OPINION OF THE COURT
SINGLETON, Judge.
Jean C. Erickson was convicted of driving while intoxicated. AMC 9.28.020. She appeals contending that the trial court erred (1) in admitting certain evidence; (2) in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) in instructing the jury; and (4) in failing to sustain objections to the prosecutor’s arguments. All of these contentions rest on two propositions. Erickson first contends that a conviction for a violation of AMC 9.28.020 requires proof of the defendant’s blood-alcohol level at the time he drives a motor vehicle. Second, she claims that where the prosecutor’s case depends upon a blood-alcohol test administered to a defendant after he ceases driving, there must in addition be expert testimony providing a nexus between the results of the test and the driver’s blood-alcohol level at the earlier time when he was driving. See, e.g., Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App.1983) (where an inference from one specific fact to another fact requires reliance on a proposition of generalized knowledge, which is not subject to judicial notice, the proposition must be proved by expert testimony). We affirm the decision of the district court.
PART I
AMC § 9.28.020 provides:
Driving While Intoxicated.
A. It is unlawful for any person to commit the crime of driving while intoxicated.
B. A person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated if he or she operates, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle ...
2. when there is 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood or 100 milligrams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his or her blood, or when there is 0.10 gram or more of [965]*965alcohol per 210 liters of his or her breath as determined by a chemical test within four hours of the offense
We are satisfied that the assembly, by utilizing the language “as determined by a chemical test within four hours of his arrest ...intended to establish two presumptions when it enacted the foregoing ordinance: (1) that a “chemical test,” which includes a breathalyzer examination, accurately reflects a subject’s blood-alcohol level at the time it is administered and (2) that an examination of a subject conducted within four hours of his driving will result in a reading equal to or less than the actual blood-alcohol rate at the time of driving. Doyle v. State, 633 P.2d 306, 310 (Alaska App.1981).1 Presentation of these presumptions to the jury is governed by A.R.E. 303 which provides:
(a) Effect.
(1) Presumptions Directed Against an Accused. In all criminal cases when not otherwise provided for by statute, by these rules or by judicial decision, a presumption directed against the accused imposes no burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption and does not shift to the accused the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. However, if the accused fails to offer evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the court must instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proved fact, but no mention of the word “presumption” shall be made to the jury. If the accused offers evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the court may instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proved fact, but no mention of the word “presumption” shall be made to the jury.
In his commentary to A.R.E. 303, Professor Saltzburg explains the reasons for the rule and its intended operation as follows:
If a presumption cannot be binding on a defendant, what is its utility? Judge Weinstein identifies a two-fold function:
Presumptions are utilized to overcome two separate problems in federal law. Primarily this function is to lessen the prosecution’s burden of establishing guilt by authorizing short-cuts in proof and exerting pressure on the person with the most knowledge to come forward with an explanation
In addition, a presumption may serve the secondary function of making undesirable activities amenable to federal jurisdiction.
[966]*9661 Weinstein’s Evidence, Paragraph 303[01] (1975). The second function is of no concern to the states in their lawmaking activities. But a third function may be important. “In a borderline case a judge may be influenced by the legislative judgment of Congress [or a state legislature] to submit a basic fact to a jury which he would not have submitted as merely circustantial [sic] evidence of the presumed fact.” Id. Thus, the first and third functions are the important ones for the states. There also may be a fourth function — to make clear the intent of the legislature in special circumstances.
Subdivision (a) allows presumptions to perform their intended functions, but prevents them from exerting too great an impact on the outcome of a case. If a presumption is created by the legislature or the courts, it serves as an incentive for the accused to submit rebuttal evidence. If no rebuttal evidence or insufficient evidence is offered, the court, without using the word “presumption,” will instruct the jury that it may, but is not bound to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic fact. Such an instruction is couched purely in terms of a permissible inference; no attempt is made to guide the jury in assessing the sufficiency of the inference to prove guilt. This mandatory instruction is in the nature of a mild comment on the evidence. No good reason appears why the legislature or the courts cannot require a specific non-binding instruction when they deem it desirable.
If the accused offers evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the giving of an instruction is discretionary.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
SINGLETON, Judge.
Jean C. Erickson was convicted of driving while intoxicated. AMC 9.28.020. She appeals contending that the trial court erred (1) in admitting certain evidence; (2) in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) in instructing the jury; and (4) in failing to sustain objections to the prosecutor’s arguments. All of these contentions rest on two propositions. Erickson first contends that a conviction for a violation of AMC 9.28.020 requires proof of the defendant’s blood-alcohol level at the time he drives a motor vehicle. Second, she claims that where the prosecutor’s case depends upon a blood-alcohol test administered to a defendant after he ceases driving, there must in addition be expert testimony providing a nexus between the results of the test and the driver’s blood-alcohol level at the earlier time when he was driving. See, e.g., Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App.1983) (where an inference from one specific fact to another fact requires reliance on a proposition of generalized knowledge, which is not subject to judicial notice, the proposition must be proved by expert testimony). We affirm the decision of the district court.
PART I
AMC § 9.28.020 provides:
Driving While Intoxicated.
A. It is unlawful for any person to commit the crime of driving while intoxicated.
B. A person commits the crime of driving while intoxicated if he or she operates, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle ...
2. when there is 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood or 100 milligrams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his or her blood, or when there is 0.10 gram or more of [965]*965alcohol per 210 liters of his or her breath as determined by a chemical test within four hours of the offense
We are satisfied that the assembly, by utilizing the language “as determined by a chemical test within four hours of his arrest ...intended to establish two presumptions when it enacted the foregoing ordinance: (1) that a “chemical test,” which includes a breathalyzer examination, accurately reflects a subject’s blood-alcohol level at the time it is administered and (2) that an examination of a subject conducted within four hours of his driving will result in a reading equal to or less than the actual blood-alcohol rate at the time of driving. Doyle v. State, 633 P.2d 306, 310 (Alaska App.1981).1 Presentation of these presumptions to the jury is governed by A.R.E. 303 which provides:
(a) Effect.
(1) Presumptions Directed Against an Accused. In all criminal cases when not otherwise provided for by statute, by these rules or by judicial decision, a presumption directed against the accused imposes no burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption and does not shift to the accused the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. However, if the accused fails to offer evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the court must instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proved fact, but no mention of the word “presumption” shall be made to the jury. If the accused offers evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the court may instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proved fact, but no mention of the word “presumption” shall be made to the jury.
In his commentary to A.R.E. 303, Professor Saltzburg explains the reasons for the rule and its intended operation as follows:
If a presumption cannot be binding on a defendant, what is its utility? Judge Weinstein identifies a two-fold function:
Presumptions are utilized to overcome two separate problems in federal law. Primarily this function is to lessen the prosecution’s burden of establishing guilt by authorizing short-cuts in proof and exerting pressure on the person with the most knowledge to come forward with an explanation
In addition, a presumption may serve the secondary function of making undesirable activities amenable to federal jurisdiction.
[966]*9661 Weinstein’s Evidence, Paragraph 303[01] (1975). The second function is of no concern to the states in their lawmaking activities. But a third function may be important. “In a borderline case a judge may be influenced by the legislative judgment of Congress [or a state legislature] to submit a basic fact to a jury which he would not have submitted as merely circustantial [sic] evidence of the presumed fact.” Id. Thus, the first and third functions are the important ones for the states. There also may be a fourth function — to make clear the intent of the legislature in special circumstances.
Subdivision (a) allows presumptions to perform their intended functions, but prevents them from exerting too great an impact on the outcome of a case. If a presumption is created by the legislature or the courts, it serves as an incentive for the accused to submit rebuttal evidence. If no rebuttal evidence or insufficient evidence is offered, the court, without using the word “presumption,” will instruct the jury that it may, but is not bound to, infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic fact. Such an instruction is couched purely in terms of a permissible inference; no attempt is made to guide the jury in assessing the sufficiency of the inference to prove guilt. This mandatory instruction is in the nature of a mild comment on the evidence. No good reason appears why the legislature or the courts cannot require a specific non-binding instruction when they deem it desirable.
If the accused offers evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the giving of an instruction is discretionary. In instances where the nature of a presumption directed against the accused is such that the relationship between the proved fact and the presumed fact is self-evident or apparent, no instruction should normally be given by the court if the accused offers evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, since in such instances, a jury instruction would tend to emphasize unduly and unnecessarily the existence of the presumption. On the other hand, in circumstances where there is no obvious connection between the proved fact and the presumed fact, an instruction to the jury regarding the existence of the presumption would ordinarily be appropriate.
A good example of this latter situation would be the standard case involving the presumption created by a Breathalyzer examination. The proved fact in such a case would be a Breathalyzer reading of .10 percent blood alcohol or greater; the fact to be presumed from the proved fact is that the accused was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the test. Under normal circumstances, with no expert testimony concerning the significance of .10 percent blood alcohol level in terms of its effect on an individual’s sobriety, the mere awareness of the proved fact — i.e., the .10 percent blood alcohol level — would be meaningless to the average juror. Assuming the accused in such a situation was willing to concede the blood alcohol level, but opted to rebut the presumption by arguing that, despite the blood alcohol level, he was not in fact impaired, the mere establishment of blood alcohol level by the prosecution would be rendered wholly ineffective in the absence of a specific instruction to the jury concerning the presumption which arises from proof of a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or greater. It should be noted that the burden of coming forward is less onerous here than in Rule 301. This reflects a judgment that the defendant should have the benefit of reasonable doubts.
Commentary to A.R.E. 303 at 57-59.
The jury was instructed on two theories of driving while intoxicated. The jury was told:
The essential elements of the offense of driving while intoxicated in this case are as follows:
1. That at the time and place charged in the complaint, the defendant was operating or driving a motor vehicle in the Municipality of Anchorage, and
[967]*9672. At the time defendant operated said vehicle, he either,
(a) was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or,
(b) had 0.10 grams of alcohol or more per 210 liters of his breath.
While our view of the ordinance would have entitled the municipality to further instructions indicating the effect of the “presumptions” we believe established by the ordinance, defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of those instructions. In summary, we hold that the breathalyzer result alone established a prima facie case, entitling the municipality to go to the jury on the issue of Erickson’s blood-alcohol level at the time of her driving. The court did not err in its instructions or in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. By the same token, the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument were within the range of the evidence and not improper.
PART II
As an alternate holding, if we were to accept arguendo Erickson’s construction of the ordinance, we would reject her contention that the evidence presented to the jury would have been insufficient to enable it to determine that her blood-alcohol rate at the time she was driving exceeded the ordinance’s limitations. A fortiori, we would reject her contention that expert evidence was necessary to relate a person’s blood-alcohol rate at the time a test is administered to their blood-alcohol rate at an earlier time when they were driving.
On March 19, 1982, at 3:44 a.m., Anchorage Police Officer Joseph Roseman observed a small blue car being driven southbound on Minnesota Boulevard with only the parking lights illuminated. Officer Roseman observed the vehicle stop “abruptly” for the red light at the intersection of Tudor Road and Minnesota. After the light changed to green, the driver of the vehicle made a left turn on to Tudor from the middle lane of Minnesota. Officer Rose-man activated his overhead lights and his alternating front lights. Only when he turned on his siren, 200 to 300 yards later, did the vehicle pull over.
After approaching the vehicle, Officer Roseman asked to see Ms. Erickson’s driver’s license. After she produced it, she attempted to get out of the car, but had left it in gear so it started to roll backward. Officer Roseman told her to put her foot on the brake, which she did, and then she put the car in “park.”
Officer Roseman asked Ms. Erickson if she had been drinking; she responded affirmatively, “yes sir, a few beers.” Officer Roseman asked her to perform a few field-sobriety tests which she failed. Specifically, he asked her to count backward by fives from fifty. She could not do that completely. She also could not recite the entire alphabet in two attempts. Finally, she swayed front to back when asked to stand with her feet together, hands down to her sides, head tilted backward, and with her eyes closed. Based on her performance of these tests and her demeanor, Officer Rose-man concluded that Erickson was intoxicated.
After her arrest, Ms. Erickson was taken to the police station for the mandatory observation period and a breathalyzer examination, which was given to her at 4:14 a.m., twenty-eight minutes after Erickson was stopped by Roseman. The results showed slightly over 0.20 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Ms. Erickson was videotaped at that time.
We have previously held that such evidence may be offered to corroborate the results indicated by the breathalyzer, see Byrne v. State, 654 P.2d 795 (Alaska App.1982), or undermine them, see Denison v. Anchorage, 630 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Alaska App.1981). More importantly, we believe the evidence tends to show that Erickson’s alcohol level was elevated at the time she operated the vehicle and not merely at the time of the test. See State v. Clark, 286 Or. 33, 593 P.2d 123 (Or.1979), and State v. Swarengin, 12 Or.App. 290, 506 P.2d 729 (Or.App.1973). We therefore decline to follow the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dacey, 138 Vt. 491, 418 A.2d 856 [968]*968(Vt.1980) (expert testimony necessary to establish nexus between blood-alcohol level at time test administered and blood-alcohol level at time defendant operated vehicle).
Finally, Erickson argues that this view of the evidence violates the rule that when circumstantial evidence is relied on by the prosecution in opposition to a motion for judgment of acquittal, the evidence must be so conclusive as to exclude any other reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt. The Alaska Supreme Court has repudiated this test on a number of occasions holding that the same test should be applied to a determination of whether or not to grant a judgment of acquittal, whether the prosecution’s evidence is direct or circumstantial. See Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d 935, 940 (Alaska 1976); Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181, 184-85 (Alaska 1976).
Consequently, if we were to accept Erickson’s construction of the ordinance in question and hold that the municipality must prove, without the aid of any presumption, that her blood-alcohol level exceeded .10 at the time she operated her vehicle, we would conclude that reasonable people could find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in reliance on the evidence in this record. Under either interpretation of the ordinance, the trial court would not have erred in denying Erickson’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Jacobson v. State, 551 P.2d at 941.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.2