Equitable Trust Co. v. FINANCE COM'N OF TX

99 S.W.3d 384, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1625, 2003 WL 365954
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 21, 2003
Docket03-01-00676-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 99 S.W.3d 384 (Equitable Trust Co. v. FINANCE COM'N OF TX) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Equitable Trust Co. v. FINANCE COM'N OF TX, 99 S.W.3d 384, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1625, 2003 WL 365954 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

DAVID PURYEAR, Justice.

Appellant Equitable Trust Company (“Equitable”) challenges the validity of an administrative rule promulgated by appel-lee Finance Commission of Texas (“the Commission”) that establishes the method by which the appellee Texas Department of Banking (“the Department”) assesses examination fees of trust companies. See 7 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.22 (2002) (“Rule 17.22”). Equitable contends that the method provided in Rule 17.22 does not result in a “ratable” examination fee as required by the unambiguous governing statute, Texas Finance Code section 181.003(4) (“Section 181.003”). See Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 181.003(a)(4) (West 2003). 1 Because we conclude that Rule 17.22’s calculation method results in ratable and equitable fees, we will affirm the district court’s judgment.

Procedural Background

In May 1999, following Equitable’s annual examination, the Department assessed Equitable an examination fee of $8,628.91. Equitable requested an administrative hearing and contended that Rule 17.22 was invalid because the rule’s examination fee assessment method did not result in a “ratable” fee and therefore the rule failed to comply with the governing statute. 2 See 7 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.22(d). Equitable tendered to the Department $6,500, the portion of the fee it was not disputing. 3 Following an evi-dentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a proposal for decision (“PFD”) recommending that Rule 17.22’s calculation method resulted in a ratable fee and the rule was valid. The Banking Commissioner, by order, adopted the PFD and the ALJ’s related findings of fact and conclusions of law and upheld the Department’s assessment of Equitable’s 1999 examination fee. Equitable asked the Commission to review the Banking Commissioner’s order. Following a hearing, a review of the administrative record, and a vote by the Commis *386 sion, the Commission’s chair signed an order affirming the Banking Commissioner’s order.

Equitable sought judicial review of the administrative orders and also requested declaratory relief that Rule 17.22 was invalid because the examination fee calculation method did not result in a ratable fee as required by the governing statute, Section 181.003. 4 See Tex. FimCode Ann. § 181.204 (West Supp.2003); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 2001.17, .038 (West 2000). The district court ruled that the examination fee calculation method complied with the governing statute and that Rule 17.22 was valid, affirmed the administrative orders, and denied Equitable’s request for a declaration that Rule 17.22 was invalid.

Discussion

On appeal, Equitable continues to maintain that Rule 17.22 is invalid on the basis that the rale’s method for computing trust company examination fees does not result in ratable examination fees as required by the unambiguous governing statutory provision, Section 181.003.

Applicable statutes and administrative rule

Trust companies operating in Texas are regulated by the Department. See generally Texas Trust Company Act, Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 181.001-.308 (West Supp. 2003). By statute, Texas trust companies bear the costs of regulation, which includes the cost of examinations. See id. § 181.105 (West Supp.2003). The Texas Legislature provided the Commission with broad discretion to recover the regulatory costs and the costs of enforcement in any manner that results in the imposition and collection of ratable and equitable fees. See id. § 181.003. Section 181.003 provides in pertinent part:

(a) The finance commission may adopt rules to accomplish the purposes of this Act, including rules necessary or reasonable to:
(4) provide for recovery of the cost of maintenance and operation of the department and the cost of enforcing this Act through the imposition and collection of ratable and equitable fees for notices, applications, and examinations.

Id. § 181.003(a)(4). Pursuant to this authority, the Commission adopted Rule 17.22, which establishes the calculation method of assessing ratable and equitable examination fees for trust companies. Under Rule 17.22, each trust company is required to pay an examination fee calculated in the following manner:

§ 17.22 Examination and Investigation Fees.

(a) Calculation of Fees. A trust company shall pay to the department a fee for examination, whether a regular or special examination, or for an investigation in connection with an application, calculated at a uniform rate of $500 per examiner per day, to recoup the salary expense of examiners plus a proportionate share of the department’s overhead allocable to the examination or investigation function. The commissioner may lower the uniform rate without the prior approval of the finance commission.
(b) Travel Expenses. In connection with an examination or investigation, *387 a trust company shall reimburse the department for actual travel expenses incurred, including mileage, public transportation, food, and lodging, in addition to paying the fees set forth in subsection (a) of this section.

7 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.22.

Statutory construction

In construing a statute, the objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. See Steering Comms. for Cities v. Public Util. Comrn’n, 42 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (citing Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000)). Construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, as long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. See Steering Committees for Cities, 42 S.W.3d at 300. This is particularly true when the statute involves a complex subject matter. Id. Courts however, “do not defer to administrative interpretation in regard to questions which do not he within administrative expertise, or deal with a nontechnical question of law.” Rylander v. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 291, 302 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (quoting 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.04, at 23-24 (6th ed.2000)).

Equitable’s arguments

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99 S.W.3d 384, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1625, 2003 WL 365954, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equitable-trust-co-v-finance-comn-of-tx-texapp-2003.