Ernesto Chacon v. James D. Hodgson, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor

465 F.2d 307, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8495
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 11, 1972
Docket71-1189
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 465 F.2d 307 (Ernesto Chacon v. James D. Hodgson, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ernesto Chacon v. James D. Hodgson, Individually and in His Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, 465 F.2d 307, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8495 (7th Cir. 1972).

Opinions

SWYGERT, Chief Judge.

This suit concerns the requirements for resident participation introduced by the 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2737 et seq., formerly Title I, § 111 et seq., 78 Stat. 512 (1964). Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring a regulation of the Manpower Administration of the Department of Labor, Manpower Administration Order 14-69 [hereinafter cited as MAO 14-69], invalid and injunctive relief to prevent the execution of a contract pursuant to it. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the action.1 We reverse that determination.

The case involves the operation of the Concentrated Employment Program [hereinafter cited as CEP], authorized in 1967 by 42 U.S.C. § 2740(a) (5). The Act describes the program as “a special program to concentrate work and training resources in urban and rural areas having large concentrations or proportions of low-income, unemployed persons.” Administration is lodged with the Department of Labor under a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department and the Office of Economic Opportunity, dated April 12, 1968, and a formal delegation agreement in 33 Fed. Reg. 15139 (October 10, 1968). The program is carried out through contracts between the Department of Labor and local “prime sponsor” agencies, which are usually community action agencies set up under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2790. The prime sponsor is required to provide overall planning while the actual operation of the program is subcontracted to “delegate agencies.” Participation [309]*309of area residents is a prerequisite at both levels under section 2739(d):

The prime sponsor and delegate agencies shall provide for participation of residents of the area and members of the groups served in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of the comprehensive work and training program and its components. Such persons shall be provided maximum employment opportunity in the conduct of component programs, including opportunity for further occupational training and career advancement.

Plaintiffs claim that the organization of the CEP program now mandated by MAO 14-69 contravenes this requirement.

In June 1968, prior to the issuance of MAO 14-69 and immediately following the effective date of the 1967 Amendments, the Department of Labor negotiated a contract with the Milwaukee County Community Relations-Social Development Commission [CR-SDC], a community action agency. Actual operation of the program was then to be subcontracted to the Resident Board of Directors for CEP, a non-profit corporation composed of elected area residents, and to other agencies, including the Wisconsin State Employment Service. The Resident Board’s role was substantial: It operated the major components of the CEP program.2 The Resident Board also directly influenced the CEP activities conducted by the State Employment Service since the CEP coordinator who was in charge of all subcontracted programs was directly accountable to the Board.

Prior to the expiration of this contract in August 1969, MAO 14-69 was released. The regulation, entitled “Outline for Renegotiation of CEP Contracts and Continuing Management of CEP’s,” proposed consolidation of all CEP manpower services into one package that would be subcontracted as a unit to the State Employment Service. It recommended that only four components of the package be subcontracted to other agencies.3 However, substantial control over all activities would remain in the State Employment Service. A manpower services director, to be appointed by the State Employment Service, was to be given full control over all employees4 — whether within the Employment Service or other subcontracting agencies — who worked “on a full or more than 50% time basis” on tasks that were within the manpower services subcontract. Resident participation was included in the proviso:

In conducting the manpower services, the employment services shall employ subprofessionals — including the poor —in the .planning, conducting, and evaluation phases.

The term of the original Milwaukee CEP contract was extended as negotiations continued between the Department of Labor and the CR-SDC for a new contract. In May 1970 a contract acceptable to the Department of Labor was proposed which embodied all the requirements of MAO 14-69 including the proviso that “subprofessionals — including the poor — be included in the planning, conducting, and evaluation of the CEP contract.” In addition, resident participation was provided for by the requirement that fifty percent of the State Employment Service staff performing work under the CEP subcontract be residents of the area served by the program.

[310]*310At this point, the instant suit was filed. Plaintiffs are residents whose role in the program is alleged to have been substantially diminished because of compliance with the new regulation. They are residents who were involved in the planning activities of the Resident Board under the first contract, the chairman of the resident board, an enrollee of the program and a resident on the staff of one of the CEP programs. The defendants are the Department of Labor and its secretary, the regional manpower administrator who is the contracting officer for the Department of Labor in the area, the Office of Economic Opportunity and its director, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and its secretary.5

A preliminary issue raised by the defendants is mootness. Appellate courts may properly consider facts arising since the lower court’s adjudication that may cast doubt on the continuing justiciability of the controversy. Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 42 S.Ct. 422, 66 L.Ed. 814 (1922). The plaintiffs concede the following facts: Signing of the May 1970 contract and subcontract had been postponed pending the outcome of the plaintiffs’ suit in district court. Following the decision of that court, negotiations were renewed and resulted in the execution of a prime contract and subcontract incorporating the contested provisions of MAO 14-69. However, we fail to see how this act moots plaintiffs’ appeal since the action challenges the regulation which remains in effect. The Department of Labor continues to condition execution of each contract and subcontract on compliance with MAO 14-69. The contracts are for a fixed term and necessitate yearly renegotiation. Accordingly, the controversy remains justiciable, and both declaratory and injunctive relief is proper.

The question before us is whether MAO 14-69 violates the participation requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2739(d). Both sides have advanced ambiguous interpretations. The plaintiffs state that section 2739(d) requires two kinds of participation by target area residents: Firstly, employment in the conduct of the component programs and, secondly, participation in the “planning, conduct and evaluation” of the programs.

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Bluebook (online)
465 F.2d 307, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8495, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ernesto-chacon-v-james-d-hodgson-individually-and-in-his-capacity-as-ca7-1972.