Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commonwealth

596 F. Supp. 1333, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22513, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 234
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 24, 1984
DocketCiv. A. No. 83-0321
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 596 F. Supp. 1333 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commonwealth, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22513, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 234 (M.D. Pa. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

HERMAN, District Judge.

1. INTRODUCTION

Pennsylvania law currently provides that any member of the Pennsylvania State Police, regardless of rank, who reaches the age of sixty, must resign from the force,1 unless at that age he has attained less than twenty years of service. 71 P.S. § 65(d) (Purdon’s Supp.1984-85). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and various State Police officers have attacked the validity of this law as a violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.2 The Commonwealth has countered that the mandatory retirement age is a bona fide occupation qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the Pennsylvania State Police. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).

On March 11, 1983, we granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the State Police from mandatorily retiring individuals who reached the age of sixty. On June 23,1983, following eight days of testimony, we granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs and continued to enjoin enforcement of the mandatory retirement age. Thereafter, further hearings and oral arguments were held to determine if a permanent injunction should be entered. The issue is ripe for decision.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Before proceeding, we must address Defendants’ motion to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that the EEOC is without authority to maintain the present action [1336]*1336to enforce the ADEA, citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).

In Chadha, the United States Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto provision contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). This provision permitted either branch of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch in permitting a deportable alien to remain in the United States. The legislative veto was held unconstitutional as violating the doctrine of separation of powers through misapplication of legislative power and procedure.

In their brief in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants observed that the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, which transferred the authority to enforce the ADEA from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC, was enacted pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 901. The 1977 Reorganization Act permitted the Executive Branch to transfer enforcement authority by either House of Congress vetoing the reorganization plan. Defendants persuasively argue, thus, that the EEOC’s authority to enforce the ADEA is void due to the violation of the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 F.Supp. 1224 (S.D.Miss. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-4652 (5th Cir. October 19, 1983).

While the legislative veto provision in the 1977 Reorganization Act may be invalid under Chadha, we find that the EEOC continues to have authority to enforce the ADEA. We believe the legislative veto provision is severable from the remainder of the 1977 Reorganization Act and that Congress has subsequently ratified the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. Moreover, we do not believe the Chadha decision should be applied retroactively to invalidate the transfer of enforcement authority. Retroactive application would create chaos. In support of our position, we rely upon the following cases and the analyses contained therein: E.E.O.C. v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.1984); Muller Optical Co. v. E.E.O.C., 574 F.Supp. 946 (W.D.Tenn.1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-5889 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1983) ; E.E.O.C. v. International Mill Service, Inc., No. 83-0749 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 22, 1984) ; E.E.O.C. v. State of New York, 590 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.N.Y.1984); E.E.O.C. v. Chrysler Corp., 595 F.Supp. 344 (E.D.Mich. 1984); E.E.O.C. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. EP-83-CA-108, (W.D.Tex. Jan. 16, 1984); E.E.O.C. v. CBS, Inc., No. 81-Civ.-2871-JES (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1984); E.E.O.C. v. Pan American World Airways, 576 F.Supp. 1530 (S.D.N.Y.1984); E.E.O.C. v. City of Memphis, 581 F.Supp. 179 (W.D.Tenn.1983); E.E.O.C. v. Cudahy Foods Co., 588 F.Supp. 13 (W.D.Wash. 1983); E.E.O.C. v. Jackson County, Missouri, 33 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 963 (BNA) (W.D.Mo. Dec. 13, 1983).3

III. THE ADEA CLAIM

A. The ADEA

Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for any employer to discharge or to discriminate against any individual within the protected age class of forty to seventy because of that individual’s age.4 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631. Nevertheless, such otherwise prohibited action is lawful “where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, ____” Id. § 623(f)(1). The ADEA’s provisions apply equally to private employers and to the State, its subdivisions, and its agencies. Id. § 630(b). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, [1337]*1337460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (extension of ADEA to encompass state and local governments held constitutional).

Congress enacted the ADEA with the purpose “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b); Usery v. Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir.1976). In other words, the ADEA permits capable older workers to decide when to retire if they are physically and psychologically able to perform their jobs satisfactorily. E.E.O.C. v. City of Altoona, Pennsylvania, 723 F.2d 4, 6 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2386, 81 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984).

“[T]he ADEA is remedial and humanitarian legislation which should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination in employment.” Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977),

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Related

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. New Jersey
620 F. Supp. 977 (D. New Jersey, 1985)
EEOC v. Com. of Pa.
596 F. Supp. 1333 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1984)

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596 F. Supp. 1333, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22513, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-commonwealth-pamd-1984.