Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ferman Management Services Corporation

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided April 27, 2023·No. 8:18-cv-02055·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:18–cv–2055–CPT

CIGAR CITY MOTORS, INC., et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________/

O R D E R

Before the Court is Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) motion to tax costs (Doc. 159), Defendants Cigar City Motors, Inc., Tallahassee CCM, LLC, Gulf Coast CCM, Inc., and Panama City Beach Cycles, LLC’s (collectively, Cigar City) response to same (Doc. 167), and the EEOC’s supplemental notice of authority (Doc. 195). After careful review of the parties’ submissions and with the benefit of oral argument, the EEOC’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. The background of this lawsuit is set forth in detail in a recent Order issued by the Court (Doc. 212) and therefore need only be summarized here. In its operative complaint,1 the EEOC averred that Cigar City discriminated against one of its employees, Virginia Duncan, on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, when it failed to promote her to the

General Manager position at one of Cigar City’s Harley-Davidson dealerships. (Doc. 19). To address this alleged misconduct, the EEOC sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. After the close of discovery, Cigar City moved for summary judgment (Docs. 49, 58, 64), which the Court denied (Doc. 85). The case subsequently proceeded to a

jury trial that lasted seven days. (Docs. 163, 169, 175–78, 185). As pertinent here, the witnesses who took the stand for the EEOC included Robert Hammers (who testified on the second day of trial immediately after jury selection), Duncan (who testified over a period of three days), Denise Presley, Steven Snell, Gary Bang, and Gary Postle. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the EEOC on the issue of

liability and awarded it $500,000 in punitive damages but no compensatory damages. (Docs. 145, 169). The Clerk of Court entered a judgment reflecting that award shortly thereafter. (Doc. 154). The instant motion for costs followed.2

1 The EEOC’s original complaint named as Defendants Ferman Management Services Corporation, d/b/a Ferman Automotive Group (Ferman), and Cigar City Motors, Inc., d/b/a Harley-Davidson of Tampa. (Docs. 1, 159 n.1). The EEOC thereafter amended its complaint to add Defendants Tallahassee CCM, LLC, Gulf Coast CCM, Inc., and Panama City Beach Cycles, LLC, and to remove Ferman. (Docs. 19, 159 n.1). 2 In addition to the EEOC’s motion for costs, the parties filed several other post-trial motions, including a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law by Cigar City (Doc. 166) and a motion for injunctive relief by the EEOC (Doc. 156). 2 II. The amount and nature of the costs that are taxable in this action are governed by federal law. Diperna v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 7246094, at *8 (M.D. Fla.

June 27, 2016) (noting that “federal law generally determines what costs may be awarded to a prevailing party in federal court”) (citation omitted). The starting point in addressing this issue is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which states that costs other than attorney’s fees “should be allowed to the prevailing party” unless a federal statute, federal rule, or court order provides otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Rule

54 creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The costs to be granted pursuant to Rule 54 are not without limits, however.

Instead, a district court generally may not award costs to a prevailing party unless they are specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)). The fees and expenses permitted under section 1920 consist of the following: (1) fees of the clerk and the marshal; (2) fees for printed or electronically

recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5)

3 docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923; and (6) compensation for court appointed experts and interpreter services. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(6). The party seeking taxation ultimately bears the burden of proving entitlement

to the costs enumerated in section 1920. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 784 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that the burden rested with the fee applicant to submit a request for expenses that enabled the court to evaluate what expenses were incurred in the litigation); Pelc v. Nowak, 2013 WL 3771233, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2013) (noting that a failure to provide sufficient detail or supporting documentation

“verifying the costs incurred and the services rendered can be grounds for denial of costs”) (citing Johnson v. Mortham, 173 F.R.D. 313, 318 (N.D. Fla. 1997)). On appeal, a district court’s decision whether to grant costs to the prevailing party will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion. Maris Distrib. Co., 302 F.3d at 1225 (“We have

recognized that we will not disturb a costs award in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the prevailing party in this litigation, the EEOC seeks to recover the monies expended in serving process and in serving both deposition and trial subpoenas; acquiring deposition and trial transcripts; having its witnesses testify at depositions and

at trial; and making copies. (Doc. 159). In support of this request, the EEOC submits a bill of costs, which includes invoices and documentation regarding the above items, as well as a declaration of counsel attesting to the necessity of the sought-after fees and expenses. (Docs. 158, 158-1). Each of these types of costs will be addressed in turn. 4 A. Fees attendant to the service of process and subpoenas are generally taxable under section 1920(1) as long as they do not exceed the statutory limit set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 1921, which represents the allowable rate assessed by the United States Marshals Service. Beach-Mathura v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 571 F. App’x 810, 812–13 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (reversing a district court’s award of service of process fees that exceeded the sanctioned rate under section 1921);3 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000). The Marshals Service is

currently authorized to charge $65 per hour for each item personally served, plus travel costs and other out-of-pocket expenses. 28 C.F.R.

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