UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Equipment East, LLC
v. Civil No. 20-cv-274-JD Opinion No. 2020 DNH 163 Corbell Development, LLC, and Eyecor Const., LLC
O R D E R
Plaintiff Equipment East, LLC, filed a renewed motion (doc.
no. 25) for default judgment against defendants Corbell
Development, LLC, and Eyecor Construction, LLC. Neither Corbell
nor Eyecor responded.
Standard of Review
After default has been entered against a defendant and when
the amount of damages is not a sum certain, the plaintiff must
apply to the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2). By defaulting, a defendant concedes the truth of the
plaintiff’s allegations as to liability but does not admit the
amount of damages claimed. KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by
FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2003); IDEXX Distribution
Inc. v. Daniel A. Lauridia DVM PC, 2020 WL 265194, at *1 (D. Me.
Jan. 17, 2020). Despite a defendant’s concession as to the
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, the court must review the complaint to determine that jurisdiction exists and that the
admitted allegations state a cognizable claim. In re The Home
Restaurants, Inc., 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 2002); see also
Inrepidus, LLC v. Bivins, 2019 WL 4911190, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 2019). The plaintiff must prove the amount of damages
it claims, and the court may hold a hearing on damages if
necessary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). A hearing is not
required, however, if the plaintiff provides sufficient proof of
the amount of damages through evidence, including affidavits.
The Home Restaurants, 285 F.3d at 114.
Background
A. Complaint
Equipment East filed this action on February 21, 2020, to
recover damages resulting from Eyecor’s and Corbell’s failure to
pay for construction equipment rentals, service on construction
equipment, and parts for construction equipment.
The complaint contains six counts:
• Count I, breach of contract against Eyecor for failure to pay for rental of construction equipment;
• Count II, unjust enrichment against Corbell for failure to pay for construction equipment rented by Eyecor but used by Corbell;
• Count III, breach of contract against Eyecor for failure to pay for parts and service of construction equipment;
2 • Count IV, quantum meruit against Eyecor and Corbell for their failure to pay for service and repair work on the construction equipment;
• Count V, unjust enrichment against Eyecor for failure to pay for parts;
• and Count VI, violation of RSA 544-B:1 against Corbell and Eyecor.
Neither Eyecor nor Corbell responded to the complaint. The
Clerk of Court entered default against Eyecor and Corbell on
April 17, 2020. Afterward, Earney Mayo, a “Member/Manager” of
Eyecor and Corbell, attempted to file a motion to vacate the
entry of default. Doc. 12. The court, however, rejected the
motion because it was filed pro se rather than through counsel,
and corporate entities must be represented by counsel. LR
83.6(c). The court nevertheless provided Corbell and Eyecor
thirty days to obtain counsel and enter an appearance. The time
expired and neither Corbell nor Eyecor appeared with counsel.
B. First Motion for Default Judgment
Equipment East filed a motion for default judgment. Doc.
21. Equipment East argued that it was entitled to a judgment
against Eyecor Construction for $364,533.57 and against Corbell
for $330,511.39. Equipment East’s claim included $7,195.13 for
legal fees and $1,034.00 for costs.
3 The court denied Equipment East’s motion for default
judgment, without prejudice, because the motion lacked the
necessary analysis of the claims to support entry of a default
judgment. The court also noted that “[i]ssues are apparent with
respect to the amount of damages Equipment East is seeking and
the viability of its claims.” Doc. 24 at 6. For example,
Equipment East appeared to count the same damages twice,
requesting a total damages award of $695,044.96, which was not
supported by the allegations in the complaint. Additionally,
the court noted a concern that Equipment East had not shown
that, as to its breach of contract claims, valid agreements
between Equipment East and Eyecor or Corbell existed. The court
denied Equipment East’s motion, without prejudice, granting
Equipment East leave to file a renewed motion for default
judgment by August 11, 2020.
C. Renewed Motion for Default Judgment
Equipment East filed a renewed motion for default judgment
within the time period specified by the court. Equipment East
supports its renewed motion for default judgment with the
affidavits of Giovanni Albanese, Gilda Albanese, and Attorney
Mary Ellen MacDonald and attached several exhibits to each
affidavit to further support or provide detail for the
statements in the affidavits. The renewed motion for default
4 judgment discusses each claim and the damages to which Equipment
East asserts it is entitled for each claim.
D. Facts
As noted, because they have failed to appear in this
action, Eyecor and Corbell admit all of Equipment East’s factual
allegations as to liability. Equipment East, whose place of
business is in Massachusetts, sells and rents construction
equipment, provides repairs and servicing for construction
equipment, and sells parts for construction equipment.
Equipment East avers that Eyecor and Corbell were in the
construction business.
1. Equipment Rentals
In 2018 and 2019, Eyecor rented various pieces of
construction equipment from Equipment East. Equipment East sent
Eyecor a rental agreement with attached terms and conditions as
well as recurring invoices for the equipment rentals. Each
rental agreement contains a line for a signature by the customer
(i.e., Eyecor) and a line for a signature by Equipment East.
Only one agreement, for a Bobcat T650, was signed by an Eyecor
representative (Earney Mayo), and no agreements were signed by
an Equipment East representative.
5 The rental agreement contains attached terms and conditions
and states that the terms and conditions are “in full force and
effect from the time the lessor’s equipment is accepted by the
lessee.” E.g., doc. 27-1 at 3; doc. 27-2 at 3; doc. 27-3 at 3.
One term selects the law of Equipment East’s place of business
from where the equipment was delivered (Massachusetts) as
applicable to the leases. Another term states that “[i]nvoices
beyond the Net 30 Day terms are subject to 1.5% monthly or 18%
annual service fee.” E.g., doc. 27-1 at 5; doc. 27-2 at 5; doc.
27-3 at 5. The agreements also state that the “Lessee shall be
liable for all reasonable costs expenses [sic] incurred,
including attorney’s fees, in the collection of any outstanding
monies.” E.g., doc. 27-1 at 5; doc. 27-2 at 5; doc. 27-3 at 5.
Each recurring invoice contains details about the equipment
to be rented, the duration of the rental period, and the amount
due for each rental period. As one example, the first unpaid
invoice for a Doosan DX85 excavator states that the rental shall
be between June 12, 2018, and July 10, 2018, and that the rate
for the rental during that period is $4,400.00. Doc. 27-1 at
14.
Eyecor accepted delivery of all the equipment or took
possession of all the equipment detailed in the agreements and
6 invoices and used it for the duration specified in the invoices.
Eyecor, however, failed to pay for the equipment.1
2. Equipment Service and Parts
In 2018 and 2019, Equipment East performed repair services
on equipment owned by Eyecor. Equipment East sent Eyecor
invoices for the repair services. Additionally, Equipment East
performed repairs of equipment rented from it by Eyecor that had
been damaged during the rental period. Equipment East sent
technicians to New Hampshire to perform the repairs. Eyecor
failed to pay $4,111.39 of the amount invoiced for the repairs
made by Equipment East.
Additionally, in 2018 and 2019, Eyecor purchased parts from
Equipment East’s retail store in Bow, New Hampshire. The parts
were purchased on credit from Equipment East. The parts were
invoiced by Equipment East, but Eyecor failed to pay $29,875.89
of the amounts invoiced.
3. Checks
On May 17, 2019, Corbell remitted a check to Equipment East
for $120,000.00. The $120,000.00 check was returned to
1 Some invoices note that Eyecor made payments toward them or that credit was received for an early return. The paid or credited amounts were deducted from the balance owed by Eyecor.
7 Equipment East for insufficient funds. Equipment East’s bank
charged it a fee of $7.50 for the returned check.
Discussion
Equipment East renews its motion for a default judgment.
Neither Eyecor nor Corbell filed a response.
A. Jurisdiction
The court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the case and personal jurisdiction over the defendants in
its order denying Equipment East’s motion for a default judgment
without prejudice. Doc. 24 at 5-6. The court adopts the same
finding here.
B. Claims and Liability for Damages
Equipment East moves for default judgment as to Counts I,
III, IV (against Eyecor only), V, and VI (against Corbell only).
Equipment East moves to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice
the following claims: Count II against Corbell, Count IV against
Corbell, and Count VI against Eyecor. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(2).
8 1. Count I (Breach of Contract against Eyecor)
Count I involves Eyecor’s failure to pay for the
construction equipment it rented from Equipment East. Equipment
East asks for damages including the unpaid sums, contractual
interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
a. Choice of Law
Equipment East asserts that Eyecor breached rental
agreements which contain a provision selecting the law of
Equipment East’s place of business from which the equipment was
delivered, which is Massachusetts. In a diversity action, the
forum state’s substantive law governs, including its choice-of-
law rules. Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC v. Brian Moses
Realty, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 148, 164 (D.N.H. 2010). “New
Hampshire law usually will uphold a contract’s selection of a
forum’s law as long as ‘the contract bears any significant
relationship to that jurisdiction.’” Hobin v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Affiliates., Inc., 144 N.H. 626, 628 (2000). Here,
the rental agreements bear a significant relationship to
Massachusetts, which is Equipment East’s place of business from
which the equipment Eyecor rented was delivered or picked up.
Accordingly, the court will apply Massachusetts law to the
issues involving the rental agreements. See id.
9 b. Sufficiency of Allegations and Evidence of Written Agreements
In Count I, Equipment East alleges that it agreed to rent
construction equipment to Eyecor and that Eyecor promised to pay
for the equipment. Equipment East argues that the invoices and
rental agreements contain the written terms of the contracts,
which include provisions for interest, attorneys’ fees, and
costs. Although the rental agreements are unsigned, Equipment
East contends that Eyecor implicitly accepted the written rental
agreements by picking up or using the equipment after receiving
the agreements and breached the agreements by failing to pay as
promised. Alternatively, Equipment East asserts that, if the
written terms of the rental agreements are not enforceable,
Eyecor breached implied oral contracts.2
“To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that there was an agreement between the
parties; the agreement was supported by consideration; the
plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her
part of the contract; the defendant committed a breach of the
contract; and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result.” See
Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 690 (2016). If
Eyecor accepted the written rental agreements despite not
2 If the agreements were oral, then Equipment East asserts that it is entitled only to damages for the cost of the rentals and not interest, attorneys’ fees, or costs.
10 signing them, then Equipment East’s allegations support a
cognizable claim for breach of contract and an award including
Acceptance of a written agreement can be established by
evidence that the offeree commenced performance of the
contractual terms after receiving notice of the terms and having
a reasonable opportunity to reject the terms. McGurn v. Bell
Microproducts, Inc., 284 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying
Massachusetts law and concluding that “silence in response to an
offer may constitute an acceptance if an offeree who takes the
benefit of offered services knew or had reason to know of the
existence of the offer, and had a reasonable opportunity to
reject it.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32
(stating the default rule that an offer permits acceptance by
either a promise to perform or actual performance). The
evidence submitted by Equipment East shows that Equipment East
sent the rental agreements to Eyecor. After receiving the
rental agreements, Eyecor took possession of the equipment
detailed in the agreements and associated invoices.
Furthermore, the agreements themselves state that they are “in
full force and effect from the time the lessor’s equipment is
accepted by the lessee.” E.g., doc. 27-1 at 3. For those
reasons, Eyecor accepted the written terms of the rental
11 agreements, and their terms are applicable to the determination
of the amount of damages owed by Eyecor.
c. Amount of Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, and Costs
Having stated a cognizable claim for breach of contract in
its complaint and established with evidence that the written
terms of the rental agreements govern, Equipment East must prove
the amount of damages it claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). For
Count I, Equipment East claims damages for the unpaid equipment
rentals and interest on those sums, as well as attorneys’ fees,
and costs.
i. Unpaid Rental Amounts and Interest
Equipment East submits that, as to Count I, it is entitled
to damages of $265,508.05 for the unpaid equipment rentals and
contractual interest of $68,921.73. “In order to recover more
than nominal damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the breach
actually and proximately caused a loss.” Exeter Theatre Corp.
v. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1123, 2011 WL
254149, at *1 (Jan. 28, 2011). “Once a plaintiff clears the
initial threshold of proving causation, he then bears the second
burden of proving the amount or extent of his damages with
reasonable certainty.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). With one
12 exception, Equipment East has shown the amount of its damages
with “reasonable certainty.” See id.
Equipment East and Eyecor agreed for the rental of several
pieces of construction equipment in exchange for the payments
specified by the invoices attached to Equipment East’s motion
for a default judgment. Equipment East’s head of operations,
Giovanni Albanese, stated in his affidavit that Eyecor failed to
pay $265,508.05 of the charges evidenced by the invoices. Each
unpaid invoice was provided with Albanese’s affidavit and the
amounts stated in those invoices, less the partial sums that
Equipment East acknowledges were paid, show that amount is owed.
Therefore, Equipment East has proved damages of $265,508.05 for
unpaid invoices.
The invoices also include a term setting an eighteen-
percent interest rate on unpaid amounts. Equipment East asserts
that the total interest owed to it under the invoices is
$68,921.73. The court, however, finds that Equipment East has
only proved interest in the amount of $68,884.80, which is
consistent with a simple annual interest rate of eighteen
percent accruing over the time periods for which the unpaid sums
have been overdue.
The discrepancy between Equipment East’s claim and the
court’s finding results from Equipment East’s exclusion from its
interest calculation of the full $150.00 credit for the June 22,
13 2018, invoice for the Bobcat T650. See doc. 27-3 at 13, 17, 25.
For the June 22, 2018, invoice, Equipment East only deducted
$50.00 of the $150.00 credit from its interest calculation. See
id. at 25. Therefore, Equipment East has proved damages of
$68,884.80 for contractual interest in addition to its damages
for unpaid invoices.
ii. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Under the rental agreements, Equipment East is entitled to
reasonable costs or expenses for collection of “outstanding
monies.” Doc. 27-1 at 5. Such costs and expenses include
attorneys’ fees. Id. Contract provisions providing for the
recovery of attorneys’ fees are enforceable under Massachusetts
law. Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass.
813, 827 (1982). The court must ascertain which attorneys’ fees
and costs are attributable to the collection of “outstanding
monies” and whether they are reasonable. See id.
“What constitutes a reasonable fee is a question that is
committed to the sound discretion of the judge.” Berman v.
Linnane, 434 Mass. 301, 302-03 (2001). The court considers
“several factors, including ‘the nature of the case and the
issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of
damages involved, the result obtained, the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged
14 for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and
the amount of awards in similar cases.’” Id. at 303 (quoting
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389 (1979)).
In her affidavit, Attorney MacDonald states that the total
attorneys’ fees accrued by Equipment East in pursuing this
action are $14,709.00. Equipment East, however, is only seeking
fifty percent ($7,354.50) of the legal fees because the fees are
only recoverable as to the breach of the equipment rental
contracts. Having considered Attorney MacDonald’s affidavit,
the exhibits attached to her affidavit, and the work that was
performed on this case, the court finds that sum advanced by
Equipment East and Attorney MacDonald is reasonable, less one
half of the $324.50 ($162.75)3 charged for preparing the June 11,
2020, motion for default judgment. The court denied the June
11, 2020, motion for default judgment without prejudice because
it was insufficiently developed, which resulted in unnecessary
and repetitive work. It is unreasonable to charge the fees for
that motion against Eyecor. Equipment East is entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,191.75.
As to costs, Equipment East is seeking $400.00, which is
the court’s filing fee, and one half of the service fees, which
3 Only one half the charge is deducted because Equipment East only requested one half of its attorneys’ fees.
15 is $239.97. The total costs claimed are $639.97, which is a
reasonable sum.
For those reasons, the court grants the motion for a
default judgment as to Count I. Damages are awarded in the
amount of $334,392.85, which consists of $265,508.05 for the
unpaid invoices and $68,884.80 in contractual interest.
Additionally, attorneys’ fees are awarded in the amount of
$7,191.75 and costs are awarded in the amount of $639.97.
2. Count III (breach of contract against Eyecor)
In Count III, Equipment East alleges that Eyecor breached
contractual terms by failing to pay for construction equipment
parts it purchased in 2018 and 2019. Equipment East also
alleges that, in 2018 and 2019, it performed repair services on
equipment owned or rented by Eyecor and that Eyecor did not pay
for the services. The allegations in the complaint state a
valid claim for breach of contract based on Eyecor’s failure to
fulfill its promises to pay Equipment East for construction
equipment parts Equipment East provided and Eyecor’s failure to
fulfill promises to pay for repair services performed by
Equipment East. See Wilcox Indus. Corp. v. Hansen, 870 F. Supp.
2d 296, 311 (D.N.H. 2012) (“In order to state a breach of
contract claim under New Hampshire law, [the plaintiff] must
allege sufficient facts to show (1) that a valid, binding
16 contract existed between the parties, and (2) that [the
defendant] breached the terms of the contract.”); Harrison v.
Watson, 116 N.H. 510, 511 (1976) (“A contract may be established
by spoken or written words or by acts or conduct . . . .”).4
As in Count I, Equipment East proves the amount of its
damages through affidavits and accompanying invoices. Based on
that evidence, Equipment East has established damages in the
amount of $29,875.89, which is the sum of the agreed upon but
unpaid amounts for parts as evidenced by the invoices and the
affidavit of Giovanni Albanese. As to the repair services,
Equipment East has, by similar evidence, established that it is
entitled to damages of $4,111.39. The total amount of damages
Equipment East has proved for Count III is therefore $33,987.28.
C. Counts IV and V (quantum meruit and unjust enrichment)
In its renewed motion for default judgment, Equipment East
asserts that “[i]f the Court declines to enter judgment in
4 As to Count III, the law of Massachusetts on the subject of breach of an implied-in-fact contract yields the same result as the law of New Hampshire. See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 690; Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460 (D. Mass. 2011) (“An implied-in-fact contract comes into being when, not withstanding the absence of a written or verbal agreement, the conduct or relations of the parties imply the existence of a contract.”). Therefore, there is no need to make a formal choice of law as to Count III. See Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Inst., 967 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[A] choice-of-law determination is obligatory only if a material conflict exists between the laws of the interested states.”).
17 Equipment East’s favor on Count III . . . for failure to pay for
the repair services, Equipment East would be entitled to
judgment on an alternate theory of quantum meruit.” Doc. 26 at
12; see also R.J. Berke & Co., Inc. v. J.P. Griffin, Inc., 116
N.H. 760, 764 (1976) (“Quantum meruit is a restitutionary remedy
intended for use by contracting parties who are in material
breach and thus unable to sue ‘on contract.’”). Similarly, as
to Count V, unjust enrichment, Equipment East states that the
claim is an “alternate theory” that it is only entitled to
judgment on if the court finds its breach of contract claim in
Count III non-cognizable. Doc. 26 at 11; Axenics, Inc. v.
Turner Constr., Co., 164 N.H. 659, 669 (2013) (“It is a well-
established principle that the court cannot allow recovery under
a theory of unjust enrichment when there is a valid, express
contract covering the subject matter at hand.”). Because the
court will enter judgment in Equipment East’s favor on Count III
as to Eyecor’s failure to pay for equipment parts and repair
services, the court does not address Equipment East’s alternate
theories of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.
D. Count VI (RSA 544-B:1)
Equipment East alleged in the complaint that Corbell
bounced a check or stopped payment on a check in violation of
18 RSA 544-B:1.5 “In any action against a person who makes, issues,
or draws any check, draft or order for the payment of money
which has been dishonored for lack of funds or credit to pay the
same, or because the maker, issuer, or drawer has no account
with the drawee, the holder may recover from the maker, issuer,
or drawer the amount of the check, draft, or order, plus court
costs, service costs, and collection costs incurred by the
holder.” RSA 544-B:1.
To recover under RSA 544-B:1, the plaintiff must have
provided notice of nonpayment under RSA 544-B:2 and the
defendant must have failed to make payment within ten days of
receiving the notice. “Such notice in writing shall be
conclusively presumed to have been given when properly deposited
in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such
maker, drawer, or issuer at his address as it appears on the
check, draft, or order or at his last known address.” RSA 544-
B:2.
Equipment East alleges that Corbell issued a check that was
either stopped or returned for insufficient funds. Equipment
Count VI names both Eyecor and Corbell as defendants, but 5
in its renewed motion for default judgment, Equipment East states that it wishes to dismiss Count VI as against Eyecor without prejudice.
19 East alleges that it provided notice of nonpayment to Corbell by
certified mail. It attached the notice and certified mail
receipt to the complaint. Equipment East alleges that payment
was not made after the notice was received by Corbell.
Therefore, the complaint states a cognizable claim for relief
under RSA 544-B:1.
In its motion for default judgment, Equipment East asserts
that the check from Corbell was for $120,000.00. It supports
that assertion with the affidavit of Giovanni Albanese and the
check itself. Albanese also noted his belief that the
$120,000.00 check from Corbell was intended to be partial
payment of the amount Eyecor owed to Equipment East for rentals,
parts, or repairs.
As to fees and costs, Equipment East asserts that it
incurred a $7.50 fee from its bank for the returned check and
that it incurred a $7.60 cost for mailing the certified mail
notice pursuant to RSA 544-B:2. In her affidavit, Attorney
MacDonald confirms that postage for the certified mail notice
sent to Corbell cost $7.60. Given the evidence cited above,
Equipment East has established damages against Corbell for
$120,000.00 for the amount of the check and $15.10 for costs
incurred.
Giovanni Albanese, on behalf of Equipment East, states in
his affidavit that the $120,000.00 check from Corbell was
20 intended to pay some of what Eyecor owed to Equipment East for
rentals, parts, and service. Because the check was returned for
insufficient funds and was not paid, that amount remains
outstanding as part of the damages owed by Eyecor in Counts I
and III. It is also part of what Corbell owes to Equipment East
under RSA 544-B:1 in Count VI.
Equipment East can only recover that amount once. Eyecor
is liable for all of the damages awarded in Counts I and III,
and Corbell is liable for all of the damages awarded in Count
VI, except that any amount that either defendant pays will
offset the $120,000.00 that they owe jointly. Therefore, any
payments made by Eyecor or Corbell to Equipment East for the
damages awarded in this case first will be offset against the
$120,000.00 that they owe jointly until that amount is
satisfied. Then, each will owe the remainder of the damages
awarded separately.
Conclusion
Equipment East’s motion for default judgment (doc. no. 25)
is granted. As to Count I, Equipment East is awarded damages
against Eyecor in the amount of $334,392.85. Additionally, as
to Count I, Equipment East is entitled to attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $7,191.75 and costs in the amount of $639.97. Count
II is dismissed without prejudice.
21 As to Count III, Equipment East is awarded damages against
Eyecor in the amount of $33,987.28. Counts IV and V are
dismissed. As to Count IV against Corbell, the dismissal is
without prejudice.
As to Count VI, Equipment East is awarded damages against
Corbell Development, LLC, in the amount of $120,000.00 and costs
of $15.10. Count VI is dismissed as to Eyecor, without
prejudice.
As stated in the order, Eyecor is liable for all of the
damages awarded in Counts I and III, and Corbell is liable for
all of the damages awarded in Count VI, except that any amount
that either defendant pays will offset the $120,000.00 that they
owe jointly. Any payments made by Eyecor or Corbell to
Equipment East for the damages awarded in this case first will
be offset against the $120,000.00 that they owe jointly until
that amount is satisfied.
All claims in this case having been resolved, the clerk of
court shall enter judgment against Eyecor and Corbell in accord
with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge
September 16, 2020 cc: Counsel of Record