Estate of Arnold Tollett v. Multilink Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006)

2006 Ohio 5055
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 29, 2006
DocketC.A. No. 06CA008866.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2006 Ohio 5055 (Estate of Arnold Tollett v. Multilink Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Arnold Tollett v. Multilink Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006), 2006 Ohio 5055 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: {¶ 1} Appellants, Multilink Inc., et al, appeal the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. We reverse.

I.
{¶ 2} This case arises out of a lease agreement between Multipower (nka Multilink)1 and Arnold Tollett and his wife, Jo Tollett (collectively known as "the Tolletts") for commercial property jointly owned by the Tolletts located at 561 Ternes Ave. in Elyria, Ohio. In 1998, the parties entered into a lease agreement under which Multipower agreed to pay the Tolletts $6500 per month to lease the commercial property. The lease agreement called for a six month term and stated that after the expiration of this six month period, the lease would continue from year-to-year upon the same terms and conditions, except that the parties would renegotiate the price.

{¶ 3} In June of 1999, the parties extended the agreement until June of 2000. Arnold Tollett fell ill in the Spring of 2000. Consequently, Mr. Tollett was unable to draft a writing to extend the parties' lease agreement. Multipower continued to occupy the property throughout this period despite the lack of an agreement extending their term. Appellants contend that in the Spring of 2000, they decided to downsize. Consequently, they no longer needed the entire building. Appellants assert that they informed Mr. Tollett of their situation and he ultimately orally agreed to (1) change the lease term to month-to-month and (2) reduce the rental rate to $4500 per month.

{¶ 4} Multipower began paying a reduced rent of $4500 per month, instead of the amount they had previously paid — $6500 per month. During the months of July, August, September, October, November, and December of 2000, and January 2001, the Tolletts received checks from Multilink, each in the amount of $4500. The July, August and September checks were made payable to Arnold Tollett while the remaining checks were made payable to Jo Tollett. The July, August and September checks were accepted by the Tolletts and cashed. Jo Tollett accepted and cashed the October and November checks for this reduced rate.

{¶ 5} Arnold Tollett passed away in September 2000. In December of 2000, Jo Tollett sent a letter to Multipower informing them that the lease agreement required them to pay $6500 per month. Multipower responded, asserting that the parties orally agreed to extend the lease from June of 2000 to June of 2001 at a reduced rate of $4500 per month. Multipower moved out of the building in January of 2001.

{¶ 6} Appellee, the Estate of Arnold Tollett, filed suit on October 18, 2002, alleging that Multilink breached its lease agreement with the Tolletts in 2000 by failing to tender the agreed rental amount of $6500 and by failing to tender monthly payments for the rental term of January 2001 to June 2001.2

{¶ 7} On September 24, 2003, the case proceeded to a bench trial. At the close of its case, Appellee moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court issued its decision on November 23, 2003, finding that Appellants owed Appellee $22,500.00. Appellants timely appealed the court's judgment. However, on February 4, 2005, this Court dismissed Appellants' appeal for lack of a final appealable order. Specifically, this Court found that the trial court had failed to affirmatively enter judgment in the amount it awarded to Appellee. On January 9, 2006, the trial court amended its November 21, 2003 order nunc pro tunc to make it a final appealable order. Appellants timely appealed the trial court's decision, raising two assignments of error for our review.

{¶ 8} This Court scheduled oral argument in this matter for September 7, 2006. On September 5, 2006, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with App.R. 18, or in the alternative, a motion for reconsideration of this Court's August 30, 2006 decision denying Appellee's motion for leave to file its brief instanter. Appellee contends that it was not properly served with Appellants' brief and thus did not file a responsive brief. Appellants filed a brief in opposition on September 6, 2006. In their brief, Appellants assert that the certificate of service attached to their appellate brief establishes that they properly served Appellee.

{¶ 9} There is a presumption that proper service exists when the record reflects that the Civil Rules pertaining to service of process have been followed. Potter v. Troy (1992),78 Ohio App.3d 372, 377. This Court finds that Appellants properly appended a certificate of service to their motion, certifying service by regular mail to Appellee on March 22, 2006. Therefore, Appellee's motions are denied.

{¶ 10} We have rearranged Appellants' assigned errors to facilitate our disposition thereof.

II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
"THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES HAD NOT ORALLY AGREED TO A MONTH-TO-MONTH LEASE."

{¶ 11} In their second assignment of error, Appellants claim that the trial court's decision that the parties had not orally agreed to a month-to-month lease was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.

{¶ 12} We review whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil context utilizing the same standard of review as that used in the criminal context.Frederick v. Born (Aug. 21, 1996), 9th Dist. No. 95CA006286, at *6. This Court must, therefore, review the entire record; weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences; consider the credibility of witnesses; and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v.Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340.

{¶ 13} Further, this Court has stated that it "will not reverse the judgment of the trial court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence if the judgment is based upon some competent, credible evidence that speaks to all of the material elements of the case." Morris v. Andros,158 Ohio App.3d 396, 2004-Ohio-4446, at ¶ 18. "This standard is highly deferential and even `some' evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment and prevent reversal." Bell v. Joecken (Apr. 10, 2002), 9th Dist. No. 20705, at *2.

{¶ 14} It is well established that "the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass (1967),10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, view their demeanor and weigh the evidence. Akron v. Portman, 9th Dist. No. 22921, 2006-Ohio-2856

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Potter v. City of Troy
604 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
Morris v. Andros
815 N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2004)
State v. Otten
515 N.E.2d 1009 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
City of Akron v. Portman, Unpublished Decision (6-7-2006)
2006 Ohio 2856 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2006)
State v. Dehass
227 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 5055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-arnold-tollett-v-multilink-inc-unpublished-decision-ohioctapp-2006.