1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8
Erik W att, ) No. CV-25-00962-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Trulieve Holdings Incorporated, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 )
15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively, 16 Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18), Defendants’ Responses (Docs. 19, 241), and 17 Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 22). Having considered the parties’ briefing, the Court now rules as 18 follows.2 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants for common law 21 fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, 22 unjust enrichment, and violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”) and other 23 state consumer protection acts. (Doc. 1 at 2–3, ¶ 3; Doc. 1 at 26–41). Plaintiff alleges 24 25 1 The Court called for a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration as Local Rule 7.2(g)(2) prohibits such responses unless ordered by the Court. (Doc. 23). 26 27 2 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 Defendants sell marijuana-infused edible products with a tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) 2 content that exceeds the legal limits imposed by Arizona’s and Florida’s consumer safety 3 laws. (Id. at 2, ¶ 1). On August 28, 2025, the Court dismissed the Complaint (the “Dismissal 4 Order”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding Plaintiff lacked Article III 5 standing as he “ha[d] not established that he ha[d] suffered an injury-in-fact by purchasing 6 a product that he otherwise would not have, due to his reliance on affirmative 7 misrepresentations about the lawfulness of Defendants’ product.” (Doc. 17 at 6–7). The 8 Dismissal Order, however, did not state whether the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with 9 or without prejudice and with or without leave to amend. (See id. at 7). Plaintiff filed the 10 instant Motion on September 11, 2025, seeking leave to amend his Complaint and 11 requesting the Court partially reconsider the Dismissal Order if the Dismissal Order was 12 with prejudice and/or without leave to amend. (Doc. 18 at 2–3). 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Reconsideration is disfavored and “appropriate only in rare circumstances.” Defs. 15 of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Motions for 16 reconsideration are “not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their 17 original briefs,” nor should such motions “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has 18 already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 19 (D. Ariz. 2003). Under Local Rule 7.2(g)(1), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily 20 be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority 21 that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” See also 22 Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) 23 (granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate if “the district court (1) is presented 24 with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 25 manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”). A party’s 26 “[m]ere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.” 27 Guillen v. Thompson, No. CV 08-1279-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 3239419, at *2 (D. Ariz. 28 Aug. 16, 2010). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 To the extent the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and 3 without leave to amend, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Dismissal Order on the 4 ground of manifest error as dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally must 5 be without prejudice, (Doc. 18 at 6), and district courts “must give plaintiffs at least one 6 chance to amend a deficient complaint,” (Id. at 7 (citation omitted)). Defendants argue a 7 dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because no amendment could cure Plaintiff’s lack 8 of Article III standing, (Doc. 24 at 4–5), therefore making leave to amend futile, (Id. at 9). 9 The Dismissal Order was silent as to whether dismissal was with or without 10 prejudice. “[D]ismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction [typically] must be entered 11 without prejudice,” Barke v. Banks, 25 F.4th 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2022)), unless it appears 12 that no amendment could cure a plaintiff’s lack of standing, Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. 13 Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Schmier v. U.S. 14 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the 15 district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing with prejudice as the plaintiff 16 “could not have possibly amended his complaint to allege an injury in fact.”); Ashurst Land 17 & Cattle, LLC v. Rancho Mountain Props., Inc., 609 F. App’x 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2015) 18 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice because the 19 plaintiffs had an opportunity to cure their lack of standing and failed to do so). 20 Here, it does not appear that any set of facts could cure Plaintiff’s lack of standing. 21 As evidenced by the Proposed Amended Complaint (“AC”), Plaintiff largely reiterates the 22 same arguments and conclusory allegations previously dismissed by this Court. (Compare 23 Doc. 18-1, with Doc. 1-1). For example, Plaintiff again argues that he paid more for the 24 RSO than he otherwise would have because he relied on Defendants’ representations that 25 the RSO was lawful. (Doc. 18-1 at 34–35, ¶¶ 97–100). But Plaintiff’s alleged reliance is 26 again based on his own assumption, not a specific misrepresentation made by Defendants. 27 (Id. at 33–34, ¶¶ 88, 92–93, 95). The Dismissal Order clearly stated that reliance on an 28 assumption that turned out to be untrue does not establish Article III standing under an 1 overpayment theory. (Doc. 17 at 5 (citing Barrales, 2025 WL 1584424, at *4)). Plaintiff 2 must allege actual false representations—which he does not. 3 Likewise, the statutory and regulatory provisions that Plaintiff cites in the AC do 4 not identify any additional duties to disclose. (Doc. 18-1 at 40, 43–44, 49, ¶¶ 128, 130, 145, 5 n.28, 169–170). Insofar as Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have a common law duty 6 to disclose beyond the statutory requirements outlined in the Arizona Marijuana Acts, 7 (Doc. 18-1 at 38–39, 55, ¶¶ 119–120, 127, 178; Doc. 22 at 4–6, 9–10), the Court is not 8 persuaded. Statutory duties are typically broader than common law duties, not vice versa. 9 See Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1959) (“The duty [to furnish and 10 maintain a safe place of employment] imposed by the Wisconsin statute is greater than that 11 required by the common law.”); see also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 12 281, 294 (1908) (recognizing that Congress had prescribed and defined a statutory duty to 13 supplant the common-law duty of care).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8
Erik W att, ) No. CV-25-00962-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Trulieve Holdings Incorporated, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 )
15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively, 16 Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18), Defendants’ Responses (Docs. 19, 241), and 17 Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 22). Having considered the parties’ briefing, the Court now rules as 18 follows.2 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants for common law 21 fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, 22 unjust enrichment, and violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”) and other 23 state consumer protection acts. (Doc. 1 at 2–3, ¶ 3; Doc. 1 at 26–41). Plaintiff alleges 24 25 1 The Court called for a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration as Local Rule 7.2(g)(2) prohibits such responses unless ordered by the Court. (Doc. 23). 26 27 2 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 Defendants sell marijuana-infused edible products with a tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) 2 content that exceeds the legal limits imposed by Arizona’s and Florida’s consumer safety 3 laws. (Id. at 2, ¶ 1). On August 28, 2025, the Court dismissed the Complaint (the “Dismissal 4 Order”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding Plaintiff lacked Article III 5 standing as he “ha[d] not established that he ha[d] suffered an injury-in-fact by purchasing 6 a product that he otherwise would not have, due to his reliance on affirmative 7 misrepresentations about the lawfulness of Defendants’ product.” (Doc. 17 at 6–7). The 8 Dismissal Order, however, did not state whether the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with 9 or without prejudice and with or without leave to amend. (See id. at 7). Plaintiff filed the 10 instant Motion on September 11, 2025, seeking leave to amend his Complaint and 11 requesting the Court partially reconsider the Dismissal Order if the Dismissal Order was 12 with prejudice and/or without leave to amend. (Doc. 18 at 2–3). 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Reconsideration is disfavored and “appropriate only in rare circumstances.” Defs. 15 of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Motions for 16 reconsideration are “not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their 17 original briefs,” nor should such motions “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has 18 already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 19 (D. Ariz. 2003). Under Local Rule 7.2(g)(1), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily 20 be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority 21 that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” See also 22 Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) 23 (granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate if “the district court (1) is presented 24 with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 25 manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”). A party’s 26 “[m]ere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.” 27 Guillen v. Thompson, No. CV 08-1279-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 3239419, at *2 (D. Ariz. 28 Aug. 16, 2010). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 To the extent the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and 3 without leave to amend, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Dismissal Order on the 4 ground of manifest error as dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally must 5 be without prejudice, (Doc. 18 at 6), and district courts “must give plaintiffs at least one 6 chance to amend a deficient complaint,” (Id. at 7 (citation omitted)). Defendants argue a 7 dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because no amendment could cure Plaintiff’s lack 8 of Article III standing, (Doc. 24 at 4–5), therefore making leave to amend futile, (Id. at 9). 9 The Dismissal Order was silent as to whether dismissal was with or without 10 prejudice. “[D]ismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction [typically] must be entered 11 without prejudice,” Barke v. Banks, 25 F.4th 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2022)), unless it appears 12 that no amendment could cure a plaintiff’s lack of standing, Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. 13 Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Schmier v. U.S. 14 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the 15 district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing with prejudice as the plaintiff 16 “could not have possibly amended his complaint to allege an injury in fact.”); Ashurst Land 17 & Cattle, LLC v. Rancho Mountain Props., Inc., 609 F. App’x 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2015) 18 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice because the 19 plaintiffs had an opportunity to cure their lack of standing and failed to do so). 20 Here, it does not appear that any set of facts could cure Plaintiff’s lack of standing. 21 As evidenced by the Proposed Amended Complaint (“AC”), Plaintiff largely reiterates the 22 same arguments and conclusory allegations previously dismissed by this Court. (Compare 23 Doc. 18-1, with Doc. 1-1). For example, Plaintiff again argues that he paid more for the 24 RSO than he otherwise would have because he relied on Defendants’ representations that 25 the RSO was lawful. (Doc. 18-1 at 34–35, ¶¶ 97–100). But Plaintiff’s alleged reliance is 26 again based on his own assumption, not a specific misrepresentation made by Defendants. 27 (Id. at 33–34, ¶¶ 88, 92–93, 95). The Dismissal Order clearly stated that reliance on an 28 assumption that turned out to be untrue does not establish Article III standing under an 1 overpayment theory. (Doc. 17 at 5 (citing Barrales, 2025 WL 1584424, at *4)). Plaintiff 2 must allege actual false representations—which he does not. 3 Likewise, the statutory and regulatory provisions that Plaintiff cites in the AC do 4 not identify any additional duties to disclose. (Doc. 18-1 at 40, 43–44, 49, ¶¶ 128, 130, 145, 5 n.28, 169–170). Insofar as Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have a common law duty 6 to disclose beyond the statutory requirements outlined in the Arizona Marijuana Acts, 7 (Doc. 18-1 at 38–39, 55, ¶¶ 119–120, 127, 178; Doc. 22 at 4–6, 9–10), the Court is not 8 persuaded. Statutory duties are typically broader than common law duties, not vice versa. 9 See Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1959) (“The duty [to furnish and 10 maintain a safe place of employment] imposed by the Wisconsin statute is greater than that 11 required by the common law.”); see also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 12 281, 294 (1908) (recognizing that Congress had prescribed and defined a statutory duty to 13 supplant the common-law duty of care). Plaintiff does not point to any Arizona law that 14 indicates Defendants’ alleged common law duty of care is broader than the statutorily 15 prescribed duties. 16 Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation of the edible oil 17 products as RSO is a “hidden defect” also fares no better. (Doc. 18-1 at 40–41, ¶¶ 129– 18 131). First, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants’ edible oil products contained the 19 mandated Arizona Department of Health Services warning disclosing the health risks of 20 marijuana use. (See Doc. 22 at 9–10; Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 22; see also Doc. 1 at 17, ¶ 102; Doc. 21 18-1 at 23, ¶ 57). Second, the Court has already found that Defendants accurately 22 represented the volume of THC in their edible oil products. (Doc. 17 at 6). Although 23 Plaintiff alleges the RSO “had no warnings or labels that Plaintiff could see pertaining to 24 the potency of the product,” (Doc. 18-1 at 33, ¶ 88), Plaintiff’s own admission that 25 marijuana consumers commonly understand RSO to be an edible marijuana product with 26 a very high THC content subverts his hidden defect claim, again assuming such a theory is 27 even viable, (Id. at 15–17, ¶¶ 34–35, 37). See McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700, 28 707 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding no hidden defect where the plaintiff acknowledged “Pop 1 | Secret’s nutritional label disclosed the presence of artificial trans fat, and the health risks 2| of consuming artificial trans fat were firmly established” at the time of purchase). 3 Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the Court finds dismissal with prejudice is 4| appropriate. The Motion is therefore denied. 5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 Having considered Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively, 7 | Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18), the Court will deny the Motion. Although 8 | dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction typically must be without prejudice, the 9 | Court may dismiss with prejudice if no set of facts could cure the deficiency. Plaintiff's proposed AC still does not allege an affirmative misrepresentation made by Defendants, 11 | nor does it identify any actionable duty to disclose. Leave to amend is thus futile. See Lopez 12| v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court should grant leave to 13 | amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (citation omitted)), 15 | overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, or Alternatively, 18 | Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Doc. 18) is denied. 19 Dated this 30th day of April, 2026. 20
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