to dismiss this
case with prejudice, thus to prevent the issue of his dishonest acts to the courts
from being brought up forever.
3. Our Interests Will Be Affected If This Case Is Dismissed
28. Our interest is impaired when Womack is not hold responsible for more than
$500,000 unnecessary service charges including an abusive document dumping
of 34 boxes of duplicated and unrelated documents to his accountant. This
increased Womack's accounting expenses to an estimated $160,000-$200,000 or
more for a company's operation that only involved less than a dozen bills to pay
annually. Under Womack's direction to his accountants, the accounting report
avoided examining the transactions in Ada's personal bank and credit card
accounts, thus significantly minimized Cindy's liabilities.
29. Even if the court allows Womack's accounting to be substantially
recalculated after our contest, the recalculation will cause another hundreds of
thousands of accounting and legal expense burdens for Ada's estate and Ian's
estate because of Womack's document dump of thousands and thousands
irrelevant documents to bury the relevant ones. We will be injured once again, if
we cannot intervene to hold Womack accountable.
Page 7 of 14
"Exhibit C" D. Our Interests May Not Be Adequately Represented
30. To determine adequacy of representation, the 9th Circuit considers the
following:
"whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the intervenor's arguments; whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect." Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1498-99 (9th Cir. 1995).
31. We meet each factor.
32. Although we are the beneficiaries who have majority interests in Ian's estate,
(53.33%) and want to pursue this litigation, we understand that Ian estate's
representative Andrew Billstein has a duty to represent all of Ian estate
beneficiaries' interests. This includes the beneficiaries who have minority
interests (16.67%-21.67%) and expressed that they did not want to spend estate's
money to pursue Ian's surviving actions. Therefore, Mr. Billstein's willingness
and ability to protect our interests is limited, at least at this point.
33. When several beneficiaries including us insisted to be distributed with the
real properties that Ian's estate was entitled to according to the law, Mr. Billstein,
under the joint pressure from both Womack and Cindy, was only able to save one
tract of 38 acres land for us, which consists only 15% of the total land, or 18% of
the total appraised value.
34. Womack could have easily re-divided the properties and let Ian's estate to
Page 8 of 14
"Exhibit C" distribute the cash and properties according to beneficiaries' preferences. This is
because the remaining 4 tracts of properties' rearrangement does not need
govemment's approval. (MCA 76-3-207(1)(d))
35. We understand that Mr. Billstein, who is not a litigator and not practices in
other law areas involved in this case (such as the area of legal professional
liabilities), may not be willing to argue for us regarding another attorney's
unethical behaviour or dishonest actions.
36. When Ian was alive, Womack took away Ian's counsel David Duke, then
withheld Ian's distribution for almost a year to prevent and delay Ian's having
sufficient fund to retain another attomey. We have the reason to believe that Mr.
Billstein may also be at Womack's mercy in obtaining the fund to pay an
attorney for the actions against Womack.
37. In addition, what is more unusual is that Womack has broader connections in
Montana's legal community. When Ian and Jenny searched for attorney
representation, as long as the issue involves Womack, the responses were either
the case were too complicated, or there was conflict of interest. Ian and Jenny
were told that Womack is a trustee in Montana Bankruptcy Court, the law firms
have conflict of interest because they had or have work relationships with
Womack. It is a reality that Montana has a small legal community where most
lawyers know each other and not want to be involved, we ask the court to
Page 9 of 14
"Exhibit C" consider that this is a truly difficult circumstance for Ian then and now for us.
38. Therefore, our intervention is necessary since it does not incur legal
expenses for Ian's estate, because the parties are suppose to pay their own legal
expenses according to the American Rule. We are committed to pay our own
legal expenses in pursuing this action.
39. This circumstance like ours is supported with precedent cases, such as In re
Estate of Bleeker, (168 P. 3d 774 - Okla, 2007, at 781). In Bleeker, an estate's
executor elects not to press a claim, reasoning the remote probability of
recovering estate assets was not sufficient to warrant the expenditure to pursue
the claim. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the beneficiary had standing
in the circumstance to sue, since the beneficiary had asked to bear the expenses.
40. In explaining its ruling, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited more than a
dozen cases from different states' appeal courts and supreme courts, including
the Supreme Court of Montana (State ex reL Palmer v. District Court of the
Ninth Judicial Dist., 190 Mont. 185, 619 P.2d 1201 (1980)), and held that
"The dispositive first-impression question on certiorari is whether the American common law settled in the last century and half, which in circumscribed circumstances allows persons other than the estate's fiduciary to bring litigation for recovery of estate assets, should be adopted in Oklahoma. We answer in the affirmative and reverse the contrary trial court's ruling." Bleeker, at 776
41. Our intervention satisfies the same circumscribed circumstances.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATE
Page 10 of 14
"Exhibit C" 42. In the alternative, we respectfully request the Court grant permissive
intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b).
43. In Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., (552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.
1977)), the 9th Circuit, citing cases from several circuits, held that in granting the
permission, the court needed to examine several relevant factors such as:
1) "the nature and extent of the intervenors' interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case. "; 2) "whether changes have occurred in the litigation so that intervention that was once denied should be reexamined"; 3) "whether the intervenors' interests are adequately represented by other parties"; 4) "whether intervention will prolong or unduly delay the litigation"; 5) "whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented."
44. We have stated in the previous sections that we satisfy the factors of
intervention as of right for the factors mentioned in Spangler 1) , 2) and 3).
45. We also satisfy the factor 4) "whether intervention will prolong or unduly
delay the litigation" Id.
46. Ian filed this litigation in July 2021. This court has not made any ruling.
After Ian's death, it was Womack, who initiated Ian estate's litigation and
delayed Ian estate's personal representative's appointment proceeding for at least
4 months, specifically for the purpose to prevent Ian estate's beneficiary, Ian
designated personal representatives Ann Sargent and Jenny from retaining an
Page 11 of 14
"Exhibit C" attorney to represent Ian's estate to pursue this action. Therefore, Womack is the
one to prolong and unduly delay this litigation, not our intervention.
47. To satisfy factor 5), we offer specialized familiarity with the factual and
legal issues.
48. We will be able to offer our experience to counter Womack's
misrepresentations to the court that Ian's action against him and Cindy were
vexatious and "inflammatory". During the last decade, when Cindy spread
disinformation attacking Ian for taking care of their mother Ada whom Cindy
herself did not want to take care of, and placed Ada to live in a caregiver's
basement and Ada suffered physical injuries, Ian's partner Jenny witnessed how
Cindy treated Ada and Ian. Jenny also participated with Ian in Ada's 24/7 care.
When Ada and Ian needed the help, we were Ada and Ian's only family. We
supported Ian and gave Ada and Ian comfort.
49. We also witnessed Ian's painful efforts to save his family's historical ranch
from being sold to pay the unreasonable service fees for Cindy, then for Womack.
Ian's partner Jenny also helped Ian to examine Ada and Starfire's bank
transactions. With a MBA in finance, Jenny was able to discover Cindy and
Womack's fraudulent bookkeeping practices in their financial reports.
50. The 9th Circuit has consistently ruled that,
"a liberal policy in favor of intervention serves both efficient resolution of issues and broadened access to the courts." Wilderness Soc y. v. U.S. Forest
Page 12 of 14
"Exhibit C" Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir.2011), quoting United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397-98 (9th Cir. 2002)
51. Depriving opposing parties' access to the courts is against our judicial
system's fimdamental principles. Womack's misrepresentations to the courts
especially his manipulation of court procedures to deprive opponents' access to
the courts, present a significant attack on the integrity of our judicial system.
52. What happened to a disabled elderly person Ada, Ada's estate, Ian's estate,
and Starfire's matters is extraordinary. Even under the courts' proceedings of
more than 8 years as of today, there has been no accounting conducted by
neither Ada's conservator nor by Womack regarding where the funds from Ada's
personal bank and credit card accounts went to.
53. Both Ada herself and Ada estate's beneficiary Ian suffered from their
fiduciaries' unethical, unlawful, and predatory practices and cover-ups. At the
same time, these fiduciaries manipulated to create hundreds of thousands dollars
of unnecessary and lucrative service fees to benefit themselves. Our intervention
not only is to protect our interests, but also to raise the court's attention to
prevent the same tragedy from happening again to other Montana families.
54. This court has the duty to prevent gross injustice caused by a court-
appointed attorney's dishonest acts and manipulations, and to preserve the public
trust and the integrity of our judicial system.
Page 13 of 14
"Exhibit C" 55. For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that this Court grant our
Motion to Intervene, pursuant to MRCP 24(a) or 24(b).
DECLARATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information I set forth in this
Respectfully submitted: 9/14/2022
Jenny Jing A tc ter Mike Bolenbaugh Interested Parties in Ian Elliot's Estate, Pro Se
I certify that on the l4th day of September. 2022, I served a true copy of this
Thomas C. Bancroft tbancroft@nelsonlawmontana.com
Andrew T. Billstein andrew@bmslawmt.com
Jamy ply Jenny Jing nter Mike Bolenbaugh
l'age 14 of
"Exhibit C" August 15, 2013
Dear ian,
l'm writing to you as general partner to general partner abouta critical business taskwe must take care of for StarFire. Our bank loan ("ag/real estate"loan catego ry) requires us to maintain current real property. To stay compliant with the terms estate listings for the collateral of our bank financing, the partnership renew the listings. needs to take immediate action and
A listing does not require us to actually accept any offers. The only exception is the unlikel the exact listing price, or higher. The listings ihood of an offer coming in for simply keep us in compliance and our fundin number of different financial options for StarFir g in place, while we seek any e ancl the family. The listings that have requiredrenewaf since June are for one 20 acre build site in the dry Village Project.As of today we have a 6 week land, and for the Amsterdam gap in compliance. Our loan comes due for refinancing in five months. When the bank reviews it, we must be continuous good faith effort since last Februa able to show we have made a ry to sell property in order to pay off the princip expected source of repayment. The keyinformati al. This is the bank's onthey need to see on our refinance applica maintained current listings. tion is that we have
lf we can't prove this, the bank will be entitled:1) to refuse to extend our loan, and 2)to initiate foreclo property. That will mean taking over 40 prime sure on the lien acres in the center of the Amsterdam Village Projec acre build sites in Section21.They will have the t land, and the 20 right to liquidate all of it for any price they $150,000 principal due on the loan. wish, so long as it covers the For example, the combined properties could be worth several times that amount of money, but allowed to sell all of it (perhaps even to a buyer the bank would be of their own)for as low as $150,000 just to move it quickly. Unfortunately, according to Glen, First Interstate does have a history of doing exactly this, foreclo farms and ranches in the area in similar situatio sing on many family ns to ours. This is not just a theoretical risk. I hope you agree that, all anger and disagre ements aside, this would be an utterly unwanted and For you, for me, for the ranch, for our family. unnecessary scenario.
our family has been in unified agreement about selling the Amsterdam Village project since May The renewals are for listings that you have signed 2006. previously,severaI times.
Renewing our listings is not asking you to give up anything, your concerns, your questions, yoursense rights to fully understand the partnership's past finance of fairness or your s. lt's simply asking you to continue exercising fiduciary responsibility to StarFire as a general partne yourcurrent r. lf you are In agreement on just this one task, please call or send an email to our agent, Mary Ackerman,lett knowyou will sign the two listing renewals: 406-58 ing her 7-2950 ormarvPmarvackerman.com. Please ask her any questio that will help with your decision. ns p snoa She will look to hearing from you. It's important to respond to her by Tuesday, August 20. This will enable reinstate the listings on the MLS before September. her to
Meanwhile, please know l respect your requests for StarFire's financial history. l have been working over to find and research the records so l can provide report the summer s that will help answer your questions and concerns. information you've asked for is extensive, and l apprec The iate your patience with the great amount of time this is requiring. Thanks lan.
My Best,
"Exhibit C" Listing Approved lan Elliot
8/16/13 TO: Mary E, Ackermann — ecoREsource Bozeman, MT FROM: lan R. Elliot —Starfire LP Billings, MT
Thanks Mary for your patience and understanding regarding our Starfire LP property issues. l signed and initialed the documents you sent me and am returning them via FAX. I remain committed to maximizing benefits from the eventual sale and/or development of Mother's inherited ranch property that she and her Ecton family have loved and nurtured for decades. l spent my summers as a teenager working as a ranch hand under the supervision of my Uncle " Ray, and stayed in close touch with him over the years following that service. It is a treasured piece of real estate , that continues to provide financial security for my Mom and immediate family members, and l wish to see this gift __handled in &good and thoughtful way.
Sincere Thanks, lan Exhibit C
"Exhibit C" In return for my timely cooperation, Cindy, I would greatly appreciate your restoration of August rental income from Mother's modular home for Mom's care use. I paid the advance on my health insurance and van lease in order to assure my self of a financial cushion (far less in the amount which you have enjoyed for more than two years with special accounts such as the $12,000 set aside for Mother's care with your name only listed on the account). Partnership breakdowns and serious misunderstandings have occurred because our family business related information has been withheld. It appears you set up numerous accounts in order to prevent both Gary and me from learning about your ranch related financial resources? Whatever the reason, I trust you will now be prepared to lay all cards on the table regarding Starfire LP instead of my having to force the issue. Keep in mind that my financial activities (cards) related to family resources remain open for your review anytime you need to see transaction documents. For now, please consider my request and restore the modular home rent to help me supplement Mother's care for which it was intended.
Onward and Upward, lan
"Exhibit C" First Interstate Bank 401 N. 31st St. P.O. Box 30918 First Billings, MT 59116-0918 406-255-5000 lidera te www.firstinterstatebank.com Bank
October 19, 2015
Ian Elliot 2512 Golden Blvd. Billings, MT 59102
RE: October 13, 2015 Correspondence on StarFire, LP
Dear Ian:
I am sending this letter in response to your correspondence that was delivered to my office on October 13, 2015, and also emailed to me on the same day. I am also infonning you that I am copying Cindy Elliot on this letter as the other General Partner of Starfire, LP.
Please find the following responses in order of the above mentioned correspondence from you.
1. You are correct that First Interstate Bank did not require StarFire, LP to ever list , any property for sale as a condition to any loan agreement. 2. Aspart of the original loan apPlication, Starfire LP did present documentation of a Real Estate Purchase Contract and Option Agreement it had already entered in with The Village at Amsterdam, LLC (C/o CTA Architects Engineers). StarFire, LP was requesting interim financing for the Elliot family to allow CTA Architects Engineers time to raise the funds to execute this agreement. This agreement was signed on June 2, 2006 by Cindy Elliot and Ian Elliot, General Partners of StarFire, LP. 3. I have not enclosed any loan agreements related to StarFire, LP as no requirement was ever made by the bank as outlined above in paragraph 1.
Exhibit D
"Exhibit C" I hope that you find this is the information that you have requested. Please feel free I contact me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
) 4crir Jared M. Maloney Vice President Commercial Loan Officer (406) 255-5262
Cc: Cindy Elliot, General Partner StarFire, LP
"Exhibit C" Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 03:41:28 -0700 Frani: acelegstrOng@yahoo co §-ubjg4: Re: LOVE AND HEARTFELT APPRECIATION! To: elliotianAhotmail.corn
You guys are all pretty much idiots for all Pm concemed, keep wasting the estate, and die in debt, find the tax collectors, andAll thc bullshitypp refine face, eppe rnpm earblyp was dead, You can find a new family!! yeah I found my self, and a new family that would never ever leave me the, wayyou suckers left me, 15 a felon and no where to.go, fuck you Elliots, ' _finally how I haye felt for thc last 15 years, poor Ada, she and Archie deserved so much better, artistic, retarded, great grades rnake you insane, what do you have now, all my moms art, all the originals, the ones I have had, my Dad gave to me, huddle around that art and wait for a storm, and lose half of it and pry to yppr self, possessive, and j cant still get one piece, one fucking original, why do you think I don't respond, good luck, you think I'm not really [14s-elfYou abandoned- yeS -this is What you wanted; go back when my mom was on her death bed, I was 15 years old.; now I'm a man and would never bring a woman -home close to you, after last time, give me -aft; or-Y-Ofir death, make me feel-enabledlike I edieleal ly,soitie morbid life I live before I die, just some art on the wall of my moms, really? can you do that for me, the hand drawn picture of my profile when I was six, just give it to me, you selfish fucks, really think about the square box you live in, with out rny moms art for me, find me after we all die, Thanks Adrian, see you then maybe, hell to pay, I was just a little kid you have no idea, think about it, lost soles?
Exhibit E
"Exhibit C" FW: greetings
lan Elliot
Love & Spring Blessings, lan and Grandma Ada
Date: Mon, 13 May 2013 11:47:34 -0700 From: acelegstrong@yahoo.com Subject: greetings To: cmaiberger7@gmail.com; g8keeper@pacbell.net; elliotian@hotmail.com; jennifer_heyden@yahoo.com
http://villadiamond.or/likeit.pho?vhozsx822hh
Exhibit F
"Exhibit C" Dkt 80 Filed 12/09/22
4 MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY Cause No.: DP 22-34 5 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: Judge Rod Souza 6 IAN RAY ELLIOT, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 7 Deceased. LEA VE TO FILE CORRECT EXHIBIT, DENYING MOTION TO VACATE MAY 23, 8 2022 ORDER, DENYING MOTION TO ALLOW INDEPENDENT ACTION, AND 9 ________________, DENYING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 10 This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Vacate the Court's May 23, 2022 11 Order, Allow an Independent Action for Fraud on the Court, and to Consolidate Cases of 12 Interested Parties Je1my Jing, Alice Carpenter, and Mike Bolenbaugh (hereafter "Jenny, Alice, 13 and Mike.") [Dkt. 59.] Preliminarily, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jenny's, Alice's, and 14 Mike's Motion for Leave to File the Correct Exhibit is GRANTED. [See Dkt. 69 at l .] Jenny, 15 Alice, and Mike state they intended "to submit [as Ex. A to their motion, their] proposed 16 complaint against Womack [that] accompanied [their] motion to intervene [in] DV 21-811." 17 [Dkt. 68 at 1-2.] This Order therefore considers that proposed complaint [Dkt. 21 in DV 21- 18 811] as Ex. A to the Motion to Vacate. 19 The Com1's May 23, 2022 order granted Petitioner Joseph Womack's Petition (that 20 Interested Person Cindy Elliot (hereafter "Cindy") joined) for Supervised Administration of 21 Ian's Elliot's Estate. [Dkt. 45.] The Order also appointed Andrew Billstein, Esq. as Special 22 Administrator oflan's Estate. [Dkt. 45.] In granting the Petition, the Court made extensive 23 23
24 24 1
"Exhibit D" I Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [Dkt. 45.] Special Administrator Billstein and Cindy
2 oppose Jenny's, Alice's, and Mike's Motion. [Dkts. 65, 66.]
3 Citing M.R.Civ.P. 60(6), Jenny, Alice, and Mike asse1i Jenny made a mistake worthy of
4 vacating the order when she testified she "thought she received [about $2,000] from Ian in
5 2021" when, after review of bank statements she avers owing $8,900. [Dkt. 59 at 6-7.]
6 However, Jenny's change is a distinction without a difference. After review of!an's bank
7 statements [Ex. VJ Finding of Fact 59 found Jenny's debt was $21,000. Jenny now
8 acknowledging to owe Ian's Estate $8,900 still constitutes her disputing owing $21,000. See,
9 also, In the Estate of Gober, 350 S.W.3d 597,600 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 2011) ("The
10 distinction [regarding when a conflict of interest renders an executor unsuitable] lies in whether
11 there is a dispute about the estate's assets ....") Moreover, Conclusion ofLaw 17 quoted Estate
12 ofAnderson-Feeley, 2007 MT 354 at ,i 13, which stated "[t]he existence ofa potential claim
13 against Feeley is sufficient to create a conflict of interest, and such conflict of interest is
14 sufficient for removal of Feeley as personal representative ofJan's estate." See, also, In re
15 Estate ofPeterson, 265 Mont. 104, 109,874 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Mont. 1994) (quoting In re
16 Rinio 's Estate, 93 Mont. 428, 435, 19 P.2d 322, 325 (Mont. 1933) ("The law does not look with
17 favor upon the administration of estates by a person where conflicts in the performance of his
18 duty are likely to arise."))
19 19 Jenny, Alice, and Mike cite In re Estate ofJochems, 252 Mont. 24, 826 P.2d 534
20 (Mont. 1992) (partially overruled on other grounds). [Dkt. 68 at 11.] Jochems is inapplicable. It
21 addresses whether a testator was competent to transfer ce1iificates ofdeposit. See 252 Mont. at
22 29-30, 826 P.2d at 537. Jenny, Alice, and Mike reference In re Estate of Graf, 150 Mont. 577,
23 437 P.2d 371 (Mont. 1968). [Dkt. 68 at 11-12.] Grafis distinguishable. It instructs a Montana
24 2
"Exhibit D" 1 probate court cannot set aside a testator's choice of executor based on possibilities. 150 Mont.
2 at 579-80, 437 P.2d at 372-73. Jenny's conflict ofinterest is more than possible. In the face of
3 claims and documentary evidence that she owes Ian's Estate $21,000, Jenny claims she owes
4 $8,900, a substantially lesser amount. Furthermore, as Finding of Fact 58 states "Jenny's debt
5 to the Estate, the extent of which she denies incentivizes Jenny to delay Estate administration."
6 Jenny, Alice,and Mike asse11 Jenny made another mistake wo11hy of Rule 60(b) relief
7 in that "she did not know she could object to judicial notice." [Dkt. 59 at 7.] "[T]here is no
8 ground for a Rule 60(b) motion where the mistake is purely a mistake oflaw, as ignorance of
9 the law is no excuse." Donovan v. Graff, 248 Mont. 21, 25, 808 P.2d 491, 494 (Mont. 1991).
10 Moreover, the Com1 can give Jenny latitude as a pro se litigant, it cannot prejudice the other
11 pa11ies in doing so. See Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, � 15,300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124.
12 Giving Jenny legal advice would have significantly prejudiced Womack and Cindy. See, also,
13 Duffy v. State, 2005 MT 228, � 17, 328 Mont. 369, 120 P.3d 398 (Court officers cannot provide
14 legal advice). Regarding mistake, Jenny, Alice, and Mike finally assert Jenny "was too
15 embil!1'assed to keep asking the [C]ourt or the witness to repeat what she did not hear well."
16 [Dkt. 59 at 7.] This is not a basis for Rule 60(b) relief.
17 Citing M.R.Civ.P. 60(d), Jenny, Alice, and Mike asse11 Womack committed fraud on
18 the court by stating "he conducted Ada['s] estate's accounting"; "Jenny talked Ann [in]to
19 refus[ing to] converse with him;" and Jenny "refused to provide'' Ian's will. [Dkt. 59 at 8-9.]
20 During the March 7, 2022 hearing Womack testified "I have completed the accounting, I just
21 got the accounting back from Wipfli,it's a forensic accounting, that was done." This testimony
22 was accurate. Womack hired Wipfli to perform an accounting of Ada's Estate, and Wipfli
23 completed their accounting. Jenny, Alice,and Mike quote Dixon v. Comm 'r ofInternal
"Exhibit D" 1 Revenue, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). [Dkt. 59 at 13.] "Fraud on the court occurs when
2 the misconduct harms the integrity of the judicial process." 316 F.3d at 1046. Accurate
3 testimony is not misconduct, and accurate testimony cannot harm the judicial process's
4 integrity.
5 Regarding Jenny convincing Ann to refuse to talk to him except in writing, Womack
6 testified "I did draw the inference from ... Jenny ...sa[y]ing...things to [Ann] about me[.] I drew
7 that inference because Ian at some point in my relationship with him and Jenny ... refused to
8 talk to me any [m]ore[a]nd would only communicate through emails or letters. So my
9 assumption was... they told [Ann] that's how [she] should act." Womack's testimony on April
10 1, 2022 additionally explained the drawbacks to requiring written communication. That
11 requirement precludes "hav[ing] some discussion and... an exchange of ideas." Womack
12 additionally testified only communicating in writing makes it "very difficult to get anything
13 accomplished, [is] time-consuming," and impractical.
14 Drawing inferences is not fraud. Moreover, Jenny, Alice, and Mike have asserted fraud
15 on the Cou11. [Dkt. 59 at 8-1 0.] They quote Pumphrey v. K. W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d
16 1128, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. 1995). [Dkt. 59 at 12.] Pumphrey instructs fraud on the court "must
17 involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the com1
18 in its decision." 62 F.3d at 1131. Drawing inferences is neither unconscionable nor designed to
19 improperly influence.
20 During the March 7, 2022 hearing, Womack explained what he meant by refusal to
21 provide the will. "I requested a copy of the Will, and you [i.e. Jenny] did not send it to me, and
22 then you said that you were going to wait and you weren't going to [do] anything for a period of
23 time, you were obtuse, all you had to do was say, yes, Joe, here is a copy of the Will. And you
"Exhibit D" I didn't do that. So I took that as a refusal." Womack further explained "even after [Jenny]
2 attempted to file the petition,[Jenny] didn't send me a copy of that with a copy of the Will
3 either." Womack did not need to provide Jenny's reasoning for his basis to use the word refusal
4 to be accurate.
5 Jenny, Alice, and Mike quote Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1989).
6 [Dkt. 59 at 8.] Alexander strongly suppmis denying their motion. When it involves fraud by
7 officers of the court, fraud on the court prevents "the judicial machinery [from] perform[ing] in
8 the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." 882
9 F.2d at 424. See, also, In re Estate a/Swanberg, 2020 MT 153,113,400 Mont. 247,465 P.3d
10 I 165 ("Submitting a will that may be subject to a will contest is not fraud on the court.")
11 Jenny's, Alice's and Mike's claims do not satisfy Alexander's high standard.
12 Jenny, Alice, and Mike assert Womack "misrepresented to the Montana Supreme Comi
13 [that] Ian obstructed his administration" and cite Jenny's use of Cindy's and Womack's court
14 exhibits to "sho[w] Ian did not obstruct... the cases." [Dkt. 59 at 9.] First, the evidence received
15 strongly supported the extensive Findings of Fact (12, 24-47, Dkt. 45) the Comi made
16 otherwise. To succinctly illustrate, Finding of Fact 25 states "Judge Brown moreover 'direct[ed
17 Ian] to Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P.,specifically including Rule 1 l(b), relating to the representations
18 made to the Comi by a party upon the filing of any pleading,motion, or other paper, and the
19 availability of sanctions for a violation of Rule 11 by a party." (citing DV14-829, Dkt. 67 at
20 4.)] Finding of Fact 29, referencing the high threshold in Montana to dismiss claims,states
21 "[d]espite this high threshold, Judge Harada dismissed all of Ian's claims that she was
22 specifically asked to dismiss." (citing DV 18-536, Dkt. 28.) Finding of Fact 33 states "Judge
23 Knisely dismissed [Ian's lawsuit suing Womack personally] at the pleading stage." (citing DV
"Exhibit D" 1 20-244, Dkt. 16). Lastly, in Finding of Fact 38, this Court opined "[i]t is remarkable Judge
2 Knisely had to threaten incarceration to achieve compliance with a comi order." (citing Ex. E-3
3 at 2).
4 Second and equally impotiant, the Montana Supreme Comi has strongly rejected the
5 argument Ian was not obstructionist. In re Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N. "The record
6 demonstrates that, however sincere he may have been, Ian obstructed Womack's administration
7 with constant litigation and unfounded accusations. He filed numerous, lengthy motions
8 objecting to almost eve1y action by Womack, and even sued him twice personally. Ian forced
9 Womack to fight for virtually eve1y decision, even tl10se that the District Comi expressly
10 placed within his discretion, most notably obtaining a full accounting of StarFire." 2022 MT
11 91N at� 19. According to the Montana Supreme Court, Ian's position was "not the reality of
12 the situation." 2022 MT 91N at� 23. "Ian similarly struggled to stay within the scope of
13 13 questioning and limit his arguments to the present issues during hearings." Id at� 28.
14 Jenny, Alice, and Mike assert it was fraud on the Comi for Womack not to allow Jenny
15 and Ann to file a reply brief for Ian's claims regarding Ada's Estate on appeal to the Montana
16 Supreme Comi. [Dkt. 59 at 9-10.] "Only 'the most egregious conduct' [such as "bribery,
17 evidence fabrication, and improper attempts to influence the court by counsel"] will rise to the
18 level of fraud upon the court." Falcon v. Faulkner, 273 Mont. 327,332,903 P.2d 197,200
19 19 (Mont. I 995). Womack not allowing Jenny and Ann file a reply brief because the issue of
20 special administration was pending before the Court is not similar to these examples. Jenny,
2I Alice, and Mike quote Selway v. Burns, 429 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1967). [Dkt. 59 at 9-1 O.] Selway
22 does not suppmi their position. Fraud on the comi "may be achieved either by affirmatively
23 misrepresenting facts ...or by concealment of facts by a person who was under a legal duty to
24 G
"Exhibit D" I make a full disclosure to the court." 150 Mont. at 9,429 P.2d at 644 (internal citation omitted).
2 Womack exercising his legal right to oppose Jenny's and Ann's request to file a reply brief is
3 not affirmative misrepresentation or knowing concealment.
4 Jenny, Alice, and Mike reference Ex. A, which is now 0kt. 21 in DV 21-811. [0kt. 59
5 at 8.] Ex. A references inter alia Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-902 and in-kind distributions,
6 condemns Womack's decision to have Wipfli perform an accounting, and accuses Womack of
7 artificially inflating expenses for his own personal gain. The Montana Supreme Court has
8 already rejected these arguments. "[T]he statute gives preference to in-kind distribution only to
9 the extent possible. As the personal representative, Womack 'ha[d] the power to sell estate
10 property if necessa1y for the estate's administration."' Estate of Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at� 22.
11 "[T]he accounting was essential to ending the seven years oflitigation over StarFire and the
12 almost five years of litigation over the Estate." Elliot, 2022 MT 91N at� 22. "Despite his oft-
13 stated purpose to save money for the Estate, Ian's interference objectively and significantly
14 increased costs and delays, further necessitating the second sale. Womack spent a considerable
15 amount of time responding to Ian's various motions and lawsuits, time which was necessarily
16 charged to the Estate." 2022 MT 91 N at� 23.
17 Lastly, Jenny, Alice, and Mike assert Womack and Cindy's attorney knowingly
18 presented the false testimony of Adrian Olson, Ian's nephew. [0kt. 59 at 11-12.] The Court
19 notes they do not challenge [see dkt. 59] Adrian's testimony that is the basis of the Comi's
20 Fomieenth Finding of Fact that states "Adrian provided compelling testimony regarding the
21 role of Jenny ... in Ian's ongoing litigation strategy." The Court's Finding of Fact 15 states that
22 "Adrian and Ian were very close ....Adrian would visit Ian in Montana yearly." Finding of Fact
23 16 calls Adrian a peacemaker for proposing a settlement to end Ian's and Cindy's longstanding
"Exhibit D" I litigation. Finding of Fact 17 observes "Cindy and Ian agreed[,] Jenny ... became upset with
2 Ian[, a] heated argument ensued, [and] Jenny's disagreement led Ian to reject Adrian's
3 proposal." Jenny, Alice, and Mike argue these findings are based on Adrian's false testimony
4 and cite the Court to Exs. B-F to their motion. [Dkt. 59 at 11-12.]
5 Ex.Eis an ang1y email dated July 4, 2012 from Adrian's email address to Ian. One
6 angry email does not show it was false for Adrian to testify he and Ian were ve1y close.
7 Moreover, Ex. F is an email from Ian to Adrian dated May 13, 2013 stating Ian and Ada "are
8 still hoping to hear from ... Adrian." Ian's email shows he did not want to cut all ties with
9 Adrian and did not believe Adrian's ang1y email meant they would no longer speak.
10 Ex. B is an August 15, 2013 letter from Cindy to Ian. Ex. C are conununications (two of
11 which occurred on August 16, 2013) from Ian stating he signed listing documents and asking
12 the August rental income be used for Ada's care. Ex.Dis a letter from a First Interstate Bank
13 Vice President dated October 19, 2015 responding to Ian's inquiries received on October 13,
14 2015.Exs. B, C, andDare wholly i!1'elevant to Adrian proposing and presenting a settlement to
15 Ian and Cindy in 2013. Contra1y to Jenny's, Alice's, and Mike's motion [dkt. 59 at 11-12],
16 Adrian's testimony did not reference a listing agreement or a property sale contract. Adrian
17 referenced "a very generic solution" that had not yet decided whether to use a real estate agent
18 or attorney. Further, when Jenny directly referenced a listing agreement when asking Adrian of
19 his proposal, Adrian answered "[i]t wasn't a conversation about listing the property, it was just
20 a family conversation."
21 Jenny, Alice, and Mike characterize the duty of the administrator oflan's estate is to
22 "act zealously in defending and protecting Ian's estate [from] adversaries Cindy and Womack."
23 [Dkt. 68 at 6.] As the Court stated in Finding of Fact 56 "Womack is not only the Special
24 8
"Exhibit D" 1 Administrator of Ada's Estate but also Starfire's liquidating prutner. The major asset of Ada's
2 Estate is land still owned by StarFire. Thus, whether it is a special administrator or a personal
3 representative handling Ian's estate, that person must work with Womack."
4 Unsuitability authorizing removal as personal representative "may ...be based upon ... a
5 mental attitude toward his duty ...that creates reasonable doubt whether the executor or
6 administrator will act honorably, intelligently, efficiently, promptly, fairly and dispassionately
7 in his trust." District Attorney for the No1folk Dist. v. Magraw, 628 N.E.2d 24, 27 (Mass.
8 1994). Such unsuitability can also arise "upon any other ground for believing that his
9 continuance in office will be likely to render the execution of the will or the administration of
IO the estate difficult, inefficient or unduly protracted." Ashley v. Ashley, 405 S.W.3d 419, 426
11 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). See, also, Long v. Willis, 113 So. 3d 80, 83-84 (2d Dist., Fla. Ct. App.
12 2013) ("Unsuitableness to administer may well consist in an adverse interest of some kind, or
13 hostility to those immediately interested in the estate, whether as creditors or distributees, or
14 even ofan interest adverse to the estate itself.") The Comt in detailed findings, concluded
15 Jenny would not work with Womack. [Dkt. 45.]
16 Lastly, Jenny, Alice, and Mike again ru·gue "Womack is not a creditor oflan's estate."
17 [Dkt. 68 at 6.] As the Comt stated in Conclusion of Law 18 of Dkt. 45:
18 "Judge Knisely issued an order approving an "[a]greement for StarFire ...to Make Loans to Limited Partners and Heirs." [Ex. Z.] Moreover, in correspondence with Womack, 19 Ian called the transaction a "loan." [Ex. L.] Therefore, Womack is a creditor."
20 To sU111marize, like the Rule 59 motion Ian filed before Judge Knisely in the probate of
21 Ada's Estate, Jenny's, Alice's, and Mike's motion does "not remotely rise to the level required
22 for" the relief sought. [See DP 17-36, Dkt. 161 at 4.] Assuming arguendo Je1my, Alice, ru1d
23 Mike had shown falsity, the Montana Supreme "Comt has repeatedly held that fraud between
"Exhibit D" 1 the parties, such as perjured testimony at trial, does not rise to the level of fraud upon the
2 court." See In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ,r 24, 297 Mont. 225, 991 P.2d 960. See,
3 also, Traders State Bank v. Mann, 258 Mont. 226, 237, 852 P.2d 604, 610-11 (Mont. 1993)
4 (partially overruled on other grounds) ("[F]orceful argument' and 'aitful pleading' do not rise
5 to the egregious conduct contemplated by this rule, but more closely relate to the Lawyer
6 Defendants' exercise of their duty to zealously represent their client.")
7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jenny's, Alice's and Mike's Motion to Vacate the
8 Comt's May 23, 2022 Order and to Allow an Independent Action for Fraud on the Comt IS
9 DENIED.
10 Jenny, Alice, and Mike lastly request the Court consolidate this case with DP 17-36, In
11 re Estate ofAda Elliot, and DV 21-811, Jan Elliot, individually and derivatively on behalf of
12 12 StarFire, L.P., v. Womack. [Dkt. 59 at 13-14.] Since the Comt is a probate cou1t, it has limited
13 13 jurisdiction. See In re Estate of Cooney, 2019 MT 293, ,r 13, 398 Mont. 166, 454 P.3d 1190
14 ("The probate comt's limited jurisdiction does not extend to adjudicating a breach of contract
15 claim."). Accordingly, the Comt cannot consolidate the cases.
16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jenny's, Alice's, and Mike's Motion to Consolidate
17 is DENIED.
18 DATED: this o/ l- day of at"A� 2022.
19 19
20 Hon. Rod Souza, D ourt Judge 21
22 cc: Ann Taylor Sargent (via email) ann2022ian@gmail.com 23 23 Jenny Jing (via emaiJ) jennyianmt@gmail.com 24 IO
"Exhibit D" 1 Joseph Womack, Esq. (via email) jwomack@jvwlaw.com
2 Cindy Elliot, via Jeffrey A. Hunnes, Esq. (via email) jhunneslw.feltmartinlaw.com
3 Cindy Elliot via Joseph Soueidi, Esq. (via email) jsoueidi@feltmartinlaw.com
4 Adrian Olson (via email) acelegstrong@yahoo.com 5 W. Scott Green, Esq. (via email) sgreen@ppbglaw.com 6 Holly Marie Dudley (via email) MotherHolly@gmail.com 7 Emily Sapp (via email) emilyesapp@gmail.com 8 Mike Bolenbaugh (via email) m.bolenbaugh@gmail.com 9 Alice Carpenter (via email) up2u2do@gmail.com 10
11 Shelley Paterson (via email) pattersonss@yahoo.com
12 Ray Ecton & Ian Elliot Trust, via email to Jenny and Ann at their emails supra
13 Andrew Billstein, Esq. (via email) andrew@bmslaw.com
14 Adrianna Potts, Esq. (via email) apotts@pottlawpllc.com
15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 16 This is to certify that the foregoing was duly served by email/mail or hand delivery upon the pat'lie r attorneys of record at their last known � 17 addresses this � day� t?'IDQ2./\-,d0d-d-- .
18 BY �Mi'6 Q� JudiciA:sistant to Hon. R So\(a 19
24 11
"Exhibit D" CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Michael Manning, hereby certify that I have served true and accurate copies of the foregoing Motion - Opposed to the following on 01-23-2023:
Jeffery A. Hunnes (Attorney) 2825 3rd Avenue North Suite 100 Billings MT 59101 Representing: Cindy Elliot Service Method: eService
Jenny Jing (Appellant) 10 Alpine Place Kearny NJ 07032 Service Method: E-mail Delivery
Alice Carpenter (Appellant) P.O. Box 22702 Billings MT 59104 Service Method: E-mail Delivery
Mike Bolenbaugh (Appellant) 2351 Solomon Avenue, Apt. 334 Billings MT 59102 Service Method: E-mail Delivery
Joseph V. Womack (Appellee) 1001 S. 24th Street West, Suite 318 Billings MT 59102 Service Method: E-mail Delivery
Electronically signed by Amy Martin on behalf of Michael Manning Dated: 01-23-2023
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Estate of Elliot, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-elliot-mont-2023.