J-A24019-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JASON MATTHEWS AND ION : No. 534 EDA 2022 CONSTRUCTION INC :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-05936
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2023
Erie Insurance Exchange appeals from the order denying its motion for
summary judgment against Jason Matthews and Ion Construction Inc. Erie
contends that the change in company name from Ion Construction LLC to Ion
Construction, Inc. on an insurance policy does not create a second policy,
requiring the need for a new form rejecting underinsured motorist (“UIM”)
coverage. We reverse and direct that summary judgment be entered in favor
of Erie.
On February 9, 2015, Alexander Matthews obtained an insurance policy
from Erie for a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche. The named insured on the policy
was listed as “Ion Construction LLC.” Alexander was the vice president, and
his father, Jason Matthews, was the president of Ion Construction LLC. J-A24019-22
Relevantly, on behalf of Ion Construction LLC, Alexander rejected UIM and
uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage.
Ion Construction LLC subsequently changed its name to Ion
Construction, Inc. Alexander was listed as the sole owner and corporate officer
of Ion Construction, Inc., and Jason was listed as an officer. In February 2016,
Erie issued an amended declarations page reflecting the name change of the
company from Ion Construction LLC to Ion Construction, Inc., and renewed
the policy without any coverage changes.
On April 15, 2017, Jason was driving the 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche in
Philadelphia, when he was rear ended and allegedly sustained injuries to his
neck and back. Subsequently, Jason made a claim for UIM coverage from Erie
under the policy. Erie denied the claim, noting that there was no UIM coverage
included in the policy, and that between the date of issuance and the date of
the subject accident that gave rise to this litigation, there were no paid
premiums for UIM benefits. In response, Jason argued that he is entitled to
UIM coverage because no agent or officer of Ion Construction, Inc. rejected
UIM coverage after formation of the corporation. To that end, Jason claims
that Erie was required to obtain a newly signed UIM rejection form after the
policy was amended to reflect the name change.
Erie filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, followed by an amended
complaint, seeking a determination that no UIM benefits are available under
the policy. After the parties conducted discovery, which included depositions
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of Jason and Alexander, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial
court denied the motion, finding that when Ion Construction LLC changed its
name to Ion Construction, Inc., and Erie changed the name on the policy, a
second policy was created which did not include a proper UIM rejection form,
and, therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the UIM
coverage was waived. The trial court also denied summary judgment because
depositions of any persons affiliated with Erie had not been conducted.
Erie filed an application to amend the order to include the language to
certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court failed to act on the
application, and it was deemed denied as a matter of law. Erie filed a petition
for review with this Court, which granted the petition and certified this case
for interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, Erie raises the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Erie’s] motion for summary judgment by finding that a 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731 statutorily prescribed uninsured/underinsured rejection waiver obtained on a commercial insurance policy at inception did not validly reject uninsured/underinsured benefits for the life of the policy solely by virtue of the named insured entity on the policy changing its corporate structure and/or name subsequent to waiver execution?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Erie’s] motion for summary judgment by finding that a change to the named insured entity’s corporate structure created a de facto “new” insurance policy that in turn required a second set of statutorily prescribed uninsured/underinsured rejection waivers to comply with the requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731?
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.1
Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under our Rules of Civil Procedure, a record that supports summary judgment will either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, the trial court may only grant summary judgment where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.
Smith v. A.O. Smith Corp., 270 A.3d 1185, 1191-92 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(citations, brackets, quotation marks, and paragraph breaks omitted). “[T]he
issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact
presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of
review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made
by the trial court.” Id. at 1192 (citation and brackets omitted).
We will address Erie’s arguments together. Erie contends that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by denying its motion for summary judgment.
See Appellant’s Brief at 43. Noting that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731 governs the
rejection of UM/UIM benefits for personal and commercial policies, Erie asserts
that UIM rejection waivers remain valid for the life of the policy unless
____________________________________________
1 Neither Jason nor Ion Construction, Inc. has filed a brief in this case.
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affirmatively changed. See id. at 11-21; see also id. at 20-21, 33-34
(alleging that if a valid “Important Notice Form” is secured, as here, alongside
a UIM/UM rejection waiver, the insured is presumed to know the benefits and
limits available under the policy and no other notice or rejection is required).
Erie maintains that the trial court’s decision is not supported by case law or
the statutory language, noting that once the policy includes a UM/UIM
rejection waiver, the named insured must request a change in UM/UIM
coverage on the policy, even if a new vehicle or a new named insured is added
to the policy. See id. at 25-32.
Erie claims that the change in the corporate name from “Ion
Construction LLC” to “Ion Construction, Inc.” did not trigger a responsibility to
obtain a second UIM rejection waiver, emphasizing that the change in name
did not create a new corporation, and did not create a new policy or have any
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J-A24019-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JASON MATTHEWS AND ION : No. 534 EDA 2022 CONSTRUCTION INC :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-05936
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2023
Erie Insurance Exchange appeals from the order denying its motion for
summary judgment against Jason Matthews and Ion Construction Inc. Erie
contends that the change in company name from Ion Construction LLC to Ion
Construction, Inc. on an insurance policy does not create a second policy,
requiring the need for a new form rejecting underinsured motorist (“UIM”)
coverage. We reverse and direct that summary judgment be entered in favor
of Erie.
On February 9, 2015, Alexander Matthews obtained an insurance policy
from Erie for a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche. The named insured on the policy
was listed as “Ion Construction LLC.” Alexander was the vice president, and
his father, Jason Matthews, was the president of Ion Construction LLC. J-A24019-22
Relevantly, on behalf of Ion Construction LLC, Alexander rejected UIM and
uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage.
Ion Construction LLC subsequently changed its name to Ion
Construction, Inc. Alexander was listed as the sole owner and corporate officer
of Ion Construction, Inc., and Jason was listed as an officer. In February 2016,
Erie issued an amended declarations page reflecting the name change of the
company from Ion Construction LLC to Ion Construction, Inc., and renewed
the policy without any coverage changes.
On April 15, 2017, Jason was driving the 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche in
Philadelphia, when he was rear ended and allegedly sustained injuries to his
neck and back. Subsequently, Jason made a claim for UIM coverage from Erie
under the policy. Erie denied the claim, noting that there was no UIM coverage
included in the policy, and that between the date of issuance and the date of
the subject accident that gave rise to this litigation, there were no paid
premiums for UIM benefits. In response, Jason argued that he is entitled to
UIM coverage because no agent or officer of Ion Construction, Inc. rejected
UIM coverage after formation of the corporation. To that end, Jason claims
that Erie was required to obtain a newly signed UIM rejection form after the
policy was amended to reflect the name change.
Erie filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, followed by an amended
complaint, seeking a determination that no UIM benefits are available under
the policy. After the parties conducted discovery, which included depositions
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of Jason and Alexander, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial
court denied the motion, finding that when Ion Construction LLC changed its
name to Ion Construction, Inc., and Erie changed the name on the policy, a
second policy was created which did not include a proper UIM rejection form,
and, therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the UIM
coverage was waived. The trial court also denied summary judgment because
depositions of any persons affiliated with Erie had not been conducted.
Erie filed an application to amend the order to include the language to
certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court failed to act on the
application, and it was deemed denied as a matter of law. Erie filed a petition
for review with this Court, which granted the petition and certified this case
for interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, Erie raises the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Erie’s] motion for summary judgment by finding that a 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731 statutorily prescribed uninsured/underinsured rejection waiver obtained on a commercial insurance policy at inception did not validly reject uninsured/underinsured benefits for the life of the policy solely by virtue of the named insured entity on the policy changing its corporate structure and/or name subsequent to waiver execution?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Erie’s] motion for summary judgment by finding that a change to the named insured entity’s corporate structure created a de facto “new” insurance policy that in turn required a second set of statutorily prescribed uninsured/underinsured rejection waivers to comply with the requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731?
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.1
Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under our Rules of Civil Procedure, a record that supports summary judgment will either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Thus, the trial court may only grant summary judgment where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.
Smith v. A.O. Smith Corp., 270 A.3d 1185, 1191-92 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(citations, brackets, quotation marks, and paragraph breaks omitted). “[T]he
issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact
presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question our standard of
review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made
by the trial court.” Id. at 1192 (citation and brackets omitted).
We will address Erie’s arguments together. Erie contends that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by denying its motion for summary judgment.
See Appellant’s Brief at 43. Noting that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731 governs the
rejection of UM/UIM benefits for personal and commercial policies, Erie asserts
that UIM rejection waivers remain valid for the life of the policy unless
____________________________________________
1 Neither Jason nor Ion Construction, Inc. has filed a brief in this case.
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affirmatively changed. See id. at 11-21; see also id. at 20-21, 33-34
(alleging that if a valid “Important Notice Form” is secured, as here, alongside
a UIM/UM rejection waiver, the insured is presumed to know the benefits and
limits available under the policy and no other notice or rejection is required).
Erie maintains that the trial court’s decision is not supported by case law or
the statutory language, noting that once the policy includes a UM/UIM
rejection waiver, the named insured must request a change in UM/UIM
coverage on the policy, even if a new vehicle or a new named insured is added
to the policy. See id. at 25-32.
Erie claims that the change in the corporate name from “Ion
Construction LLC” to “Ion Construction, Inc.” did not trigger a responsibility to
obtain a second UIM rejection waiver, emphasizing that the change in name
did not create a new corporation, and did not create a new policy or have any
bearing the validity of the initial UIM rejection, which was still enforceable.
See id. at 11, 21, 25-26, 28, 32-39; see also id. at 35-39 (noting that policy
number, coverage, and premiums remained the same on the policy). Erie
highlights that during their deposition, Alexander and Jason admitted that Ion
Construction, Inc. was formed for tax purposes; the Ion Construction name
was kept because of the familiarity to its client base; and the incorporated
company did the same work as the LLC. See id. at 22-25; see also id. 33-
34 (arguing that Ion Construction, Inc. was wholly owned by the same person,
Alexander, who executed the UIM rejection waiver when the company was
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known as Ion Construction, LLC, and therefore had an actual understanding
and notice of the rejection of such benefits). Erie maintains that there is no
continuing obligation on the insurance company to obtain new UM/UIM
rejection forms when the name on the policy changes. See id. at 30. Finally,
Erie argues that further depositions were unnecessary because the sole issue
was one of a legal nature and could be resolved with the policy and the
depositions already conducted, as this Court must resolve whether the UIM
rejection form complies with Section 1731. See id. at 39-43.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that in interpreting an automobile insurance policy, a court must view the policy in its entirety, giving effect to all of its provisions. An insurance policy must be read as a whole, and not in discrete units. The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a pure question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 275 A.3d 507, 511-12 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Section 1731 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Fiscal Responsibility Law
(“MVFRL”) governs UIM and UM coverage. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731. The
MVFRL mandates that insurers offer UIM coverage to insureds; nevertheless,
such coverage is optional. See id. § 1731(a) (stating that UIM and UM
coverage must be included in any insurance policy and that the purchase of
such coverage is optional). “Section 1731 provides that the insured must be
provided with specific information to explain the separate purposes of
U[M]/UIM coverage and must sign written rejection forms with certain stated
language in prominent type and location in order to knowingly and voluntarily
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reject each type of coverage.” Koch v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 280
A.3d 1060, 1066 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(b), (c)).
Further, under Section 1731(c), an insured’s “affirmative decision to waive
UIM coverage is presumed to be in effect throughout the lifetime of that policy
until ‘affirmatively changed’ by the insured.” Koch, 280 A.3d at 1067 (citation
omitted); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791 (stating that it is presumed “that the
insured has been advised of the benefits and limits available under this
chapter provided the following notice in bold print of at least ten-point type is
given to the applicant at the time of application for original coverage, and no
other notice or rejection shall be required[.]”).
Here, on February 9, 2015, Alexander signed a valid rejection of both
UIM and UM coverage for the 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche on behalf of Ion
Construction LLC. See Rejection of UIM Protection, 2/9/15; see also
Important Notice, 2/9/15 (providing notice to Alexander that he could
purchase UIM coverage). The Erie policy also advised that it contained no
protection for “damages caused by underinsured motorist.” See Policy
(Q020930685), 2/9/15, at 2 (unnumbered). During his deposition, Alexander
confirmed that he had signed the rejection of UIM coverage. See N.T.,
11/18/20, at 29.
Alexander testified that the corporation’s name was changed from Ion
Construction LLC to Ion Construction, Inc. for tax and liability purposes on the
advice of their accountant. See id. at 40; see also N.T., 12/16/20, at 88-89
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(wherein Jason confirmed that the company changed its name for tax
purposes). Alexander confirmed that the company’s work stayed the same
after the name change. See N.T., 11/18/20, at 41. Subsequently, Erie issued
an amended declarations on the policy, reflecting the company’s name
change. See Amended Declaration (#Q020930685), 2/9/16. The amended
declarations did not include any UIM or UM benefits and specifically stated
that there was no change in the premiums. See id. Jason further admitted
that after the name change of the corporation, the policy on the vehicle in
question was not cancelled and they kept paying the premiums. See N.T.,
12/16/20, at 109.
The trial court found that the corporate name change on the policy
constitutes a new policy, which required Erie to obtain a new UIM rejection
form from Ion Construction, Inc. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/30/22, at 5
(finding that two “policies were created, one for Ion Construction, LLC and one
for Ion Construction, Inc. As such, although Ion Construction, LLC was offered
and validly waived UIM coverage, Ion Construction, Inc. was not offered a
rejection of UIM form pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1731(c) and could not have
validly waived UIM coverage.”). However, the trial court’s conclusion ignores
the language of section 1791 that states once notice of available coverages
and the rejection of those coverages has been given, that decision carries
forward until affirmatively changed. Indeed, while not expressly addressing
the name change of the insured on a policy, this Court has previously held
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that a new request regarding coverage limits or the adding of a named insured
to a policy does not equate to the creation of a new policy and subsequent
requirement for the insurer to provide new UIM/UM rejection forms. See, e.g.,
Koch, 280 A.3d at 1068-69 (concluding that insured’s execution of valid UIM
benefits upon delivery of the original policy was still in effect despite insured’s
later request for more coverage on the policy); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
849 A.2d 277, 281 (Pa. Super. 2004) (concluding that insurer was not required
to provide a new UIM rejection form when insured sought to increase the
liability coverage on the existing policy, where he had previously rejected the
UIM benefits at the inception of the policy); Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 660
A.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Pa. Super. 1995) (concluding that daughter was bound
by mother’s prior reduction of benefits when the daughter’s name was added
to the policy, noting that the endorsement amending the policy to add
daughter’s name clearly provided the lower benefits). We see little difference
in being able to change liability limits or adding a named insured and a
corporation’s nominal name change on the policy, and the insurer’s continuing
ability to utilize a prior properly executed UIM coverage rejection form.
Here, Alexander executed a valid rejection of UIM coverage on behalf of
Ion Construction LLC in February 2015. The mere change from Ion
Construction LLC to Ion Construction, Inc. did not create a new entity, nor
does it affect the corporation’s property, rights or liabilities. See Smith, 270
A.3d at 1193 (“There is in effect but one corporation which merely changes
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its form and ordinarily ceases to exist upon the creation of the new corporation
which is its successor.” (citation omitted)); see also 18A Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 234 “(An authorized change in the name of a corporation has
no more effect on its identity as a corporation than a change of name of a
natural person has upon his or her identity; the corporation’s identity remains
unchanged. A corporate name change does not make a new corporation but
only gives the corporation a new name.” (footnotes omitted)); 18 C.J.S.
Corporations § 143 (“In general, a change in the corporate name does not
affect the identity, rights, or liabilities of the corporation. … The corporation
continues, as before, responsible in its new name for all debts or other
liabilities which it had previously contracted or incurred.” (footnote omitted)).
Indeed, Alexander admitted that the change from Ion Construction LLC to Ion
Construction, Inc. was done for tax purposes and the new company did the
same work as the old company. See N.T., 11/18/20, at 41; see also 18A Am.
Jur. 2d Corporations § 223 (“A change in a corporation’s name does not
establish a new corporation when the evidence shows that the name change
did not alter the identity of the corporate entity.”).
Moreover, the Amended Declaration, which reflected the changed name
of the insured, included the same insurance policy number and explicitly did
not include UIM or UM benefits. Importantly, after the corporate name change,
Ion Construction, Inc. continued to enjoy the savings on the premiums by
rejecting the UIM coverage and allowing coverage now would be awarding the
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corporation’s inaction in adding such coverage. See Kimball v. Cigna Ins.
Co., 660 A.2d 1386, 1389 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding a UM/UIM sign-down
form valid where “the plaintiff accepted the policy with the lower limits without
complaint and permitted payment of the lower premium without incident.”).
Significantly, as further support that the policy did not include UM/UIM
benefits at the time of the accident in April 2017, on October 4, 2017, Erie
issued an Amended Disclosure, which indicated that Ion Construction, Inc.,
had added UM/UIM benefits.
Accordingly, once Alexander properly rejected the UIM coverage on
behalf of Ion Construction LLC, it applied to Ion Construction, Inc., despite the
name change on the policy after the rejection form had been executed. See
generally Koch, 280 A.3d at 1066-67 (noting that change in insurance
company’s name did not result in the creation of a new company and the
insured’s policy remained the same); Breuninger v. Pennland Ins. Co., 675
A.2d 353, 358-59 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that the transfer of a motor
vehicle insurance policy from one company to another did not constitute a new
policy, as the policy number, coverage, and premium stayed the same
throughout the life of the policy). Therefore, under the facts of this case, the
policy did not include UIM coverage at the time of the accident, and Jason was
not entitled to UIM benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of
summary judgment in favor of Erie and remand with direction to enter
summary judgment in favor of Erie on its declaratory judgment claim.
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Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 1/25/2023
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