UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ESTATE OF D.C.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-743 (TJK)
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff is a guardianship estate created to hold funds for a minor. ECF No. 32 (Compl.)
¶¶ 1–2. It alleges that it was supposed to receive a check for $55,703.36 from a law firm, one of
the Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiff says the law firm sent the check, but it never arrived
because it was stolen and cashed by the thief. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–26. The remaining two Defend-
ants are banks involved in that transaction. See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18, 26. Having never received the
funds to which it claims entitlement, Plaintiff sued the law firm and both banks, alleging breaches
of various common-law and state-statutory duties. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 27–78. Defendants
have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See ECF Nos. 33, 35.
Although no party contests this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must question
it sua sponte. Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Federal
courts have “limited jurisdiction.” Friends of Animals v. Pruitt, 258 F. Supp. 3d 91, 93 (D.D.C.
2017). They must presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). And the party invoking its jurisdiction—
Plaintiff here—has the burden to show otherwise. Id.; see also Wendland v. Gutierrez, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 152 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff says the Court has diversity jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 7. Federal diversity jurisdic-
tion has two elements. The first is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, as defined
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). The Court has already ordered Plaintiff to show cause why its case
should not be dismissed for failure to allege complete diversity, permitted an amended complaint
in response to that order, and ordered Defendants to describe their state citizenship in affidavits.
See Min. Order of June 8, 2022; Min. Order of July 8, 2022; ECF Nos. 29–32. The second element,
which has not been litigated so far, is that the amount “in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this context, Plaintiff’s burden to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction includes the “burden to establish with evidence ‘that it does not appear
to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” Griffith v. EduCap,
Inc., No. 16-CV-1541 (DLF), 2019 WL 4737064, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019) (quoting Payne v.
Gov’t of D.C., 559 F.2d 809, 820 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). And that burden may be triggered “by
the court sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Payne, 559 F.2d at 820).
Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden concerning the amount-in-controversy requirement.
The amount of financial harm it claims to have suffered is both certain—$55,703.36—and well
short of $75,000. See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 27–28, 34, 36, 42, 47, 53, 66, 70, 73, 76–78. Its complaint
hints at three reasons why its total claim might exceed $75,000, but none of those reasons are
adequately pleaded.
The first possible reason is that the operative complaint’s prayer for relief asks for “com-
pensatory damages in the amount of $150,00.00against [sic] Defendants jointly and severally.”
Compl. at 29. 1 But that figure is not explained. And “a bare-bones assertion of jurisdictional
sufficiency” is inadequate; Plaintiff must allege some facts supporting its damage calculation.
1 The Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to request $150,000.
2 Bronner ex rel. Am. Studies Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Moreover, if
the $150,000 figure reflects Plaintiff’s attempt to hold all three Defendants “jointly and severally”
liable by multiplying its damages by three, it is improper. See Compl. at 29. Joint and several
liability allows a wronged party to recover for the same harm against any of multiple wrongdoers.
See Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133, 137 & n.3 (D.C. 1982). Plaintiff may not recover more than
once for that same harm. See Saunders v. Hudgens, 184 A.3d 345, 350 (D.C. 2018). For those
reasons, the unexplained $150,000 claim does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.
The second possible reason is that Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees. See Compl.
¶¶ 34, 47, 53, 66, 73, 78; id. at 29. But such fees “are generally not included in the amount in
controversy, unless provided for by statute or contract.” Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiff alleges no contract and cites no statutory provision for
attorney’s fees. The only statute that the complaint mentions at all is the District of Columbia’s
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains no provision for attorney’s fees. See
generally D.C. Code § 28:3-101 et seq. Anyway, the mere availability of attorney’s fees would
not be enough. To include those in an amount-in-controversy calculation, a plaintiff must provide
something more than conjecture, speculation, or a bare assertion. See Inst. for Truth in Mktg. v.
Total Health Network Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 76, 90–91 (D.D.C. 2018). The Court has nearly a
$20,000 gap to fill before it can conclude that it has jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has not even asserted
that its attorney’s fees could fill that gap, let alone provided a basis for the Court to so conclude.
For those reasons, the requests for attorney’s fees do not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.
The third possible reason is that one of Plaintiff’s claims—for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress—seeks unquantified damages for “serious emotional distress to the Plaintiff.”
Compl. ¶ 62. But again, an unquantified, unexplained assertion will not do. A plaintiff hoping to
3 use emotional harm as a ticket to federal court must “explain how [it] has suffered” that harm.
Symkowicz v. Frisch, No. 19-CV-3329 (BAH), 2020 WL 4432240, at *6 (D.D.C. July 31, 2020)
(quoting Bronner, 962 F.3d at 610) (alteration adopted). A statement that the plaintiff has suffered
emotional injury is a description only of the “type[ ] of harm,” and so does not meet the plaintiff’s
burden. Id. (quotation omitted). That is all Plaintiff says. See Compl. ¶¶ 61–63. And again, the
complaint fails even to assert that the claimed emotional damages could close the $20,000 gap.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ESTATE OF D.C.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-743 (TJK)
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff is a guardianship estate created to hold funds for a minor. ECF No. 32 (Compl.)
¶¶ 1–2. It alleges that it was supposed to receive a check for $55,703.36 from a law firm, one of
the Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiff says the law firm sent the check, but it never arrived
because it was stolen and cashed by the thief. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–26. The remaining two Defend-
ants are banks involved in that transaction. See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18, 26. Having never received the
funds to which it claims entitlement, Plaintiff sued the law firm and both banks, alleging breaches
of various common-law and state-statutory duties. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 27–78. Defendants
have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See ECF Nos. 33, 35.
Although no party contests this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must question
it sua sponte. Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Federal
courts have “limited jurisdiction.” Friends of Animals v. Pruitt, 258 F. Supp. 3d 91, 93 (D.D.C.
2017). They must presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). And the party invoking its jurisdiction—
Plaintiff here—has the burden to show otherwise. Id.; see also Wendland v. Gutierrez, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 152 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff says the Court has diversity jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 7. Federal diversity jurisdic-
tion has two elements. The first is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, as defined
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). The Court has already ordered Plaintiff to show cause why its case
should not be dismissed for failure to allege complete diversity, permitted an amended complaint
in response to that order, and ordered Defendants to describe their state citizenship in affidavits.
See Min. Order of June 8, 2022; Min. Order of July 8, 2022; ECF Nos. 29–32. The second element,
which has not been litigated so far, is that the amount “in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this context, Plaintiff’s burden to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction includes the “burden to establish with evidence ‘that it does not appear
to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” Griffith v. EduCap,
Inc., No. 16-CV-1541 (DLF), 2019 WL 4737064, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019) (quoting Payne v.
Gov’t of D.C., 559 F.2d 809, 820 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). And that burden may be triggered “by
the court sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Payne, 559 F.2d at 820).
Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden concerning the amount-in-controversy requirement.
The amount of financial harm it claims to have suffered is both certain—$55,703.36—and well
short of $75,000. See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 27–28, 34, 36, 42, 47, 53, 66, 70, 73, 76–78. Its complaint
hints at three reasons why its total claim might exceed $75,000, but none of those reasons are
adequately pleaded.
The first possible reason is that the operative complaint’s prayer for relief asks for “com-
pensatory damages in the amount of $150,00.00against [sic] Defendants jointly and severally.”
Compl. at 29. 1 But that figure is not explained. And “a bare-bones assertion of jurisdictional
sufficiency” is inadequate; Plaintiff must allege some facts supporting its damage calculation.
1 The Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to request $150,000.
2 Bronner ex rel. Am. Studies Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Moreover, if
the $150,000 figure reflects Plaintiff’s attempt to hold all three Defendants “jointly and severally”
liable by multiplying its damages by three, it is improper. See Compl. at 29. Joint and several
liability allows a wronged party to recover for the same harm against any of multiple wrongdoers.
See Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133, 137 & n.3 (D.C. 1982). Plaintiff may not recover more than
once for that same harm. See Saunders v. Hudgens, 184 A.3d 345, 350 (D.C. 2018). For those
reasons, the unexplained $150,000 claim does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.
The second possible reason is that Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees. See Compl.
¶¶ 34, 47, 53, 66, 73, 78; id. at 29. But such fees “are generally not included in the amount in
controversy, unless provided for by statute or contract.” Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiff alleges no contract and cites no statutory provision for
attorney’s fees. The only statute that the complaint mentions at all is the District of Columbia’s
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains no provision for attorney’s fees. See
generally D.C. Code § 28:3-101 et seq. Anyway, the mere availability of attorney’s fees would
not be enough. To include those in an amount-in-controversy calculation, a plaintiff must provide
something more than conjecture, speculation, or a bare assertion. See Inst. for Truth in Mktg. v.
Total Health Network Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 76, 90–91 (D.D.C. 2018). The Court has nearly a
$20,000 gap to fill before it can conclude that it has jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has not even asserted
that its attorney’s fees could fill that gap, let alone provided a basis for the Court to so conclude.
For those reasons, the requests for attorney’s fees do not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.
The third possible reason is that one of Plaintiff’s claims—for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress—seeks unquantified damages for “serious emotional distress to the Plaintiff.”
Compl. ¶ 62. But again, an unquantified, unexplained assertion will not do. A plaintiff hoping to
3 use emotional harm as a ticket to federal court must “explain how [it] has suffered” that harm.
Symkowicz v. Frisch, No. 19-CV-3329 (BAH), 2020 WL 4432240, at *6 (D.D.C. July 31, 2020)
(quoting Bronner, 962 F.3d at 610) (alteration adopted). A statement that the plaintiff has suffered
emotional injury is a description only of the “type[ ] of harm,” and so does not meet the plaintiff’s
burden. Id. (quotation omitted). That is all Plaintiff says. See Compl. ¶¶ 61–63. And again, the
complaint fails even to assert that the claimed emotional damages could close the $20,000 gap.
Thus, the request for emotional damages does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction either.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet its burden, so the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rosenboro v. Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, the
Court “must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006). Still, “the governing law mandates generosity in evaluating the eligibility of a claim for
federal jurisdiction.” See Rosenboro, 994 F.2d at 290. Because this issue has not previously been
raised during this litigation and it is conceivable that further allegations could remedy the present
jurisdictional defects, the Court will give Plaintiff a chance to file a complaint that cures them.
For all the above reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32, is DISMISSED for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint by April 19, 2023. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,
ECF Nos. 33, 35, are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion for a Status Conference, ECF No. 25, is DE-
NIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4 SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 20, 2023