THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Julia Mae Caldwell Anderson, Representative
of the Estate of Tonia LaQuita Anderson,
Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Mental Health,
Richland County Sheriffs Department, City of Columbia Police Department,
Defendants,
Of Whom South Carolina Department of Mental
Health is Respondent.
Appeal From Richland County
Jackson V. Gregory, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-095
Submitted November 20, 2002 Filed
February 4, 2003
AFFIRMED
Donald E. Jonas, of Columbia, for appellant.
S. Elizabeth Brosnan, Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., and William
C. McDow, all of Columbia, for respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Estate
of Tonia LaQuita Anderson (the Estate) appeals the trial courts dismissal
of its wrongful death suit against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health
(the Department). The trial court found the two-year statute of limitations
expired before the Estate filed its suit. The Estate appeals, asserting several
alleged errors. We affirm.
ISSUES
The Estate argues the trial court erred by: 1)
considering the Departments motion to dismiss because it was not properly presented
to the trial court; 2) converting the Departments motions to dismiss and for
judgment on the pleadings into one motion for summary judgment; 3) granting
the Departments motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of
limitations; and 4) considering the affidavits submitted by the Department without
first forcing the Department to comply with the Estates discovery requests.
FACTS
In its complaint, the Estate alleged the following
facts. On several occasions prior to Andersons death, Martin punched, kicked,
choked, and cut Anderson, purchased a pistol in violation of his status as a
convicted felon, threatened and battered his own family, and threatened Andersons
family. Twenty days before Anderson was murdered, Martin was arrested for stalking,
assault and battery, and malicious injury to personal property, all with respect
to Anderson.
Only seven days before Andersons murder, Martin
kidnapped Anderson. Following Andersons release, Martin was admitted to a
psychiatric hospital run by the Department, where he was treated for a period
of five days. This was at least the fourth time the Department treated Martin
prior to Andersons murder. During his treatment, Martin made specific threats
against Andersons life. Following his short treatment, the Department released
Martin without warning to Anderson. Four days later, on June 5, 1998, Martin
shot Anderson to death.
On June 6, 2000, the Estate filed a complaint for
wrongful death, claiming the Department was liable because its failure to warn
Anderson of Martins release was the proximate cause of Andersons death. Pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), SCRCP, the Department filed motions to dismiss
and for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the two-year statute of limitations
had expired before the Estate filed its wrongful death claim. The Department
filed and served affidavits in support of its motions approximately fifteen
days after it filed the motions and nearly seven months before the motions were
heard.
The trial court converted the 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
motions into a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Estates case,
finding the two-year statute of limitations expired before the Estate filed
its suit. The trial court also determined the Estates pending motion to compel
discovery was moot. The Estate appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss
Initially, the Estate appears to argue the trial
court should not have heard, or perhaps did not actually hear, the Departments
motion to dismiss at the same hearing where the trial court heard the motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, the Estate argues it was error for
the trial court to issue an order in which it seemingly ruled on a motion to
dismiss, which was never heard. This argument is without merit.
On July 3, 2000, the Department filed its answer
to the Estates amended complaint, asserting it was filing a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to SCRCP Rule 12 (b) . . . (6). (R. 24) Accompanying the Departments
answer was a separate motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. Both
of these documents were filed and served more than seven months before the motions
hearing.
Following the commencement of this lawsuit and
filing of the Departments motion to dismiss, the clerk of courts office transmitted
three notices to the parties regarding the motions hearing. Each of these notices
indicated that All Outstanding Motions would be heard at the scheduled hearing.
In addition, the Estates memorandum, submitted during the motions, hearing
specifically addressed the Departments motion to dismiss, which it now claims
was not properly before the trial court.
The record reflects the Estate knew the Departments
motion to dismiss was pending before the trial court prior to the motions hearing
and thus would be addressed at the hearing. Therefore, the Estate cannot now
claim the trial court did not actually hear or should not have heard the motion.
II. Conversion of Motions
The Estate argues the trial court erred in converting
the motions to dismiss and judgment on the pleadings into one for summary judgment.
We disagree.
When supported by materials outside the pleadings,
and relied on by the trial court, both a motion to dismiss and for judgment
on the pleadings may be considered as a motion for summary judgment, pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), SCRCP. See Pitts v. Jackson Nat. Life
Ins. Co., Op. No. 3571 (Ct. App. filed Nov. 25, 2002) (Shearouse Adv. Sh.
No. 39 at 65, 68-69) (holding motions to dismiss, supported by matters outside
the pleadings and relied on by the trial court, should be treated as motions
for summary judgment); Diminch v. 2001 Enterprises, Inc., 292 S.C. 141,
142, 355 S.E.2d 275, 275 (Ct. App. 1987) ([M]otions for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c), SCRCP, can be considered as motions for summary judgment.).
However, before the trial court may convert the motion to one for summary judgment,
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion. Rule 12(b)(6), (c), SCRCP.
The Department filed and served affidavits in support
of its motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings approximately fifteen
days after it filed the motions and nearly seven months before the trial court
heard the motions. In the Departments motion to dismiss, it specifically stated
the motion will be based upon the pleadings, depositions, any furnished
affidavits . . . and such other evidence as may be acceptable to the Court.
During the motions hearing, the Department presented testimony contained within
its affidavits. The trial court referred to the Departments affidavits when
issuing its order dismissing the Estates suit. In addition, more than eight
months passed between the motions hearing and the issuance of the trial courts
order.
Therefore, the Estate had ample time to provide
any supporting materials in accordance with Rule 56, SCRCP, and cannot now claim
prejudice from the trial court having converted the Departments motions to
dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment. See
Pitts (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 39 at 65, 69) (holding the parties had
ample opportunity to introduce additional evidentiary material where the trial
court issued its order six months after a memorandum containing supplementary
material was filed; thus, the trial court did not err in converting the motion
to dismiss into one for summary judgment).
III. Statute of Limitations
The Estate argues the trial court erred in granting
the motion for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations
because it was unaware it had a potential claim against the Department until
approximately eight months after Andersons murder. We disagree.
In determining whether summary judgment is proper,
this [C]ourt must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 344 S.C. 280, 285,
543 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when
it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Columbia v. ACLU
of South Carolina, 323 S.C. 384, 386, 475 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1996).
South Carolina Code Annotated section 15-78-100(a)
(Supp. 2001) states any action brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act (the Act) is forever barred unless commenced within two years after the
loss was or should have been discovered. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110
(Supp. 2001). For purposes of the Act, loss includes death. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f) (Supp. 2001). In determining when the loss was discovered,
the trial court must use an objective, not subjective standard. See
Joubert v. South Carolina Dept of Soc. Servs., 341 S.C. 176, 191, 534
S.E.2d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2000).
Although the Estate concedes the two-year statute
of limitations applies, it argues the statute should not have begun to run until
approximately eight months after Andersons murder because it was at that time
the Estate learned of its potential claim against the Department. Under the
Estates theory, this Court would have to adopt a discovery rule in which the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of the
negligence on the part of a particular defendant.
However, our supreme court has previously rejected
a similar argument, stating the significant date under the discovery rule is
the date of discovery of the injury, not the date of discovery of the
wrongdoer. Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 128, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170
(1994) (emphasis added). According to our supreme courts decision in Wiggins,
the statute of limitations runs from the time a party is on notice that some
right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might
exist . . . not when advice of counsel is sought or a full-blown theory of recovery
[is] developed. Id. at 128, 442 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting Snell v.
Columbia Gun Exch., Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 303, 278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1981));
see also Bayle v. South Carolina Dept of Transp., 344 S.C. 115,
122, 542 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding the date of loss for purposes
of the Act was the date on which the plaintiff knew of the injury).
The record reflects the Estate knew of its loss,
Andersons murder, on June 5, 1998. As mentioned above, the Estate concedes
the two-year statute of limitations applies. Finally, the record establishes
the Estate filed its complaint on June 6, 2000, two years and one day after
Andersons murder. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired before the
Estate filed its claim, and the trial courts order dismissing its claim was
without error.
IV. Motion to Compel
The Estate further argues the trial court erred
in denying its motion to compel discovery and in considering the affidavits
submitted by the Department without first forcing the Department to comply with
the Estates discovery requests. This argument is without merit.
The record clearly establishes the Estate filed
its complaint on June 6, 2000, two years and one day after Andersons murder.
Thus, even without reference to the Departments affidavits, a sufficient basis
existed upon which to properly determine the two-year statute of limitations
had expired. Therefore, forcing the Department to submit to discovery would
not have aided the trial court in determining whether to grant summary judgment
based on the statute of limitations. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Richland
County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 441, 567 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2002) (holding appellant
has no right to discovery where discovery would not aid the trial court in rendering
its decision whether to grant summary judgment); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 128-29,
542 S.E.2d at 742-42 (holding the trial court did not err by granting summary
judgment without allowing for additional discovery where no further discovery
would have contributed to the resolution of the case).
Furthermore, a trial courts rulings on discovery
matters will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 502, 381 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1989) (emphasis
added). The burden is upon the party appealing from the order to demonstrate
the trial court abused its discretion. Belk of Spartanburg, S.C., Inc.
v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 127, 522 S.E.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1999). Moreover,
[m]ere allegations of error are not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994).
Given this Courts limited standard of review with respect to discovery matters,
and because the Estate merely alleges an abuse of discretion, the Estate has
failed to affirmatively prove the trial court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial courts order
dismissing the Estates wrongful death action and finding the Estates motion
to compel was moot was without error, and therefore, is
AFFIRMED. [1]
CONNOR, STILWELL, and HOWARD, JJ., concur.
[1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving
any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.