Estate of David Barefield Sr. v. City of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 20, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-03427·Unknown

Opinion

IPORTER SCOTT Carl L. Fessenden, SBN 161494 clessenden @porterscott.com Cruz Rocha, SBN 279293 crocha@porterscott.com 2180 Harvard Street, Suite 500 Sacramento, California 95815 TEL: 916.929.1481 ] 916.927.3706 Attorney for Defendants COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, JIM COOPER, and JAMES EDDINS Exempt from Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103 Mark E. Merin Paul H. Masuhara ) LAW OFFICE OF MARK E. MERIN 1010 F Street, Suite 300 Sacramento, CA 95814 mark @markmerin.com paul @markmerin.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs AARON BAREFIELD, FINAS BAREFIELD, and LOIS BAREFIELD, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ESTATE OF DAVID BAREFIELD SR., CASE NO. 2:24-cv-03427-TLN-JDP DAVID BAREFIELD Il, AARON BAREFIELD, FINAS BAREFIELD, and PROPOSED] STIPULATED PROTECTIVE LOIS BAREFIELD, ORDER RE: VIDEO Plaintiffs, Complaint Filed: 12/10/2024 Vv. POLICE DEPARTMENT, KATHERINE LESTER, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S EDDINS, and DOE 1 to 20, fPROPOSED} STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: VIDEO

Defendants. ___________________________________/ Defendants believe that the disclosure and discovery activity concerning the materials described in this stipulated protective order is likely to involve production of information for which protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Plaintiffs have not been permitted to view the materials described in this stipulated protective order. The parties acknowledge that this protective order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or discovery activity, and that the protection it affords extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to such protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The parties further acknowledge that this stipulated protective order does not entitle any party to file information designated as protected or confidential under seal, where Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order: 1. The “Action” shall mean and refer to the above-captioned matter and to all actions now or later consolidated with the Action, and any appeal from the Action and from any other action consolidated at any time under the above-captioned matter, through final judgment. 2. “Documents” or “Confidential Documents” shall mean the documents that Defendants designate as “Confidential” and described in section C. 3. “Confidential” shall mean information designated “Confidential” pursuant to this stipulated protective order. Information designated “Confidential” shall be information that is determined in good faith by the attorneys representing the designating party to be subject to protection pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Confidential documents, material, and/or information shall be used solely for purposes of litigation. Confidential information shall not be used by the non-designating party for any business or other purpose, unless agreed to in writing by all parties to this action or as authorized by further order of the Court. 4. “Defendants” shall mean COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, JIM COOPER, and JAMES EDDINS. 5. “Plaintiffs” shall mean ESTATE OF DAVID BAREFIELD SR., DAVID BAREFIELD II, AARON BAREFIELD, FINAS BAREFIELD, and LOIS BAREFIELD. 6. “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs and Defendants, identified above. Covered Information: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(1), a description of the information eligible for protection under this stipulated protective order is limited to the following: 1. Redacted Body Worn Camera video from inside the jail depicting the matter which is the subject of this litigation. Particularized Need for Protection: Pursuant to Local Rule141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order. Defendants represent to the Court and Plaintiffs that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated protective order are limited solely to those which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Showing of Need for a Protective Order: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the parties and the Court from conducting the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986) As a result, production may be made with this stipulated protective order in place and, if necessary, it will permit discrete and narrowed challenges to documents designated for protection. Confidential Documents subject to protection may be designated as “Confidential” and produced subject to this stipulated protective order: 1. The Confidential documents shall be used solely in connection with the above-captioned civil case, and in the preparation and trial of the case. The parties do not waive any objections to the admissibility of the documents or portions thereof in future proceedings in this case, including trial. 2. The parties will designate the Confidential documents as confidential by affixing a mark labelling them “Confidential” or otherwise specifically designating in writing visual media that is protected. 3. The Confidential documents may only be disclosed to the following persons: a. Plaintiffs and Mark E. Merin and Paul H. Masuhara of the Law Office of Mark E. Merin, and any partners and associates in that office; b. Defendants and Carl L. Fessenden and Cruz Rocha of Porter Scott, and any partners and associates in that office; c. Paralegal, clerical, and secretarial personnel or support staff regularly employed by counsel referred to in subparts (a) and (b) immediately above, including stenographic deposition reporters or videographers retained in connection with this action; d. Court personnel, including stenographic reporters or videographers engaged in proceedings as are necessarily incidental to the preparation for the trial in the civil action; e. Any expert, consultant, or investigator retained in connection with this action; however, such persons must be advised of and abide by this protective order; f. The finder of facts at the time of trial, subject to the court’s rulings on in limine motions and objections of counsel; and g. Witnesses during their depositions in this action. If confidential documents are used in the deposition, the documents must be identified as “Confidential” and the portion of the deposition in which the documents are described should also be considered confiden

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