E.R. v. D.D.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 2, 2016
Docket1505 WDA 2015
StatusUnpublished

This text of E.R. v. D.D. (E.R. v. D.D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
E.R. v. D.D., (Pa. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

J-A04045-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

E.R., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

D.D.,

Appellant No. 1505 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County Civil Division at No(s): 2007-673

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 2, 2016

Appellant, D.D. (“Mother”), appeals pro se from the order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Elk County in this child custody matter, in which E.R.

(“Father”) received additional physical custody of the parties’ daughter,

P.E.R. (“Child”). We affirm.

We summarize the history of this case as follows. Mother and Father

were married on October of 2005 and separated in May of 2007, when

Mother was several months pregnant with Child. Child was born in January

of 2008. Father then filed for visitation. Mother agreed to the visitation and

the parties eventually divorced. Father has since remarried. Mother resides

in Emporium, Pennsylvania, and Father lives in St. Marys, Pennsylvania.

In March of 2011, the trial court entered a custody order directing that

Mother would have physical custody of Child (then three years old) from J-A04045-16

10:00 a.m. on Monday until 12:00 p.m. on Thursday, and Father would have

physical custody of Child from 12:00 p.m. on Thursday until 10:00 a.m. on

Monday. On November 30, 2012, Father filed a petition to modify custody.

On March 12, 2013, the parties stipulated to the entry of a court order

setting out in detail the periods of custody each parent would receive.1

Although the basic weekly time frame for custody was not altered by the

trial court’s order, it did set forth greater detail regarding custody for

vacations and holidays, and provisions for travel and transportation.

Paragraph six of the court order provided as follows: “6. The parties agree

that [Child] shall attend the St. Marys Area School District commencing in

kindergarten and Mother will relocate to St. Marys Area School District.”

Custody Order, 3/12/13, at 9.

On October 14, 2014, Mother filed a pro se petition to modify custody

in which she sought primary physical custody of Child and permission to

relocate Child to an Emporium school in Cameron County. In her petition,

Mother alleged that she did not have the financial capacity to move to St.

Marys. Petition to Modify Custody, 10/14/14, at 2. In addition, in

paragraph four of her pro se petition, Mother stated the following: “4.

[Mother] has been driving [Child] to and fro[m] school daily and is under

financial strain to continue to afford to drive this far daily[.]” Id. ____________________________________________

1 Both parties were represented by counsel at the time the stipulation was accepted by the trial court and reduced to an order.

-2- J-A04045-16

The parties participated in court-ordered custody evaluations. The

matter eventually proceeded to a custody hearing before the Honorable

Richard A. Masson, President Judge of Elk County, on June 23, 2015. On

August 6, 2015, the trial court entered an order modifying physical custody

in favor of Father and keeping Child in her current school district. On August

11, 2015, the trial court authored a detailed opinion setting forth its general

findings of fact and its statutory-factor findings. Mother filed this pro se

appeal on September 2, 2015. The trial court did not direct Mother to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

opinion on September 25, 2015.

Prior to discussing the substantive issues raised by Mother on appeal,

we first consider Father’s contention that Mother’s appeal should be quashed

or dismissed because of Mother’s failure to comply with provisions of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure relating to the filing of the notice

of appeal in family fast track cases. Father’s Brief at 4-5. We have

reviewed the record before us and observe that Mother has failed to fully

comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, as alleged.2

Although this Court may dismiss or quash an appeal based upon an

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, it has been alleged that Mother’s appeal failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 904(a) (relating to the proper form of the notice of appeal) and (f) (explaining the notice of appeal should advise the appellate court that the appeal is a children’s fast track), and Pa.R.A.P. 906(a) (relating to service of notice of appeal).

-3- J-A04045-16

appellant’s failure to follow the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,

because her violations have not hampered the presentation of the appeal to

this Court, and we are able to discern the issues raised by Mother on appeal,

we decline to dismiss or quash in this instance. In re J.F., 27 A.3d 1017,

1019-1020 (Pa. Super. 2011). See also Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d

1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2006) (deciding issues raised on appeal by pro se

appellant because, “[d]espite the numerous defects in his brief, we are able

to identify [a]ppellant’s issues”). Thus, we will proceed with our review.

In her pro se brief, Mother presents the following issues for our

review, which we reproduce verbatim:

1. Whether or not the trial committed an error in law and or abused its discretion by taking the appellants custody time away when even the father wanted to keep the previous order the same?

2. Whether or not the trial committed an error in law or abused its discretion by making finding of facts that was contrary to the sufficient evidence or testimony presented?

3. Whether or not the trial committed an error in law or abused its discretion by ignoring the findings and report by Daniel Keysor, the clinical custody evaluator and not having him present in court but allowing the plaintiff to argue the report and aluding to a prior relationship between the appellant and the evaluator?

4. Whether or not the trial committed an error in law or abused its discretion by not giving the proper weight to all thje factors that are in the best interest of the child?

5. Whether or not the trial made an error in law or abused its discretion by giving more time to the father or appellee after he admitted in court to using alcohol with methadone and Percocet, and the evaluator finding an addiction?

-4- J-A04045-16

Mother’s Brief at 4.

Initially, we observe that Mother’s pro se brief fails to conform to

multiple rules of appellate procedure pertaining to the construction of

appellate briefs. In particular, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

2119 addresses the argument section of appellate briefs and provides, in

part, as follows:

Rule 2119. Argument

(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have…such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

“The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each

question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of

pertinent authority.” Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.

Super. 2002). “Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ketterer v. Seifert
902 A.2d 533 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Wilkins v. Marsico
903 A.2d 1281 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Estate of Haiko v. McGinley
799 A.2d 155 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2002)
Commonwealth v. Hardy
918 A.2d 766 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
Rizzo v. Haines
555 A.2d 58 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Smith v. Smith
637 A.2d 622 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
Commonwealth v. Stafford
749 A.2d 489 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
Fillmore v. Hill
665 A.2d 514 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
In the Interest of J.F.
27 A.3d 1017 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
IRWIN UNION NAT. BANK AND TRUST v. Famous
4 A.3d 1099 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2010)
Keasbey Trust
47 A.2d 674 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1946)
Jackson v. Beck
858 A.2d 1250 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Lackner v. Glosser
892 A.2d 21 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
M.A.T. v. G.S.T.
989 A.2d 11 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2010)
E.D. v. M.P.
33 A.3d 73 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
J.R.M. v. J.E.A.
33 A.3d 647 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
C.R.F. v. S.E.F
45 A.3d 441 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2012)
M.O. v. J.T.R.
85 A.3d 1058 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)
Coulter v. Ramsden
94 A.3d 1080 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
E.R. v. D.D., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/er-v-dd-pasuperct-2016.