Escobedo v. Blessing-Co,Inc

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 12, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-00390·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JOSE ESCOBEDO, ) Case No.: 1:24-cv-0390 JLT SAB ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE FINDINGS ) AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING IN 13 v. ) PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT ) JUDGMENT, DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 14 BELSSINGS-CO, INC., et al., ) STATE LAW CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE, ) AND DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO 15 Defendants. ) CLOSE THE CASE ) 16 ) (Docs. 13, 18) ) 17

18 Jose Escobedo seeks default judgment against the defendants—including Blessing-Co, Inc; 19 Xiaohong Chen dba Moy’s Restaurant; Han Hong Li dba Moy’s Restaurant; Golden Tripod Restaurant 20 Group, LLC dba Noodle Q; and Golden Tripod Restaurant, LLC dba Noodle Q— for violating Title III 21 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. (See Docs. 1, 13.) For 22 the reasons set forth below, the motion for default judgment is granted in part. The Court finds default 23 judgment is appropriate for the claim arising under the ADA, but declines to exercise supplemental 24 jurisdiction and dismisses claims arising under state law without prejudice. 25 I. Relevant Background 26 Escobedo reports that he “suffers from rheumatoid arthritis which impairs his ability to move 27 his joints without pain, is substantially limited in his ability to walk requiring a cane for mobility, and 28 has limited dexterity due to arthritis and finger amputation.” (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 8.) He asserts that he 1 visited Moy’s Restaurant on June 14, 2023, and Noodle Q on June 15, 2023, intending to dine at the 2 facilities that are “less than ten miles” from his residence. (Id. at 3, ¶ 10.) Escobedo alleges he 3 “personally encountered barriers (both physical and intangible) that interfered with, if not outright 4 denied, [his] ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, privileges and accommodations offered” at the 5 facilities. (Id.; see also id. at 3-5.) Escobedo asserts that he “was, and continues to be, deterred from 6 visiting” the dining facilities because he knows the “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 7 and accommodations were and are unavailable to [him] due to [his] physical disabilities.” (Id. at 6, ¶ 8 12.) According to Escobedo, he will return to Moy’s Restaurant and Noodle Q “once the barriers are 9 removed” because he “enjoys the goods and services offered.” (Id.) Escobedo asserts Defendants 10 “possessed and enjoyed sufficient control and authority” to remove the barriers, and to be sure the 11 facilities complied with the 1991 ADA Accessibility Guidelines and/or the 2010 ADA Standards for 12 Accessible Design. (Id., ¶ 14.) Escobedo also contends, “Defendants have the financial resources to 13 remove the[] barriers …without much difficulty or expense[], and make the Facilities accessible to the 14 physically disabled.” (Id. at 5-6, ¶ 13.) 15 On April 3, 2024, Escobedo initiated this action by filing a complaint against Defendants 16 alleging: (1) violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (2) violations of California’s 17 Unruh Act, and (3) denial of full and equal access to public facilities under California’s Health and 18 Safety Code. (Doc. 1 at 6-10.) Escobedo served the defendants with the summons and complaint. 19 (Docs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.) After Defendants failed to respond to the complaint, Escobedo requested entry of 20 default. (Doc. 10.) The Clerk of Court entered default against all defendants on May 9, 2024. (Doc. 21 11.) Escobedo now seeks default judgment, requesting injunctive and declaratory relief, statutory 22 damages under the Unruh Act, attorneys’ fees, and costs.1 (Doc. 13.) 23 II. Findings and Recommendations 24 As an initial matter, the magistrate judge determined the Court has original jurisdiction over the 25 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, based upon Escobedo’s claim for violations of the ADA. (Doc. 18 26 at 7.) In addition, the magistrate judge noted that the Court “has the discretion to exercise supplemental 27

28 1 Escobedo did not seek default judgment for his claim for the denial of full and equal access to public facilities arising 1 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for Plaintiff’s related state law claims pursuant to the Unruh Act, 2 California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq.,” and recommended “exercising supplemental jurisdiction over 3 Plaintiff’s claim under the Unruh Act.” (Id.) 4 The magistrate judge evaluated the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Eitel v. McCool, 782 5 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986), and found the factors weighed in favor of granting the motion for 6 default judgment. (Doc. 18 at 11-21.) Specifically, the magistrate judge found default judgment was 7 appropriate for Escobedo’s claim arising under the ADA, and recommended the requested injunctive 8 relief be granted. (Id. at 12-16.) The magistrate judge also found default judgment was appropriate for 9 the claim arising under the Unruh Act, and recommended awarding statutory damages in the amount of 10 $8,000.00. (Id. at 17-18, 25.) Finally, the magistrate judge recommended Escobedo be awarded 11 attorneys’ fees in the modified amount of $2,610.0 and litigation expenses and costs in the amount of 12 $871.44, for a total of $3,481.44. (Id. at 21-25.) 13 The Court served the Findings and Recommendations on November 21, 2024, and informed the 14 parties that any objections must be filed within 14 days. (Doc. 18 at 26.) In addition, the Court advised 15 the parties that “the failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 16 on appeal.” (Id. at 26-27, citing Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014).) No 17 objections were filed, and the time to do so expired. 18 III. Supplemental Jurisdiction 19 Significantly, while noting the Court could take supplemental jurisdiction, the magistrate judge 20 did not make any findings as to whether exceptional circumstances exist to decline jurisdiction over 21 Escobedo’s claims arising under California law. As the magistrate judge observed, a court that has 22 original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 23 are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 24 case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). State 25 claims are part of the same case or controversy as federal claims “when they derive from a common 26 nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one 27 judicial proceeding.” Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Assoc., 387 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 28 quotation marks, citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit concluded ADA and Unruh Act claims that 1 derive from a common nucleus of facts “form part of the ‘same case or controversy/ for purposes of § 2 1367(a).” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). 3 Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right” and district courts 4 “can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons.” City of 5 Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (internal quotation marks, citations 6 omitted).

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