25CA0057 Estate of Baker 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0057 Jefferson County District Court No. 18PR32 Honorable Todd L. Vriesman, Judge
In re the Estate of Lucille A. Baker, deceased.
George H. Frantz III,
Appellant,
v.
Lisa Blattner, Esq., Successor Personal Representative, Estate of Lucille Baker,
Appellee,
and
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.,
Intervenor-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Solem, Woodward & McKinley, P.C., Peter Harris, Andrew J. Gwirtsman, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellant
Coan, Payton & Payne, LLC, Scott H. Challinor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee David N. Sutton, Aurora, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellee ¶1 George H. Frantz III, the former personal representative of
Lucille Baker’s estate, appeals the district court’s judgment in favor
of Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.
(Watchtower),1 and against him for breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud during the performance of his duties as personal
representative.2 We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 Baker had no children. When she died in January 2018, her
husband, parents, and siblings were also deceased. Susan Frantz
was Baker’s cousin and lived in Ohio. A few weeks after Baker’s
death, Susan filed an application to appoint her son, George H.
1 The district court’s orders refer to Watchtower as “Watch Tower.”
But the parties’ briefs and the record refer to the organization as “Watchtower,” which we will also do. 2 We remind Frantz’s counsel that they must comply with the
appellate rules, including C.A.R. 28. The opening brief doesn’t provide the record location preserving each claim and at times fails to cite the record when required. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7); O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631-32 (Colo. App. 2010) (we are under no obligation to search the record, and parties should not “expect the court to peruse the record without the help of pinpoint citations” (quoting L.S.F. Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 282 F.3d 972, 975 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002))). Counsel also failed to provide authority supporting the purported standard of review as required by C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A).
1 Frantz III, as the estate’s personal representative.3 The Frantzes
drove from Ohio to Colorado to tend to Baker’s affairs.
¶3 A few years before her death, Baker had shown her friend,
June Justice, whom she had met through church and had known
for years, the location of a steel box in her home, which was hidden
in a workshop closet and contained Baker’s will and other
important papers. Baker also gave Justice a key to her residence.
Shortly after Baker’s death, Justice and Brian West, an elder in
Baker’s congregation, used the key to enter Baker’s home.4 They
found the steel box, but it was locked and they couldn’t find the
key. The next day, West used a drill to open the box. The box
contained Baker’s will, important documents, and about $25,000 in
cash. Justice and West didn’t inventory the box’s contents, but
Justice made copies of the will and returned the original to West.
3 Because the Frantzes share the same surname, we will refer to
George H. Frantz III as “Frantz” and to his mother as “Susan” to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect by the informality. 4 Justice and West had known Baker for decades and were
members of the same church congregation. West served as a church elder and, as detailed below, as Frantz’s point of contact for some of the communications he had with Watchtower.
2 ¶4 The will was executed on August 8, 1975. The will’s named
devisees (Baker’s husband and her parents) and Baker’s nominees
for personal representatives had all died. Watchtower was the only
remaining beneficiary. West sent Watchtower a copy of the will.
¶5 The court appointed Frantz as the estate’s personal
representative. Frantz called Laura Frazier, a legal secretary for
Watchtower, in February 2018 to inform Watchtower of his
appointment and to discuss Baker’s estate. The conversation was
memorialized in a letter that Watchtower’s general counsel sent
Frantz on February 23, 2018, which confirmed that Watchtower
was a beneficiary of and had received a copy of the will.5 The letter
also asked Frantz for the estate’s accounting and inventory and
provided Frantz with Watchtower’s tax information. The letter was
addressed to Frantz’s home, but he testified that he didn’t receive it.
Frantz didn’t send Watchtower the estate’s accounting or inventory.
¶6 Frantz began administering the estate as if Baker had died
intestate. He filed a notice in a local newspaper to put estate
creditors on notice and listed Baker’s home for sale. He informed
5 During his testimony, Frantz denied discussing the will.
3 Watchtower of the sale. After he sold Baker’s home and liquidated
her estate, Frantz distributed the proceeds to Baker’s intestate
heirs — Susan and James Tipton (another of Baker’s cousins).
Frantz also retained some funds as compensation for estate
administration.6 He did not distribute any proceeds to Watchtower.
¶7 On March 25, 2019, Frantz filed a “Statement of Personal
Representative Closing Administration,” verifying that he had
distributed the estate’s assets to those entitled to receive
distributions (Susan and Tipton) in the appropriate amounts. The
statement didn’t mention Watchtower.
¶8 Between September 2018 and May 2019, Watchtower sent
Frantz at least four letters asking about the estate’s probate status.
Watchtower never received a response. Frantz testified that he
never received any of these letters even though they were all
addressed to his home. Watchtower also called Frantz multiple
times and left messages, but Frantz denied receiving any phone
calls.
6 The accounting prepared during litigation showed that Susan
received $770,619.75 and Tipton received $263,282.96 from the estate’s proceeds. Frantz paid himself $26,282.96 in compensation.
4 ¶9 In April 2020, Watchtower conducted its own investigation and
realized that Baker’s house had been sold in April 2018.
Watchtower sent another letter to Frantz on April 14, 2020,
requesting a copy of the closing statement for the sale of Baker’s
residence and an estate accounting.
¶ 10 After years of no response from Frantz, Watchtower contacted
the probate court and received the case file for the estate on April 7,
2022. Watchtower discovered that Frantz had not complied with
Baker’s will and had instead administered the estate as if Baker
had died intestate. In August 2022, Watchtower filed a motion to
intervene and reopen the estate. Frantz didn’t respond. The court
granted the motion to intervene but didn’t enter any findings
regarding the validity of the will or whether the estate should be
reopened for redistribution.
¶ 11 On January 24, 2023, Watchtower moved to appoint a
successor personal representative and to probate the will. Frantz
didn’t respond, and the court granted the motion, appointing the
current successor personal representative in March 2023.
¶ 12 In September 2023, the successor personal representative filed
the underlying petition and asserted claims against Frantz for
5 (1) breach of fiduciary duty under the Colorado Probate Code;
(2) conversion; (3) civil theft; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) fraud (false
representation); (6) fraud (nondisclosure or concealment); (7) fraud
(nondisclosure – duty to disclose); and (8) fraudulent transfer.
Frantz moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim and
for being untimely. The district court denied the motion to dismiss
after concluding that the claims were alleged with sufficient
particularity and that the applicable statute of limitations was five
years under section 15-10-106, C.R.S. 2025. After a one-day
evidentiary hearing on the petition, the court dismissed the claims
for conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, fraud (false
representation), and fraudulent transfer. The court entered
judgment in Watchtower’s favor on the remaining two fraud claims
and the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Frantz appeals.
II. Analysis
¶ 13 Frantz contends that the district court erred by finding that
(1) West and Frazier were not Watchtower’s agents; (2) Watchtower
wasn’t on notice that Baker’s estate was being administered
contrary to her will until Watchtower received the probate court’s
case file on or about April 7, 2022; and (3) Frantz breached his
6 fiduciary duty. We address and reject each of these contentions in
turn.
A. Agency
¶ 14 Frantz first argues that the district court erroneously found
that there was no agency connection between individual church
members that would bind Watchtower or otherwise impair its legal
rights. In support, Frantz asserts that West was Watchtower’s
agent based on the following: West sent Watchtower a copy of the
will, he was a church elder, and he put Frantz in contact with
Watchtower. Similarly, he contends that Frazier was an agent
because she worked for Watchtower, communicated with Frantz
about the estate, and tracked whether Watchtower had received
estate proceeds. Frantz contends that, because they were agents
and were aware in February 2018 that Frantz was administering
Baker’s estate, Watchtower was also aware, and any claims against
Frantz started accruing at that time. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 15 The question of agency is, when the facts are disputed, a
question of fact, Villalpando v. Denv. Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d
357, 363 (Colo. App. 2007); we will only set aside the court’s finding
on that question if it is clearly erroneous, Citywide Banks v. Armijo,
7 313 P.3d 647, 651 (Colo. App. 2011). A factual finding is clearly
erroneous only if there is no support for the finding in the record.
Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12. We will not
“reweigh [the] evidence” or substitute our own judgment for that of
the district court. In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22
(citation omitted).
¶ 16 An agent is generally one who acts for, or in place of, another
or who is entrusted with the business of another, and an agency
relationship carries legal consequences. Armijo, 313 P.3d at 651.
“An agent can make his principal responsible for his actions if he is
acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority.” First
Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d
166, 177 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260,
1264 (Colo. 1994)). An agent acts with actual authority when “the
agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s
manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so
to act.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 21
¶ 17 Ample evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that
West and Frazier were not agents because neither participated in
8 Watchtower’s financial, business, or legal matters. Similarly,
although Frantz points to evidence that West and Frazier were
aware that he was selling Baker’s residence and disposing of her
assets, he fails to demonstrate how that awareness established
either actual or apparent authority. Mere status as an elder or
secretary of Watchtower, standing alone, doesn’t confer authority to
bind Watchtower in any capacity. We therefore perceive no error
with the court’s finding that West and Frazier weren’t agents.
¶ 18 Even if West and Frazier had been Watchtower’s agents,
however, any error would have been harmless because there is no
evidence supporting Frantz’s argument that the statute of
limitations for Watchtower’s claims began running in February
2018. As discussed below, nothing would have put West and
Frazier or Watchtower on notice that Frantz was administering the
estate as if Baker had died intestate.
B. Statute of Limitations
¶ 19 Frantz next argues that the district court incorrectly
determined that the claims accrued on April 7, 2022, for purposes
of applying the statute of limitations. We disagree.
9 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 20 Because the accrual date is factually disputed, we review the
district court’s order for clear error. See Jackson v. Am. Fam. Mut.
Ins. Co., 258 P.3d 328, 332 (Colo. App. 2011) (when the material
facts are disputed, the question of when a claim accrued is one of
fact).
¶ 21 Section 15-10-106 states that
[w]henever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this code, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be commenced within five years after the discovery of the fraud.
“Integral to any statute of limitations is the time of accrual: the time
when the proverbial clock starts ticking and the statute of
limitations begins to run.” City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 2024 CO 5, ¶ 27 (citation omitted). A cause of action for
fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit accrues on the
date that the fraud “is discovered or should have been discovered by
10 the exercise of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(3), C.R.S. 2025.
Likewise, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty accrues
when the plaintiff has knowledge of facts that would put a
reasonable person on notice that the defendant engaged in wrongful
conduct causing some damages. Prospect Dev. Co. v. Holland &
Knight, LLP, 2018 COA 107, ¶ 26; see also § 13-80-108(8) (The
cause of action accrues “when the injury, loss, damage, or conduct
giving rise to the cause of action is discovered or should have been
discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”).
¶ 22 To establish a claim for fraud by nondisclosure, a plaintiff
must prove that (1) the concealment of a material existing fact that
in equity and good conscience the defendant should have disclosed;
(2) knowledge on the defendant’s part that such a fact was being
concealed; (3) ignorance of that fact on the plaintiff’s part; (4) the
intention that the concealment be acted upon; and (5) action on the
concealment resulting in damages. Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v.
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, 2018 CO 54, ¶ 56. To establish a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
defendant was acting as a fiduciary of the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) the
11 plaintiff incurred damages; and (4) the defendant’s breach of
fiduciary duty was a cause of the damages. In re Estate of Chavez,
2022 COA 89M, ¶ 36.
¶ 23 Watchtower’s fraud claims could not have accrued until
Watchtower knew, or should have known, that Frantz concealed or
failed to disclose a material fact. Likewise, Watchtower’s breach of
fiduciary duty claims could not have accrued until Watchtower had,
or should have had, knowledge that Frantz breached his personal
representative duty.
2. Analysis
¶ 24 The record supports the court’s conclusion that Watchtower
didn’t have notice — and couldn’t have reasonably discovered — the
alleged fraud or breach of fiduciary duty until April 7, 2022, when it
received the case file from the probate court. Before then, there was
no indication to Watchtower, West, or Frazier that Frantz was
administering the estate contrary to Baker’s will. Instead, they
reasonably relied on Frantz’s repeated representations that he was
administering the estate and that distribution of the estate’s assets
would be forthcoming, as required by the will.
12 ¶ 25 The record further reflects that Frantz’s conduct, at least
outwardly, was consistent with proper estate administration.
Frantz acted as the personal representative, sold Baker’s residence,
and informed Watchtower that he planned to distribute the
proceeds of the sale to Watchtower. Watchtower later confirmed
this discussion. Although Watchtower became aware around April
2020 that Baker’s house had been sold,7 based on the record,
Watchtower had no reason to believe that it wouldn’t receive the
proceeds from the sale. Further, nothing in the record indicated
that Watchtower knew or was told that Frantz didn’t open the will
for probate, that he failed to identify Watchtower as a beneficiary in
court filings, or that he had administratively closed the estate after
disbursing the sale proceeds to Susan and Tipton.
¶ 26 Likewise, Frantz didn’t serve Watchtower with the information
of appointment, didn’t provide a copy of the home’s closing
statement or accounting from the home sale, and testified that he
never informed Watchtower that he was administering the estate as
7 Even assuming the accrual date was April 2020, when
Watchtower learned the house had been sold, the claims are timely because they fall within the five-year statute of limitations.
13 intestate. On this record, there were no circumstances that would
have placed Watchtower on notice that Frantz breached a fiduciary
duty or engaged in fraud until Watchtower received the estate’s
court file on April 7, 2022. Accordingly, the district court did not
err by concluding that the accrual date was April 7, 2022.
¶ 27 To the extent Frantz’s testimony conflicted with the district
court’s findings, the court found that his testimony wasn’t credible.
We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and factual
findings. Owens, ¶ 22 (we may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute our judgment for the trial court’s). Given the absence of
notice and Watchtower’s reasonable reliance on Frantz’s
representations, we discern no clear error with the court’s
determination that the claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
accrued on April 7, 2022.
C. Other Issues
¶ 28 Frantz also contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support a fraud finding, and (2) the district court erroneously held
him to a professional standard of care by concluding that he
breached his fiduciary duty. However, these arguments are
presented in a conclusory manner and are unsupported by citation
14 to relevant legal authority. We won’t consider them further because
we do not consider undeveloped arguments on appeal. See Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2015 COA 135,
¶ 42.
D. Attorney Fees
¶ 29 Although Frantz requests an award of attorney fees on appeal,
we decline to award any for his failure to comply with C.A.R. 39.1,
which requires parties claiming attorney fees to “explain the legal
and factual basis” for such an award. See also Sos v. Roaring Fork
Transp. Auth., 2017 COA 142, ¶ 59 (declining to consider an
“undeveloped request” for attorney fees when the requesting party
failed to state any legal or factual basis for an award). Also, Frantz
didn’t prevail on appeal.
¶ 30 The Estate and Watchtower also request an award of attorney
fees and costs on appeal. “When a party is awarded attorney fees
for a prior stage of the proceedings, it may recover reasonable
attorney fees and costs for successfully defending the appeal.”
Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 75 (quoting
Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 390 (Colo. App. 2006)).
The Estate and Watchtower sought attorney fees for their successful
15 defense of the action in the district court, and the court granted
their request.8 In requesting fees on appeal, the Estate and
Watchtower argue that Frantz’s appeal is frivolous. We disagree;
Frantz raised a genuine issue regarding the accrual date.
¶ 31 Because the Estate and Watchtower successfully defended the
district court’s judgment on appeal, were awarded attorney fees by
the district court, and cited a legal and factual basis supporting the
award under C.A.R. 39.1, we grant their request. We remand the
case to the district court to determine and award the amount of
reasonable attorney fees and costs that the Estate and Watchtower
incurred on appeal.
8 Though not included as part of the record, we take judicial notice
of the district court’s “Order re Attorney Fees and Costs by WatchTower” and “Order: Granting Motion for Personal Representative’s Fees and Costs,” issued on May 21, 2025, which finalized the specific amount of attorney fees and costs payable to the Estate and Watchtower. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (appellate courts can take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding whether requested to do so or not).
16 III. Disposition
¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed. We remand the case to the district
court to determine appropriate appellate attorney fees for the Estate
and Watchtower.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.