Knutson, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Hennepin County denying plaintiff’s motion for amended findings or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Ruth Erickson, his wife, had claimed a half interest in certain savings accounts which his wife had held in nominal joint tenancy with her mother and her sister, the defendant herein. The essential facts of the matter are as follows:
In 1951, Huida E. Dahlroos, mother of Ruth Erickson and Irma V. Kalman, had savings accounts in Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank of Minneapolis and in Minneapolis Savings and Loan Association (now Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association). On August 22, 1951, by written agreements with the institutions, Huida Dahlroos, together with her daughters, signed documents establishing joint ownership of the accounts by the three.1 On August 3, 1954, Huida Dahlroos, together with her [43]*43daughter Irma Kalman, caused to be placed in a joint and several account the savings account which Huida Dahlroos held at First Bloomington Lake National Bank of Minneapolis.
On December 7, 1965, Huida Dahlroos died intestate. At that time, the foregoing accounts contained the following amounts: $5,873.40 (Farmers & Mechanics); $11,477.73 (Minneapolis Savings); and $229.76 (Bloomington Lake). At the time of Hulda’s death, both daughters survived her; but on the same day, a few hours after the death of Huida, her daughter Ruth died intestate.
On May 17, 1966, Irma Kalman was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased mother, Huida Dahlroos, and on July 18, 1966, plaintiff was appointed administrator of the estate of his wife, Ruth Erickson.
As administrator of Ruth Erickson’s estate, plaintiff demanded of defendant Irma Kalman, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Huida Dahlroos, one half of the amount of the deposits in the three savings accounts. Defendant refused the demand and claimed the proceeds of those accounts as the survivor of the parties who had established them.
Plaintiff brought the present action to recover one half of each of the accounts, interest from the time of Hulda’s death, and double damages under Minn. St. 525.392, which provides, in part, that if any person converts to his own use any of the personal property of a decedent’s estate he shall be liable for [44]*44double the value of the property converted. The trial court denied all relief requested by plaintiff.
The issue presented on this appeal is whether the three bank accounts described above are “joint and several” accounts within the provisions of Minn. St. 48.30, and if so, what result follows from such a determination. Although slightly different language was employed in creating the accounts, we shall treat them as essentially identical.
Minn. St. 48.30 provides in relevant part:
“* * * When any deposit shall be made by or in the names of two or more persons upon joint and several account, the same, or any part thereof, and the dividends or interest thereon, may be paid to either of these persons or to a survivor of them, or to a personal representative of the survivor.”
It was the trial court’s position that from the evidence it was the apparent intent of Huida to dispose of the proceeds of the accounts to the survivor of the persons named therein.2 In its memorandum that court indicated two bases for this decision.
First, the court stressed the “arrangements” among the parties whereby the parties “agreed” in “contract” that the survivor was to take all as evidence of “the intent of the said Huida E. Dahlroos to dispose of the proceeds of said bank accounts to the survivor of the three named persons.” That the court seemed to treat this case as one of contract is evident from its quotation from Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 470, 47 N. W. (2d) 194, 196, wherein it was stated in reference to a “joint and several account”:
“* * * [W]e are forced to treat this case as presenting a contract question and must decide what the incidents of this type of ownership are primarily by reference to the terms of the contract creating it.”
[45]*45If the trial court was treating the case as one of contract, it was error for it to do so because this court considers deposits such as the ones before us to be in the nature of gifts and to be governed by the rules applicable to gifts. Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N. W. (2d) 607. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the case on this ground.
Second, in addition to the finding of “intent” which appears to be based on a “contract” view of the case, the trial court quoted from Cashman v. Mason (8 Cir.) 166 F. (2d) 693, 697, stating that there was no evidence to overcome the “rebuttable presumption that the residue of the deposit is the absolute property of the surviving party, who takes as a donee. * * * But this presumption in favor of a gift of an interest in the deposit arises only upon the death of the supposed donor.”
While the above quotation is a correct statement of the rebut-table presumption of “gift” arising from Minn. St. 48.30 as first expressed by this court in Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865, and most recently followed in Rutchick v. Salute, supra, it is our opinion that the trial court applied the presumption erroneously in this case.
The presumption arising from § 48.30 serves a dual function. First, it operates to establish the fact of gift. Rutchick v. Salute, supra. Second, it operates to ascertain those persons who are to receive the proceeds of joint and several accounts upon a donor’s death.
In the cases 3 which led to the statement of the presumption, there was no need to distinguish between these two aspects of the presumption because only one person was in the position of donee at the donor’s death. In those cases, proceeds would go to the only possible donee — the surviving party. Here, however, two parties named as joint account holders survived the donor.
[46]*46We agree with the trial court to the extent, if any, that he upheld the validity of the Farmers and Mechanics and Minneapolis Savings accounts as “gifts.” The only evidence in the record concerning these two accounts supports the presumption and the court’s determination of that aspect of the case. Irma Kalman was called for examination as an adverse party under Rule 43.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, and was asked why her mother had added the names of the two daughters to the two larger accounts. She answered:
“Well, she put — put it up like that so we would not have any trouble and that we would — that the books would go to our sisters — to her daughters or this surviving daughter. That is why she had the accounts put up like that.”
Later, when Irma was questioned about the purpose of adding the names of the two daughters to the two larger accounts, she stated :
“I didn’t have those accounts for — as a convenient account, I had them — she had put up her accounts so if anything happened to her, that she knew where her money was at and that it would go to her daughters or to her survivor. * * *”
Shortly afterward, Irma was asked whether the daughters’ names were added to the two larger accounts for the purpose of making testamentary gifts to them. She answered:
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Knutson, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Hennepin County denying plaintiff’s motion for amended findings or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Ruth Erickson, his wife, had claimed a half interest in certain savings accounts which his wife had held in nominal joint tenancy with her mother and her sister, the defendant herein. The essential facts of the matter are as follows:
In 1951, Huida E. Dahlroos, mother of Ruth Erickson and Irma V. Kalman, had savings accounts in Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank of Minneapolis and in Minneapolis Savings and Loan Association (now Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association). On August 22, 1951, by written agreements with the institutions, Huida Dahlroos, together with her daughters, signed documents establishing joint ownership of the accounts by the three.1 On August 3, 1954, Huida Dahlroos, together with her [43]*43daughter Irma Kalman, caused to be placed in a joint and several account the savings account which Huida Dahlroos held at First Bloomington Lake National Bank of Minneapolis.
On December 7, 1965, Huida Dahlroos died intestate. At that time, the foregoing accounts contained the following amounts: $5,873.40 (Farmers & Mechanics); $11,477.73 (Minneapolis Savings); and $229.76 (Bloomington Lake). At the time of Hulda’s death, both daughters survived her; but on the same day, a few hours after the death of Huida, her daughter Ruth died intestate.
On May 17, 1966, Irma Kalman was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased mother, Huida Dahlroos, and on July 18, 1966, plaintiff was appointed administrator of the estate of his wife, Ruth Erickson.
As administrator of Ruth Erickson’s estate, plaintiff demanded of defendant Irma Kalman, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Huida Dahlroos, one half of the amount of the deposits in the three savings accounts. Defendant refused the demand and claimed the proceeds of those accounts as the survivor of the parties who had established them.
Plaintiff brought the present action to recover one half of each of the accounts, interest from the time of Hulda’s death, and double damages under Minn. St. 525.392, which provides, in part, that if any person converts to his own use any of the personal property of a decedent’s estate he shall be liable for [44]*44double the value of the property converted. The trial court denied all relief requested by plaintiff.
The issue presented on this appeal is whether the three bank accounts described above are “joint and several” accounts within the provisions of Minn. St. 48.30, and if so, what result follows from such a determination. Although slightly different language was employed in creating the accounts, we shall treat them as essentially identical.
Minn. St. 48.30 provides in relevant part:
“* * * When any deposit shall be made by or in the names of two or more persons upon joint and several account, the same, or any part thereof, and the dividends or interest thereon, may be paid to either of these persons or to a survivor of them, or to a personal representative of the survivor.”
It was the trial court’s position that from the evidence it was the apparent intent of Huida to dispose of the proceeds of the accounts to the survivor of the persons named therein.2 In its memorandum that court indicated two bases for this decision.
First, the court stressed the “arrangements” among the parties whereby the parties “agreed” in “contract” that the survivor was to take all as evidence of “the intent of the said Huida E. Dahlroos to dispose of the proceeds of said bank accounts to the survivor of the three named persons.” That the court seemed to treat this case as one of contract is evident from its quotation from Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 470, 47 N. W. (2d) 194, 196, wherein it was stated in reference to a “joint and several account”:
“* * * [W]e are forced to treat this case as presenting a contract question and must decide what the incidents of this type of ownership are primarily by reference to the terms of the contract creating it.”
[45]*45If the trial court was treating the case as one of contract, it was error for it to do so because this court considers deposits such as the ones before us to be in the nature of gifts and to be governed by the rules applicable to gifts. Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N. W. (2d) 607. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the case on this ground.
Second, in addition to the finding of “intent” which appears to be based on a “contract” view of the case, the trial court quoted from Cashman v. Mason (8 Cir.) 166 F. (2d) 693, 697, stating that there was no evidence to overcome the “rebuttable presumption that the residue of the deposit is the absolute property of the surviving party, who takes as a donee. * * * But this presumption in favor of a gift of an interest in the deposit arises only upon the death of the supposed donor.”
While the above quotation is a correct statement of the rebut-table presumption of “gift” arising from Minn. St. 48.30 as first expressed by this court in Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N. W. 865, and most recently followed in Rutchick v. Salute, supra, it is our opinion that the trial court applied the presumption erroneously in this case.
The presumption arising from § 48.30 serves a dual function. First, it operates to establish the fact of gift. Rutchick v. Salute, supra. Second, it operates to ascertain those persons who are to receive the proceeds of joint and several accounts upon a donor’s death.
In the cases 3 which led to the statement of the presumption, there was no need to distinguish between these two aspects of the presumption because only one person was in the position of donee at the donor’s death. In those cases, proceeds would go to the only possible donee — the surviving party. Here, however, two parties named as joint account holders survived the donor.
[46]*46We agree with the trial court to the extent, if any, that he upheld the validity of the Farmers and Mechanics and Minneapolis Savings accounts as “gifts.” The only evidence in the record concerning these two accounts supports the presumption and the court’s determination of that aspect of the case. Irma Kalman was called for examination as an adverse party under Rule 43.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, and was asked why her mother had added the names of the two daughters to the two larger accounts. She answered:
“Well, she put — put it up like that so we would not have any trouble and that we would — that the books would go to our sisters — to her daughters or this surviving daughter. That is why she had the accounts put up like that.”
Later, when Irma was questioned about the purpose of adding the names of the two daughters to the two larger accounts, she stated :
“I didn’t have those accounts for — as a convenient account, I had them — she had put up her accounts so if anything happened to her, that she knew where her money was at and that it would go to her daughters or to her survivor. * * *”
Shortly afterward, Irma was asked whether the daughters’ names were added to the two larger accounts for the purpose of making testamentary gifts to them. She answered:
“Well, I don’t know what you mean by ‘testamentary gift.’ What I am saying is that at the time of her death, that it would go to her daughters or to her surviving daughter. That is why she had those books drawn up like that. She did not want it to go into hands that — outside of the family.”
On direct examination, when Irma was asked if she and her mother had fully discussed the significance of the joint tenancy aspect of the account before going down to the bank, she replied:
“Yes. My mother had wanted to put her daughters’ names onto the accounts so there wouldn’t be any trouble or any ques[47]*47tion as to — if anything happened to her, that she wanted it set up so it would go to her daughters or to her surviving daughter.”
This evidence is sufficient to uphold the validity of the two larger accounts against any contention that they were mere “convenience” accounts whereby no gift was intended.
In contrast, the evidence concerning the First Bloomington Lake account clearly indicates that this account was established only for convenience.
Since requisite donative intent was lacking as to that account, it cannot be sustained as a “gift.” Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, supra. Therefore, the proceeds of this account are to be distributed as a part of the estate of Huida Dahlroos.
In applying the presumption which arises from § 48.30, the trial court obviously felt that the focus of the presumption was on the surviving party. Accordingly, the trial court placed the burden of presenting at least some evidence to meet the presumption on the representative of Ruth’s estate, who claimed that the accounts here were not owned absolutely by Irma, the surviving party. This construction of the presumption is understandable because the presumption was framed with the two-party situation in mind. Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, supra. However, the trial court failed to observe that the presumption arises on the death of the donor.
Minn. St. 48.30, from which the presumption arises, does not speak in terms of a single survivor. Rather, it states that proceeds of joint and several accounts “may be paid to either of these persons or to a survivor of them, or to a personal representative of the survivor.” Thus, absent other circumstances, a bank may pay to “a survivor” without liability to other named joint and several account payees or their representatives. This statutory language clearly refers to any survivor. Any other reading of “a survivor” necessarily eliminates some of the protection for banks which the statute was intended to provide. In re Estate of Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N. W. (2d) 473; Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, supra.
[48]*48Bearing this in mind, we feel that the presumption makes the most sense when viewed as arising upon the death of the donor in favor of each of the parties to whom the bank could make payment of the jointly held funds without legal liability to the other surviving co-owners. In this case, at the instant of the donor-mother’s death, there arose a rebuttable presumption that the residue in the accounts was the absolute property of the surviving parties. This included both daughters, Irma and Ruth.
The view of the presumption taken by the trial court placed the burden of offering evidence to rebut the presumption on the representative of Ruth, the deceased daughter. The burden was properly on Irma, the survivor, who claimed that the money was to go to her alone. In a case where the question is as close as the one before us, failure of the trial court to place the risk of non-presentation of evidence to rebut the presumption on the proper party is reversible error.
Normally, our determination that the risk of nonpresentation of evidence to rebut the presumption has been wrongly placed at trial would necessitate a new trial. However, on the facts of this case we see no need to remand for a new trial regarding the two larger accounts, and we reverse the trial court as a matter of law.
From our review of the record we are in accord with the assessment of the trial court that the evidence presented was not sufficient to rebut the presumption, with the qualification, overlooked by that court, that the presumption arose in favor of both Irma and Ruth. In saying this, we are aware that the presumption “disappears the moment evidence is presented negating the gift.” Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 263, 179 N. W. (2d) 607, 611. The only testimony in the record bearing on the issue of Hulda’s intent is contained in the quotations from the testimony of Irma, supra. This is ambiguous at best and is insufficient to rebut the presumption. Notwithstanding intimations to the contrary in Rutchick v. Salute, supra, the presumption is dispositive of the issue in the absence of countervailing evidence.
[49]*49Accordingly, the proceeds of the Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank account and of the Minneapolis Savings and Loan Association account are to be equally distributed to the daughters or their representatives. The proceeds of the First Bloomington Lake National Bank account are to be distributed to Irma Kalman as administratrix of the estate of Huida Dahlroos.
We find no merit in plaintiff’s contention that defendant is liable for double damages for the value of converted assets. Minn. St. 525.892.
Reversed.