1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ERIK RANDALL MILNER, Case Nos. 25-cv-03350-JSC Plaintiff, 25-cv-03428-JSC 8 v. 9 ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS 10 DUSTIN DODD, et al., Re: Case No. 3:25-cv-03350-JSC, Dkt. Nos. Defendants. 11 15, 22, 24, 60, 65; 12 ERIK RANDALL MILNER, Case No. 3:25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. Nos. 25, Plaintiff, 13 30, 37. 14 v.
15 NAPA EMERGENCY WOMEN’S SERVICES (NEWS), et al., 16 Defendants. 17
18 In two cases, Erik Milner, proceeding in forma pauperis without attorney representation, 19 sues Napa County Child Welfare Services (“CWS”), Napa County Health & Human Services 20 (“HHSA”), the Napa Valley Police Department, the Napa County Probation Department (“Napa 21 Probation”), Napa Emergency Women’s Services (“NEWS”), Aric Bright, Dustin Dodd, Jose 22 Velasquez, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, Matthew Lipscomb, Nick Toscani, and Pete Peirsig for 23 federal constitutional violations and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 24 Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. (Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC, Dkt. No. 1; 25 Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1.)1 Now pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions 26 1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) in Case No. 25-cv-03350- 27 JSC, unless otherwise noted; pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top 1 to dismiss Mr. Milner’s original complaints, (Dkt. Nos. 15, 22, 24; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, 2 Dkt. Nos. 25, 30), and strike his amended complaints, (Dkt. No. 60; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, 3 Dkt. No. 37.) Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the Court determines oral 4 argument is not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the December 18, 2025 5 hearing, and GRANTS Defendants’ motions, dismisses Mr. Milner’s initial complaints with leave 6 to amend, and strikes Mr. Milner’s amended complaints.2 7 As to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, Mr. Milner does not include sufficient facts to plausibly 8 allege (1) any individual Defendant violated his Eighth, Fourteenth, or First Amendment rights; 9 (2) NEWS is a state actor; and (3) the local government Defendants had a municipal policy, 10 practice, or custom which was the moving force behind constitutional violations. As to his RICO 11 claim, Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a pattern of racketeering activity, an injury to his 12 business or property, or each Defendant’s role in the enterprise. 13 BACKGROUND 14 I. CASE NO. 3:25-CV-03350-JSC 15 A. Complaint Allegations 16 On August 31, 2023, Officers Dustin Dodd and Pete Peirsig left Mr. Milner locked in a 17 police car without air conditioning for over two hours and “ordered a forced blood draw” without 18 a signed warrant while he was unconscious. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 7.) Because three versions of a 19 warrant exist: one unsigned from August 31, 2023, one signed on September 5, 2023, and one 20 signed on September 19, 2023, “the Napa Police laundered warrants after illegal searches.” (Id. at 21 5.) Karen Roberts witnessed the mistreatment and gave a statement, but Mr. Milner’s lawyer 22 “never interviewed or called [her] to testify.” (Id.) Later that day, Mr. Milner was placed in an 23 interview room while unconscious, ignored when he asked for a lawyer, and not given water or 24 medical help although he “was slumped over the desk for hours.” (Id. at 6.) 25 Meanwhile, Amanda Dawson was hospitalized for a “traumatic brain injury” and 26
27 3:25-cv-09369-JSC. 1 questioned by Officer Velazquez, and although she “did not consent to medical release” and was 2 “administered fentanyl and morphine right before the interview,” the officers “used her 3 statements.” (Id. at 6, 8.) On body camera footage, an officer said he “had an ‘in’ with hospital 4 staff” and “mocked someone who had allegedly [b]een sexually assaulted,” but “[t]his footage was 5 not given to [Mr. Milner’s] defense before trial.” (Id. at 6.) The same day, Officers Toscani and 6 Lipscomb entered Mr. Milner’s residence and seized his truck without a warrant. (Id.) 7 On October 19, 2023, CWS employee Martha Jimenez, Officer Lipscomb, and Officer 8 Toscani removed Mr. Milner’s and Ms. Dawson’s son without a warrant, despite Officer 9 Lipscomb’s prior statement they would not do so. (Id.) Because Mr. Milner and Ms. Dawson 10 were “never convicted of any child-related crime,” and “[p]rior claims were ruled unfounded,” 11 “CPS took [their] child with no emergency or new evidence” and “acted on fake and incomplete 12 information.” (Id. at 6, 8.) 13 On December 20, 2024, Mr. Milner’s probation was “revoked without cause,” “warning, 14 hearing, or new violation.” (Id. at 6.) On December 24, 2024, Mr. Milner filed a motion to vacate 15 his sentence, and, the same day, a retaliatory warrant was issued . (Id.) 16 In addition, the nonprofit “NEWS, which receives federal funding under FVPSA and 17 VAWA, falsely advertises that its services are voluntary,” including on “federal grant documents.” 18 (Id. at 6, 9.) Ms. Ramirez and CWS “forced [Ms. Dawson] into NEWS programming” and 19 “requir[ed] her to sign releases giving access to her medical and drug test info” “under threat of 20 losing custody of [their] child.” (Id. at 6, 10.) Mr. Milner “was not required to participate in 21 NEWS programming, but [he] was still court-ordered to pay them money as part of [his] release 22 conditions.” (Id. at 6.) 23 Mr. Milner also alleges Defendants “[u]sed [a] fake search to cover up illegal actions,” 24 “tampered with” and hid body camera footage and other evidence, used Ms. Dawson’s hospital 25 statements, “file[d] false charges,” “took [his] blood with no signed warrant,” and “filed and filled 26 out two other versions after the fact to justify it.” (Id. at 8.) He was then “prosecuted using 27 multiple fake warrant[s].” (Id. at 9.) In addition, Mr. Milner “was denied fair access to evidence,” 1 stop” the due process violations. (Id.) Mr. Milner ultimately “lost [his] child, [his] rights, [his] 2 time, and any chance at a fair trial.” (Id. at 9.) 3 Furthermore, “every time [Mr. Milner] filed something in court to fight [his] case like a 4 motion in probation or motion for a sentence review they hit [him] with [something] new . . . 5 usually within 24 to 72 hours of [] filing.” (Id. at 12.) These were not “based on new violations,” 6 but instead “just retaliation to punish [him] for exercising [his] rights.” (Id.) For example, Mr. 7 Milner’s probation was revoked, he lost access to his child, and he was “targeted for using the 8 court system.” (Id.) 9 B. Procedural History 10 On April 15, 2025, Mr. Milner sued Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Jose Valasquez, Nick 11 Toscani, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, Aric Bright, Napa Probation, CWS, and NEWS for violations 12 of his Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) CWS, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, and Napa Probation moved to dismiss, and 14 then filed an amended motion also on behalf of Aric Bright. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 22.) The City of 15 Napa, the Napa Police Department, Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Jose Velasquez, Matthew 16 Lipscomb, and Nick Toscani also moved to dismiss and strike Mr. Milner’s complaint or for a 17 more definite statement. (Dkt. No. 15.) NEWS also filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 24.) 18 Because Mr. Milner did not file a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court 19 ordered him to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Dkt. 20 No. 30.) Mr. Milner responded and filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a 21 temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. Nos. 31, 32.) The Court denied 22 Mr. Milner’s habeas petition because it sought release from detention, a form of relief not 23 available in a section 1983 action. (Dkt. No. 42.) And, as Mr. Milner remained incarcerated, the 24 Court extended his time to oppose the motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 55.) 25 Instead of filing an opposition, Mr. Milner filed an amended complaint against the City of 26 Napa, Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Nicholas Toscani, Matthew Lipscomb, the Napa County District 27 Attorney’s Office, Aric Bright, CWS, and NEWS for violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 1 judicial documents under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1519; RICO; and the False Claims Act, 31 2 U.S.C. § 3729. (Dkt. No. 56.) CWS, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, and the Napa County District 3 Attorney’s Office moved to dismiss or strike Mr. Milner’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 60.) Mr. Milner 4 filed a sur-reply addressing the earlier motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 61.) He also sought leave to 5 file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss or strike at Docket No. 60. (Dkt. Nos. 65, 66.) 6 II. CASE NO. 3:25-CV-03428-JSC 7 A. Complaint Allegations 8 First, Mr. Milner alleges NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha Jimenez 9 Ramirez coerced Mr. Milner by “explicitly threatening Plaintiff and family members with loss of 10 child custody and reunification services unless they signed mandatory Release of Information 11 (ROI) forms.” (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Second, Defendants “repeatedly 12 misrepresented NEWS services as voluntary in publicly available communications while 13 simultaneously mandating participation and exchanging coercive communications via electronic 14 and postal means.” (Id.) Third, “Defendants submitted false statements and misleading 15 information to Napa County Superior Court.” (Id.) Fourth, “Defendants misused and 16 misrepresented federal and state funds . . . by fraudulently claiming voluntary client participation, 17 while simultaneously mandating participation under threats.” (Id. at 4.) 18 B. Procedural History 19 On April 17, 2025, Mr. Milner sued NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha 20 Jimenez Ramirez under RICO. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants moved to 21 dismiss. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. Nos. 25, 30.) As Mr. Milner was incarcerated, the 22 Court twice extended his time to oppose the motions to dismiss. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, 23 Dkt. Nos. 31, 33.) Instead of opposing the pending motions, Mr. Milner filed an amended 24 complaint, adding Aric Bright, Dustin Dodd, Nicholas Toscani, Matthew Lipscomb, Pete Peirsig, 25 Jose Velasquez, the City of Napa, and the Napa Valley Police Department as defendants, and 26 asserting violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 27 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to commit fraud and falsify judicial documents under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1 (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 34.)3 CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha Jimenez 2 Ramirez then moved to strike or dismiss Mr. Milner’s amended complaint. (Case No. 25-cv- 3 3428-JSC, Dkt. No. 37.) Mr. Milner did not oppose this motion. 4 DISCUSSION 5 I. MOTIONS TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINTS 6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party “may amend its pleading once as a 7 matter of course” within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s 9 written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 10 County Defendants4 move to strike Mr. Milner’s amended complaints in both cases. (Dkt. 11 No. 60; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt No. 37.) County Defendants served their motions to 12 dismiss on June 16, 2025 and September 12, 2025, respectively, and Mr. Milner filed his amended 13 complaint on October 20, 2025—more than 21 days later. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 56; Case No. 25-cv- 14 03428-JSC, Dkt Nos. 30, 34.) Mr. Milner also did not obtain Defendants’ consent or the Court’s 15 leave before filing his amended complaint. 16 The Court therefore GRANTS County Defendants’ motion to strike Mr. Milner’s amended 17 complaints. 18 II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS INITIAL COMPLAINTS 19 A. Legal Standard 20 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must include a “short and plain 21 statement of [each] claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 22 While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it demands 23 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 24 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, the court “must take all of the factual 25 3 This amended complaint is identical to the amended complaint filed at Case No. 25-cv-03350- 26 JSC, Dkt. No. 56. 4 In Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC, County Defendants include Aric Bright, CWS, Martha Jimenez 27 Ramirez, and the Napa County District Attorney’s Office. (Dkt. No. 60.) In Case No. 25-cv- 1 allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. However, this presumption does not apply to 2 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 3 statements.” Id. Ultimately, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual 4 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” in other words, to 5 “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 6 alleged.” Id. (cleaned up). When a plaintiff files a complaint without representation by a lawyer, 7 the Court must “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 8 doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 B. Section 1983 Claims 10 “42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of 11 state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Jones v. Williams, 297 12 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the 13 vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by government officials.” Id. To state a Section 14 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a government official (1) acted “under color of state law,” and 15 (2) “the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” Id. 16 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 In addition, “[i]n order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under 18 section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.” 19 Id. Therefore, a plaintiff must allege a specific government official’s actions caused his injuries. 20 See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 21 633 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 22 and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 23 caused a constitutional deprivation.”). As an initial matter, all of Mr. Milner’s constitutional 24 claims are insufficiently pled because he does not identify which Defendants took each specific 25 action to violate his constitutional rights. 26 1. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim 27 Mr. Milner sues Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr. Toscani, Napa, the Napa Police Department, 1 punishment based on his treatment on August 31, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) 2 “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protections [do] not attach until after conviction and 3 sentence.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989). “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is 4 appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally 5 associated with criminal prosecutions.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). So, 6 “[c]onditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth 7 Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment.” Veaver v. Honea, 8 No. 2:20-CV-02554-CKD P, 2021 WL 369438, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2021) (citing Bell v. 9 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)). 10 Mr. Milner alleges Defendants locked him in a patrol car “for over two hours with no air 11 conditioning,” did not provide water or medical help, left him unconscious in an interview room 12 for 2.5 hours, and “forcibly” drew his blood. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) However, Mr. Milner does not 13 allege Defendants’ actions took place after he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison, 14 which is necessary to plead an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. To the 15 extent Mr. Milner challenges conditions of confinement which occurred before his criminal trial, 16 he must instead bring a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim. 17 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Eighth Amendment claim with leave to amend. 18 2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim: False Evidence and Improper Legal Procedure 19 Next, Mr. Milner sues Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr. Toscani, Napa, the Napa Police 20 Department, Napa Probation, Mr. Lipscomb, Ms. Ramirez, and Mr. Bright for violating his 21 Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsifying evidence, using a “fake search to cover up illegal 22 actions,” improperly using statements from Ms. Dawson, filing false charges, and taking his blood 23 without a warrant. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) He also claims he was denied “proper legal procedure” and 24 “fair access to evidence,” including when Defendants blocked Ms. Roberts from testifying and 25 “acted on fake and incomplete information to remove [his] child.” (Id.) And he alleges Mr. 26 Bright “did nothing to stop this whole system treating [him] like [he] was guilty before trial 27 punished [him].” (Id.) 1 There is a Fourteenth Amendment “due process right not to be subjected to criminal 2 charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” 3 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). “To prevail on a § 1983 4 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately 5 fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” 6 Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “To establish the second 7 element of causation, the plaintiff must show that (a) the act was the cause in fact of the 8 deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury would not have occurred in the absence of the 9 conduct; and (b) the act was the ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause’ of the injury, meaning that the 10 injury is of a type that the reasonable person would see as a likely result of the conduct in 11 question.” Id. (citation omitted). 12 Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a fabricated evidence claim because he has not 13 identified the deprivation of liberty which occurred—perhaps a criminal sentence or the loss of his 14 child—and included facts from which the Court can infer Defendants’ actions caused such 15 deprivation of liberty. And, to the extent Mr. Milner challenges the legal process, he must allege a 16 particular legal proceeding in which he was denied legal process. Mr. Milner’s complaint also 17 fails to specify which Defendants fabricated particular pieces of evidence or followed improper 18 legal processes. 19 As to Mr. Milner’s claim against Mr. Bright, Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged Mr. 20 Bright specifically acted to violate his constitutional rights, as opposed to failing to stop others’ 21 constitutional violations. Furthermore, “a public defender does not act under color of state law 22 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 23 proceeding.” See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). So, Mr. Milner cannot state 24 a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Mr. Bright. 25 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim based on false 26 evidence and improper legal procedures with leave to amend, except as to the claim against Mr. 27 Bright which is dismissed without leave to amend. 3. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy Claim 1 Mr. Milner sues Ms. Ramirez, CWS, NEWS, Napa Probation, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr. 2 Toscani, and Mr. Lipscomb for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy including by 3 collecting his blood and seizing his truck without a warrant and using Ms. Dawson’s statements in 4 the hospital and NEWS documents. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) 5 “While there is no generalized right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized a 6 privacy right against certain kinds of governmental intrusions under the Due Process Clause of the 7 Fourteenth Amendment.” Parents for Privacy v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 8 1092 (D. Or. 2018). However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “specially 9 protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this 10 Nation’s history and tradition, . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 11 liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 12 720-21 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). So, a plaintiff must include a “careful 13 description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 721 (quotation marks and citation 14 omitted). 15 Mr. Milner has not alleged enough facts explaining the type of liberty interest affected for 16 the Court to infer that liberty interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 17 Clause. To the extent Mr. Milner seeks to challenge police officers’ searches as unreasonable, he 18 may instead be able to plead a Fourth Amendment claim. See Deryan v. Glover, No. 2:23-CV- 19 000063-MKD, 2023 WL 6120908, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2023) (“The Fourth Amendment, 20 [however], provides a right to privacy, including a right to be free from unreasonable 21 governmental searches.”). 22 In addition, to the extent Mr. Milner alleges Defendants violated the Health Insurance 23 Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), “HIPAA itself provides no private right of 24 action” under which he may sue. See Webb v. Smart Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 25 (9th Cir. 2007). 26 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim with leave to 27 amend. 4. Fourteenth Amendment Family Integrity Claim 1 Mr. Milner next sues Ms. Ramirez, CWS, NEWS, and Mr. Lipscomb for violating his 2 Fourteenth Amendment rights to “family integrity and fair process,” including by forcing Ms. 3 Dawson “into federally funded programs by threatening to take [their] child.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 10.) 4 “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be separated from their 5 children without due process of law except in emergencies.” Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 6 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Officials violate this 7 right if they remove a child from the home absent information at the time of the seizure that 8 establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury 9 and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.” Id. 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 Mr. Milner alleges “CPS took [his] child with no emergency or new evidence.” (Dkt. No. 12 1 at 6.) However, to support his claim there was “no emergency” or “evidence,” Mr. Milner only 13 states he and Ms. Dawson were “never convicted of any child-related crime” and “[p]rior claims 14 were ruled unfounded.” (Id.) These facts are not sufficient to plausibly allege Defendants lacked 15 reasonable cause to remove his child and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. 16 Milner also cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim based only on officials’ threats to 17 remove his child. 18 In addition, to the extent Mr. Milner seeks to assert claims under the Family Violence 19 Prevention Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10408, or the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, he may 20 not do so. See Thompson v. Washington, No. C04-2554L, 2005 WL 2045886, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 21 Aug. 25, 2005) (“[T]he Family Violence Prevention Services Act contains no private right of 22 action.”); Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The 23 FCA [] does not authorize a [plaintiff] to prosecute a § 3729 violation pro se.”) 24 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment family integrity claim with 25 leave to amend. 26 5. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 27 Mr. Milner also sues the Napa Police Department, Napa Probation, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. 1 Toscani for retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.) 2 “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to 3 retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff must allege an official “acted with a retaliatory 5 motive” to cause a plaintiff’s injury, meaning “the adverse action against the plaintiff would not 6 have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at 398-99. A plaintiff must therefore plead the 7 absence of probable cause or non-retaliatory motives for an official’s actions. See Hartman v. 8 Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006). 9 Mr. Milner alleges every time he filed a motion for probation or sentence review, there was 10 “retaliation to punish [him] for exercising [his] rights.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.) However, he has not 11 specified when he exercised a right, what right he exercised, and how each particular Defendant 12 retaliated against him. Furthermore, although he alleges a retaliatory warrant was issued after he 13 filed a motion to vacate his sentence, (Dkt. No. 1 at 6), he does not identify which Defendant 14 issued the warrant. And, he has not included facts which support a plausible inference the 15 individual Defendants who retaliated against him had no probable cause for the actions they took 16 and instead acted with retaliatory motive. 17 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s First Amendment retaliation claim with leave to 18 amend. 19 6. Claims Against NEWS 20 NEWS moves to dismiss all claims against it because it is a nonprofit and not a state actor. 21 To state a federal constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which show a 22 deprivation by a person acting under color of state law. See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee 23 Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Generally, private parties do not act 24 under color of state law. See id.; see also Single Moms, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 25 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The United States Constitution protects individual rights only from 26 government action, not from private action. Only when the government is responsible for a 27 plaintiff’s complaints are individual constitutional rights implicated.”). Courts consider three 1 Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-12 2 (1982)). First, there must be a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged 3 action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State 4 itself.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, the nexus must be 5 such that the State “has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, 6 either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Id. (citations 7 omitted). Third, the entity must have exercised powers “that are traditionally the exclusive 8 prerogative of the State.” Id. at 1005 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 Mr. Milner’s allegations NEWS “receives federal funding” are insufficient to show NEWS 10 is a state actor. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) See Jackson, 980 F. Supp. at 1357 (“Extensive case law 11 establishes that a private doctor or hospital cannot be deemed a state actor merely because they are 12 recipients of state or federal funding.”). His allegations CWS “forced” Ms. Dawson “into NEWS 13 programming,” and a court “ordered [him] to pay them money as part of [his] release conditions” 14 are also insufficient to plausibly allege NEWS is a state actor. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) See Pasadena 15 Republican Club v. Western Justice Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[M]erely 16 contracting with the government does not transform an otherwise private party into a state actor.”). 17 So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s constitutional claims against NEWS because Mr. 18 Milner has not plausibly alleged NEWS is a state actor. However, the Court gives Mr. Milner 19 leave to amend because NEWS has not shown it is impossible for Mr. Milner to allege it is a state 20 actor. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court should grant 21 leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 22 allegation of other facts.”). 23 7. Claims Against Local Governments 24 CWS, Napa Probation, the City of Napa, the Napa Police Department, and NEWS also 25 seek to dismiss Mr. Milner’s claims against them because, to the extent they are local 26 governments, Mr. Milner has not sufficiently alleged a Monell claim. 27 “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 1 the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 2 Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must 3 first show his constitutional rights were violated by an individual defendant who was a local 4 government employee. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person 5 has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the 6 departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite 7 beside the point.”) Because as explained above, Mr. Milner has not alleged any individual officer 8 violated his constitutional rights, his constitutional claims against local government Defendants 9 also fail. 10 However, a plaintiff must also “establish that the local government had a deliberate policy, 11 custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [he] suffered.” 12 AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 13 “[G]enerally, a single instance of unlawful conduct is insufficient to state a claim for municipal 14 liability,” but it may be sufficient “where fault and causation were clearly traceable to a 15 municipality’s legislative body or some other authorized decisionmaker.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of 16 San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Although Mr. Milner alleges 17 Eighth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment claims against several governmental entities, he has not 18 identified a particular Napa County or Napa City policy, custom, or practice and explained how it 19 led to the constitutional violations. 20 So, local government Defendants’ motions to dismiss claims against them are granted with 21 leave to amend. 22 C. RICO Claim 23 A civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 24 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of 25 racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or 26 property.’” See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th 27 Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To conduct or participate directly or indirectly 1 enterprise.” Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 416 F. Supp. 2d 885, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (cleaned up; 2 quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993)). And, to show a pattern of 3 racketeering activity, a plaintiff must show “the racketeering predicates are related, and that they 4 amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 5 1529, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). Furthermore, a plaintiff must allege a “racketeering 6 activity” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which includes:
7 “[A]ny act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 8 controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State Law 9 and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” § 1961(1)(A). Also included are any of more than twenty types of 10 conduct indictable under enumerated provisions of the United States Code, ranging from mail fraud and wire fraud, through robbery and 11 extortion, to white slave trade. § 1961(1)(B). Finally, a “predicate act” may also be established by any offense involving fraud “connected 12 with” a bankruptcy case, “fraud in the sale of securities,” or any act related to a controlled substance or listed chemical “punishable' under 13 federal law.” § 1961(1)(C). 14 See Flores, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 911. In addition, “[t]o demonstrate injury for RICO purposes, 15 plaintiffs must show proof of concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable intangible 16 property interest.” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Personal injuries are not 17 compensable under RICO.”). 18 Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a RICO claim against NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa 19 Probation, and Ms. Ramirez. As predicate acts, Mr. Milner alleges Extortion and Coercion, Mail 20 and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the Court, and Federal Grant Fraud. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. 21 No. 1 at 3-4.) As to all four activities, Mr. Milner alleges “[t]hese predicate acts occurred 22 repeatedly (more than twice within ten years).” (Id. at 4.) However, he needs to also allege the 23 acts were related because they had “the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or 24 methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not 25 isolated events.” H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 26 3575(e)); see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1535 (requiring “the racketeering predicate[] [acts] [be] 27 related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity”). Mr. Milner’s 1 “financial harm,” and so has not alleged an injury under RICO. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. 2 No. 1 at 4.) See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of 3 a violation of [RICO] . . . may sue.”); see also Ove, 264 F.3d at 825 (requiring “proof of concrete 4 financial loss”). And, rather than allege “Defendants” violated RICO, Mr. Milner must identify 5 the specific individuals who were involved in the enterprise and explain how each of them was 6 involved. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) See Franco v. City & Cnty. of San 7 Francisco, No. C 10-04768 WHA, 2012 WL 1980799, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (“A 8 plaintiff is required under RICO to allege for each particular defendant the specific ‘racketeering 9 activity’ committed by the defendant.” (citation omitted)). 10 As claims grounded in fraud, Mr. Milner’s claims of Mail and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the 11 Court, and Federal Grant Fraud must be pled with particularity. Under Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 9(b), a plaintiff must allege claims “grounded in fraud” with particularity. See Kearns 13 v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well 14 Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Rule 9(b) particularity 15 requirements to RICO claims). Particularity requires specifying “the who, what, when, where, and 16 how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly 17 fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” United States ex rel. Anita Silingo v. WellPoint, Inc., 18 904 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Mr. Milner only alleges “Defendants” 19 “misrepresented” NEWS services or federal and state funds, or “submitted false statements and 20 misleading information.” (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) He does not specify 21 which Defendants made what statements, at what time, and why those statements were false or 22 misleading. So, he has not pled the Mail and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the Court, and Federal Grant 23 Fraud predicate acts with the necessary particularity. 24 So, Mr. Milner’s RICO claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss all of 27 Mr. Milner’s claims in his initial complaints with leave to amend, except Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth 1 leave to amend as to Mr. Bright. Mr. Bright is not considered a state actor so Mr. Milner may not 2 || make constitutional claims against him. The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike 3 || Mr. Milner’s amended complaint. 4 Several Defendants move in the alternative for a more definite statement of Mr. Milner’s 5 || pleading. (Dkt. No. 15.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite 6 statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 7 ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”). Because the Court has granted 8 Defendants’ motions to dismiss, it DENIES this motion. However, if Mr. Milner files an amended 9 complaint, he must specify each legal claim he asserts, the facts supporting each claim, and the 10 || exact defendants against which he asserts each claim. 11 Mr. Milner may file a single amended complaint in Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC consistent 12 || with this Order. Mr. Milner should include all claims and defendants from both his cases that he 5 13 wishes to pursue in that complaint and should not file an amended complaint in Case No. 25-cv- 14 || 03428-JSC. Mr. Milner’s deadline to file an amended complaint is January 17, 2026. If he does 3 15 || not file an amended complaint by that date, judgment will be entered in Defendants’ favor and a 16 || against Mr. Milner on all claims. 3 17 Finally, as Mr. Milner is proceeding without counsel, the Court directs his attention to the 18 Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which is available along with further information for the parties on 19 || the Court’s website located at http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants. Mr. Milner may also contact 20 || the Legal Help Center via telephone: (415)-782-8982, or email: fedpro@sfbar.org for free 21 assistance regarding his claims. 22 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 15, 22, 24, 60, and 65 in Case No. 3:25-cv-03350-JSC, 23 and Docket Nos. 25, 30, 37 in Case No. 3:25-cv-03428-JSC. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: December 12, 2025 26
28 JAGQUELINE SCOTT CORL United States District Judge