Eric Williams v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 26, 2022
DocketDC-3330-18-0427-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Eric Williams v. Department of Defense (Eric Williams v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eric Williams v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ERIC WILLIAMS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-3330-18-0427-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: August 26, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Eric Williams, North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.

Katherine Largo Yourth, Esquire, Richmond, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) of 1998. On petition for review, the appellant argues that he is entitled to corrective action because he proved that the agency violated

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

his veterans’ preference rights, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 3311(2) and 3319, 2 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), and another provision that appears to be from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Delegated Examining Operations Handbook (DEOH), 3 by rating him ineligible based only on his occupational assessme nt; by rating him ineligible, regardless, because his response to Question #1 of the assessment showed that he rated himself as minimally qualified ; by failing to place him in the highest category; and by selecting a nonveteran over him without following the passover procedures. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 5, 9- 12. He also argues that the administrative judge was biased because he ruled for the agency, declined his request for a hearing, failed to issue a close of record order, and denied him an opportunity to respond to the agency’s evidence before issuing the initial decision. Id. at 6-10. ¶2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fac t; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

2 The appellant argues that the agency violated the passover procedures identifi ed in 5 U.S.C. § 3318, which apply to the traditional rating and ranking process. Here, the agency utilized category rating in making a selection for the position at issue. Initial Appeal File, Tab 5 at 49. Section 3319 sets forth the process for utilizing category rating, including the procedures for placing preference-eligible candidates in categories in accordance with their veterans’ preference and passing over preference -eligible candidates. 5 U.S.C. § 3319(a), (b), (c)(7). We therefore construe the appellant’s argument as raising a section 3319 claim. 3 See Office of Personnel Management, Delegated Examining Operations Handbook, chapter 5, section B at 105 (May 2007), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data- oversight/hiring-information/competitive-hiring/deo_handbook.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2022). 3

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to address the appellant’s claims that the administrative judge committed rever sible procedural errors and to consider in more detail his arguments that were not addressed below, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶3 The administrative judge did not address whether the agency allowed the appellant to credit all of his experience when completing the assessment. Under 5 U.S.C. § 3311, a preference eligible is entitled to have a broad range of prior experience considered, including relevant military experience and experience gained “in religious, civic, welfare, service, and organizational activities.” No aspect of the application materials restricted the appellant from considering that type of experience in assessing whether he met the specialized experience requirement for the position and in selecting the most appropriate response to Question #2 of the assessment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 21, 47-48; see 5 U.S.C. § 3311; cf. Kirkendall v. Department of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318, 1324-25 (2009) (finding that the agency violated the veterans’ preference rights afforded to the preference-eligible applicant under 5 U.S.C. § 3311 by failing to consider his relevant military experience in determining his eligibility). Rather, the announcement apprised applicants that such experience would be credited. IAF, Tab 5 at 47-48. To the extent that the appellant did not consider those experiences in selecting an answer to Question #2, that error is attributable to him, not the agency. ¶4 Further, the appellant’s claim that the DEOH required the agency to consider his application attachments in determining his eligibility is without merit. PFR File, Tab 2 at 11-12; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 4. The DEOH is not a statute or regulation and therefore cannot support a claim for 4

corrective action under VEOA. Cf. Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 117 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 9 (2012) (finding that, to the extent the appellant alleged that the agency violated OPM’s VetGuide, he failed to nonfrivolously allege a violation of statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference). Because the appellant rated himself not minimally qualified in his assessment, he was not entitled to be considered for the next phases of the selection process, such as being placed in a category in accordance with his veterans’ preference. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6; IAF, Tab 5 at 10-12, 18, 20-21, 47-48; see Harellson v. U.S. Postal Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 534, 539 (2010) (observing that no authority requires that a preference eligible be considered at every stage of the selection process); Dale v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R.

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Eric Williams v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eric-williams-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2022.