Erika Flores and Sarah Garner, individuals, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. The Computer Merchant, Ltd.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 ERIKA FLORES and SARAH GARNER, Case No.: 25-cv-00038-AJB-DEB individuals, on behalf of themselves and 12 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ all others similarly situated, MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF 13 Plaintiffs, CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND 14 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, AND SERVICE AWARDS

Defendant. 16 (Doc. Nos. 35; 36) 17 18 19 Before the Court is an unopposed motion for final approval of class action settlement 20 (Doc. No. 36) and an unopposed motion for award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service 21 awards (Doc. No. 35), both filed by Plaintiffs Erika Flores and Sarah Garner (“Plaintiffs”).1 22 No objections have been filed or otherwise brought to the Court’s attention. (See Doc. Nos. 23 36; 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for final 24 approval and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards. 25

26 1 As with the motion for preliminary approval, Defendant The Computer Merchant, LTD 27 (“Defendant”) failed to file a response to the instant motions. The Court admonishes Defendant for failing to comply with the Preliminary Approval Order and the Civil Local Rules but nonetheless deems the 28 2 A. Factual Background 3 This putative class action centers around Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant, an 4 IT staffing company, failed to properly secure and safeguard the personal identifiable 5 information of former and current employees. (Doc. No. 31-1 at 6; Doc. No. 1, Complaint 6 (“Compl.”), at ¶¶ 1–3.) Plaintiffs allege that, due to Defendant’s failure, a third party gained 7 unauthorized access to Defendant’s computer network July 2024 (the “Data Incident”), 8 compromising the personal information of approximately 34,127 individuals, which then 9 was posted on the “dark web.”2 (Doc. No. 31-1 at 6; Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, 7.) Plaintiffs allege 10 claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary 11 duty, breach of confidence, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law, the 12 California Customer Records Act, and the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”). 13 (See generally Compl.) 14 B. Procedural Background 15 Plaintiffs filed the complaint on January 8, 2025 (see Compl.), which Defendant 16 answered (Doc. No. 10). The parties attended two early neutral evaluation (“ENE”) 17 conferences with Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Butcher on August 12 and August 28, 2025. 18 (Doc. Nos. 20; 23.) At the end of the second ENE, Judge Butcher provided the parties with 19 a mediator’s proposal (Doc. No. 31-1 at 7), after which the parties reached a settlement in 20 principle (see id.; see also Doc. No. 24). Over several months, the parties “worked 21 cooperatively and diligently” to draft the Settlement and Release (Doc. No. 31-3, 22 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”)), which the parties and 23 counsel executed in November 2025 (id. at 32–35). 24 On December 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of the class 25 action settlement (Doc. No. 31), for which no opposition was filed or served on Plaintiffs’ 26

27 2 Both Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant whose personal information were taken in the 28 1 counsel (see Doc. No. 33). The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and entered the order (the 2 “Preliminary Approval Order”), which inter alia approved the Notice in form and content, 3 appointed Simpluris as Settlement Administrator, set administrative dates, conditionally 4 certified the class, and tentatively approved the Settlement. (Doc. No. 34.) 5 On January 7, 2026, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. 6 Section 1715, Simpluris informed the appropriate state and federal Attorneys General by 7 mail about the Settlement on behalf of Defendant. (See Doc. No. 36-2, Declaration of 8 Settlement Administrator Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris Decl.”), at ¶ 5.) As an exhibit to its 9 declaration, Simpluris submitted true and correct copies of the CAFA notice letter sent to 10 the Attorneys General and the list of recipients. (Doc. No. 36-2 at 9–13 (CAFA notice).) 11 On February 25, 2026, Simpluris received a data file containing the names and valid 12 mailing addresses of 34,131 Settlement Class Members. (Id. ¶ 9.) Because the initial data 13 file included zero valid email addresses, Defendant provided two supplemental data files 14 containing a combined total of 58,121 records, but only 8,000 email addresses could be 15 matched to the original class list. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) On March 20, 2026, Simpluris sent the 16 Postcard Notice to 28,677 Settlement Class Members. (Id. ¶ 13.) For the 5,097 Postcard 17 Notices that were returned by U.S.P.S., Simpluris performed an advanced address search 18 and were able to re-mail 4,240 to either a newfound address or to the forwarding address 19 provided by U.S.P.S. (Id. ¶ 14.) Simpluris prepared and maintained both a Settlement 20 Website including important dates, deadlines, and Settlement-related documents, and a 21 Settlement-specific toll-free telephone number to field Settlement Class Member’s 22 inquiries about the Settlement. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) Simpluris also sent the Email Notice to 5,455 23 Settlement Class Members for whom a valid email address was available. (Id. ¶ 15.) Of 24 those, 818 Settlement Class Members’ Email Notices were undeliverable, so Simpluris sent 25 Postcard Notice to those individuals. (Id.; Doc. No. 38, Supplemental Declaration of 26 Settlement Administrator Simpluris, Inc. (“Suppl. Simpluris Decl.”), at ¶ 13.) On April 7, 27 2026, Simpluris sent a Supplemental Email Notice to 9,683 Settlement Class Members for 28 whom additional email addresses had subsequently been sent a Postcard Notice. (Simpluris 1 Decl. ¶ 16.) Of those, 8,297 Supplemental Email Notices were successfully delivered. (Id.) 2 Based on all methods employed, 33,733 of the 34,131 Settlement Class Members, or 3 98.83% of the Settlement Class, successfully received Notice. (Id. ¶ 17.) Simpluris 4 submitted true and correct copies of the Postcard Notice, the Email Notice, the longform 5 Notice of Class Action Settlement, and Claim Form. (Doc. No. 36-2 at 14–16 (postcard 6 notice), 17–19 (email notice), 20–30 (longform notice), 31–37 (claim form).) On June 10, 7 2026, Simpluris sent a Reminder Email Notice to 14,809 Settlement Class Members who 8 had not yet filed a claim. (Suppl. Simpluris Decl. ¶ 15.) Finally, Simpluris received zero 9 objections to the settlement and one valid request for exclusion.3 (Suppl. Simpluris Decl. 10 ¶¶ 26, 28.) 11 On May 18, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions for final approval and for award 12 of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards. (Doc. Nos. 35; 36.) In support of the final 13 approval motion, Plaintiffs filed the declaration by the Settlement Administrator detailing 14 Simpluris’ progress to date with notice and claims administration (Simpluris Decl.), a 15 declaration from each named plaintiff (Doc. Nos. 36-3, Decl. of Erika Flores (“Flores 16 Decl.”); 36-4, Decl. of Sarah Garner (“Garner Decl.”)), a declaration from each co-class 17 counsel (Doc. Nos. 36-5, Decl. of Joshua B. Swigart (“Swigart Approval Decl.”); 36-7, 18 Decl. of Ben Travis (“Travis Approval Decl.”)), and an itemized accounting of the 19 settlement administration costs (Doc. No. 36-6). In support of the fees motion, Plaintiffs 20 proffered a second declaration by each co-class counsel (Doc. No. 35-2, Decl. of Joshua B. 21 Swigart (“Swigart Fees Decl.”); 35-7, Decl. of Ben Travis (“Travis Fees Decl.”)), 22 declarations from Plaintiffs,4 and supporting documentation, including itemized billing 23

24 25 3 In its initial declaration, Simpluris stated it had received one deficient request for exclusion, in response to which Simpluris sent a deficiency notice and deadline by which to cure. (See Simpluris Decl. 26 ¶¶ 28, 30.) At the hearing on this motion, Class Counsel indicated that the deficient notice was not resubmitted but both parties agreed to honor the clear intent by deeming it valid. (See Doc. No. 41.) 27 4 Plaintiffs’ declarations attached to the fee motion (Doc. Nos. 35-9 (Flores); 35-10 (Garner)) are identical to those attached to the final approval motion. Accordingly, all citations are to the declarations 28 1 records (Doc. Nos. 35-6 (Swigart’s records); 35-8 (Travis’s records)), itemized litigation 2 costs records (Doc. No. 35-3), and litigation cost invoices (Doc. Nos. 35-4; 35-5). On July 3 7, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a supplement declaration from Simpluris. (Suppl. Simpluris Decl.) 4 Then, in response to the Court’s order preparing for the Final Approval Hearing, Plaintiffs 5 filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. No. 40.) The Court held the Final Approval Hearing on 6 July 9, 2026, at which counsel for both parties appeared. (Doc. No. 41.) To date, the Court 7 has not been made aware of any objections. (See Doc. No. 36-2 ¶ 30.) 9 The primary terms of the Settlement are provided below: 10 A. Settlement Benefits 11 Pursuant to the Settlement, Defendant is to transfer $610,000 to an Escrow Account 12 to set up the Settlement Fund, which will be used to pay the monetary benefits to the 13 Settlement Class as detailed below, Settlement Administration Costs, Service Award 14 payments to each named Plaintiff, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs. (Settlement 15 Agreement ¶¶ 61, 62, 65.) Separate from the Settlement Fund, Defendant will pay for a 16 one-year subscription to CyEx Financial Shield. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 65.) 17 All Settlement Class Members were permitted to submit a Claim Form electing from 18 the following benefits: (1) compensation for Extraordinary Out-of-Pocket Losses up to a 19 total of $3,000 per Settlement Class Member; (2) compensation for Out-of-Pocket Losses 20 up to a total of $500 per Settlement Class Member or an Alternative Cash Payment, 21 estimated to be $40 per Claimant; (3) compensation at a rate of $20 per hour for up to five 22 hours of Lost Time spent monitoring accounts or otherwise dealing with issues related to 23 the Data Incident; and (4) for California Settlement Class Members, a CCPA Cash 24 Payment, estimated to be $75. (Id. ¶ 69.) All Class Members will be provided with one 25 year of CyEx Financial Shield without needing to submit a Claim Form, the enrollment 26 codes for which will be provided in the individualized Notice to each Class Member. (Id. 27 ¶ 70.) 28 /// 1 If the total amount of Valid Claims for Extraordinary Out-of-Pocket Losses, Out-of- 2 Pocket Losses, Lost Time, Alternative Cash Payments, and CCPA Cash Payments 3 submitted by the Claim Form Deadline exceeds the amount of money available in the 4 Settlement Fund, the amount of each valid Claim will be reduced proportionally. (Id. ¶ 71.) 5 To the extent any funds remain in the Settlement Fund from uncashed checks ninety days 6 after the Settlement Administrator completes the process for stopping payment on any 7 checks that remain uncashed, all remaining funds will be distributed to a cy pres recipient 8 to be approved by the Court. (Id. ¶ 103.) 9 To benefit from the Settlement, Settlement Class Members must complete and 10 submit a Claim Form to the Settlement Administrator, postmarked or submitted 11 electronically in accordance with the requirements for electronic submission of a Claim 12 Form, on or before the Claim Form Deadline, which is fifteen days before the Final 13 Approval Hearing. (Id. ¶ 17.) 14 B. Releases 15 In exchange for the benefits described above, Plaintiffs and Class Members will “be 16 forever barred from instituting, maintaining, or prosecuting, any and all liabilities, rights, 17 claims, actions, causes of action, demands, damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, losses and 18 remedies, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, existing or potential, 19 suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, legal, statutory, or equitable, based 20 on contract, tort or any other theory, whether on behalf of themselves or others, that result 21 from, arise out of, are based upon, or relate to (1) the Data Incident; or (2) any of the alleged 22 violations of laws or regulations cited in the Complaint.” (Id. ¶ 104.) Plaintiffs Erika Flores 23 and Sarah Garner are subject to an additional release that expressly waives Section 1542 24 of the California Civil Code. (Id. ¶ 107.) 25 C. Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation Costs, and Service Awards 26 The Settlement provides for Class Counsel seeking up to 33.33% in attorneys’ fees, 27 plus reimbursement of costs, and service awards for each named Plaintiff of an amount not 28 to exceed $2,500. (Id. ¶¶ 100–01.) In the fees motion, Class Counsel seeks $152,500.00 in 1 attorneys’ fees (equal to 25% of the Settlement Fund), reimbursement of $7,290.55 in 2 litigation costs, and service awards to Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,500 each. (Doc. No. 3 35-1 at 6.) However, the Settlement is not contingent upon approval of these requests. 4 (Settlement ¶ 102.) 6 Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for final approval seeking certification of the 7 Settlement Class and the California Settlement Subclass, a determination that the 8 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Class, and a finding that the Notice 9 effectuated by the Settlement Administrator afforded Class Members adequate protection. 10 (Doc. No. 36.) No opposition was filed by Defendant, and no objections have been filed or 11 otherwise brought to the Court’s attention. (See Docket generally.) For the reasons set forth 12 below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for final approval. 13 A. Legal Standard 14 A class action may only be settled with court approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “[I]n 15 the context of a case in which the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class 16 certification, courts must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of 17 the certification and the fairness of the settlement.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” 18 Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Staton 19 v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118, 20 1130 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Roes, 1–2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1048 (9th 21 Cir. 2019) (“[W]here the parties negotiate a settlement agreement before the class has been 22 certified, settlement approval requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing 23 inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e).”) (internal punctuation omitted). 24 B. Class Certification 25 Before granting final approval of a class action settlement agreement, the Court must 26 first determine whether the proposed class can be certified. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). 27 “When, as here, the parties have entered into a settlement agreement before the district 28 court certifies the class, reviewing courts “must pay undiluted, even heightened, attention 1 to class certification requirements.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) 2 (quoting Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). 3 In the present case, the Court scrutinized the proposed Class and Subclass pursuant 4 to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) before granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval and 5 conditionally certifying the class for purposes of settlement. (Doc. No. 34 at 6–15.) 6 Although the motion was light on analysis, the Court noted no concerns at the time, no 7 objections have been filed in response, and no circumstances have changed in the interim. 8 In fact, the motion for final approval provides more fulsome analysis, further bolstering 9 the propriety of certification. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms and incorporates its prior 10 analysis under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) as set forth in its Preliminary Approval Order (see 11 id.) and certifies the following classes for purpose of settlement: 12 1. “Settlement Class”: “[A]ll persons in the United States whose 13 Private Information was potentially compromised as a result of the Data 14 Incident and who were sent notice of the Data Incident.” (Settlement ¶ 59.) 15 2. “California Settlement Subclass”: “[T]hose individuals who are 16 California Settlement Class Members and are eligible to receive a CCPA Cash 17 Payment under the Settlement.” (Id. ¶ 12.) 18 C. Adequacy of Notice 19 Next, the Court must determine whether the class members received adequate notice. 20 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all 21 class members who would be bound by the proposal[.]”). “Adequate notice is critical to 22 court approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 23 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 24 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 25 As mentioned supra § I, the Court approved the proposed Class Notice Packet in 26 plan, form, and content. (Doc. No. 34 at 30–31.) Plaintiffs filed a declaration by Simpluris, 27 detailing the actions taken by the Settlement Administrator to provide notice in accordance 28 with the Preliminary Approval Order (see Simpluris Decl. ¶¶ 7–19) and a supplemental 1 declaration on July 7, 2026, to provide the Court an updated accounting (see generally 2 Suppl. Simpluris Decl.). Pursuant to the notice plan, the Settlement Administrator 3 successfully directed notice to 33,733 Settlement Class Members or 98.83% of the 4 Settlement Class. (Suppl. Simpluris Decl. ¶ 15; Doc. No. 36-1 at 32.) Between March 20, 5 2026, and July 6, 2026 the Settlement Website received 2,620 unique visitors with 7,119 6 page views and the Settlement-specific toll-free telephone number received 47 phone calls. 7 (Suppl. Simpluris Decl. ¶¶ 16–17.) Simpluris has received 591 claim form submissions 8 consisting of 13 claims for extraordinary losses, 9 claims for out-of-pocket losses, 533 9 claims for the alternative cash payment benefit, 344 claims for lost time, and 41 claims for 10 the CCPA cash payment. (Id. ¶¶ 18–23.) The 533 claims reflect a 1.5% response rate to the 11 notice. 12 Having reviewed the declaration, the Court finds that the Settlement Administrator 13 duly effectuated the court-approved Notice and that Class Members received adequate 14 notice of the Settlement. See, e.g., Carter v. McDonald’s Restaurants, No. 15 EDCV1501531MWFJCX, 2017 WL 5634300, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017) (finding a 16 notice delivery rate of 94.5% satisfactory). Hod v. Medtronic MiniMed, Inc., No. 2:23-CV- 17 07154-JLS-PVC, 2025 WL 2934516, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025) (accepting a direct 18 settlement notice rate of 91.72% in approving the settlement of a data security class action). 19 D. Fairness of the Settlement 20 Next, the Court must determine whether the proposed settlement and notice are “fair, 21 reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), (2). “Under this standard, district 22 courts can neither rubberstamp the settlement nor unduly meddle in the parties’ affairs.” In 23 re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 129 F.4th 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2025). 24 Traditionally, courts in this circuit assess the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy 25 of a proposed Rule 23 class settlement by balancing the following factors: 26 (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action 27 status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent 28 of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience 1 and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement. 2 3 Kim v. Allison, 8 F.4th 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021). “The district court’s approval order 4 must show not only that ‘it has explored [these] factors comprehensively,’ but also that the 5 settlement is ‘not[] the product of collusion among the negotiating parties.’” In re Bluetooth 6 Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Mego Fin. 7 Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19, 2000)). 8 In 2018, Rule 23(e)(2) was amended to require courts to consider whether: 9 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented 10 the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; 11 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: 12 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief 13 to the class, including the method of processing class-member 14 claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including 15 timing of payment; and 16 (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 17 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 19 1. Rule 23(e)(2) Factors 20 In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court found that the Rule 23(e)(2) factors 21 preliminarily weighed in favor of approving the Settlement. (See Doc. No. 34 at 16–25.) 22 However, the Court also expressed concern about insufficient justification provided for the 23 requested amount of attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs’ requested service awards, and the equity of 24 the different share options. (Id. at 21, 22, 25.) Considering that no pertinent facts the Court 25 relied upon changed, and that the Settlement is not dependent on the Court approving the 26 requested fees and incentive award (see Settlement ¶ 102), the Court reaffirms and 27 reincorporates its analysis finding the adequacy of relief, adequacy of representation, and 28 1 the lack of collusion support the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement. 2 Although not identified as an impediment to approval, the Court noted that the 3 motion for preliminary approval estimated individual monetary recovery at $17.87 per 4 Class Member while the Notice estimated the Alternative Cash Payment to be $40 and the 5 CCPA Cash Payment to be $75. (Doc. No. 34 at 17 n.4.) The Court directed the parties to 6 be prepared to address the discrepancy at the Final Approval Hearing. (Id.) In the motion 7 for final approval, Plaintiffs explain that $17.87 was derived from dividing the gross 8 settlement ($610,000) by the approximate 34,127 Settlement Class Members to provide a 9 comparison to other settlements. (Doc. No. 36-1 at 26.) However, Plaintiffs assert that, 10 considering “claims rates in similar data security class actions tend to be 3-10% of the 11 class,” the $40 and $75 values are more realistic conservative values based on those claims 12 rates (the estimated $40 and $75 amounts may even end up being higher, depending on the 13 final claims rate).” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs state that inclusion of the “more realistic $40 14 and $75 values in the Notice [was] an effort to encourage more Settlement Class Members 15 to participate than if they would be provided with lower numbers that is based on all 16 members of the Settlement Class participating.” (Id.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ 17 explanation dispels any concerns raised in the Preliminary Approval Order regarding the 18 discrepancy in numbers and further supports the adequacy of relief. 19 With regard to the equitable treatment factor, the Preliminary Approval Order noted 20 “the Settlement expressly contemplates providing Class Members with a share based either 21 (1) on the amount of losses actually incurred or (2) absent documentation of actual losses, 22 a pro rata calculation,” but Plaintiffs provided no discussion of whether “the difference in 23 potential recovery takes appropriate account of Class Members’ individual circumstances.” 24 (Doc. No. 34 at 25.) The Court then directed the parties to explicitly address and justify the 25 equity of the different share options. (Id.) To address the Court’s concern, Plaintiffs state 26

27 5 The Court will analyze the requested fees and incentive award when addressing motion for award 28 1 that the “differing forms of relief,” namely documented losses compared to the Alternative 2 Cash Payment, “appropriately account for the varying circumstances and levels of harm 3 experienced by Settlement Class Members.” (Doc. No. 36-1 at 28.) Specifically, Plaintiffs 4 argue “[i]t is appropriate for those who can demonstrate losses to receive higher payments.” 5 (Id.) Moreover, in the supplemental brief, Plaintiffs explain how the maximums for 6 documented losses were set based on “arm’s-length negotiation between the Parties [and 7 were] informed by the types of benefits commonly offered and approved in comparable 8 data breach class action settlements[.]” (Doc. No. 40 at 7.) Based on the motion and the 9 supplemental brief, the Court is satisfied that the difference compensation categories take 10 appropriate account of the difference in the individual circumstances of the Settlement 11 Class Members. 12 Accordingly, the Court finds that all Rule 23(e)(2) factors weigh in favor of 13 approval. 14 2. Additional Ninth Circuit Factors 15 As the amended Rule 23(e)(2) factors were not intended to replace the factors 16 developed by circuits, the Court now turns to analyze the remaining factors traditionally 17 considered by this Circuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2018 18 amendment. 19 i. Experience and Views of Counsel 20 In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court found the experience and views of 21 counsel weighed in favor of approval. (Doc. No. 34 at 26.) As no changes to Class Counsel 22 have occurred, no relevant facts have changed, and no objections to Class Counsel have 23 been brought to the Court, the Court reaffirms and incorporates its analysis on this factor 24 and finds this factor weighs in favor of settlement approval. 25 ii. Presence of a Government Actor 26 There is no government actor party to this action. However, CAFA requires that, 27 “[n]ot later than 10 days after a proposed settlement of a class action is filed in court, each 28 defendant that is participating in the proposed settlement shall serve upon the appropriate 1 State official of each State in which a class member resides and the appropriate Federal 2 official, a notice of the proposed settlement[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b). “Although CAFA 3 does not create an affirmative duty for either state or federal officials to take any action in 4 response to a class action settlement, CAFA presumes that, once put on notice, state or 5 federal officials will raise any concerns that they may have during the normal course of the 6 class action settlement procedures.” In re LinkedIn, 309 F.R.D. at 588–89. 7 Simpluris served CAFA Notices to the appropriate state and federal Attorneys 8 General by January 7, 2026 (Simpluris Decl. ¶ 5), more than 10 days after the motion for 9 preliminary approval was filed (see Doc. No. 31). Simpluris explains that the delay was 10 due to “the winter holidays and a misunderstanding.” (Simpluris Decl. ¶ 5.) Although 11 untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b), the late notice is not fatal to final approval. See Adoma 12 v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 964, 973 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“[N]umerous courts 13 [have found] that late mailing of notices to state and federal officials under CAFA is not 14 fatal to approval of settlements.”) (collecting cases). Rather, courts have found more 15 critical whether the appropriate state and federal officials were provided at least 90 days to 16 assess the settlement and respond, if desired. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d); see also Cavazos v. 17 Salas Concrete Inc., No. 119CV00062DADEPG, 2022 WL 1198367, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 18 Apr. 22, 2022) (collecting cases). 19 The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of settlement because the delay of 20 minimal, more than 90 days elapsed to provide government officials sufficient time to 21 object or otherwise respond, and no responses of any kind were received from government 22 officials (id. ¶ 6). See, e.g., Rose v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 5:11-CV-02390-EJD, 2014 WL 23 4273358, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (“Although CAFA notice was sent to various 24 governmental entities, none sought to participate in the settlement proceedings by objection 25 or comment. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approval.”). 26 iii. Reaction of Class Members 27 “It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class 28 action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement 1 action are favorable to the class members.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 2 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 3 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 4 Here, no objections to the Settlement by Class Members have been received and 5 only one Class Member requested to be excluded. (Simpluris Decl. ¶¶ 28, 30; Suppl. 6 Simpluris Decl. ¶¶ 26, 28; Doc. No. 36-1 at 30.) The absence of objections and requests 7 for exclusion weigh in favor of settlement. See, e.g., Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop., 221 8 F.R.D. at 529 (“The complete absence of Class Member objections to the Proposed 9 Settlement speaks volumes with respect to the overwhelming degree of support for the 10 Proposed Settlement among the Class Members. That unanimous, positive reaction to the 11 Proposed Settlement is compelling evidence that the Proposed Settlement is fair, just, 12 reasonable, and adequate.”); Carter v. Vivendi Ticketing US LLC, No. 13 SACV2201981CJCDFMX, 2023 WL 8153712, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023) (finding 14 “[t]he fact that there was only one request for exclusion and one objection also indicate[d] 15 strong support for the Settlement [of the data breach action] and weighs in favor of granting 16 final approval”) (collecting cases). 17 3. Conclusion 18 Having analyzed the Rule 23(e)(2) factors and the Ninth Circuit’s factors, and 19 finding them weigh in favor of approval, the Court finds the Settlement fundamentally fair, 20 adequate, and reasonable. See Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 21 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t must not be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and settlement are 22 the preferred means of dispute resolution[,] especially . . . in complex class action 23 litigation[.]”). 24 E. Cy Pres Recipient 25 “[C]y pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable 26 portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of beneficiaries.” Lane v. 27 Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 28 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)). “[A] district court should not approve a cy pres 1 distribution unless it bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class members” 2 meaning that it “must account for the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the 3 underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members.” Id. at 821(cleaned up). 4 The Settlement Agreement contemplates the possibility of identifying a cy pres 5 recipient through subsequent Court involvement, if necessary. Specifically, “[i]f there is 6 any balance remaining in the Settlement Fund 90 days after the Settlement Administrator 7 completes the process for stopping payment on any checks that remain uncashed, the 8 Parties will return to the Court seeking direction as to the disposition of these funds, 9 including the selection of a cy pres recipient, which shall be a 501(c)(3) selected by the 10 Parties (subject to Court approval).” (Settlement ¶ 73.) 11 At the Court’s direction (Doc. No. 34 at 27–28), the parties propose the International 12 Association of Privacy Professionals (“IAPP”) Westin Scholarship Fund be designated the 13 cy pres recipient. (Doc. No. 36-1 at 32–33.) “IAPP is a leading, policy neutral not-for-profit 14 association and gathering place for professionals who work at the intersections of data and 15 technology.” (Id. at 33.) The parties argue IAPP’s Westin Scholarship Fund is an 16 appropriate cy pres recipient because “there is a sufficient nexus between IAPP’s mission 17 and the objectives of this litigation[.]” (Id.) Specifically, “the Westin Fellowship program 18 provides opportunities for early-career professionals to spend a year with the IAPP, 19 conducting research in the fields of privacy, artificial intelligence governance and digital 20 responsibility, engaging with global leaders across these disciplines.” (Id.) 21 The Court finds the IAPP Westin Scholarship Fund to bear a substantial nexus to the 22 interest of the class in having employers properly safeguard personal information through 23 funding early-career professionals’ research into such issues as digital responsibility and 24 privacy. See, e.g., Hod, 2025 WL 2934516, at *9 (finding IAPP “a proper cy pres recipient 25 in th[e] context [of a data security action involving personally identifiable information and 26 protected health information] given its mission to promote and improve the professions of 27 privacy and digital responsibility”). 28 /// 1 F. Settlement Administration Costs 2 Per the terms of the parties’ Settlement and the Preliminary Approval Order, 3 Simpluris was approved as the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement ¶ 76; Doc. No. 34 at 4 30, 32.) Initially estimated to be $30,069.00 (Doc. Nos. 31-1 at 8; 34 at 30), the final 5 requested amount is $48,821.12, “mostly due to the need to send more Postcard Notices 6 than initially expected and Simpluris’ efforts to identify additional email addresses, to 7 ensure that even those who received the Postcard Notice may also be provided with the 8 Email Notice,” and the Reminder Email Notice. (Id.; Simpluris Decl. ¶¶ 9–16 (detailed 9 additional steps required due to the data files provided); Suppl. Simpluris Decl. ¶ 29.) In 10 support of the final number, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief providing an updated 11 itemized invoice from Simpluris and extensive case law in support of the reasonableness 12 of the costs under the circumstances. (Doc. No. 40.) Based on all supporting 13 documentation, the Court finds the settlement administration costs of $48,821.12 to be fair 14 and reasonably incurred for the benefit of the Class. 15 G. Conclusion 16 In conclusion, having found the effectuated Notice adequate, the Settlement fair, 17 adequate and reasonable, the cy pres recipient appropriate, and the Settlement 18 Administrator’s costs reasonable, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval. 19 IV. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, EXPENSES, AND SERVICE AWARD 20 Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking an award of $152,500.00 (25% of the 21 common fund) for attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of $7,290.55 for litigation costs incurred, 22 and a service award of $2,500 for each named Plaintiff, all to be paid from the Settlement 23 Amount. (Doc. No. 35.) Defendant filed no opposition, and no Class Members have 24 objected. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for 25 attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and service awards. 26 A. Legal Standard 27 “In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and 28 nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 23(h). “Because the relationship between class counsel and class members turns adversarial 2 at the fee-setting stage, district courts assume a fiduciary role that requires close scrutiny 3 of class counsel’s requests for fees and expenses from the common fund.” In re Optical 4 Disk Drive Prod. Antitrust Litig., 959 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 B. Attorneys’ Fees 6 First, Class Counsel—Swigart Law Group, APC, and Ben Travis Law, APC—seek 7 a combined $152,500.00 in attorneys’ fees, which Plaintiffs argue is reasonable under 8 either the percentage-of-fund method or the lodestar method. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 11–15.) 9 1. Legal Standard 10 “In a common fund case, such as this, the district court has the discretion to choose 11 between either the lodestar or the percentage-of-fund methods when calculating fees.” 12 Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 812 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2016). 13 “Under the percentage-of-fund method, the district court may award plaintiffs’ 14 attorneys a percentage of the common fund, so long as that percentage represents a 15 reasonable fee.” Stanger, 812 F.3d at 738 (citing Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 16 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The benchmark percentage is 25%, but, similar to the lodestar, the 17 benchmark percentage ‘can be adjusted upward or downward, depending on the 18 circumstances.’” In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 784 (9th Cir. 19 2022) (quoting Kim, 8 F.4th at 1181). “[I]n assessing a request for attorneys’ fees that was 20 calculated using the percentage-of-recovery method,” courts in the Ninth Circuit may 21 consider “the extent to which class counsel ‘achieved exceptional results for the class,’ 22 whether the case was risky for class counsel, whether counsel’s performance ‘generated 23 benefits beyond the cash settlement fund,’ the market rate for the particular field of law (in 24 some circumstances), the burdens class counsel experienced while litigating the case (e.g., 25 cost, duration, foregoing other work), and whether the case was handled on a contingency 26 basis.” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2015) 27 (quoting Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2002)). 28 /// 1 “Whichever method is chosen, courts often employ the other method as a cross- 2 check that the award is reasonable.” In re Apple, 50 F.4th at 784. “Reasonableness is the 3 goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it yields an 4 unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Stanger, 812 F.3d at 739 (citation 5 omitted)). 6 2. Percentage-of-Fund Analysis 7 Considering the circumstances of this case under the percentage-of-fund analysis, 8 the Court finds Counsel’s requested fee reasonable. First, the amount sought— 9 $152,500.00—represents the benchmark percentage for this circuit. See In re Apple, 50 10 F.4th at 784. Although not dispositive, it lends itself toward a finding of reasonableness. 11 Second, Class Counsel arguably “achieved exceptional results” because the average 12 monetary value for each Settlement Class Member exceeding the average individual 13 recovery in settlements of similar cases. In re Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (“The 14 overall result and benefit to the class from the litigation is the most critical factor in granting 15 a fee award.”). Additionally, the Settlement provides a benefit beyond the cash recovery 16 because all Settlement Class Members also receive one year of credit monitoring through 17 CyEx Financial Shield. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 11–12.) Third, litigating data breach cases is 18 costly, time consuming, and risky. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 12–13.) Specifically, Plaintiffs point 19 to how resolution of the factual disputes regarding reasonableness of Defendant’s security 20 protocols “would require complex, expensive, and unpredictable technical discovery and 21 expert evidence regarding Defendant’s cybersecurity measures.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs 22 anticipate that, had the case not settled, “there would have been extensive motion practice 23 on the pleadings,” with “an appreciable risk that Defendant may succeed[.]” (Id. at 12.) 24 Fourth, adding an additional layer of risk, “Class Counsel prosecuted this matter on a 25 purely contingent basis while agreeing to advance all necessary expenses and knowing that 26 Class Counsel would only receive a fee if there was a recovery.” (Id. at 14–15.) Considering 27 all these factors, the Court finds $152,500.00 a reasonable award under the percentage-of- 28 fund analysis. 1 3. Lodestar Cross-Check 2 “Calculation of the lodestar, which measures the lawyers’ investment of time in the 3 litigation, provides a check on the reasonableness of the percentage award.” Vizcaino, 290 4 F.3d at 1050. “The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the 5 prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by adequate 6 documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the 7 lawyer.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963– 8 64 (9th Cir. 2003)). 9 Joshua Swigart, principal of Swigart Law Group, expended 115.8 hours at a rate of 10 $1,250, resulting in a lodestar of $144,750. (Swigart Fee Decl. ¶ 8.) Katherine Tuohy, an 11 associate attorney at Swigart Law Group, expended 51.4 hours at a rate of $459, resulting 12 in a lodestar of $25,443.00. (Swigart Fee Decl. ¶ 10.) Ben Travis of Ben Travis Law, APC, 13 expended “at least 58.4 hours” at an hourly rate of $1,000, resulting in a lodestar of 14 $58,400. (Travis Fee Decl. ¶¶ 14, 16–17.) Travis further avers that his “lodestar does not 15 include completing work on the class action administration, dealing with any objections 16 and/or opt outs, and preparing for, traveling to and attending the final approval hearing.” 17 (Id. ¶ 17.) Thus, using the lodestar cross-check, “the 25% fee requested by Class Counsel 18 currently reflects a negative multiplier of approximately 0.67[.]” (Doc. No. 35-1 at 16; see 19 also Swigart Fee Decl. ¶ 12.) 20 Although Swigart’s rate is on the high end, “courts in this District have awarded 21 hourly rates for work performed in civil cases by attorneys with significant experience 22 anywhere in range of $550 per hour to more than $1000 per hour.” Tanner v. Plavan Com. 23 Fueling, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-1341-BTM-JLB, 2025 WL 2231304, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 24 2025) (approving an hourly rate of $800 as reasonable in a data breach class action). Based 25 on review of Class Counsel’s experience, the rates are reasonable for attorneys litigating 26 complex data breach actions in this district. Additionally, reviewing the billing records 27 provided, the hours expended are reasonable. Together, the negative multiplier supports 28 the reasonableness of 25% award under the percentage-of-the-fund method. 1 4. Conclusion 2 The Court finds Plaintiffs’ request for $152,500.00 (25% of the common fund) worth 3 of attorneys’ fees to be reasonable under the circumstances, given the records and 4 declarations provided by Class Counsel, and considering the complex nature of a class 5 action lawsuit, the favorable result obtained both monetary and otherwise, the lack of 6 objections, and lodestar cross-check. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the instant motion 7 with regard to the requested attorneys’ fees. 8 B. Expenses 9 Class Counsel seek reimbursement of $7,290.55 in actually incurred litigation costs. 10 (Doc. No. 35-1 at 17.) In support of this request, Swigart and Travis both proffer an list of 11 itemized costs along with an invoice detailing the purpose for which the expert was retained 12 and an invoice supporting the mailing item line. (Travis Decl. ¶ 18 (totaling $166.89); Doc. 13 Nos. 35-3 (totaling $7,123.66); 35-4 (mailer invoice); 35-5 (expert retainer invoice).) 14 “Attorneys may recover their reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to 15 paying clients in non-contingency matters.” In re Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 16 (citing Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994)). “In assessing the 17 reasonableness of the reimbursement request, the Court is ‘reminded that it is generally not 18 the practice of an attorney to bill a client for every expense incurred in connection with the 19 litigation in question,’ and ‘the attorney is expected to absorb some of the cost of doing 20 business as an attorney.’” In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177 21 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 22 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). 23 Here, Counsel seeks reimbursement of: $1,190.14 for legal research, incurred 24 through use of Westlaw ($1,029.60) and Lexis ($160.54); $5,000.00 as a retainer for an 25 expert; $695.41 in mailing, copies, and service of process costs; and $405.00 in filing fees. 26 (See Doc. No. 35-3; Travis Decl. ¶ 18.) Having reviewed the itemized billing records and 27 considering the circumstances of the instant action, the Court finds these costs were 28 reasonably incurred in litigating this action for the benefit of the Settlement Class and are 1 all commonly reimbursed in similar amounts. See, e.g., Heid v. CyraCom Int’l, Inc., No. 2 22-CV-01445-MMA-KSC, 2024 WL 4008650, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2024) (finding 3 reasonable $31,110.36 in fees related to mediation, legal research, service of process, 4 filing, travel, courier and copying); Scott v. Blackstone Consulting, Inc., No. 21-CV-1470- 5 MMA-KSC, 2024 WL 271439, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2024) (awarding $15,204.08 6 filing fees, service fees, photocopying costs, postage, travel, discovery and research related 7 expenses, mediation fees and related travel, and other litigation related expenses); Tanner, 8 2025 WL 2231304, at *6 (approving $6,603.75 in a data breach class action that settled 9 prior to the filing of an answer). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Class Counsel’s request 10 for $7,290.55 to reimburse litigation costs. 11 C. Class Representative Service Award 12 Finally, Plaintiffs seek an award $2,500 each for service as Class Representatives. 13 (Doc. No. 35-1 at 17–18.) 14 Incentive awards are designed to “compensate class representatives for work done 15 on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing 16 the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney 17 general.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009). Although 18 “[i]ncentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases,” they are discretionary. Staton, 19 327 F.3d at 958. In deciding whether to approve an incentive award, courts consider factors 20 including “the number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the proportion of 21 the payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size of each payment.” In re Online 22 DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 947 (quoting Staton, 327 F.3d at 977); see also Ridgeway v. Wal- 23 Mart Stores Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 975, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (listing factors including risk 24 to the representative, notoriety and personal difficulties encountered, amount of time and 25 effort spent, duration of litigation, and personal benefit). 26 Here, Garner and Flores each seek $2,500 as an incentive award, and each proffers 27 a declaration to support her individual request. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 17–18; see also Garner 28 Decl.; Flores Decl.) Both Plaintiffs aver that to having “spent approximately 30 hours on 1 this case, including but not limited to communicating with counsel, providing information 2 and documents, and reviewing case and settlement materials.” (Garner Decl. ¶ 7; Flores 3 Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs argue that they have “actively participated in the prosecution of this 4 action[,] acted in the interests of the proposed class, including attending the initial ENE,” 5 “put their names and reputations on the line for the sake of the class,” and “adequately 6 represented the class members throughout this litigation.” (Doc. No. 35-1 at 18.) 7 Plaintiffs do not assert any risk, notoriety, or personal difficulties encountered as an 8 impact of their representation. However, Plaintiffs have provided information and made 9 themselves available to Counsel for nearly two years, expending at least 30 hours each. 10 Moreover, while the $2,500 service award is approximately 147 times larger than the 11 conservatively estimated $17.87 individual recovery, the Ninth Circuit has approved 12 incentive awards “roughly 417 times larger” than the individual recoveries on the basis that 13 “the number of class representatives, the average incentive award amount, and the 14 proportion of the total settlement that is spent on incentive awards” is of more importance. 15 See In re Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 947. Here, the requests total $5,000 together, 16 are only for two representatives, and constitute only 0.8% of the total common fund. (Doc. 17 No. 35-1 at 18.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for service awards. 18 D. Conclusion 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion and AWARDS 20 $152,500.00 of the common fund for attorneys’ fees, $7,290.55 in litigation expenses, and 21 $2,500 each to Flores and Garner as service awards for serving as Class Representatives. 23 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval 24 and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and service awards. 25 The Court APPROVES the Settlement, and all of its terms, and DIRECTS the parties to 26 effectuate the Settlement Agreement according to its terms, including inter alia that: 27 1. Simpluris be paid $48,821.12 for its services rendered as Settlement 28 Administrator; 1 2. Swigart Law Group, APC, and Ben Travis Law, APC be paid a combined 2 ||$152,500.00 in attorneys’ fees and $7,290.55 in litigation costs for their work as Class 3 || Counsel; 4 3. Plaintiff Erika Flores be awarded $2,500 for her service as Class 5 || Representative; and 6 4. Plaintiff Sarah Garner be awarded $2,500 for her service as Class 7 || Representative. 8 The Court further ORDERS: 9 1. No later than November 5, 2026, the parties are to file a Joint Status Report, 10 identifying: 11 1. The number of Claim Forms submitted; 12 il. The number of Claim Forms approved in whole and in part; 13 iil. The average, median, minimum, and maximum recovery per claimant; 14 iv. | The number of checks not cashed and their total value; 15 Vv. The number of Class Members who activated their subscription to 16 || CyEx Financial Shield; 17 V. The amount of the settlement funds distributed at that point; 18 vi. |The amount to be distributed to the cy pres recipient; and 19 vil. Any outstanding issues that need resolution prior to dismissal. 20 2. An in-person, counsel-only Settlement Disposition Conference is SET for 21 ||November 12, 2026, at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4A of the Edward J. Schwartz United 22 States Courthouse, 221 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101. 24 || Dated: July 13, 2026 © 25 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 26 United States District Judge 27 28