Estate of David Barefield Sr. v. City of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-03427·Unknown

Opinion

1 Mark E. Merin (State Bar No. 043849) Susana Alcala Wood (SBN 156366) Paul H. Masuhara (State Bar No. 289805) Sean D. Richmond (SBN 210138) 2 LAW OFFICE OF MARK E. MERIN srichmond@cityofsacramento.org 1010 F Street, Suite 300 Scott P. Thorne (SBN 326917) 3 Sacramento, California 95814 sthorne@cityofsacramento.org 4 Telephone: (916) 443-6911 Kate D.L. Brosseau (SBN 345596) Facsimile: (916) 447-8336 kbrosseau@cityofsacramento.org 5 E-Mail: mark@markmerin.com CITY OF SACRAMENTO paul@markmerin.com 915 I Street, Room 4010 6 Sacramento, CA 95814-2608 7 Robert L. Chalfant (State Bar No. 203051) Telephone: (916) 808-5346 LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT L. CHALFANT Facsimile: (916) 808-7455 8 13620 Lincoln Way, Suite 325 Auburn, California 95603 Attorneys for Defendants 9 Telephone: (916) 647-7728 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO E-Mail: robert@rchalfant.com POLICE DEPARTMENT, KATHERINE 10 LESTER, KYLE STEDMAN, JARED KISER, 11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs DILLON BORTMAS, RYAN HANCOCK, ESTATE OF DAVID BAREFIELD SR., LATAURUSS HARRIS, CASEY DIONNE, 12 DAVID BAREFIELD II, AARON BAREFIELD, ARMANDO SANDOVAL, HERIBERTO FINAS BAREFIELD, and LOIS BAREFIELD BASULTO, and MARTIN TELLERIA 13 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 SACRAMENTO DIVISION 17 ESTATE OF DAVID BAREFIELD SR., Case No. 2:24-cv-03427-TLN-JDP DAVID BAREFIELD II, AARON BAREFIELD, 18 FINAS BAREFIELD, and LOIS BAREFIELD, STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: PERSONNEL FILES; 19 Plaintiffs, [PROPOSED] ORDER

20 vs. 21 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT, KATHERINE 22 LESTER, KYLE STEDMAN, JARED KISER, DILLON BORTMAS, RYAN HANCOCK, 23 LATAURUSS HARRIS, CASEY DIONNE, 24 ARMANDO SANDOVAL, HERIBERTO BASULTO, and MARTIN TELLERIA, 25 Defendants. 26 27 28 1 STIPULATION 2 A. PURPOSE AND LIMITATION 3 Defendants believe that the disclosure and discovery activity concerning the materials described 4 in this stipulated protective order is likely to involve production of information for which protection from 5 public disclosure is warranted. Plaintiffs have not been permitted to view the materials described in this 6 stipulated protective order and, thus, are unable to form an opinion as to whether protection is necessary. 7 The Parties acknowledge that this protective order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures 8 or discovery activity, and that the protection it affords extends only to the limited information or items 9 that are entitled to such protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The Parties further 10 acknowledge that this protective order does not entitle any party to file information designated as 11 protected or confidential under seal, where Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be 12 followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to 13 file material under seal. 14 B. DEFINITIONS 15 The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order: 16 1. The “Action” shall mean and refer to the above-captioned matter and to all actions now or 17 later consolidated with the Action, and any appeal from the Action and from any other action 18 consolidated at any time under the above-captioned matter, through final judgment. 19 2. “Documents” or “Confidential Documents” shall mean the documents that Defendants 20 designate as “Confidential” and described in Section C. 21 3. “Confidential” shall mean information designated “Confidential” pursuant to this 22 stipulated protective order. Information designated “Confidential” shall be information that is determined 23 in good faith by the attorneys representing the designating party to be subject to protection pursuant to 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Confidential documents, material, and/or information shall be 25 used solely for purposes of this Action. Such Confidential information may be disclosed only to the 26 categories of persons and under the conditions described in this Order. Confidential information shall not 27 be used by the non-designating party for any business or other purpose, unless agreed to in writing by all 28 parties to this action or as authorized by further order of the Court. 1 4. “Plaintiffs” shall mean the Estate of David Barefield SR., David Barefield II, Aaron 2 Barefield, Finas Barefield, and Lois Barefield. 3 5. “Defendants” shall mean the City of Sacramento, Sacramento Police Department, 4 Katherine Lester, Kyle Stedman, Jared Kiser, Dillon Bortmas, Ryan Hancock, Latauruss Harris, Casey 5 Dionne, Armando Sandoval, Heriberto Basulto, And Martin Telleria. 6 6. “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs and Defendants, collectively, as identified above. 7 C. INFORMATION COVERED 8 Covered Information: 9 Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(1), a description of the information eligible for protection under 10 this stipulated protective order is limited to the following: 11 1. Personnel Files of Kyle Stedman (RFP # 33–41) 12 2. Personnel Files of Jared Kiser (RFP # 42–50) 13 3. Personnel Files of Dillon Bortmas (RFP # 51–58) 14 4. Personnel Files of Ryan Hancock (RFP # 59–66) 15 5. Personnel Files of Latauruss Harris (RFP # 67–75) 16 6. Personnel Files of Casey Dionne (RFP # 76–83) 17 7. Personnel Files of Armando Sandoval (RFP # 84–91) 18 8. Personnel Files of Heriberto Basulto (RFP # 92–99) 19 9. Personnel Files of Martin Telleria (RFP # 100–107) 20 Further, these personnel files will be redacted pre-production to remove personal identifying 21 information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, including dates of birth, social 22 security numbers, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, credit card information, banking account 23 information, passwords, insurance policy numbers, driver’s license or passport numbers, and the names 24 of government employees’ relatives. The personnel files will be identified as “CONFIDENTIAL” on the 25 face of the document. 26 Particularized Need for Protection: 27 Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized 28 need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order because the 1 information contained in the personnel files is private. Defendants represent to the Court and Plaintiffs 2 that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated protective order are limited solely to those 3 which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include 4 information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop 5 of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 Showing of Need for a Protective Order: 7 Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for 8 the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of 9 resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the Parties and the Court from conducting 11 the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure 12 whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need 13 for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986).

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