Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cheltenham Township Zoning Board of Adjustment

13 Pa. D. & C.2d 697, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 133
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County
DecidedDecember 9, 1957
Docketno. 26
StatusPublished

This text of 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 697 (Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cheltenham Township Zoning Board of Adjustment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cheltenham Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 697, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957).

Opinion

Gerber, J.,

Appellant, Esso Standard Oil Co., filed a petition with the Cheltenham Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, requesting permisson to demolish an existing gasoline service station, automobile service and repair facility at the Southeast corner of Central Avenue and Ashbourne Road and to replace same with a new, modern gasoline service station. The existing facilities are a nonconforming use in a “AA” residential district.

The board of adjustment considered the petition as an application for a special exception under section 1511(2) of the Zoning Ordinance of Cheltenham Township wherein it is provided that no structural change shall be made in any building used for a nonconforming use without its having been authorized as a special exception. The board considered that the [698]*698application was governed further by section 1511(5) as a change of use.

In accordance with the requirements of the ordinance notices of a hearing were sent to property owners in the area. The hearing was held before two of the three members of the board. The zoning board of adjustment refused the request, with one of the members who attended the meeting dissenting, whereupon the Esso Co. appealed to this court, contending that the board’s refusal to grant the special exception was unlawful, arbitrary, capricious and a manifest abuse of discretion. No additional testimony was taken before the court. The cause was argued before the court en banc on the record as it came up from the board of adjustment.

The testimony taken before the board of adjustment was very brief, being solely that of the representative of petitioner. He stated that the service station presently on the site was antiquated and it was the wish of petitioner to completely remove same and construct on the site a new modern service station; that the new station would conform with all municipal and State requirements. Plans were presented showing the present building and use of the site and showing the proposed building and proposed use of the site. It was apparent from the plans that no part of the old building would remain, the new building would be no higher than the old building, would cover less area and the over-all use both within and outside of the building would not involve any greater area of land.

At the time of the hearing the secretary of the board of adjustment asked if anyone was present who was interested in being heard and no one appeared. Thus it can be said that no one appeared to protest the request of applicant, nor did anyone file a written objection.

[699]*699The material portions of section 1511 of the Zoning Ordinance dealing with nonconforming uses, read as follows:

“1. Land: Any land, the existing lawful use of which at the time of passage of this Ordinance does not conform with the regulations of the district in which it is located, shall have such use considered a non-conforming use, which may continue on such land but shall be subject to the regulations covering non-conforming uses.
“2. Buildings: Any lawful building, or the lawful use of any building existing at the time of the passage of this Ordinance that does not conform to use, height, location, size or bulk with the regulations of the district in which it is located, shall be considered a nonconforming building or use, and may continue such use in its present location, but shall be subject to the regulations covering non-conforming uses. No structural alteration or change, other than such as has been ordered by an authorized public officer to assure the safety of the building, shall be made in any building used for a non-conforming use, without its having been authorized as a special exception.
“3. Change of use: A non-conforming building or use shall be considered as such unless and until it complies with the regulations of the district in which it is located. Such use shall not be changed to a use designated for a district having less restrictive regulations. . . .
“5. Change or resumption of non-conforming use: The Board of Adjustment shall have discretion to determine what resumption or change of non-conforming use is of the same class of use and permissible....”

The material findings of the board of adjustment are as follows:

“6. In addition to the present facilities of a gasoline service station, the operation in question also offers automobile repair services.
[700]*700“7. In the construction of its new building, the applicant proposes to do away with the automobile repair facilities and only oifer the services of a gasoline service station.
“8. The present auto repair facilities provide a much needed service in the community and constitute the primary use to which the property is put.
“9. Elimination of this service in the new building and conversion to only a gasoline service station will thus be detrimental to the welfare of the neighborhood.
“10. With the emphasis placed on the sale of gasoline and service, the public safety will also be affected by the increased flow of traffic into and out of the property in question, which property is located at the intersection of two narrow, highly traveled roads.
“11. It is the conclusion of the majority that applicant’s proposed change or resumption of use represents a change in the existing non-conforming use which is not permissible and which would be detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the residents of Cheltenham Township particularly those residing in this area.”

There is serious doubt as to whether the complete demolition of the building and erection of a totally new building constitutes a structural alteration or change in the building as contemplated by section 1511(2) of the ordinance. See Peirce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100 (1956).

Assuming that section 1511(2) applies, the case is controlled by the legal principles governing a special exception and appellant’s right to continue, expand and modernize its nonconforming use provided such use is not changed to a use designated for a district having less restrictive regulations.

On the subject of a change of use the board concludes that with the present facilities, the repairing of automobiles is the primary use even though there [701]*701are gasoline pumps which are operated as a gasoline service station. The board apparently finds that the new plans proposed to do away with the automobile repair facilities and only offer the services of a gasoline service station. Thus the board determines that applicant proposes a change of a nonconforming use which the board may refuse. This is not so. Section 1511(5) only empowers the board to determine what change of nonconforming use is of the same class of use and permissible. Section 1511(3) provides that a nonconforming use shall not be changed to a use designated for a district having less restrictive regulations. Thus the board, in determining under section 1511(5) whether a nonconforming use is being changed to a different class of use, must be guided by section 1511(3).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lord Appeal
81 A.2d 533 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
Davis Appeal
80 A.2d 789 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal
131 A.2d 587 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1957)
Borden Appeal
87 A.2d 465 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1952)
Firth v. Scherzberg
77 A.2d 443 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
HUMPHREYS v. Stuart Realty Corp.
73 A.2d 407 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1950)
Peirce Appeal
119 A.2d 506 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1956)
Cheswick Borough v. Bechman
42 A.2d 60 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1945)
White's Appeal
134 A. 409 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1926)
Molnar v. George B. Henne & Co.
105 A.2d 325 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1954)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
13 Pa. D. & C.2d 697, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/esso-standard-oil-co-v-cheltenham-township-zoning-board-of-adjustment-pactcomplmontgo-1957.