Erich S. Lamas v. Markus Hopkins; Steven Witt; Matt McConnell; Natalie (Wonder) Rose; Gina VonHeim; Meghan Erickson; Megan Schwartz; Cassandra Sammons; Juliana Uher; Erik Elgan; Kelly Slater; Jared Lee; Clarissa Shah; Melanie W.; Sarah Wright

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 9, 2026·No. 1:26-cv-05473·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ERICH S. LAMAS, Plaintiff, -against- MARKUS HOPKINS; STEVEN WITT; MATT 26-CV-5473 (LLS) MCCONNELL; NATALIE (WONDER) ROSE; GINA VONHEIM; MEGHAN ERICKSON; ORDER OF DISMISSAL MEGAN SCHWARTZ; CASSANDRA WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD SAMMONS; JULIANA UHER; ERIK ELGAN; KELLY SLATER; JARED LEE; CLARISSA SHAH; MELANIE W.; SARAH WRIGHT, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, a New York resident who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging violations of state law related to statements allegedly made about him on social media platforms. He names as defendants: (1) Markus Hopkins; (2) Steven Witt; (3) Matt McConnell; (4) Natalie (Wonder) Rose; (5) Gina VonHeim; (6) Meghan Erickson; (7) Megan Schwartz; (8) Cassandra Sammons; (9) Juliana Uher; (10) Erik Elgan; (11) Kelly Slater; (12) Jared Lee; (13) Clarissa Shah; (14) Melanie W.; and (15) Sarah Wright. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Plaintiff also filed a motion for permission to participate in electronic case filing and a document that he styles as a motion for a pre-discovery subpoena for production of documents under Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) By separate order, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days’ leave to replead; (2) grants Plaintiff’s motion for permission to participate in electronic filing; and (4) denies Plaintiff’s request for relief under Rule 27. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff is a New York resident “engaged in legitimate business activities with established business relationships, contracts, and economic interests.” (ECF No. 1, at 1.) Defendants “are individuals employed by or associated with a social media platform, whose addresses are to be obtained through discovery.” (Id.)

The complaint appears to suggest that unidentified persons made defamatory statements about Plaintiff on an unspecified social media platform, and despite Defendants allegedly knowing that the statements were false, Defendants took no action to remove the allegedly false statements from the platform. (Id.) Defendants themselves also made false statements about Plaintiff, despite knowing that the statements were not true, and suspended his social media account. (Id. at 1-2.) As a result of Defendants’ actions, “Plaintiff suffered loss of business

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. relationships, loss of prospective opportunities, severe reputational harm, account suspension, significant financial damages, emotional distress, and costs of legal defense.” (Id. at 2.) DISCUSSION A. Subject matter jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has

jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.

574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”). To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188- 89 (2d Cir. 1996). In the complaint, Plaintiff states that this court has federal question jurisdiction of the claims in this action (ECF No. 1, at 1), but the facts in the complaint are not sufficient to allow

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Erich S. Lamas v. Markus Hopkins; Steven Witt; Matt McConnell; Natalie (Wonder) Rose; Gina VonHeim; Meghan Erickson; Megan Schwartz; Cassandra Sammons; Juliana Uher; Erik Elgan; Kelly Slater; Jared Lee; Clarissa Shah; Melanie W.; Sarah Wright, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Erich S. Lamas v. Markus Hopkins; Steven Witt; Matt McConnell; Natalie (Wonder) Rose; Gina VonHeim; Meghan Erickson; Megan Schwartz; Cassandra Sammons; Juliana Uher; Erik Elgan; Kelly Slater; Jared Lee; Clarissa Shah; Melanie W.; Sarah Wright (Erich S. Lamas v. Markus Hopkins; Steven Witt; Matt McConnell; Natalie (Wonder) Rose; Gina VonHeim; Meghan Erickson; Megan Schwartz; Cassandra Sammons; Juliana Uher; Erik Elgan; Kelly Slater; Jared Lee; Clarissa Shah; Melanie W.; Sarah Wright) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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