Estate of Aaron Daniel Bonin, et al. v. County of San Diego, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 3:23-cv-02158
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF AARON DANIEL BONIN, Case No.: 23cv2158-LL-MSB et al., 12 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT Plaintiffs, 13 JOY DAVID’S MOTION TO v. DISMISS THIRD AMENDED 14 COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 15 FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL Defendants. PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) 16

17 [ECF No. 87] 18 19 20 21 Before the Court is Defendant Joy David’s (“David” or “Defendant”) Motion to 22 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss” or “Motion”). ECF No. 87. Plaintiff Barbara Brisson, 24 individually and as successor in interest to the Estate of Aaron Daniel Bonin, filed an 25 opposition to the Motion, to which Defendant replied. ECF Nos. 89, 90. The Court finds 26 this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated 28 below, the Court DENIES David’s Motion to Dismiss. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The parties are well versed in the factual and procedural history of this case. On 3 September 1, 2022, Aaron Daniel Bonin (“Mr. Bonin”) was transferred from the 4 Department of State Hospitals forensic psychiatric facility in Patton, California to the San 5 Diego Central Jail (the “Jail”) for civil commitment reconsideration proceedings. ECF 6 No. 80 (“Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC”) ¶ 31. Mr. Bonin suffered from severe 7 mental illness and had been civilly committed for over a decade. Id. ¶ 2. He also suffered 8 from health conditions, including renal disease, which required dialysis two to three times 9 per week and a “renal diet.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 34. 10 On September 26, 2022, Mr. Bonin’s potassium level was 6.4 mmol/L, which is 11 “critically high,” and he was taken to the hospital for dialysis because the machines at the 12 Jail were not working. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges that beginning on October 17, 2022, staff 13 at the Jail allowed Mr. Bonin to have a normal diet instead of a renal diet. Id. ¶ 37–39. On 14 October 19 or 20, Mr. Bonin’s bloodwork again revealed a dangerously high blood 15 potassium level: 6.3–6.4 mmol/L. Id. ¶ 41. Medical staff treated Mr. Bonin with dialysis 16 on October 21, but his dialysis was cut short that day. Id. ¶ 45. Mr. Bonin’s potassium 17 levels were not retested, and he did not receive dialysis, after October 21. Id. ¶ 74–75. 18 Mr. Bonin fell ill on the night of October 23, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 37–43, 84. At around 10:00 19 p.m. that evening, a nurse was asked by a deputy to check on Mr. Bonin. Id. ¶ 89. She 20 found him lying on the floor, and he told her: “I feel like I am having hypotension.” Id. 21 The nurse checked Mr. Bonin’s blood pressure, and after confirming his levels were 22 “okay,” she left. Id. Mr. Bonin continued to feel unwell and a few hours later he called out 23 for help, begging to go to the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 91–92. Throughout the night, Mr. Bonin’s 24 pleas were ignored. Id. ¶¶ 97–100. 25 Mr. Bonin’s cries for help “fell silent around 3:00 a.m. on October 24, 2022.” 26 Id. ¶ 102. While conducting routine safety checks, deputies found Mr. Bonin unresponsive 27 on the floor of his cell around 3:16 a.m. that morning. Id. ¶ 105. Life-saving efforts were 28 employed, and medical staff arrived at 3:23 a.m. Id. ¶ 106. Fire Department personnel 1 responded at around 3:31 a.m., and Mr. Bonin was taken and admitted to the University of 2 California, San Diego – Hillcrest hospital in critical condition. Id. ¶¶ 108, 128. 3 In the emergency room, Mr. Bonin’s blood potassium level was recorded at 4 8.0 mmol/L. Id. ¶ 130. According to medical records, Mr. Bonin had suffered cardiac arrest 5 and “had been down for approximately ten minutes prior to deputies beginning CPR.” 6 Id. ¶ 129. A subsequent MRI revealed “diffuse hypoxic ischemic injury, which is a brain 7 injury that results from prolonged lack of oxygen.” Id. ¶ 131. Mr. Bonin was pronounced 8 dead on November 1, 2022. Id. ¶ 132. 9 Plaintiff is Mr. Bonin’s mother, see id. ¶ 9, and she brings this action challenging 10 the actions and inactions of various individuals during the time that Mr. Bonin was at the 11 Jail. In the TAC, Plaintiff alleges the following six claims: (1) as successor in interest, for 12 deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983; (2) as an individual, for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due 14 process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) as an individual, for deliberate indifference in 15 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Monell; (4) as an individual, for 16 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process, pursuant to Monell; (5) as 17 successor in interest, for violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 52.1; and (6) as an 18 individual for wrongful death. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 20 Rule 12(b)(6)1 permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint 21 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” generally referred to as a motion 22 to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and 23 sufficient facts in light of Rule 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the 24 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require 25 ‘detailed factual allegations,’” it does require “more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 26 27 1 The term “Rule” refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 28 1 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A “formulaic recitation of the 3 elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor 4 does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 5 enhancement.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 6 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 7 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 8 party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 9 Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 10 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 11 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 12 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court also need not accept as true allegations that 13 contradict matter properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits 14 attached to the complaint. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. 15 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 16 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 17 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pleaded “allow[] 18 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 19 alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that 20 the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 21 defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 22 When a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the 23 court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 24 could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 25 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 26 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Court may deny leave to amend where an amendment 27 would be futile. Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658 (citation omitted). 28 / / / 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 As a preliminary matter, the Court briefly recounts the history of this case. The 3 operative complaint before the Court is Plaintiff’s fourth pleading. Plaintiff’s initial 4 Complaint [ECF No. 1] and First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 37] were challenged by 5 motions to dismiss [ECF Nos. 19, 24, 38, 39]. The Court granted in part the motions in two 6 prior dismissal orders, which the Court incorporates by reference here. ECF Nos. 36 (the 7 “First Dismissal Order”) and 52 (the “Second Dismissal Order”). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed 8 her Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 60] to which the remaining named defendants 9 answered [ECF No. 61]. Then, on the deadline to seek leave to amend, Plaintiff filed her 10 Third Amended Complaint, naming previously unidentified defendants, such as David. See 11 ECF Nos. 76, 80. Although David has only just been named as a defendant in this case, 12 Plaintiff previously pleaded claims against him as Medical Provider Doe 1, a nurse working 13 at the Jail in October 2022. TAC ¶ 21. David now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate 14 indifference (Claim 1), substantive due process (Claim 2), and Bane Act (Claim 5) claims 15 against him. ECF No. 87 at 4–7.2 David also challenges Plaintiff’s claim for punitive 16 damages. Id. at 7–9. The Court addresses his arguments in turn. 17 A. Deliberate Indifference (Claim 1) 18 First, David moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. While he 19 recognizes that Plaintiff’s claim is pleaded pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, he 20 nevertheless appears to apply the Eighth Amendment’s subjective standard. ECF No. 87 at 21 4 n.3, 5. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her claim is governed by the Fourteenth 22 Amendment’s objective standard. ECF No. 89 at 13. 23 In the First Dismissal Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s allegations did not 24 sufficiently make clear whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment applied to her 25 deliberate indifference claim. ECF No. 36 at 8–9. At that time, the Court assumed based 26 27 2 Citations to page numbers in docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number 28 1 on Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint and arguments against dismissal that Mr. Bonin 2 was not a pretrial detainee and therefore that the Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate 3 indifference standard applied “for the limited purpose of resolving the present motion to 4 dismiss.” Id. at 9. Then, because Plaintiff expressly pleaded in her First Amended 5 Complaint that the Fourteenth Amendment’s objective deliberate indifference standard 6 applied to civilly committed individuals, such as Mr. Bonin, in the Second Dismissal Order 7 the Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment standard to her claim, again “for the limited 8 purpose of resolving the present motion to dismiss.” ECF No. 52 at 6 n.3. The Court 9 observed, however, that the issue remained unresolved. Id. 10 Based upon Plaintiff’s pleading and opposition, the Court again presumes that the 11 Fourteenth Amendment provides the relevant standard for Plaintiff’s deliberate 12 indifference claim. TAC ¶ 178; ECF No. 89 at 13. And again, the Court reminds the parties 13 that they should be prepared to put forth evidence and argument on this issue at summary 14 judgment. 15 The elements of a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim are: 16 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions 17 under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff 18 at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 19 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 20 involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 21

22 Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 23 According to Plaintiff, David was as a dialysis nurse for Mr. Bonin at the Jail on 24 October 21, 2022. TAC ¶¶ 21, 55. On that day, Mr. Bonin “insisted upon ending his dialysis 25 early—a little over three hours into it.” Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff alleges that David did not properly 26 counsel Mr. Bonin on the risks of ending dialysis early. Id. ¶ 67. Further, David allegedly 27 ended Mr. Bonin’s dialysis early despite knowing from the medical records that Mr. Bonin 28 was under an Involuntary Medication Order (“IMO”) and had been refusing to take 1 medication for his psychiatric conditions. Id. ¶ 57. She also pleads that David was aware 2 that Mr. Bonin’s potassium level would still be dangerously elevated as a result of ending 3 dialysis early and that failing to dialyze Mr. Bonin to a normal potassium level was life- 4 threatening. Id. ¶¶ 59, 71. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that David failed to enter any 5 notes regarding his encounter with Mr. Bonin that day and therefore failed to properly 6 notify other medical staff that Mr. Bonin had refused to complete treatment. Id. ¶¶ 61–63, 7 68–69. She pleads that David was required to refer Mr. Bonin to be seen by a physician or 8 psychiatrist for refusing treatment by scheduling a “sick call” but David similarly failed to 9 do so. Id. ¶¶ 64–65. According to Plaintiff, David knew that by failing to update 10 Mr. Bonin’s medical record, staff would not have the necessary information to properly 11 treat Mr. Bonin and that he could die as a result of a lack of continuity of care. Id. ¶ 72. 12 Moreover, Plaintiff contends that David never re-tested Mr. Bonin’s potassium levels after 13 dialysis that day and he never attempted to provide Mr. Bonin with further dialysis. Id. 14 ¶¶ 74–75. 15 The Court finds these allegations sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment 16 deliberate indifference claim. Accepting these facts as true, David knew Mr. Bonin’s 17 potassium levels were critically high when he presented for dialysis on October 21 and yet 18 David made the intentional decision to end Mr. Bonin’s dialysis early. Although it was Mr. 19 Bonin who insisted on ending early, David was aware Mr. Bonin was under an IMO and 20 being treated for psychiatric conditions. Further, David, as a nurse, was aware that 21 Mr. Bonin faced a serious risk of harm or death if his blood was not dialyzed to a normal 22 potassium level. David failed to take reasonable measures to abate this risk: David did not 23 update Mr. Bonin’s records to reflect he had not completed treatment and did not schedule 24 a “sick call” based on Mr. Bonin’s refusal to do so. According to Plaintiff, David knew that 25 medical staff would not be able to properly care for Mr. Bonin without knowing he had not 26 been properly dialyzed. It is plausible on this record that a reasonable nurse under these 27 circumstances would have appreciated the high risk of injury or death by ending Mr. 28 Bonin’s dialysis early and failing to update his medical records accordingly. For this 1 reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly pleads facts in support of her Fourteenth 2 Amendment deliberate indifference claims and therefore DENIES David’s Motion. 3 B. Substantive Due Process (Claim 2) 4 David also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s second claim, for violation of her 5 substantive due process rights. ECF No. 87 at 2 (requesting that the Court dismiss 6 Plaintiff’s second cause of action); id. at 87-1 at 2 (same). However, substantively, David 7 does not argue this claim is subject to dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff 8 adequately pleads her substantive due process claim. As the Court explained in its prior 9 Dismissal Orders, “[t]he substantive due process right to family integrity or to familial 10 association is well established.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 11 2011); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that 12 “the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the existence of a constitutional right to the 13 maintenance of a parent-child relationship” and that “a parent has a constitutionally 14 protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child”); James v. 15 Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 16 Clause protects parents’ well-established liberty interest in the companionship, care, 17 custody, and management of [their] children.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 18 omitted). “[A] parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth 19 Amendment in the companionship and society of his or her child . . . ,” Ochoa v. City of 20 Mesa, 26 F.4th 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) (alteration in original), and 21 “[a] state may not interfere with this liberty interest,” Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1079 (citing 22 Kelson, 767 F.2d at 655). To amount to a violation of substantive due process the harmful 23 conduct must “shock[ ] the conscience” or “offend the community’s sense of fair play and 24 decency.” Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). The appropriate 25 test to determine whether a state actor’s conduct “shocks the conscience” turns on whether 26 the officers had time to deliberate their conduct. Ochoa, 26 F.4th at 1056. The deliberate 27 indifference test applies if the situation at issue “evolve[d] in a time frame that permits the 28 officer to deliberate before acting.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008); 1 see also Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). Alternatively, the purpose- 2 to-harm test applies if the situation at issue “escalate[d] so quickly that the officer [had to] 3 make a snap judgment.” Id. 4 Here, Plaintiff’s pleading of the circumstances involving David do not illustrate a 5 quickly evolving situation requiring him to make a snap judgment and, accepting Plaintiff’s 6 allegations as true, David “had adequate time to reflect and reason prior to acting or failing 7 to act.” TAC ¶ 189. The Court therefore considers the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleading 8 under the deliberate indifference standard. As discussed, Plaintiff alleges that David knew 9 Mr. Bonin’s blood potassium level was dangerously high and that he was suffering from 10 psychiatric conditions requiring an IMO. Despite being aware of Mr. Bonin’s condition, 11 David ended Mr. Bonin’s dialysis early without updating his medical records to reflect as 12 much or schedule a “sick call” as was required based upon Mr. Bonin’s failure to complete 13 treatment. According to Plaintiff, David as a nurse knew that by failing to dialyze Mr. 14 Bonin to normal potassium levels and failing to update Mr. Bonin’s records to reflect that 15 he had not been properly dialyzed, Mr. Bonin could die. These allegations, if true, plausibly 16 rise to the requisite level to state a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. 17 Consequently, to the extent David seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s second claim, the Court 18 DENIES his Motion. 19 C. Bane Act Claim (Claim 5) 20 Next, David asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth claim, for violation of the Bane 21 Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 52.1. The Bane Act provides a private cause of action against anyone 22 who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, 23 intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by an individual or individuals of 24 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or laws and rights secured 25 by the Constitution or laws of California.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a); see also Reese v. Cnty. 26 of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Bane Act “protects 27 individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state 28 law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, intimidation or coercion’”) (quoting 1 Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). Many 2 district courts have recognized that allegations of “a defendant’s deliberate indifference to 3 a plaintiff’s serious medical needs suffices to state a claim under the Bane Act because of 4 the coercion, or specific intent, inherent in the deliberate indifference standard.” Greer 5 v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 3:19-CV-0378-GPC-AGS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29224, at *27 6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021) (collecting cases). 7 Here, David argues that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is subject to dismissal because it 8 is reliant on her claim for deliberate indifference, which fails. ECF No. 87 at 7. However, 9 the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate 10 indifference claim against David and for this reason her claim under the Bane Act survives 11 dismissal as well. Accordingly, the Court DENIES David’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 12 Bane Act claim. 13 D. Punitive Damages 14 Finally, David asks the Court to dismiss or strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive 15 damages. ECF No. 87 at 7–8. He argues that courts may dismiss a request for punitive 16 damages pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where they are not available as a matter of law. Id. 17 However, “[a] growing number of district courts have concluded that Rule 12(b)(6) is 18 generally inapplicable to damage prayers.” Mata v. Digit. Recognition Network, Inc., 19 No. 21-CV-1485 JLS (BLM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54857, at *23-24 (S.D. Cal. 20 Mar. 25, 2022) (citing Sturm v. Rasmussen, Case No.: 18-CV-01689-W-BLM, 2019 U.S. 21 Dist. LEXIS 24504, 2019 WL 626167, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) (collecting cases)); 22 see also Mora v. City of Chula Vista, No. 20cv779-GPC(AGS), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23 176651, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2021) (noting a split among district courts since the 24 Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 25 2010)). In any event, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages 26 “is not appropriate and should be dismissed or stricken from the [Third Amended] 27 Complaint.” ECF No. 87 at 8. Here, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in connection with 28 her constitutional violation claims. TAC ¶¶ 185, 193, 207, 213. To recover punitive 1 ||damages against an individual under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the 2 || officer’s conduct is “mitigated by evil motive or intent” or “involves reckless or callous 3 indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 4 ||(1983). The Ninth Circuit has further explained that “the standard for punitive damages 5 ||under [Section] 1983 mirrors the standard for punitive damages under common law tort 6 || cases,” which extends to “malicious, wanton, or oppressive acts or omissions.” Dang 7 Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Wade, 461 U.S. at 49). 8 Plaintiff alleges David knew Mr. Bonin’s potasstum levels were dangerously high 9 ||such that Mr. Bonin could die if he was not dialyzed and yet David ended Mr. Bonin’s 10 |/dialysis early, failed to update the medical records so that other staff would know 11 Bonin had not been properly dialyzed, and never re-tested Mr. Bonin’s potassium 12 levels or attempted to dialyze him again. These allegations, if true, plausibly support a 13 ||finding that David’s actions and inactions were at least recklessly indifferent to 14 || Mr. Bonin’s rights. For this reason, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff's request for 15 punitive damages is inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court DENIES David’s Motion to 16 || dismiss or strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. 17 || IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES David’s Motion to Dismiss. 19 || David must file an answer to the Third Amended Complaint on or before April 9, 2026. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: March 26, 2026 NO 22 QF 3 Honorable Linda Lopez 54 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28