Eric Thompson v. Riverside Community College District

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 11, 2024
• Docket: 23-55743
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC THOMPSON, No. 23-55743

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:23-cv-00138-SSS-SHK v.

RIVERSIDE COMMUNITY COLLEGE MEMORANDUM* DISTRICT; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and BADE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.

Plaintiff Eric Thompson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. complaint without leave to amend because the district court determined that

collateral estoppel barred Thompson’s claims. Because we assume the parties’

familiarity with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court appropriately dismissed Thompson’s complaint. Claim

preclusion bars Thompson from asserting his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in federal court. Claim preclusion “extend[s] to state administrative adjudications

of legal as well as factual issues, even if unreviewed, so long as the state

proceeding satisfies the requirements of fairness outlined” in United States v. Utah

Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). Miller v. County of Santa

Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (quoting Guild Wineries

& Distilleries v. Whitehall Co., 853 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1988)). Utah

Construction requires that (1) “the administrative agency act in a judicial

capacity,” (2) “the agency resolve disputed issues of fact properly before it,” and

(3) “the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Id. at 1033. Thompson’s

administrative appeal was conducted in an adversary proceeding before an

arbitrator, where the parties could call witnesses to testify under oath, introduce

documentary evidence, make opening and closing statements, and hire

representation. See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927–28 (9th Cir.

2012) (setting forth factors to consider in determining whether an administrative

2 proceeding is entitled to preclusive effect). Because the arbitrator issued a written

opinion, resolving factual questions before him, and because the California state

courts reviewed that opinion, the administrative decision is subject to preclusive

effect in this action.1 See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038 (“[W]e reiterate our longstanding

policy, arising out of concerns of comity and finality, of respecting state court

systems for review of administrative decisions.”).

Claim preclusion applies here because the causes of action asserted in the

complaint filed in federal court would “involve the same injury to [Thompson]”

and thus “the same primary right” as that asserted in the arbitration. Furnace v.

Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying California law). The

primary right asserted in the arbitration was Thompson’s right to continued

employment. See Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 64, 66, 72

(Ct. App. 1992), disapproved of on other grounds in Johnson v. City of Loma

Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 881 (Cal. 2000).2 The district court thus appropriately

dismissed Thompson’s complaint. See United States v. Charette, 893 F.3d 1169,

1 The preclusive effect also applies to the individual defendants sued in their official capacities. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038. 2 The cases cited by Thompson are either inapposite because they relate to arbitration provisions under collective bargaining agreements not at issue here or simply do not address claim preclusion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358, 359 (Ct. App. 2003); Ortega v. Contra Costa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 2007); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).

3 1175 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We may affirm on any grounds supported by the

record.”).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

the complaint. Nothing in Thompson’s Opening Brief indicates that the Title VII

claim he wishes to assert in an amended complaint would involve a distinct

primary right from the right to continued employment. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59

F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the

denial of a motion for leave to amend.”).

AFFIRMED.