Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United States

31 Cust. Ct. 149, 1953 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 925
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 30 Cust. Ct. 111
United States Customs Court·Decided November 27, 1953·No. C. D. 1562·Published

Opinion

MollisoN, Judge:

This is a protest filed pursuant to section 514, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1514) whereby plaintiff challenges the action of the collector of customs at the port of New York in classifying for duty under paragraph 1 of the said tariff act an imported material known as naphthenic acid. An additional assessment of % cent per gallon imposed under section 3422 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U. S. C. § 3422), as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 51802, under a provision for “all liquid derivatives of crude petroleum” is not challenged, but plaintiff claims that the proper classification under the tariff act is under the free list provisions in paragraph 1733 for refined petroleum, or for distillates obtained from petroleum.

For convenient reference, there are set forth in the margin the pertinent portions of the paragraph under which plaintiff claims and those under which each of the assessments of duty was made.1

The position of the defendant, and the theory behind the assessment of duty upon the merchandise under the provision for acids, appears to be that the merchandise in its imported condition is a new product, an acid, created by chemical action between a byproduct of the proc[151]*151esses of distilling and refining petroleum and a substance or substances other than petroleum.

The position of the plaintiff appears to be that the naphthenic acid in controversy is not a new product made from petroleum, or a byproduct thereof, but is, in substance, a product extracted from petroleum by processes of distillation and refining. It asserts that these are the normal processes by which the components of petroleum are ■segregated and refined and that the components thus separated are the “distillates obtained from petroleum,” and/or the “petroleum, * * * refined,” described and provided for in paragraph 1733, supra.

The parties have joined issue on this basis. In addition to the rather ample record in the case at bar, defendant moved the incorporation, as part of the record in this case, of the record in the case of Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, Inc., et al. v. United States, 28 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 155, C. A. D. 138, which, in turn, had incorporated as part thereof the record in United States, v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, Inc., 26 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 132, C. A. D. 6.

Our rules authorize the incorporation of a record in another case “When a case * * * under consideration * * * involves questions of law and fact substantially the same in character as were involved in another case which has been previously decided, or tried and submitted to the court for decision.” We have no hesitation in ruling that there is such similarity between the case at bar and the incorporated case as to warrant the exercise of our discretion to incorporate the record in the Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, Inc., et al. case pursuant to the motion of defendant’s counsel.

However, no effort was made by the moving party to establish that the merchandise in the case at bar and that in the incorporated case were the same. We cannot find that they are the same merely because each was called naphthenic acid, in the face of evidence establishing that there is a variety of such acids. The record in the incorporated case is properly before us, but we cannot assume that the evidence therein, which describes the characteristics and properties of the merchandise in that case, necessarily applies to the merchandise in the instant case. Defendant did not establish such identity.

A review of the entire record in the case at bar shows that naph-thenic acids occur as one of the natural constituent parts in almost all types of crude petroleum, but that it is economically feasible to recover them from only certain crudes, of which one is the particular crude which was the source material of the merchandise at bar. Two steps were involved in separating the naphthenic acid at bar from the crude oil that was taken from the earth. In the distillation of the crude petroleum in Aruba, Netherlands West Indies, from whence the imported merchandise came, the naphthenic acid in controversy came [152]*152off the still, combined with that fraction of distilled petroleum known as gas oil. This was the first step.

Excessive naphthenic acid depreciates the value of gas oil as a fuel, but, conversely, naphthenic acid alone is valuable for a variety of uses. It serves as a dryer in paint. A more recent and possibly significant use is in the manufacture of napalm, or jellied gasoline, an ingredient in the preparation of incendiary bombs and shells.

In the second step, following the distillation process, the so-called gas oil feed stock (the combination of gas oil and naphthenic acid) was placed in a dilute aqueous solution of caustic soda. The quantity of caustic soda used was designedly insufficient to neutralize completely all the naphthenic acid present. The mixture was agitated with air and allowed to settle. The gas oil, being the lighter component of the mixture, settled on top of the heavier so-called “aqueous phase,” and the two were mechanically separated.

The “aqueous phase” was placed in a tank to which was added dilute sulfuric acid. After mixing by blowing with air the solution was allowed to settle and separate into water and naphthenic acid. The water was discharged into a sewer and the naphthenic acid which remained was washed with water to remove mineral acids and soluble salts, transferred to another tank, and blown with air to drive off any water remaining.

The chief point of difference between the plaintiff and defendant concerns the physical and chemical situation which obtains in the so-called “aqueous phase.” On behalf of the plaintiff, it is urged that that phase upon separation from the gas oil contains essentially naphthenic acid and sodium hydroxide in equilibrium with sodium naphthenate and water; that the acidification of the aqueous phase with dilute sulfuric acid affects the equilibrium in such manner as to regenerate the original naphthenic acid.

On behalf of the defendant, it is urged that a chemical reaction took place in the process of separating the naphthenic acid from gas oil and involved a chemical union of naphthenic acid and caustic soda which resulted in sodium naphthenate and water; that when the sodium naphthenate was treated with sulfuric acid it necessarily followed that the naphthenic acid thus produced derived its hydrogen atom from the sulfuric acid and was, therefore, not the same material as was taken from the earth.

A similar argument was advanced by the defendant in the incorporated case and adopted by this tribunal as its reason for overruling the protest therein. Our judgment was affirmed on appeal. The brief of the plaintiff in this case is devoted largely to a technical explanation of the physical and chemical situation which obtained in the “aqueous phase” and its treatment, and arguments addressed to the fundamental proposition that the situation did not result in the destruction of one [153]*153naphthenic acid and the creation of another. Rather, it is contended, that the process was one of chemical separation of the various constituents of the aqueous phase which neither created nor destroyed any of them.

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Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 31 Cust. Ct. 149, 1953 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 925 (cusc 1953).

31 Cust. Ct. 149 (Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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