Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Scottsdale Healthcare Hospitals

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: October 4, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01894
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Equal Employment Opportunity No. CV-20-01894-PHX-MTL Commission, 10 ORDER Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 Scottsdale Healthcare Hospitals, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Discovery Dispute Motion regarding the scope 16 of certain discovery requests promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 17 Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 34.) For the reasons that follow, the Court resolves the 18 dispute in favor of the EEOC. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the Americans with Disabilities Act 21 of 1990 (“ADA”) incorporates by reference, details the procedure through which the EEOC 22 enforces the statute’s prohibition on employment discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 23 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The process generally starts when “a person claiming to be 24 aggrieved” files a charge of an unlawful workplace practice with EEOC. § 2000e–5(b). At 25 that point, the EEOC notifies the employer of the complaint and undertakes an 26 investigation. Id. If, after the investigation, the EEOC finds no “reasonable cause” to think 27 that the allegation has merit, it dismisses the charge and notifies the parties. Id. If, on the 28 other hand, the EEOC finds reasonable cause, it must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged 1 unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 2 persuasion.” Id. If the parties’ efforts at conciliation fail, the EEOC may then sue the 3 employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1). 4 Consistent with that procedure, the present action began when, on May 1, 2017, 5 Angela Carter (“Carter” or “Charging Party”) filed a charge of discrimination (“Charge”) 6 with the EEOC alleging that Defendant HonorHealth discriminated against her and other 7 aggrieved individuals in violation of ADA. (Doc. 39 at 2.) After receiving the Charge, the 8 EEOC conducted a 15-month investigation, pursuant to which it determined there was 9 reasonable cause to believe HonorHealth had discriminated against Carter and other 10 aggrieved individuals in violation of the ADA. (Doc. 39 at 2.) On August 16, 2019, the 11 EEOC’s District Director issued a letter of determination to HonorHealth detailing the 12 Commission’s reasonable cause findings. The letter of determination stated, in pertinent 13 part: 14 I find that there is reasonable cause to believe that [HonorHealth] discriminated against Charging Party and other 15 aggrieved individuals with disabilities by implementing a policy and/or practice of requiring individuals with disabilities 16 to compete for open positions when returning from medical leave rather than providing reasonable accommodations 17 including reassignment. I find that [HonorHealth] failed to engage in the interactive process and failed to provide 18 reasonable accommodations, including reassignment, for the Charging Party and other aggrieved individuals. 19 I also find that there is reasonable cause to believe that [HonorHealth] discharged and/or constructively discharged 20 Charging Party and other aggrieved individuals because of their disabilities and/or need for accommodation in violation 21 of the ADA. I also find that there is reasonable cause to believe that 22 [HonorHealth] subjected aggrieved individuals to harassment because of their disabilities and/or need for accommodation. 23 24 (Doc. 39, Ex. 3.) The EEOC then invited HonorHealth to engage in informal conciliation. 25 (Comp. ¶ 8.) After conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC brought this action. (Comp. ¶ 9.) 26 The EEOC served HonorHealth with its first set of interrogatories on April 27, 2021. 27 (Doc. 21.) HonorHealth objected to the interrogatories on the ground that the information 28 sought by the EEOC exceeded the permissible scope of the present action. (Doc. 34, Ex. 1 1.) After conferring, the parties filed the instant Motion. (Doc. 34.) Upon review, and in 2 light of the issues involved, the Court ordered supplemental briefing, which has since been 3 completed. (Docs. 36, 38, 39.) 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Parties in civil cases may obtain discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that 6 is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A party may serve interrogatories relating “to any matter that may 8 be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). Relevance for the purpose of 9 discovery “is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th 10 Cir. 1998). “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” 11 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The party seeking 12 to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy 13 requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of 14 showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining 15 or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794 at * 1 (S.D. Cal. May 16 14, 2009). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 A. Discovery Dispute 19 HonorHealth contends that the EEOC’s requested discovery is improper because it 20 exceeds the scope of the initial Charge, letter of determination, and conciliation, and 21 thereby violates the ADA’s statutory enforcement provisions. (Doc. 39 at 3.) The EEOC 22 responds in two ways. First, it argues that HonorHealth’s discovery objection is a disguised 23 dispositive motion, in that it seeks to narrow the scope of EEOC’s Complaint and 24 subsequent litigation, rather than merely the scope of discovery. (Doc. 38 at 2–4.) 25 Accordingly, the EEOC contends that HonorHealth can seek to limit the scope of this 26 action only by filing a dispositive motion. Second, EEOC contends that it did in fact 27 comply with its pre-suit obligations under the ADA as that statute is properly construed. 28 (Doc. 38 at 4–7.) For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with the EEOC. 1 HonorHealth first asserts that the EEOC’s discovery requests are overbroad because 2 they exceed the scope of the Charge. (Doc. 39 at 3–5.) In particular, it argues that because 3 the Charge related only to “individuals who took an ADA leave of absence, were required 4 to compete for a job when returning, were not reassigned, and were terminated,” the claims 5 in the Complaint alleging other forms of discrimination exceed the permissible scope of 6 this action. (Doc. 39 at 3.) Such an argument represents a misapplication of the role of the 7 initial charge in a civil action brought by the EEOC. While the charge-filing requirement 8 is a mandatory processing rule, see Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 9 1846–47 (2019), neither the EEOC’s investigation nor subsequent litigation is “limited by 10 the literal terms of the charge.” Paige v. State of Cal., 102 F.3d 1035, 1042 n.9 (9th Cir. 11 1996); see also Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Group, Inc., 816 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 12 2016). Rather, “an EEOC civil suit may allege any discrimination ‘stated in the charge 13 itself or discovered in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge, provided such 14 additional discrimination was included in the EEOC “reasonable cause” determination and 15 was followed by compliance with the conciliation procedures of the Act.’” Geo Group, 16 816 F.3d at 1205 (quoting EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1976)). Thus, 17 even if certain claims in the Complaint do exceed the scope of Carter’s initial Charge, 18 discovery relevant to such claims may yet be obtained if the claims arose out of EEOC’s 19 reasonable investigation of that Charge and are encompassed within its letter of 20 determination. The alternative—to require the EEOC to separately bring charges based on 21 the additional evidence of discrimination it acquired during the course of its reasonable 22 investigation, rather than allowing it to include the new claims of discrimination in a single 23 action—“would be to champion form over substance and to generate an inexcusable waste 24 of valuable administrative resources and intolerable delay, in violation of statutory 25 purpose.” EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1976) 26 (internal quotations omitted). That certain of the claims in the Complaint do not come 27 within the terms of the initial Charge is therefore not determinative. The determinative 28 question, rather, is whether EEOC’s challenged claims arose out of the EEOC’s reasonable 1 investigation and are encompassed within the determination letter. Id. at 1204–05. It is to 2 that question that the Court now turns. 3 HonorHealth asserts that the determination letter “made only one specific factual 4 finding” and related “only to individuals who took an ADA leave of absence, were required 5 to compete for a job when returning, were not reassigned, and were terminated.” (Doc. 39 6 at 2–3.) But the determination letter was not so narrow. In fact, the letter also indicated that 7 EEOC had reasonable cause to believe that HonorHealth “failed to provide reasonable 8 accommodations, including reassignment, for the Charging Party and other aggrieved 9 individuals” and that it “constructively discharged Charging Party and other aggrieved 10 individuals because of their disabilities and/or need for accommodation.” (Doc. 39, Ex. 3.) 11 While it is true that these additional findings do not smack of specificity, by noting that 12 HonorHealth’s failure to provide accommodations merely “included” reassignment, EEOC 13 implicitly indicated that it had reasonable cause to believe HonorHealth failed to provide 14 reasonable accommodations other than reassignment to individuals with disabilities. (See 15 Doc. 38 at 6.) 16 Moreover, the scope of the EEOC’s investigation itself provided HonorHealth with 17 notice of the potential breadth of the Commission’s claims. During the investigation, the 18 EEOC requested information regarding the identity of “all employees who requested a 19 reasonable accommodation including, but not limited to leave, extension of leave, modified 20 job duties, work restrictions, light duty, etc.” (Doc. 38, Ex. 1.) And HonorHealth responded 21 to the EEOC’s inquiry by identifying individuals who requested accommodations besides 22 leave and assignment. (See Doc. 38 at 6.) HonorHealth’s argument that it lacked sufficient 23 notice of the extent of EEOC’s claims is therefore unpersuasive, given that HonorHealth 24 itself provided the EEOC with information that gave rise to the challenged allegations in 25 the Complaint. Had HonorHealth “believed that the EEOC’s investigation exceeded the 26 permissible statutory scope, it could have refused the EEOC’s demand for access and 27 sought adjudication of its rights.” Occidental Life, 535 F.2d at 541. HonorHealth did not 28 do so. “Thus we can only conclude that the EEOC investigation was reasonable and that 1 the information supporting the allegations in [the Complaint] was acquired during that 2 reasonable investigation.” Id. at 542. Accordingly, the Court finds that HonorHealth had 3 sufficient notice of the claims in the Complaint, based on both the EEOC’s investigation 4 and its subsequent letter of determination. 5 HonorHealth next argues that the discovery sought by EEOC is improper because 6 the Commission did not attempt to conciliate each of the claims included in the Complaint. 7 (Doc. 39 at 4–6.) Title VII “imposes a duty on the EEOC to attempt conciliation of a 8 discrimination charge prior to filing a lawsuit.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 9 486 (2015). That statutory directive is mandatory, not precatory, and serves as a “necessary 10 precondition to filing a lawsuit.” Id. Federal courts have jurisdiction to review whether the 11 EEOC has satisfied the conciliation requirement. Id. at 486–89. The scope of that review, 12 however, is limited. 13 [T]he EEOC must inform the employer about the specific allegation, as the Commission typically does in a letter 14 announcing its determination of “reasonable cause.” Such notice properly describes both what the employer has done and 15 which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered as a result. And the EEOC must try to engage the employer in 16 some form of discussion (whether written or oral), so as to give the employer an opportunity to remedy the allegedly 17 discriminatory practice. Judicial review of those requirements (and nothing else) ensures that the Commission complies with 18 the statute. At the same time, that relatively barebones review allows the EEOC to exercise all the expansive discretion Title 19 VII gives it to decide how to conduct conciliation efforts and when to end them. 20 21 Id. at 494. In a recent case involving the scope of this limited review, the Ninth Circuit 22 “reject[ed] the . . . premise that the EEOC . . . must identify and conciliate on behalf of 23 each individual aggrieved employee during the investigation process prior to filing a 24 lawsuit seeking recovery on behalf of a class.” Geo Group, 816 F.3d at 1200. It held instead 25 that the EEOC satisfies its pre-suit conciliation requirements when it “attempt[s] to 26 conciliate on behalf of an identified class of individuals prior to bringing suit.” Id. 27 Otherwise, it reasoned, the EEOC “would be effectively barred from seeking relief on 28 behalf of any unnamed class members they had yet to identify when they filed their suit.” 1 Id. The EEOC’s attempt to identify additional aggrieved individuals and instances of 2 discrimination through discovery, without attempting to individually conciliate such 3 claims, is therefore consistent with recent Ninth Circuit precedent. 4 The Court also notes that Title VII protects the confidentiality of conciliation efforts. 5 It provides that “[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors 6 may be made public by the Commission . . . or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding 7 without the written consent of the persons concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Pursuant 8 to that statutory directive, judicial review must not delve too deeply into the precise 9 substance of the parties’ conciliation attempts, as doing so would neglect “to give effect to 10 the law’s non-disclosure provision.” Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 493. The Court should 11 “look[] only to whether the EEOC attempted to confer about a charge, and not to what 12 happened (i.e., statements made or positions taken) during those discussions.” Id. In this 13 case, the EEOC did attempt to confer with HonorHealth about Carter’s Charge and the 14 EEOC’s investigation. Indeed, HonorHealth acknowledges as much. (Doc. 39 at 5.) It 15 asserts, however, that conciliation was nonetheless inadequate because it did not include 16 discussion of each of the claims now found in the Complaint. (Doc. 39 at 5–6.) It is thus 17 the content of the conciliation, and not the fact of its occurrence, that HonorHealth 18 challenges. But by so doing, HonorHealth asks the Court to do precisely what the Supreme 19 Court and Ninth Circuit have said it must not do—examine the content of the parties’ 20 conciliation to determinate whether the EEOC engaged in a good-faith effort to resolve 21 each of the allegations of discrimination directed at HonorHealth. See Geo Group, 816 F.3d 22 at 1199 (clarifying that the EEOC, like any other litigant, may refrain from negotiating in 23 good faith). That the EEOC engaged HonorHealth in “some form of discussion” and gave 24 HonorHealth “an opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice” is sufficient 25 to satisfy the Commission’s obligations under the statute. See Mach Mining, 575 U.S. at 26 494. 27 Even if the Court agreed with HonorHealth that the EEOC failed to adequately 28 conciliate all of the claims prior to initiating the present action, the appropriate remedy 1 would be a stay of proceedings to permit an attempt at conciliation, not the dismissal of the 2 non-conciliated claims (or, in this instance, the constructive dismissal of such claims 3 through limitations on the scope of discovery). Geo Group, 816 F.3d at 1199 (citing Mach 4 Mining, 575 U.S. at 495). Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, the Court finds that the 5 EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to engage HonorHealth in informal conciliation.* 6 Because the Court resolves the dispute in favor of the EEOC, it need not consider 7 whether HonorHealth waived its objections. 8 B. Motion to Strike 9 HonorHealth attached, as an exhibit to its supplemental brief, a declaration of its in- 10 house counsel Matthew Walls. (Doc. 39, Ex. 2.) The declaration purports to describe the 11 scope of the parties’ conciliation attempts. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–11.) Specifically, it avers that 12 “[c]onciliation did not address any requests for accommodation other than returning from 13 leave and reassignment” and that “[d]uring conciliation, the EEOC did not engage in 14 discission on behalf of any group of individuals other than those who were required to 15 compete for a position upon returning from medical leave.” (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.) While the 16 parties’ Joint Discovery Motion was pending before the Court, the EEOC moved to strike 17 certain paragraphs of the declaration and HonorHealth’s supplemental brief on the ground 18 that they “violate Title VII[] . . . by describing what was allegedly said and done in 19 conciliation.” (Doc. 40 at 3.) HonorHealth filed a Response to the EEOC’s Motion 20 (Doc. 44) and the EEOC filed a Reply (Doc. 45). Because the Court resolves the discovery 21 dispute in favor of the EEOC notwithstanding the contested language, however, the Court 22 need not address the merits of the EEOC’s Motion. The Motion will therefore be denied as 23 * HonorHealth cites four cases—each from outside the Ninth Circuit—that, in its view, 24 compel a different conclusion. See EEOC v. Amer. Nat. Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012), EEOC v. 25 Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978), and EEOC v. Outback Steak House of Fla., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Colo. 2007). The Court is not 26 persuaded. Each predates the Supreme Court’s decision in Mach Mining, see Geo Group, 816 F.3d at 1200 n.5 (questioning the validity of CRST because it was decided prior to 27 Mach Mining), and each involves factual circumstances not present here. See, e.g., Sherwood, 452 F. Supp. 678 (holding that EEOC’s claim of sex discrimination exceeded 28 the scope of a reasonable cause determination which discussed only race discrimination). 1]} moot. 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED resolving the Joint Motion for Resolution of Discovery Dispute dated August 27, 2021 (Doc. 34) in the EEOC’s favor as described herein. HonorHealth 5 || shall respond to the EEOC’s discovery requests within 14 days of this Order. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 40) as || moot. 8 Dated this 4th day of October, 2021. Wichak T. diburde Michael T. Liburdi 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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