Escalera v. Samaritan Village Men's Shelter

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 27, 2019·No. 1:17-cv-04691·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WILLIAM ESCALERA, JR., Plaintiff, -against- 17-CV-4691 (CM) SAMARITAN VILLAGE MEN’S SHELTER; DHS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS ORDER TO AMEND SERVICES; NELSON BROWN; P.O. CLIFF MUELLER; P.O. BRIAN DEVITA; P.O. YONG LI, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated September 17, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND In this complaint — naming as Defendants the Samaritan Village Men’s Shelter, shelter counselor Nelson Brown, the New York City Department of Homeless Services, and Police Officers Cliff Mueller, Brian Devita, and Yong Li — Plaintiff makes the following allegations about events occurring in December 2015.2 Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to enter the shelter just before the 10:00 p.m. curfew, but shelter counselor Nelson Brown refused to allow Plaintiff in because he believed Plaintiff was intoxicated. According to Plaintiff, he may have appeared “drowsy” because he takes medications for various “medical disabilities,” but he had not been drinking. Brown then “slammed, kicked, punched, and assaulted” Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was

taken to the hospital for medical treatment. The complaint does not contain allegations about any of the other Defendants. Plaintiff seeks money damages because he has “been homeless over the course of 14 yrs with no place to stay. I have sought programs and shelters, without any sort of support from these agencies.” (ECF 1:17-CV-4691, 1.) Attached to the complaint are Plaintiff’s medical records. DISCUSSION A. Claims Against the Samaritan Village Men’s Shelter and Nelson Brown “Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tancredi v. Metro. Life

Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to show state action.”). The activity of a private entity can be attributed to the state in three situations: (1) the entity acts using the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state (the “compulsion

2 The Second Circuit recently remanded this action for further proceedings. See Escalera v. Samaritan Vill. Men’s Shelter, 17-CV-2441-pr (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2019) (holding that the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York had erroneously determined that Plaintiff was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from filing new action in forma pauperis). test”); (2) the entity willfully participates in joint activity with state or its functions are entwined with state policies (the “joint action” or “close nexus” test); or (3) the state has delegated a public function to the entity (the “public function” test). See Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). The fundamental question under each test is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are “fairly attributable” to the state. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838

(1982)). In analyzing whether a private entity acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, the district court begins “by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains,” rather than the general characteristics of the entity. Id. Providing housing is not a public function because it is not the exclusive province of the state. See, e.g., George v. Pathways to Housing, Inc., No. 10-CV-9505 (ER), 2012 WL 2512964, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (“It is well established that the provision of low-cost supportive housing is not a ‘public function.’”). The fact that an entity receives public funds does not turn private action into state action. See Rendell-Baker v.

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