Essex Crane Rental Corp. of Alabama v. Millman Construction Co.

516 So. 2d 1130, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 11, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11730, 1987 WL 3018
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 22, 1987
DocketNo. 87-607
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 516 So. 2d 1130 (Essex Crane Rental Corp. of Alabama v. Millman Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Essex Crane Rental Corp. of Alabama v. Millman Construction Co., 516 So. 2d 1130, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 11, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11730, 1987 WL 3018 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

In an action by the owner of a large construction crane on a mechanic’s lien payment bond posted under section 713.23, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants, the contractor and surety, on the ground that the notice to contractor required by section 713.23(l)(d)1 had not been timely served. In so doing, the court held that the forty-five day period for the notice in question began to run in July, 1983, when unassembled pieces of the crane were delivered to the job site, rather than in early October, 1983, when the crane had been assembled and both was ready for use and was in fact employed in the construction process. We agree and affirm.

In our view, this result is compelled by a common sense reading of the statutory language which pegs the commencement of the period at the point of “beginning to furnish labor, materials, or supplies....” [e.s.] It is supported also by that portion of section 713.01(6)2 which provides that “[t]he delivery of materials to the site of the improvement shall be prima facie evidence of incorporation of such materials in the improvement.” On the other hand, we think that Essex’s reliance on that portion of section 713.01(6) which refers to the supplying of machinery “to the extent of the reasonable rental value for the period of actual use” is misplaced; this portion of the admittedly difficult subsection appears, however murkily, to refer to the amount of payment protected under the mechanic’s lien law rather than to the notice issue before us. Since the first notice was not given until October 17, 1983, more than forty-five days after the July date of first delivery which we have determined is deemed to have set the notice clock running, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered. See Oolite Indus., Inc. v. Millman Constr. Co., 501 So.2d 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (forty-five day notice period runs from first fabrication of special materials even though later actually incorporated into improvement), review denied, 509 So.2d 1118 (Fla.1987); see also Pilot Elec. Constr. Co. v. Waters, 384 So.2d 61 [1132]*1132(Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (forty-five day notice to owner provision begins from first commencement of work on project even though contractual arrangements were subsequently modified).

The lower court also awarded attorney’s fees for the successful defendants. Because, as the appellees forthrightly concede, no such fees are recoverable from a contractor like Millman, Julian E. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 408 So.2d 1044 (Fla.1982), and there is no other basis for recovery against the surety, see §§ 627.728(1), 627.756, Fla.Stat. (1988), this portion of the judgment under review is set aside.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

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Bluebook (online)
516 So. 2d 1130, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 11, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11730, 1987 WL 3018, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/essex-crane-rental-corp-of-alabama-v-millman-construction-co-fladistctapp-1987.