UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
ERICK DE JESUS FIGUEROA PEREZ, proceeding by his next friend DORALIS GOMEZ CARMONA, Case No. 1:26-cv-2340
Petitioner, Honorable Jane M. Beckering
v.
MATTHEW PUTRA,
Respondent. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, proceeding by his next friend, Ms. Doralis Gomez Carmona, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, he challenges the constitutionality of his current detention following an order issued by the Elizabeth Immigration Court denying him bond, and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Ms. Gomez Carmona to proceed as next friend of Petitioner in this action. Respondents to release Petitioner or provide Petitioner with a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) In an Order entered on August 20, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondent filed his response and a recording of the
August 6, 2026, bond hearing on August 25, 2026. (Resp., ECF No. 6; Recording of Aug. 6, 2026, Bond Hearing, filed on Aug. 25, 2026). II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Gomez Carmona may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which [she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Ms. Gomez Carmona, Petitioner’s legal spouse, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Gomez Carmona to proceed as next friend to Petitioner. III. Relevant Factual Background Petitioner is a citizen of Colombia who entered the United States in 2017. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) He overstayed his visitor visa. (Id.) On July 27, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE in Pennsylvania. (Id.) On August 6, 2026, Petitioner received a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). (Immigration
Judge Order, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) At the conclusion of the August 6, 2026, hearing, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for bond because Petitioner “failed to establish that he is not a flight risk, nor that any amount of bond would mitigate his flight risk.” (Id.) IV. Analysis Respondent argues that the Court should deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition due to a lack of jurisdiction and Petitioner’s failure to exhaust Petitioner’s administrative remedies, as well as on the merits. The Court has fully addressed these issues and Respondent’s arguments in Soto-Medina v. Lynch, 817 F. Supp. 3d 612 (W.D. Mich. 2026). Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Soto- Medina, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
ERICK DE JESUS FIGUEROA PEREZ, proceeding by his next friend DORALIS GOMEZ CARMONA, Case No. 1:26-cv-2340
Petitioner, Honorable Jane M. Beckering
v.
MATTHEW PUTRA,
Respondent. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, proceeding by his next friend, Ms. Doralis Gomez Carmona, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, he challenges the constitutionality of his current detention following an order issued by the Elizabeth Immigration Court denying him bond, and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Ms. Gomez Carmona to proceed as next friend of Petitioner in this action. Respondents to release Petitioner or provide Petitioner with a bond hearing where the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) In an Order entered on August 20, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondent filed his response and a recording of the
August 6, 2026, bond hearing on August 25, 2026. (Resp., ECF No. 6; Recording of Aug. 6, 2026, Bond Hearing, filed on Aug. 25, 2026). II. Next Friend Status As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Gomez Carmona may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which [she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements” because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163. In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Ms. Gomez Carmona, Petitioner’s legal spouse, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Gomez Carmona to proceed as next friend to Petitioner. III. Relevant Factual Background Petitioner is a citizen of Colombia who entered the United States in 2017. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25.) He overstayed his visitor visa. (Id.) On July 27, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by ICE in Pennsylvania. (Id.) On August 6, 2026, Petitioner received a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). (Immigration
Judge Order, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19.) At the conclusion of the August 6, 2026, hearing, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for bond because Petitioner “failed to establish that he is not a flight risk, nor that any amount of bond would mitigate his flight risk.” (Id.) IV. Analysis Respondent argues that the Court should deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition due to a lack of jurisdiction and Petitioner’s failure to exhaust Petitioner’s administrative remedies, as well as on the merits. The Court has fully addressed these issues and Respondent’s arguments in Soto-Medina v. Lynch, 817 F. Supp. 3d 612 (W.D. Mich. 2026). Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Soto- Medina, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Conclusion The Court will order Respondent to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, at which time the government will have the burden to demonstrate dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, within five business days and with notice to the Parties as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondent to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: September 9, 2026 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge